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Abstract 
This study sets out to examine whether there was an evolving partnership 
approach emerging in England in the management of ‗highway works‘, which 
are works carried out in the highway by companies providing utility services 
such as gas, water, electricity, and telecommunications, and by local authorities 
undertaking the repair and maintenance of their highway networks. Local 
government in England has been extensively covered in academic literature, 
but the management of ‗highway works‘ is an area that has not been widely 
covered. It is an area that is currently receiving more widespread attention 
generally as local authorities implement ‗permit schemes‘, which were 
introduced by the Government in response to concerns about the disruption and 
delay caused by ‗highway works‘ and the associated cost to the national 
economy. There are currently a small number of ‗permit schemes‘ in operation 
in England, including schemes in London (2010), Kent (2010), 
Northamptonshire (2011), and St Helens (2012). Six Yorkshire authorities have 
applied to operate a permit scheme, and these come into effect in June 2012. 
The study takes a case study approach to examine the way in which two 
highway authorities in England apply the same national legislation, with 
research also being carried out in two additional highway authorities in order to 
triangulate the findings. Research was carried out between February 2010 and 
December 2011 using in-depth, semi-structured interviews including a 
councillor, local authority officers and representatives of utility companies 
operating in the local authority areas. The interview findings were also 
triangulated by an examination of relevant documents, including policies, 
procedures and plans. A review of the literature on public policy and policy 
implementation and inter-organisational collaborations was carried out, together 
with a review of local government in England, and the legislation relating to the 
management of ‗highway works‘. 
The research identified similarities in how local authorities approach their role in 
managing ‗highway works‘ by having a ―street works team‖ with responsibilities 
for the co-ordination of works. However, differences were identified with regard 
to the emphasis and focus that authorities placed upon different aspects of the 
national legislation. The research identified factors that influence utility 
companies in complying with the legislation, and that affect their relationships 
with individual authorities. The findings add reputational considerations to 
factors that are present in inter-organisational collaborations. 
The research draws three main conclusions: (1) that the complex, and at times 
ambiguous, nature of the legal framework surrounding the management of 
‗highway works‘ means that utility companies need to work with authorities; (2)  
authorities need to work with utility companies in order to discharge their legal 
network management duty; and (3) utility companies and authorities need to 
work jointly in order to avoid the need for further legislation in an industry sector, 
already regarded as being heavily regulated, to address Government concerns 
about the disruptive effects of all ‗highway works‘. 
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Glossary of Terms 
Category A Inspections 
Inspection of signing, lighting and guarding at 
works sites 
Category B Inspections 
Inspection of reinstatements within 6 months of 
the works being completed 
Category C Inspections 
Inspection of reinstatements within one month 
of the end of the guarantee period 
Coring 
A core sample taken from a reinstatement to 
test for compliance against the reinstatement 
code of practice 
DfT Department for Transport 
FPN 
Fixed Penalty Notice (Charge), which 
authorities can apply for incorrect notifications 
from utility companies 
HAUC Highway Authorities and Utilities Committee 
Highway Works 
General term covering both ‗street works‘ and 
‗roadworks‘ 
Inspections 
Inspections by authorities to monitor 
compliance by utility companies with codes of 
practice 
JAG Joint Authorities Group 
JUG Joint Utilities Group 
KPIs Key Performance Indicators 
KPS Kent Permit Scheme 
LoPS London Permit Scheme 
LTP Local Transport Plan 
NRASWA New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 
Reinstatement 
The replacement and compaction of material 
layers back to surface level following an 
excavation 
Roadworks 
Works in the highway carried out by local 
authorities 
S74 
Section 74 of NRASWA, under which 
authorities can apply charges for overrunning 
‗street works‘ 
Street Works 
Works carried out in the highway by utility 
companies 
SWHAUC South West HAUC 
TMA Traffic Management Act 2004 
YCPS Yorkshire Common Permit Scheme 
YHAUC Yorkshire HAUC 
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Chapter One – Introduction 
1.1  Overview of the Study 
This study is concerned with works on the highway carried out by local authority 
highway authorities and works carried out by companies providing utility 
services such as electricity, gas, water (both clean, i.e. drinking water, and foul, 
i.e. sewerage) and telecommunications. For the purpose of this study, highway 
authority works are referred to as ‗roadworks‘, utility works are referred to as 
‗street works‘, and the term ‗highway works‘ will be used when discussing 
generally both highway authority and utility works together. In addition, the term 
‗works promoter‘ refers to any organisation wanting to carry out works on the 
highway. 
 
The author of this study is employed in a local highway authority and, for nearly 
30 years, has been involved with ‗highway works‘. In addition to being a 
practitioner, the author has completed at the academic establishment at which 
this present study was undertaken a number of courses of study, on a part-time 
basis, where aspects of his daily work formed the basis for contributions to 
course work. It was following the completion of an MBA that the author decided 
to continue research into ‗highway works‘ through this study. ‗Highway works‘ is 
not an area that has been subject to much academic research, although it is 
becoming of increasing interest to policymakers and academics, and the 
intention of this study is to make a contribution towards filling that gap. 
 
‗Highway works‘ are regulated primarily by legislation, chiefly the New Roads 
and Street Works Act 1991 (NRASWA) and the Traffic Management Act 2004 
(TMA). Under NRASWA, utility companies have a statutory right to execute 
works, including installing their apparatus, in a public highway; local highway 
authorities have powers to execute their own ‗roadworks‘ and also have a duty 
to co-ordinate all highway works, i.e. ‗roadworks‘ and ‗street works‘, on the 
highway. All organisations that need to carry out works in the highway must give 
notice to the local highway authority so that the works are recorded in the Street 
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Works Register. Highway authorities, therefore, are both a promoter of their 
own works and are also responsible for the co-ordination of all works on the 
highway, and have powers to prosecute utility companies for non-compliance in 
a number of areas under NRASWA, thus setting-up a potentially adversarial 
relationship between individual highway authorities and utility companies. 
 
The TMA expanded the co-ordination role of highway authorities to include a 
duty on them to ensure that traffic was able to move ―expeditiously‖ around their 
area‘s highway network, and that consideration was given to minimise the 
impact of ‗highway works‘ on the highway network of adjacent authorities. The 
TMA also made provision for local highway authorities to apply to the Secretary 
of State for Transport to operate a permit scheme for certain or all classes of 
roads in their areas, under which scheme all works promoters, rather than 
exercising a statutory right to carry out works in the highway, would have to 
obtain from the highway authority a permit to work. 
 
Although provided for in legislation dating back to 2004, guidance on permit 
schemes was only issued in 2008. Since then, a high-profile permit scheme has 
commenced operation in London (started January 2010), driven by the city‘s 
elected mayor, with two further schemes in operation: one in Kent (started 
January 2010) and the other in Northamptonshire (started in January 2011). 
These permit schemes have resulted in local authority members and officers 
taking an increased interest in the management of works on the highway. 
Kirklees Council, one of the authorities included in this study, has, along with 
five other authorities from Yorkshire, made a submission to the Secretary of 
State for Transport to operate a permit scheme. The Secretary of State has 
approved the Scheme and it comes into effect in June 2012. 
 
‗Roadworks‘, those works undertaken by local highway authorities, range in 
scale and impact, and include activities such as repairing potholes and 
replacing road-markings, maintaining street lighting, resurfacing part or entire 
roads, and (less frequently) the construction of new highways. 
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‗Street works‘ are carried out by utility companies to provide and maintain a 
supply or service (electricity, gas, water, sewerage or telecommunications) to 
the public. Utility companies have developed from private companies, have 
gone through a period where they were public corporations and, currently, are 
mainly in private ownership. In some cases this was a return to their original 
status, where private companies were formed in the mid to late nineteenth 
century to provide gas and electricity lighting and heating, and for others, such 
as the management and treatment of water and sewerage, this represented a 
change from a service provided by municipal corporations. The 1970s and 
1980s saw the British Government embark on a wide ranging programme of 
privatisation, and, in order for them to continue fulfilling their statutory 
obligations, utility companies were given statutory rights that allows them to 
break open publicly maintainable highways in order to lay and maintain their 
apparatus. 
 
In the Yorkshire area, prior to the commencement of the privatisation 
programme begun in the 1980s, there were only four organisations which 
served notices for ‗street works‘, these being ―Yorkshire Water Board‖, ―North 
Eastern Gas Board‖ (NEGAS), ―Yorkshire Electricity Board‖ and ―Post Office 
Telephones‖. Other organisations, such as ―British Relay‖, an early, prototype 
cable-television provider, had been active for a short period of time up to the 
company ceasing activities. In some areas, the local authority might also be the 
sewer authority, rather than that service being provided by a ―water board‖, but 
this arrangement of four main utility companies providing services and so 
needing to work in the highway would be typical around England. 
 
In 1991, the NRASWA extended this right to 100-plus companies, including the 
privatised utilities, cable television and telecommunications companies. This 
extension of rights has ―…predictably resulted in chaos (because) all too often 
the utility just turns up and starts digging‖ (Economist, 2002). 
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The ―Economist‖ (2002) set-out the extent of the impact of ‗highway works‘ on 
society when it reported that the ―…country‘s highways are plagued by 
…excavations and street works‖. There are, said the article, some four million 
holes dug in Britain‘s roads at a cost of some £2billion per year. The article went 
on to identify the root problem as being with the New Roads and Street Works 
Act 1991. 
 
The highway network in the United Kingdom serves two purposes: (1) as a 
surface-level conduit for transporting goods and to allow people to travel 
between places; and (2) (with the exclusion of motorways) an underground 
facility in which apparatus for the supply of utility services is installed and 
maintained. 
 
Maintenance of the highway network in England has over time, like the 
provision of utility services, been a mixture of private funding (such a Toll roads) 
and public funding via municipal corporations. Currently, highway maintenance 
is one of the responsibilities of local highway authorities in district or county 
councils, although the provision of works might be contracted-out to private 
firms. 
 
Management of the highway network has both economic implications, through 
the movement of goods, people (employees) and services, and social 
implications, allowing people to make journeys. Local highway authorities have 
to take into account the need for ‗highway works‘ to be carried out, in order to:  
 Maintain utility supplies. 
 Deliver new types of utility provision such as high-speed broadband, in 
order to maintain a competitive economy and to facilitate the use of 
information technology in schools, homes and businesses, and fibre-
optic cables. 
 Maintain the highway as an asset in good condition. 
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 Use the highway network as part of council priorities (for example, 
improving health by encouraging walking and cycling, and maintaining 
links within and between communities.) 
 
1.2 The Research Question 
The research question that this study sets out to answer is: 
To what extent is a partnership approach to managing 
‘highway works’ an advantage in implementing public policy? 
 
The aims of the research are to: 
1. Examine alternative approaches to the implementation of public policy by 
selected local authorities. 
2. Analyse and consider the use of charters in a way not previously 
described in the literature. 
3. Deliver empirical research results for a sector of public management not 
widely covered in the literature. 
 
The objectives of the research are to: 
4. Address gaps in research on public policy implementation, specifically 
with regard to implementing central Government policy and inter-
organisational relationships. 
5. Relate practice to current policy formulation, particularly with regard to 
the development and implementation of schemes for ―permitting‖ 
‗highway works. 
  
1.3 Aim and Focus of the Study 
This study proposes to examine the way in which local authorities in England 
deal with the implementation of central Government policy. As well as looking at 
the authorities internal arrangements, including organisational structures and 
strategies, the study will examine stakeholder involvement, particularly that of 
the utility companies. 
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The research will take account of published documents and reports and 
interviews with council and utility personnel in order to collect the primary data. 
With regard to documents, these would relate to ‗highway works‘, and would 
include the councils‘ Strategic Vision, Performance Plans, Local Transport Plan, 
Committee Reports and utility reports. Interviews will be arranged with highway 
authority officers and elected members, utility company representatives 
(particularly water and gas) and with the chairs (highways and utility sides) of 
joint highway authority and utility committees, and interviewing persons in 
similar positions in local highway authorities. 
 
Data collected will be used to identify factors, for example, political, 
professional, and personal interest, that influence the operation and 
management of ‗highway works‘, and the implementation of central Government 
policy so as to identify similarities, to examine where divergences occur, and to 
draw conclusions from the different approaches adopted by different local 
highway authorities. 
 
The research will record the approach taken by two English local highway 
authorities, Kirklees Metropolitan Council (KMC) and Devon County Council 
(DCC)in relation to the management of ‗highway works, mapping it against 
models and the existing literature, and will compare and triangulate the findings 
by reference to arrangements in effect in North Yorkshire County Council 
(NYCC) and Transport for London (TfL), and also will evaluate KMC‘s approach 
against the different approaches taken by DCC, NYCC and TfL. 
 
KMC has entered into written charters with Transco, now known as Northern 
Gas Networks (NGN), and Yorkshire Water (YW). These charters are similar in 
that they set out what is expected of each party, but different in that the NGN 
charter is supported by quantifiable measure whereas the YW charter is more 
qualitative. There are other companies providing utility services within Kirklees, 
chiefly electricity and telecommunications (including cable television) but 
charters have not been developed individually with these utility companies. This 
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is mainly due to NGN and YW between them accounting for approximately 75% 
of ‗street works‘ carried out in the district, and so are the ―main players‖ in terms 
of volume of activity on the highway, particularly works affecting the 
carriageway. 
 
DCC‘s approach to dealing with ‗street works‘ includes enforcement of 
regulations through legal action. With regard to ‗street works‘, since March 2003 
(Devon, 2006), DCC has prosecuted utility companies for offences relating to 
incorrect signing, lighting and guarding of works, and also for reinstatements of 
excavations that failed to comply with the national specification, and has 
obtained convictions in over 289 cases, resulting in fines of over £180,000 and 
costs totalling over £115,000. KMC Highways has not prosecuted any utility 
companies under NRASWA since the mid-1990s. 
 
NYCC has been included in this study because (i) it is a member of the same 
regional HAUC, and deals with most of the same utility companies, as KMC, 
and (ii) is a county council like Devon, and so can provide triangulation for the 
research findings. 
 
Once the study had started, the findings from interviews in both Yorkshire and 
the Devon area pointed to the significance of how ‗highway works‘ were carried 
out in London as a driver for national legislation. The arrangements for the 
management of ‗highway works‘ in London involves 34 separate authorities: 32 
Boroughs, the City of London, and Transport for London (TfL). TfL is an agency 
of the London Assembly and is responsible for the strategic routes across all of 
London. It also reports to the Mayor of London, and the current Mayor has, 
since his election in 2008, placed the management of ‗highway works‘ in his top 
three priorities (the other two being smoothing traffic flows in the city, and the 
2012 Olympics.)Therefore, the focus of the study was expanded to also include 
London and, specifically, the London Assembly and TfL. 
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1.4 Research Context 
The conceptual framework for the study involves literature and research on 
public policy, with particular regard to implementation, and on inter-
organisational collaboration in order to examine different approaches to the 
implementation of central Government policy relating to the management of 
‗highway works‘ adopted by local highway authorities, and how this affects, and 
is affected by, their relationships with other policy ‗actors‘, particularly the utility 
companies. 
 
1.4.1 Central Government Legislation and Regulation 
The Horne Report (Department of Transport, 1985) identified several major 
problems relating to the execution and control of ‗street works‘. 
 
With regard to organisation, communications and relationships within and 
between local authorities and utilities there are autonomies and management 
hierarchies with differing accountabilities. The Horne Report says that 
experience since 1950 suggests that relationships and individual attitudes within 
and across organisations ―…are not always as good as they could be and may 
therefore be impeding the efficient management of the industry. The need to 
establish common management objectives and principles across all these 
organisations is self-evident.‖ 
 
Delays to traffic were reported as being the main concerns of many 
organisations representing road users, including motorists, freight transport and 
public passenger transport. In general, the worst cases were reported to be 
those works interfering with peak commuter flows. In addition, delays were not 
caused just by the works themselves but also by traffic signals set incorrectly. 
 
Lack of co-ordination was one of the greatest concerns of members of the 
public in that they saw as a lack of co-ordination between the utilities, and 
between the utilities and the highway authority, resulting in a situation where 
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after one excavation is finished someone else comes along to work in the same 
street. 
 
There were costs to the nation in a variety of ways, including the cost of the 
works and the cost of the delays to road users. (The Report focuses on the 
direct cost of carrying out the works.) 
 
‗Amtec Consulting plc‘ (Amtec, 2003), in a report on ‗highway works‘ to the 
Department for Transport, categorised stakeholders by the nature of their 
interest in the works and highlighted stakeholders‘ conflicting interest, in that 
their individual interest in works depends on context and that they might have 
several different, (possibly competing) interests. They give the example of a 
member of the public who may be a resident of an area with an interest in 
having a new service laid to their house. That same person might at the same 
time be a road user with an interest in minimising the delays due to ‗street 
works‘ encountered on their journey to work. The Amtec report concludes that 
all works affecting roads need to be managed – this includes ‗street works‘ 
carried out by utility companies and ‗roadworks‘ carried out by local highway 
authorities – and that all participating organisation should work to a standard 
data format. The report recommends that information on works should be made 
available to the public to aid in route planning and to avoid congestion. 
 
The Government has responded to these and other issues by passing the 
Traffic Management Act 2004 (TMA). In its draft guidance notes, the 
Department for Transport (DfT, 2004) acknowledge that road users may have 
differing expectations. Reliable journey times are important for the majority of 
users, but local highway authorities and utilities need to occupy the road in 
order to maintain and upgrade the infrastructure for the benefit of all of their 
customers. The DfT‘s guidance notes set out the expansion of the role of local 
authorities in the co-ordination and direction of works in three areas including: 
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 Local authorities will have to ensure that the principles already in use to 
manage utilities‘ ‗street works‘ are also applied to the management of 
their own ‗roadworks‘ (paragraph 91). 
 Systems to record and co-ordinate both planned utilities works and 
planned ‗roadworks‘ should be established, and it is suggested that use 
should be made of map-based systems (paragraph 92). 
 
1.4.2 Public Policy 
A number of definitions of ‗public policy‘ can be found in the academic literature. 
Anderson (Hill and Hupe, 2002:5) describes ‗public policy‘ as being ―… those 
policies developed by governmental policies and officials‖, and Hill and Hupe 
(2000:7) then go on to suggest that what is called ‗public policy‘ is that which is 
seen to be implemented and is the product of what has happened in the earlier 
stages of the policy process. This notion of the implementation stage is 
described by Nutley and Webb (2000:26) as being part of a ‗policy cycle‘.  
 
Schofield (2001) suggests that British public policy is dominated by the Labour 
Government‘s ―Third Way‖ political ideology, leading to a number of new 
challenges for those who study the implementation of public policy, including 
new structures in public services organisations, particularly inter-agency 
partnership arrangements, and new and complex linkages between 
Government and the public, where that public is highly differentiated and has a 
modified view of citizenship. Within implementation studies, there is the 
dominance of evaluation in the policy cycle and the philosophy of ‗what works, 
counts‘, is creating an evidence-based culture among public services 
managers. Lastly, there is the overriding importance of corporate public 
governance and the development of the regulatory state. 
 
Schofield (2001:253) argues that public policy implementation studies need to 
address the contemporary problems facing the management of public services, 
and goes on to identify four areas to assist with this: 
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1. Knowledge, learning and capacity in implementation – where knowledge 
and learning can refer to both how to implement policies and assessing 
the outcomes as part of a policy loop. 
2. The processes of implementation – where policy becomes action through 
various dynamic effects such as decision-making, communication, 
bargaining, negotiation and conflict. 
3. The role of actors and agents – whilst the various models of 
implementation emphasise the importance of individual and groups of 
actors, little in the literature addresses how actors‘ goals and priorities 
impact on policy outcomes. 
4. Bureaucratic discretion – focussing on the discretion and interpretive 
power exercised by ‗lower-level bureaucrats‘ in respect of policy 
implementation, and contrasting this with questions of organisational 
governance and the requirement for command, control and 
accountability. 
 
The environment in which local government operates will be a significant 
contextual factor. This environment has changed significantly over the past 
twenty-five years, particularly in response to pressures from central 
Government. These pressures are summarised in Table 1.1 below. 
 
1) Cost reductions
2) Service improvements
3) Quality services and competition
4) Public Service Agreements, which are intended to force an improvement in service
provision by 'stretching' performance beyond the norm
5) "Best Value" regime, backed up by an inspectorate and the need to report on 
results in achieving "Best Value Performance Indicators" (BVPI's)
6) The requirement for local authorities to produce plans and strategies, including
reporting on performance against local key performance indicators (KPI's)
7) Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) scoring system, by which 
councils are inspected and graded into categories
8) Efficiency gains
based upon Wisniewski and Olafsson (2004); Travers (2004);
Local Government Association (2010)
Table 1.1 - Pressures on Local Government from Central Government
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Utility companies, like local authorities, are also subject to regulation – Ofgem 
(for gas and electricity), Ofwat (for water) and Ofcom (for telecommunications) – 
where the regulators set out standards of service that customers can expect, for 
example a new electricity supply should be provided within 28 days of the 
electricity company receiving the customer‘s written request. Taking into 
account the requirement for utility companies to serve a period of notice before 
starting works, there is potential for a conflict between NRASWA and regulatory 
requirements. 
 
The pressures in Table 1.1 have led to a transformation in the management of 
public-sector organisations, moving from traditional bureaucratic systems of 
public administration to a more market-oriented results-driven system of public 
management (Horton, 2003). This management revolution is widely described 
(Lane, 2000; Pollitt, 2003) as being ―new public management‖ (NPM), which 
features a number of elements, including a shift in the focus of management 
systems and efforts from inputs and processes towards outputs and outcomes; 
and a shift towards more measurement and quantification, especially in the form 
of systems of ‗performance indicators‘ and ‗standards‘. In addition, there has 
been a widespread substitution of contracts (or contract-like relationships) for 
what were previously formal, hierarchical relationships. 
 
1.4.3 Inter-organisational Collaboration 
The ―Amtec‖ (2003) report mentioned above, and the Government‘s subsequent 
actions suggests a wider consideration of the effects of ‗street works‘, taking 
into account the implications of disruption caused by them. Local authorities 
also need to incorporate their new Network Management Duty into their overall 
community strategies. Leach and Percy-Smith (2001) use the term ‗wicked 
issues‘ to describe policy problems that have proved to be intractable, 
persistent and not amenable to simple solutions, and which share certain 
characteristics in that they are multifaceted and cannot be resolved by any one 
level of government. At a local level, many agencies may be involved to 
 21 
address certain facets of the problem but they do not fit in easily within an 
organisation‘s existing structure because they require long-term interventions 
 
Leach and Percy-Smith (2001) go on to suggest that the ‗failures‘ of the old-
style of policy is leading to a growing consensus on what is required to more 
effectively address ‗wicked issues‘ involving a joined-up/holistic approach which 
focuses on outcomes, and is supported by evidence-based policy – evidence 
about what works, from whom, in what circumstances. Key to obtaining 
successful outcomes is engagement with communities 
 
Lowndes and Skelcher (1998:315) share this consensus view and say that 
‗wicked issues‘ can only be tackled by ―…bringing together the resources of a 
range of different issues and interest groups‖. Innovation can arise in the 
―…form of strategies to develop interrelationships, trust and collaboration in an 
environment of resource scarcity where organisations would typically be 
orientated to defence and self-protection behind their bureaucratic ramparts‖ 
 
The Best Value framework in particular encourages public-sector organisations 
to achieve effective partnerships and innovative approaches in the delivery of 
local services (Magd and Curry, 2003). Hill (2001) agrees that the effective 
delivery of public services is increasingly dependent upon partnerships between 
the private, public and voluntary sectors. According to Armistead and Pettigrew 
(2004) there is no clear definition of what constitutes a ‗partnership‘ but they 
suggest the following working definition: 
 
“A partnership is a cross-organizational group working together towards 
common goals which would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
achieve if tackled alone.” 
 
Butler and Gill (Hill, 2001:217) described how partnerships between public- and 
private-sector organisations can exist along a continuum ranging from highly 
formal to informal. Informal partnerships include tacit agreements between 
senior managers of organisations, whereas formal partnerships would include 
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arrangements for contracting-out for the provision of services. Hill (2001:218) 
goes on to suggest that the increasing complexity of the public sector and its 
striving for ‗best value‘ has led the sector into recognising that working in 
partnership is the only sensible way to design and deliver services, and that this 
has accelerated the range of partnership arrangements to include joint 
developments and networks. 
 
1.4.3.1 Forms of Inter-organisational Collaboration 
A number of different terminologies are used in the literature to describe inter-
organisational collaboration (Huxham, 2003), including: 
 Partnership 
 Alliance 
 Collaboration 
 Network 
 
In his survey of the literature on inter-organisational relations, Williams (2002) 
says that there is no consolidated body with research being generated from a 
variety of disciplines, research paradigms, theoretical perspectives and sectoral 
focuses. Williams (2002) argues that a distinction can be drawn between inter-
organisational relations at different levels – macro and micro. At the macro 
level, a number of writers typify relationships along a continuum ―…of varying 
degrees of sophistication from co-operation to collaboration…‖ (Williams, 
2002:109). At the micro level, the focus of research is on the role of individual 
actors, their behaviour patterns and motivations (Williams, 2002: 107). 
 
In presenting a view of how public organisations can adopt the best managerial 
and organisational response in order to dealing with ‗wicked issues‘, Williams 
(2002) describes a move from the ‗traditional‘ (i.e. bureaucratic) to ‗post-
modern‘ arrangements such as networking, collaboration and partnership. 
 
Looking specifically at the role of the actors, Schofield (2004) describes how 
there is a tendency to assume that ‗public managers‘ have the detailed 
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technical knowledge required to implement public policies and to make them 
operational – or do ‗public managers‘ need to learn how to implement policy 
requirements? Nakamura and Smallwood (Schofield, 2001) present a typology 
of actors that focuses on relationships between actors and how power and 
responsibility is distributed between them. 
 
Schofield (2004:284) goes on to highlight the dilemmas for ‗public managers‘ in 
implementing policies, in that it is unlikely that policy designers can anticipate 
the operational consequences of their initiatives because they are too far 
removed from operational management; and even if they could anticipate the 
consequences, they may notice a lack of congruence between the policy ideal 
and the reality because of the lack of operational capability on the part of ‗public 
managers‘. 
 
Williams‘ (2002) notion of the micro aspects of collaborative working is 
supported by existing literature which seeks to describe taxonomies of those 
elements required to ensure successful outcomes (or that are lacking in 
collaborative ‗failures‘.) Huxham (2003) describes a taxonomy based upon: 
 Goal ownership – collaborative, organisational, individual 
 Openness – explicit, assumed, hidden 
 Means of achievement - collaborative, organisational, individual 
 Power – identifying the points of power in a collaboration, and that these 
can change over time 
 Trust – common wisdom suggests that trust is a precondition for 
successful collaboration; common practice shows that suspicion is 
usually the starting point. This leads to the importance of trust building. 
 Membership structure – where structures are conceptualised by: 
o Ambiguity – organisations not clear as to who they are 
collaborating with 
o Complexity – where organisations are also members of other 
(possibly competing) collaborations 
o Dynamics – shifting roles of collaborative members 
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o Leadership – the mechanisms by which things are made to 
happen in the collaboration 
 
As a caveat against readers assuming that collaborative working should always 
been seen as an ideal for which organisations should strive, Huxham (2003) 
defined two concepts from her research: collaborative advantage – something 
achieved out of the collaboration that could not have been attained by any of 
the organisations acting alone; and collaborative inertia – where the outputs 
from the collaboration appear to be negligible or appear to be extremely slow. 
   
Stoker (2004:159) identifies four aspects of local partnership working that 
characterised the then Labour Government‘s area, including the role of the 
partnership in service delivery, where partnerships are used to ensure delivery 
of outcomes to improve the ‗well-being‘ of communities rather than ‗bricks-and-
mortar‘ infrastructure renewal. These partnerships are expected to run over 
relatively longer periods, often up to 10 years or more, and initiatives tend to be 
more neighbourhood or area-based. Since 2001 there has been the overarching 
Local Strategic Partnership (LSP) arrangement, which usually covers the whole 
of a local authority‘s area. 
 
The overall management of ‗highway works‘ would appear to be an important 
element of the strategy identified by KMC and stakeholders in the ―Vision‖. The 
Government‘s own roads policy (Department for Transport, 2005:25), 
―Managing Our Roads‖, recognises that KMC has adopted a strong approach to 
the co-ordination of ‗highway works‘. 
 
1.4.4 Charters 
Since the mid-1980‘s, local authorities have taken an interest in service design 
and the specification of service standards, with published standards ―… 
expressed as a ‗contract‘ between the local authority and the citizens‖ (Flynn, 
2002). In 1991, the Government published the ‗Citizen‘s Charter‘, which 
widened the remit of charters from just accountability and standards to also 
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include openness, information, choice, non-discrimination, accessibility and 
redress. The implementation of these principles tied into the environmental 
changes mentioned above. 
 
Since those early days the number of charters in use by public sector 
organisations has increased considerably. A National Consumer Council (NCC) 
report in 1998 said that of 823 public sector organisations that responded to 
their survey, 606 had already produced a local charter. There were 209 
organisations that had not produced a charter but 77 of them said that they 
intended to do so in the future. From a review of the questions asked in the 
NCC survey, it appears that the charters focus almost exclusively on the 
identification and satisfaction of users’ needs and expectations. Theakston 
(Richards and Smith, 2002:240) also notes how the acceptance of ‗charterism‘ 
is related to the shift from a producer to a consumer emphasis. 
 
1.5 Contribution to Knowledge 
By recording the approach taken by KMC in relation to the co-ordination of 
highway works and contrasting it with other arrangements currently in effect, the 
research will attempt to assess the extent to which the KMC Highways 
approach represents: 
o A distinct ‗partnership‘ arrangement when mapped against the 
existing literature. 
o The use of charters in a way not previously described in the 
literature (e.g. not between ‗supplier‘ and ‗consumer‘). 
 
The research data and conclusions will add to knowledge by: 
o Providing empirical research results for a sector of public 
management not widely covered in the literature. 
o Addressing gaps in research on public policy implementation, 
specifically with regard to inter-organisational relationships. 
o Describing the divergence in implementation of central 
Government policy by different local authorities, looking at 
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influences such as professionalism, politics and central 
Government. 
 
The area of study, looking at the management of ‗highway works‘, has not been 
widely covered in the current literature. A search conducted on 20 February 
2012 of an electronic journals database, looking for journal articles in scholarly 
publications containing the phrase ―New Roads and Street Works Act‖ returned 
28 results, including duplicates; the phrase ―Traffic Management Act‖ returned 
10 results, including duplicates; and for both phrases together returned just two 
results. 
 
1.6 Outline of the Study 
This study is comprised of a further 11 chapters: 
 
 Chapters Two to Six – Literature Review: 
o Chapter Two – Local Government in England 
This chapter describes the development and changing functions of 
local government in England, and the relationship between local and 
central Government where, in recent times, central Government 
policy has required local authorities to open themselves up to market 
mechanisms and private-sector management methods, and the 
implications of Government programme of privatisation of previously 
publicly-owned utility providers. The chapter also describes how the 
functions, role and purpose of local authorities, and of its elected 
members and officers, have been redefined by central Government.  
o Chapter Three – Legislation Relating to Highways and ‗Highway 
Works‘ 
This chapter outlines the legislation relating to the maintenance of 
highways, and of the legislation by which local highway authorities 
and utility companies are able to carry out work in highways. The 
chapter also describes the expansion in the numbers of organisations 
allowed to work on the highway, the increasing number of utility 
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services demanded by consumers, and the relationship between 
highway authorities and utility companies. 
o Chapter Four – Public Policy 
In this chapter, the process and differing models of public policy 
implementation are examined, where the literature highlights the 
importance and contribution of individual people (or ―actors‖) public 
policy formulation and implementation.  
o Chapter Five – Inter-organisational Collaborations 
This chapter examines the concepts relating to the study of 
organisations and, in particular, how organisations compete with each 
other for resources, how and why they collaborate, and describes the 
elements required for successful collaboration. 
 
 Chapter Six – Research Methodology 
In this chapter, the alternative approaches to research are discussed and 
evaluated. It also describes and explains the process to identify a suitable 
research methodology. 
 
 Chapter Seven – Document Analysis: Context and Triangulation 
This chapter discusses the identification and selection of documentary data 
that will be used to provide additional information about the implementation 
of policies by authorities, as well as giving context and identifying sources of 
triangulation for the interview findings. 
 
 Chapters Eight to Ten – Interview Data Analysis 
These chapters outline the interview strategy used to collect primary data, 
the way in which the data was analysed and sets out the findings for the 
interviews carried out. 
o Chapter Eight – Yorkshire area Interview Data Analysis 
This chapter sets out the findings for the interviews carried out in Kirklees 
Council, North Yorkshire County Council, and with representatives from the 
regional highway and utility committee operating in the Yorkshire area. 
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o Chapter Nine – Devon area Interview Data Analysis 
This chapter sets out the findings for the interviews carried out in the Devon 
County Council, and with representatives from the regional highway and 
utility committee operating in the South West of England in which DCC 
operates. 
o Chapter Ten – London Interview Data Analysis 
This chapter sets out the findings for the interviews carried out in London 
with Transport for London. 
 
 Chapter Eleven – Discussion of Findings 
In this chapter the findings from chapter‘s seven to ten are discussed in the 
context of the research questions and current literature. It also sets out the 
limitation of this research and suggests future research. 
 
 Chapter Twelve – Contribution to Knowledge and Conclusions 
This chapter sets out the contribution to knowledge from this research, 
together with the limitations and areas for future research identified. The 
chapter also sets out the conclusions drawn by the author from the study. 
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Chapter Two – Local Government in England 
The focus of this thesis is the implementation of legislation regulating the way in 
which works on the highway are carried out by companies, in order to provide 
utility supplies, and by highway authorities undertaking works to maintain the 
condition of the highway network. The current arrangements in England are that 
the functions, powers and responsibilities of the highway authority are vested in 
District or County councils. 
 
This chapter will describe the development and changing functions of local 
government, moving from a ―localist‖ tradition concerned with meeting the 
collective needs of the community, including, with particular relevance to this 
thesis, the maintenance of local roads and bridges, and the direct provision of 
services to, following recent changes, being more of a facilitator or 
commissioning body. Service provision by local authorities is also influenced to 
an extent by local discretion, with notions of ―uniform‖ provision being 
challenged in the literature and reflected in the different emphasis the 
authorities place on how service areas are structured and services provided. 
This may help to explain later how and why authorities apply and administer the 
legislation relating to ‗highway works‘ differently. 
 
A key aspect of the development of local government has been the relationship 
between central and local government. In recent years, central Government 
policy has had a significant direct impact on the operations of local councils, 
including introducing legislation requiring local authorities to contract-out 
services and employ private-sector style management techniques within a 
public-sector context. 
 
Changes to the role and structure of local government have also affected the 
nature of the relationship between elected members and officers, and their roles 
and functions. This has implications for how policies are made, or maintained, 
within local authorities. 
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Central Government policies have also had an indirect effect, through social 
and economic policies, on the environment in which local government operates 
and the nature of the relationship with the utility companies, and these issues 
are explored further in chapter 3. 
 
2.1 Local Government Development and Changes 
Local government in the United Kingdom can trace its origins back to the Middle 
Ages and pre-dates the creation of the United Kingdom in 1707. In England and 
Wales, most of the functions were provided at parish or borough level but with 
little co-ordination between them (Barlow, 1991). 
 
Local government is defined as meaning the ―…self-government of Britain‘s 
counties, cities and towns‖ (Kingdom, 1991:3), and denotes the separate 
government of a sub-national unit of the state, where Parliament has delegated 
certain powers, and so represents a continuation of the ‗localist‘ tradition, dating 
back to Anglo-Saxon times, whereby small communities sought to meet 
collective needs such as the upkeep of roads and bridges, care for the poor, 
and the maintenance of order.  
 
Before discussing the development of local government in England, it is first 
necessary to recognise that implications of the last Labour Government‘s 
programme of devolution, i.e. the granting of powers from a state‘s central 
Government to a regional level, carried out in the late 1990s. With regard to the 
countries that make up the United Kingdom, devolution resulted in the following: 
 
 Scotland. The Labour Government elected in 1997 held a referendum in 
Scotland and, following a ―yes‖ vote and the enactment of the Scotland 
Act 1998, the Scottish Parliament was established in 1999 and has 
powers to pass primary legislation on ―devolved matters‖ including 
education, health, agriculture and justice. There is a debate on-going 
currently about further devolution of powers. In Scotland, the regulations 
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relating to ‗highway works‘ are different to those in effect in England and 
Wales. 
 Wales. The Government held a referendum in Wales in 1997which 
resulted in the Government of Wales Act 1998, leading to the 
establishment of the National Assembly for Wales. Originally, the 
Assembly had powers only to pass secondary legislation in devolved 
areas. Following the passing of the Government of Wales Act 2006, the 
Assembly gained limited powers to make primary legislation. 
 Northern Ireland. The situation regarding devolution in Northern Ireland is 
a long and complex one. However, the current arrangements began in 
1998 with the establishment of a devolved Assembly as part of the 
―Belfast Agreement‖ (also known as the ―Good Friday Agreement‖.) The 
Northern Ireland Assembly has authority to legislate in areas known as 
―transferred matters‖ including justice, environment, education, 
agriculture, and regional and rural development. Northern Ireland has its 
own regulations relating to ‗highway works‘ 
 
It should be noted that in the discussion below of legislation relating to ‗highway 
activities‘, particularly the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 (NRASWA), 
separate arrangements have been introduced by the relevant legislative bodies 
in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Unless otherwise stated, any 
reference to NRASWA in this thesis will refer to arrangements in England. 
 
2.1.1 Local Government Development and Changes in England 
Modern local government in England can be seen to have its origins in major 
reform acts of the 1800s, which began the move away from governance at 
parish level:  
 The Poor Law Amendment Act 1834 created boards of guardians 
responsible for the local administration of the Poor Law. 
 The Municipal Corporations Act 1835 reformed many existing 
boroughs and created multi-purpose elected local authorities in urban 
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areas, providing a range of services that Parliament felt it could not 
itself supervise. 
 The Local Government Act 1888 established county councils and 
county borough councils in England and Wales, with each electoral 
division within the county returning a single councillor. Powers and 
responsibilities in the Act included the making and levying of rates 
and the repair of county roads and bridges. Councils could also 
declare a road to be a ―main road‖ and take over its maintenance. 
 The Local Government Act 1894 established with the county council 
areas a network of urban and rural district councils, which operated 
as a ‗second tier‘ within the counties. The Act also passed all the 
powers, duties and liabilities of existing highway boards, highway 
authorities or surveyors to the newly created rural district councils. 
Rural district councils continued to exercise these powers until 1930, 
when the Local Government Act 1929 transferred responsibility for 
rural highways to county councils. 
 
Apart from the creation of new county boroughs, the most significant change 
since 1899 was the establishment in 1965 of Greater London and its thirty-two 
London boroughs, covering a much larger area than the previous county of 
London. A Local Government Commission was set up in 1958 to review local 
government arrangements throughout the country, and had some successes, 
such as merging small administrative counties and the creation of several 
contiguous county boroughs. However, it was generally agreed that there were 
significant problems with the structure of local government. Despite mergers, 
there was still a proliferation of small district councils in rural areas, and in the 
major conurbations the borders had been set before the pattern of urban 
development had become clear.  
 
The Local Government Commission was wound up in 1966, and replaced with a 
Royal Commission (known as the Redcliffe-Maud commission). In 1969 it 
recommended a system of single-tier unitary authorities for the whole of 
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England, apart from three metropolitan areas of Merseyside, Greater 
Manchester and West Midlands, which were to have both a metropolitan council 
and district councils. The Redcliffe-Maud report was accepted by the Labour 
Government but the Conservative party won the June 1970 general election, on 
a manifesto that committed them to a two-tier structure, and they dropped the 
Redcliffe-Maud report. They invited comments from interested parties regarding 
the previous Government's proposals, and amended proposals were introduced 
as the Local Government Bill into Parliament soon after the start of the 
1971/1972 session, later becoming the Local Government Act 1972. The 1972 
Act abolished all county boroughs and reduced the number of county councils 
from 58 to 47. In the major conurbations, six metropolitan county councils were 
established. Three of these were as proposed by Redcliffe-Maud, covering 
Merseyside, Greater Manchester, and West Midlands, and to these were added 
Tyne and Wear, South Yorkshire, and West Yorkshire (Wilson and Game, 
2011). 
 
The allocation of functions differed between the metropolitan and the non-
metropolitan areas (the so-called 'shire counties') — for example, education and 
social services were the responsibility of the shire counties, but in metropolitan 
areas was given to the districts. The distribution of powers was slightly different 
in Wales than in England, with libraries being a county responsibility in England 
— but in Wales districts could opt to become library authorities themselves. A 
key principle was that education authorities (non-metropolitan counties and 
metropolitan districts), were deemed to need a population base of 250,000 in 
order to be viable. Although called two-tier, the system was really three-tier, as 
it retained civil parish councils, although in Wales they were renamed 
community councils. The Act introduced 'agency', where one local authority 
(usually a district) could act as an agent for another authority. Some powers 
were specifically excluded from agency, such as education. 
 
The Local Government Act 1985 abolished the metropolitan county councils 
and Greater London Council that had been set up in 1974 by the 1972 Local 
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Government Act, along with the Greater London Council that had been 
established in 1965. The provisions came into effect on 1 April 1986, with 
some powers being devolved to the metropolitan district councils and the 
London boroughs, with others reverting to central Government. Responsibility 
for roads and road maintenance was one of the functions transferred from 
metropolitan counties to district councils. 
 
The Local Government Act 1988 introduced a wide range of changes, including 
the introduction of compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) of contracts for 
certain types of activities, including highways functions. 
 
The Local Government Act 2000 concentrated on reforming the structure of 
local authorities, particularly to give powers to local authorities to promote 
economic, social and environmental well-being within their boundaries; to 
require local authorities to shift from their traditional committee-based system of 
decision-making to an executive model, possibly with a directly-elected mayor 
(subject to approval by referendum), and with a cabinet of ruling party group 
members; to create a consequent separation of functions with local authorities, 
with backbench councillors fulfilling an overview and scrutiny role; and to 
introduce a revised ethical framework for local authorities, requiring the 
adoption of codes of conduct for elected members and standards committees to 
implement the codes of conduct; the introduction of a national Standards Board 
and Adjudication Panel to deal with complaints and to oversee disciplinary 
issues. 
 
2.2 The Changing Role and Functions of Local Government in England 
A dominant tradition of writing about local government in England states that 
local authorities are agents of central Government, and serve only as 
administrative structures to implement policies designed by a higher authority. 
The situation is described in which ―...central government (sic) is the 
determination of policy and principle; local government is the application of the 
principles to the peculiarities of local fact‖ (Clarke, 1969). This is attributed to 
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central Government‘s reliance not only on its full powers of intervention and on 
its ability to impose its will upon local authorities by means of informal 
persuasion, for the existence of extensive legal powers of control has had a 
cumulative and psychological effect where local authorities submit questions to 
the minister of which he has no legal control (Jennings, 1947). These informal 
concentrations between central and local government ensure that the policy of 
the Government works its way into the practice of local authorities, perhaps 
imperceptibly and sometimes called ―government by circular‖ (Cross, 1966). 
 
The most popular explanation accounting for the extent of central control was 
based upon consideration of the dependence of local authorities upon central 
finance. There was the idea that "he who pays the piper calls the tune". Another 
argument which has been developed to account for the most increasing central 
control point to "the prevailing desire for uniformity of public services" (Marshall, 
1960), and suggests that "public demand for equality... drove central 
government into detailed control" (Smellie, 1968). 
 
Dearlove (1973:14) suggested that the authors advancing these arguments 
failed to put their theses to the test by examining the actual extent of uniformity 
of service provision in different local authorities, and when this exercise is 
undertaken it is found that there are "vast differences...between the same 
services in different areas" and examples of the variation of service can be 
found  over the whole range of local government activity", with evidence of 
erratic provision of services including day nurseries, services for old people, and 
welfare services generally. 
 
Burns (2000:967), looking at council‘s area committees, noted that, in 
experimenting with local democracy, council‘s ―... found it difficult to accept 
different levels and patterns of service in different neighbourhoods‖, and went 
on to say that variation ―...appears to challenge deep seated values of equality, 
justice, and fairness, yet local variation is the very essence of local democracy.‖  
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The work of Dearlove (1973) and Burns (2000) highlighted the idea that 
provision of service can vary between local authorities, and can also vary within 
an authority. Jordan (2007) used the term ―post code lottery‖ as a label that is 
stuck on any instance where local discretion is permitted, and noted that real 
variation caused by decentralisation and discretion was seen as a problem 
rather than a virtue. This perception as variation as problem rather than virtue 
has implications for this thesis, looking at implementation of public policy by 
local authorities, where authorities take a different view, i.e. exercise their 
discretion, in administering legislation and in their relationships with the utility 
companies. 
 
2.2.1 Categorisation of Local Government Functions 
Dearlove (1973) also highlighted the different use made by local authorities of 
their ―permissive powers‖ regarding, for example:  
 Support for the arts 
 Housing provision, where in Greater London there were great differences 
in the number of dwellings built, methods of council house allocation, rent 
levels, interpretation of statutory standards of dwellings, and the use of 
standards to designate improvement areas (Spencer, 1970) 
 Variations in the provision of primary and secondary education 
Where studies of ―public policy‖ accept the arguments of uniformity of provision 
of services by local authorities, they run the risk of assuming that variations in 
service provision reflect differences in local needs. Dearlove (1973) argued that 
the studies that have shown otherwise, i.e. that local needs do not explain the 
differences in service provision between local authorities, challenged the view 
that the demand for minimum standards brought with it more control and greater 
uniformity in the provision of various services throughout the country. Dearlove 
(1973) went on to suggest that there was a pressing need to account for 
variations in service provision, and that this was likely to demand a 
consideration of politics within local authorities. 
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The functions of local government have changed and evolved over the years. 
Redcliffe-Maud and Wood (1974) characterised local government functions as 
being either ―traditional‖, meaning Victorian or pre-Victorian functions, or ―new‖, 
meaning post-Victorian functions: 
 ―Traditional‖ local authority functions that were transferred to central 
Government or ad hoc agencies following the 1888 and 1894 Acts 
included trunk roads (1936), hospitals (1946), and water supply and 
sewage disposal (1974). 
 Consequent to the intention of the 1888 and 1894 Acts to reduce the 
number of separate bodies providing a single service, a number of 
―traditional‖ functions originally performed by local bodies were taken 
over by local authorities, including the running of school boards (1902). 
 ―New‖ functions given to local authorities included town and country 
planning (1909), creation of smokeless zones (1956), and the 
development of social services provision. 
 ―New‖ functions originally given to local authorities but subsequently 
transferred to central Government or agencies included clinics, maternity 
and family planning services (1974). 
 Functions for which responsibility has been reallocated with the structure 
of local government, in a predominantly upwards process from district to 
county level, for example, town planning, fire protection and highways 
responsibilities, although London and the six metropolitan areas saw a 
devolution downwards in areas such as public libraries, education, and 
social services. 
 
Writing in the 1970s, Redcliffe-Maud and Wood (1974) described local 
government as both a provider of services to the local communities and also an 
instrument of democratic self-government, not just an agent of the national 
state. As a ―provider of services‖, services were classed as being: 
 Protection – keeping the peace, i.e. responsibility for a local police force, 
fire and civil defence; 
 38 
 Convenience – including roads and bridges, with associated traffic 
controls, parking and speed limits; 
 Welfare – personal services provided because of age (for example, 
education for children or old-people‘s homes) or circumstances (for 
example, foster care or help for people with disabilities.) 
 
These were re-categorised in 2006 by Wilson and Game as being: 
 Need services – accessed by everyone, regardless of means, including 
education, personal social services and housing benefit. Education gives 
an illustration of the changing role of local government. The Education 
Act 1944 provided for central Government to set the national policy 
framework, with local education authorities (LEA) appointing chief 
education officers, and local authorities dealing with the provision, 
staffing and running of schools. Subsequent Education Acts have 
reduced the role of local authorities in the management of schools. The 
Education Reform Act 1988 introduced local management of schools 
(LMS), requiring LEAs to pass at least 85% of their education budget to 
school governing bodies, which bodies then became responsible for 
overseeing the running of their schools. The Act also enables schools, 
following a parental ballot, to opt-out of control by their LEA and be 
directly-funded by central Government as ―grant-maintained‖ schools. 
Without an operational role, LEAs retained responsibility for strategy – 
including management of admissions, appeals, parental advice, home-to-
school transport, assessment of needs, and free school meals eligibility – 
and support – including educational welfare, catering, security, grounds 
maintenance, information technology support, and cleaning services. But 
schools are free to procure their own support services from alternative 
providers. 
 Protective services – which are provided for the security of people, to 
national guidelines, and includes policing and community safety, fire and 
rescue, and emergency planning. Up until the 1990s, policing was a local 
authority service, with (except for the Metropolitan Police) the chief 
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constable being accountable to the police committee of (usually) the 
county council. The Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 changed the 
role of police authorities by establishing them as independent authorities, 
with powers over their own service provision. Police authorities still 
depend upon local authorities for the collection of their revenue, which 
councils must include in the council tax bills which they send to their 
residents. 
 Amenity services – which are provided mainly to standards determined 
locally to meet the needs of local communities, and includes highways, 
street cleaning, planning, parks and open spaces, environmental health, 
refuse disposal and re-cycling, and economic development. Highway 
services cover a range of different types of highway from motorways to 
bridleways, and involve all levels of government from the Department for 
Transport to parish councils. The Secretary of State for Transport is 
responsible for motorways and trunk roads, with decisions being taken 
by regional offices and maintenance contracted out by the Highways 
Agency, which is an executive agency acting on behalf of the 
Government‘s behalf. County councils, unitary and district have 
responsibility for other primary and secondary roads, with ―responsibility‖ 
including road building, maintenance and improvement, highway 
management, including parking, speed limits, street lighting, traffic signs, 
street cleaning, winter maintenance, and road safety. Even here, ―agency 
agreements‖ are common, with, in two-tier authorities, functions being 
carried out by district councils. Local authorities also work with transport 
authorities and bus and rail companies to improve local transport 
networks. 
 Facility services – which includes those services which people can 
access if they wish and are sometimes provided in competition with 
private-sector provision. Examples include housing, libraries, museums 
and art galleries, sports and recreational facilities, and refuse collection. 
With regard to housing, where the provision of council housing was once 
a main feature of local authority service provision has, over the years, is 
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now forecast (Wilson and Game, 2006) to have virtually disappeared by 
2015. The Housing Act 1957 had placed a duty on local authorities to 
consider housing conditions in their area and provide any further housing 
required – by building it themselves or buying, converting and improving 
existing housing. By the 1970s, the stock of council housing stood at 
some 7 million properties. The Housing Act 1980, introduced by the 
incoming Conservative Government, then gave tenants the right to buy 
their homes, and a discount and subject to length of tenancy. Local 
authorities, often Labour administered, which attempted to resist could 
be forced to comply by the Secretary of State.  
 
Even though a reduced number, the housing stock owned by local 
authorities still had to be maintained. Central Government restrictions in 
both revenue spending and capital expenditure resulted in a build-up of 
repairs. Government further removed local authorities from responsibility 
for housing by allowing new landlords, for example, housing 
associations, to take over council housing following a ballot of tenants or 
for service delivery via so called ―arms-length management 
organisations‖. 
 
The sale of council housing stock continued under the Labour 
Government elected in 1997. The Government had a choice (Wilson and 
Game, 2006) of ending the borrowing restrictions imposed on local 
authorities or ending completely their housing management 
responsibilities, and chose the latter. As mentioned with regard to 
schools above, local authorities maintained a strategic role in housing – 
reviewing current housing conditions, identifying future needs for 
provision, repairs, slum clearance, grants for improvements and repairs, 
and consulting with other agencies. 
 
The changes in roles and functions between the 1970s, when Redcliffe-Maud 
and Wood set out their classification of services, and 2006, when they were re-
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classified by Wilson and Game, can be seen as direct or indirect consequences 
of the reforms and policies of, firstly, the Conservative Government elected in 
1979 and developed by the Labour Government elected in 1997 as part of the 
―New Labour‖ project. This environment in which local government operated 
has changed significantly over the past twenty-five years, particularly in 
response to pressures from central Government with regard to the formulation 
and implementation of public policy. These reforms are described and analyse 
in greater detail below. 
 
As democratic institutions, local authorities have long been challenged to 
―…better secure effective and convenient local government‖ (Herbert 
Commission) and ―…sustain a viable system of local democracy‖ (Redcliffe-
Maud Commission). Redcliffe-Maud and Wood (1974) acknowledged that, for 
many people, local democracy meant little more than the periodic exercise of 
the right to vote for local councillors and, even then, the majority of those 
entitled to vote do not participate, but went on to suggest that the concept of 
local democracy goes beyond attendance at polling stations to include: 
 Accountability and control – where local authorities are directly 
accountable for their actions, both to Parliament and to the local 
electorate. Elections to local authorities are, in the majority of cases, 
conducted on (national) political party lines, with the consequences that: 
o Some local authority areas have been controlled by the same 
political party since World War II, and many others have been 
dominated by one party with only occasional or temporary 
changes. 
o Local election results tend to depend more on the national 
standing of the parties than on local factors. 
 Responsiveness – where councillors (and officers) respond to local 
pressures, directed by pressure groups and an active local press, in 
order to preserve their local reputations; 
 Redress of grievance – up to 1974 councillors were responsible for 
investigating or taking-up complaints about local services; in 1974, 
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regional commissioners (or ‗ombudsmen‘) were established to look into 
complaints about local authority maladministration, the intention being to: 
o Avoid a conflict of interest arising where (as was then the case) 
there was no separation of the executive from legislative functions 
of councillors, so the councillor investigating a complaint might 
have been involved in the decision that gave rise to the complaint; 
and 
o To aid the development of the working relationship between 
councillors and the professional officers, where this could be 
jeopardised by a councillor pressing complaints with excessive 
zeal. 
 
2.2.2 Public Administration 
According to Leach and Percy-Smith (2001) local public services up to the 
1960s could be characterised as being ―public administrations‖, in that services 
were delivered through departments or divisions that were organized along 
functional lines and were staffed by officers with particular professional or 
technical expertise. Their role was to implement the policies of the authority. 
However, while the policies of the authority provided the framework within which 
they operated, their own professional codes of conduct informed their day-to-
day decisions. The works of departments and professional groups was largely 
overseen by administrators rather than manages, implying little room for 
discretion and relatively small incremental changes. Defined in this way, 
―administration‖ left relatively little room for management initiative of any kind. 
Leach and Percy-Smith (2001) did come to see that such a stark division 
between administration and management or between management and policy-
making was to oversimplify what was undoubtedly a much more diverse picture, 
and that there were countless examples of officers who did exercise discretion 
in the way in which they administered and implemented policy. 
 
By the 1970s the traditions of public administration and professional dominance 
were being threatened by a perception of crisis in relation to the public sector. A 
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view had developed that the public sector and public sector spending was 
growing out control. The initial response in relation to local authorities was to try 
to reduce the influence of individual departments and the associated 
professional groups and increase efficiency largely through the mechanism of 
centralizing and concentrating bureaucratic power (Maud, 1967; Bains Report, 
1972). There were four main changes that were introduced in most local 
authorities as a result (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001): 
1. The appointment of a chief executive responsible for coordinating the 
work of the authority and providing advice and counsel on policy matters. 
2. The establishment of policy and resources committee with responsibility 
for coordinating the council's policies. 
3. A reduction in the number of departments by combining related functions 
under a single chief officer or multifunctional directorate and a 
corresponding reduction in the number of committees with a widening of 
each committee's scope. 
4. The establishment of a management team of chief officers. 
 
The Conservative Government elected in 1979 identified increased central 
Government controls over the public sector and in particular the amount of 
resources they had access to. At the same time attempts were made to reduce 
costs, increase efficiency and secure value for money. The Audit Commission 
had a particular responsibility in this regard, undertaking ―value for money‖ 
audits designed to assess policy in terms of all the three ―E's‖ - economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness. 
 
This was also a time when management ideas borrowed from the private sector 
were applied widely in the public sector, and which saw the beginning of the 
shift from ―public administration‖ to ―public management‖ (Corrigan et al, 1999). 
According to Keen and Scase (1998) this change saw a move from bureaucratic 
and professionally dominated administration to a more flexible, customer-
orientated, private-sector style of management and service provision. This 
change became known as ―new public management‖ and incorporated two 
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dimensions: emphasis on flexibility and decentralization. In addition, ―new public 
management‖ separated out three roles: corporate policymakers were 
responsible for determining overall strategy; the client side responsible for 
setting and monitoring standards and the service provider responsible for 
delivering services (Walsh, 1995). 
 
2.2.3 Market Mechanisms 
Leach and Percy-Smith (2001) argued that one of the most important aspects of 
the changes that occurred between the late 1970s and early 1990s was the 
introduction of some form of competition or markets to most activities and 
organizations in the public sector. This had an impact on the structure and 
organization of public sector bodies and also changed at least some aspects of 
their culture and had implications for their roles and responsibilities. The use of 
contractual arrangements between those who commissioned services and 
those who provided them had resulted in a need to specify much more clearly 
the standards of provision and the quality of the service provided. In addition, 
there was a shift from primary producer-led to more customer-focused services 
as authorities looked to make their services more responsive to local needs. 
 
There were three main ways in which market mechanisms were introduced to 
public services. The first way was through contracting. Although in local 
authorities some services had always been provided under contract, what was 
new in the 1980s was the fact that an element of compulsion was introduced, 
with the intention of making the process of competitive tendering and the 
provision of services under contract the norm. The process of compulsory 
competitive tendering (CCT) began in the NHS and local government in the 
early 1980s. It was a requirement of the Local Government Planning and Land 
Act 1980 that local authorities should engage in competitive tendering for the 
construction and maintenance of buildings and highways. If authorities wished 
to carry out work by direct labour then they had to invite bids for the work and 
were only allowed to carry it out if they won through competition. 
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The CCT process required a comparison of the costs of continuing in-house 
provision of services with those of any private contractor, with the contract 
awarded to the most competitive (i.e. lowest) bidder (Wilson and Game, 2002). 
Where contracts were won in-house, the major organisational change was the 
separation of roles between client, responsible for the specification and 
monitoring of services, and contractor, responsible for the delivery of services. 
 
CCT entailed a rethinking of the role of local authorities, with the term ―enabling‖ 
being used to describe a future local government that would only directly 
provide a minimum of services and that its main role should be to ―enable‖ 
provision. Their role would be to stimulate, facilitate, support, regulate, influence 
and there by enable other agencies and organizations to act on their behalf 
(Wilson and Game, 1994). 
 
In addition, many local authorities also changed their internal management 
structure by grouping together the contractor-side activities into multifunctional 
contract services organizations which brought together a wide range of different 
activities. This had the effect of, to some extent, undermining the traditional 
professionally based departments. 
 
A further consequence of CCT was a need to specify precisely what the service 
should entail in order to draw up a contract. In some cases, for the first time, it 
was necessary to set out standards of quality expected and the cost of 
delivering a service. 
 
The second way was via internal markets. In some cases the nature of the 
service of political pressures or a combination of both made it impossible for the 
services to be contracted out to external providers. Where this was the case, for 
example in the NHS, this led to the creation of internal markets. 
The arguments in favour of the introduction of an internal market were that it 
resulted in a clarification of responsibilities, a reduction in the power of specific 
professional groups, increased accountability through great openness about the 
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basis on which his service is provided, and greater efficiency in allocation of 
resources (Walsh, 1995). 
 
The final way in which market mechanisms were introduced was through 
agencies and devolved control. Changes introduced at this time also separate 
political and managerial levels through devolved management. Two methods 
were used (Walsh, 1995): devolution of financial control to managers at all 
levels of the organization, and the establishment of internal agencies operating 
as relatively autonomous units. For example, under local management of 
schools budgets were delegated to school governing bodies on the basis of 
pupil numbers. 
 
2.2.4 Strategic Management 
One of the consequences of competition and ―new public management‖ was 
organizational fragmentation within local authorities, who had to manage an 
increasingly complex network of diverse providers with varying degrees of 
autonomy (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001). In order to hold this decentralized 
web together there was an increasing need for strong central direction. As a 
result most local authorities adopted some form of strategic management, 
characterized by a statement of organizational values and key strategic aims. 
The process of strategic management was closely linked to ―performance 
management‖ which had, according to the Audit Commission (1995), three 
aspects: the specification, communication and evaluation of aims and objectives 
at all levels. So, performance management provided the link between the 
development and articulation of a corporate strategy and organization and 
delivery of front-line services. 
 
2.2.5 Customer-focused Services 
Traditionally, delivery of public services emphasized the role of professional, i.e. 
experts who knew best. This was reflected in the style of service delivery, which 
was paternalistic in style and allowed little room for choice or diversity. 
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However, the expectation of the public in relation to services was changing and 
people increasingly wanted the same level of service and degree of choice that 
they had become used to in the private sector. 
 
According to Drewry (2005), charters were part of the much bigger ―new public 
management‖ (NPM) agenda that had ―dominated the bureaucratic reform 
agenda in the OECD group of countries from the late 1970s‖ (Hood 1992:3), but 
that charters came in many different guises, and with a variety of labels 
attached. 
 
The original version of the UK ‗Citizen‘s Charter‘ was officially launched in a 
White Paper, published in July 1991 (Cabinet Office, 1991). Although it pursued 
themes (value for money, increased competition, privatization, greater 
emphasis upon performance measurement, etc.) that were already on-going by 
the time John Major took over the premiership from Margaret Thatcher in 1990, 
the Charter was presented from the outset as encapsulating the then new prime 
minister‘s personal vision of the public services. The initiative had support from, 
among others, the free market think-tank, the Adam Smith Institute (Pirie, 
1992), and it remained a core part of the Conservative Government‘s 
programme until the change of Government in 1997. It was then repackaged 
and re-launched by Tony Blair‘s Labour administration, and has become 
absorbed into the continuing process of ‗modernizing‘ public services. 
 
The original ‗Citizen‘s Charter‘ reaffirmed the Government‘s continuing 
commitment to privatization, to the further contracting out of public services and 
to the extension of compulsory competitive tendering, but it implicitly accepted 
that a lot of major services should remain within the public sector, while arguing 
that they must be more consumer-sensitive. Its main themes were (Drewry, 
2005): 
 Higher standards: publication, in clear language, of standards of service; 
tougher, independent inspectorates; a ‗Charter Mark‘ scheme to 
commend bodies that abide by the terms of the Charter. 
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 Openness: elimination of secrecy about organizational arrangements, 
costs of service, etc. Staff to be identified by name badges. 
 Information: regular publication of information about performance targets, 
anyhow well they have been met. 
 Choice: ‗the public sector should provide choice wherever practicable‘. 
 Non-discrimination: services to be available regardless of race or sex; 
leaflets to be printed in minority languages where there is a need. 
 Accessibility: ‗services should be run to suit the convenience of 
customers, not staff‘. 
 Proper redress when things go wrong: ‗at the very least the citizen is 
entitled to good explanation, or an apology‘; better machinery for redress 
of grievances (including, as originally envisaged, a system of local lay 
adjudicators to deal with minor claims for redress); adequate remedies, 
including compensation where appropriate. 
 
The White Paper also stressed the theme of value for money: ‗the Charter 
programmes about finding better ways of converting the money that can be 
afforded into even better services‘. 
 
The Charter was to apply to central Government departments and their Next 
Steps executive agencies; also to local government, the National Health 
Service, the police and even the courts, where there are special sensitivities 
about judicial independence. It also promised stronger powers for the regulatory 
agencies that oversaw the privatised public utilities like British Telecom, and the 
gas, electricity and water industries (all of which have their own charters). 
 
On the wider questions about the Charter for Citizens, writing in 1994 Connolly 
et al (1994) asked what else might be needed if it is to become more than 
simply a stick with which to beat public servants? They suggested that the way 
forward lay in promoting a number of possible developments, including a 
reflective and much more explicit attempt to recognise and deal with the 
multiple, complex relationships between individuals and Government and its 
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services. Through the genuine empowerment of the public, both as individual 
citizens and as members of the community, including the provision of access to 
decision-making, lay the potential to improve public services.  
 
Extending the themes of the Charter to a wider range of Government activity, 
including the scrutiny and evaluation of central Government departments would 
require much greater freedom of information available to the citizen. Any such 
extension would be difficult to implement due to the nature of the issues 
involved in that they were complex, ambiguous and sometimes in conflict, and 
all had fundamental implications for the management of public services. 
 
According to Taylor and Kelly (2006) a characteristic of public service provision 
during the past 15 years had been the increased role of users or ―customers‖ in 
evaluating service delivery in particular. The introduction of the ‗Citizen‘s 
Charter‘, and subsequently various service charters covering all public services, 
established the principle of ‗bottom-up‘ pressure, with increased user 
involvement having an impact on professionals because of the constant need to 
be aware of the effect of their actions on clients and impact of complaints, which 
managers were duty-bound to follow up. 
 
Tony Blair‘s (2002) proposals to establish more effective stakeholder and citizen 
involvement in service provision suggested what Hood referred to as a 
―contrived randomness‖ or a ―fatalistic‖ approach to controlling public 
administration (Hood, 1996:211) in contrast to the subsequent combination of 
competition and explicit regulation (Hood, 1996:227). Stoker (2002:21) referred 
to a ―strategy of governance by lottery‖ by encouraging or requiring target 
organisations to ―participate in a complex and rolling game of chance‖. The 
establishment of partnerships under New Labour required professionals to 
consider how other agencies operate and develop services with professionals in 
those agencies in for example, health and social care. 
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McBeath and Webb (2002) referred to the ―self-flourishing‖ worker in an article 
which set out to remind the professional that they play a role in the production 
and reproduction of the public sphere with the power to ―affect the structure of 
social relations contained therein‖, and so not losing sight of the wider societal 
responsibilities and public expectations of professionals. This depended, in part, 
on whether or not professionals lose a degree of discretion on the one hand and 
are exposed to more pressure from service users on the other, in which users 
may be seen as co-producers of policy as participants in organisations such as 
schools and hospitals. 
 
‗Bottom-up‘ as well as ‗top-down‘ pressure has been at the centre of the issue 
of professional discretion at street-level in recent years. Discretion can be 
influenced by involving clients and client groups in evaluation processes as well 
as involving community groups in the governance and provision of services.  
 
The extent to which ‗bottom-up‘ pressure impacted upon street-level discretion 
depends in part upon the knowledge of users about the service being offered 
and also upon the professional‘s knowledge of how to make the best use of 
consumer involvement. Government proposals to introduce new forms of 
localism building on more community involvement which by-passes formal local 
authority decision-making processes have created a new layer of community 
governance. This will put more pressure on professionals to familiarise 
themselves with the structures of governance and their impact on service 
delivery at street-level and the relationship between their own established 
statutory agencies and parish or neighbourhood governance. Their ability to 
exercise discretion may well depend on their understanding of their own impact 
on the working of these processes, and the relationship between different actors 
in both the provision and receipt of services. 
 
Since the mid-1980‘s, local authorities had taken an interest in service design 
and the specification of service standards, with published standards ―… 
expressed as a ‗contract‘ between the local authority and the citizens‖ (Flynn, 
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2002). The ‗Citizen‘s Charter‘ widened the remit of charters from just 
accountability and standards to also include openness, information, choice, 
non-discrimination, accessibility and redress.  
 
Since those early days the number of charters in use by public sector 
organisations has increased considerably. A National Consumer Council (NCC) 
report in 1998 said that of 823 public sector organisations that responded to 
their survey, 606 had already produced a local charter. There were 209 
organisations that had not produced a charter but 77 of them said that they 
intended to do so in the future. From a review of the questions asked in the 
NCC survey, it appears that the charters focus almost exclusively on the 
identification and satisfaction of users’ needs and expectations. Theakston 
(Richards and Smith, 2002:240) also noted how the acceptance of ‗charterism‘ 
is related to the shift from a producer to a consumer emphasis. 
 
2.2.6 Governance 
Governance refers to ―... a new process for governing‖ (Rhodes, 1997) where 
the centre of attention is on mechanisms that do not rest on recourse to the 
authority and sanctions of Government, leading to a focus on outcomes and so 
is better able to deal with cross-cutting issues. As a consequence, the 
boundaries between the public and private sectors are more blurred, with 
informal as well as formal relationships, and partnerships and networks are 
seen as being centrally important (Stoker and Wilson, 2004). 
 
The Labour Government elected in 1997 did not overturn the initiatives 
described above introduced by the previous Government, although some would 
be modified. Many of the modified initiatives were brought together under the 
overarching framework of the ―Best Value‖ regime. ―Best Value‖ was explicitly 
based on performance management principles, and emerged to replace CCT 
because, according to Leach and Percy-Smith (2001) it had been only partially 
successful in making local services more efficient and economic, had been 
perceived as being rigid and prevented innovation, and was biased in favour of 
 52 
the private sector and towards a form of contracting that was no longer seen as 
representing best practice. The view was that CCT could not simply be 
abolished – it had to be replaced with a system that continued to emphasise 
economy and efficiency in service delivery. 
 
The management of ―Best Value‖ involved many of the initiatives introduced by 
the Conservative Government, for example: organisations setting corporate 
objectives and the use of performance indicators. ―Best Value‖ built on these by 
including a duty to consult with the community and other stakeholders, with 
partnerships seen as having an important part to play in improving services 
(Geddes, 1999). 
 
The ―Third Way‖ had implications for the delivery of public services. The view of 
the Labour Government (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003) had been that, under 
―Thatcherism‖, too much faith had been placed in markets. New Labour 
believed that individuals were not just competitive and self-interested but also 
co-operative and concerned for the welfare of others. The extension of this 
belief was that public services should encourage co-operation while continuing 
to use market mechanisms where suitable. Also, in promoting customer-
focused services, Labour adopted features of ―new public management‖ when it 
considered them suitable while arguing that elements such as quasi-markets 
and contracting-out maintained an unhealthy dichotomy between the public and 
private sectors.  
 
Blair (1996) identified trust – the recognition of a mutual purpose and mutual 
benefits – as being the basis for the networks for delivering public services. 
Bevir and Rhodes (2003) commented that under the ―Third Way‖, trust was 
promoted inside organisations through forms of management that allowed 
individuals responsibility and discretion, that citizens should trust organisations 
to provide suitable services, and that organisations should trust citizens to use 
the services properly. 
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2.2.6.1 Multi-level Governance 
According to Skelcher (2004), at the sub-national level in Britain since the 
1980s there has been a shift from local government to local governance, in 
which elected local authorities have become just one of a number of bodies 
―governing‖ at the local level. With the development of appointed boards, local 
―quangos‖ and partnership organisations, elected members were less central to 
the direct delivery of services. Local government became one of a number of 
collaborators in multi-level partnerships with central Government, regional 
development agencies, the private sector, and voluntary agencies. 
 
2.2.7 Political Management 
Local authorities are the only local bodies that have to combine professional 
management with political management (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001). The 
systems arranged around functional committees remained largely intact, with 
some revisions in the 1960s, from the nineteenth century up until the changes 
introduced by the Labour Government in the 1990s.   
 
Until the late 1960s, local authorities consisted of functional departments, each 
with its own chief officer who reported to a committee of councillors. These 
committees operated relatively autonomously, with little overall co-ordination in 
their activities, and the role of the full council was, in general, to ratify their 
decisions. Co-ordination was carried out by the controlling party group and, 
from the 1970s, through strategic management arrangements.  
 
The disadvantages of the committee system – recommending that members 
should be more involved with strategy-setting, policy planning and performance 
review rather than detailed administration and financial control, and local 
authorities needed to resolve the tension between members‘ political, 
representational and organisational roles – were incorporated into Labour‘s 
White Paper ―Modernising Local Government‖ (DETR, 1998b) which identified 
several challenges: 
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1. That the existing committee structures lead to inefficient and opaque 
decision-making by small groups of key members, often behind closed 
doors; 
2. That members spent too much time, often unproductively, in committee 
meetings rather than representing the community or scrutinising the work 
of the council; 
3. That there was little effective political leadership in most authorities, and 
that it was not always clear who was taking decisions and who should be 
praised or blamed. 
The result was contained in the Local Government (Organisation and 
Standards) Act, 1999, which required all local authorities to introduce new 
political management arrangements, selected from a range of options, which 
represented a central principle of separating the executive from the 
representative and scrutiny functions of members, where the executive role was 
to propose the policy framework and implement policies within the agreed 
framework, and ―backbench‖ councillors would represent their constituents, 
share in the policy and budget decisions of the full council, suggest policy 
improvements, and scrutinise the policy proposals of, and implementation by, 
the executive. 
 
The perception summarised by Dearlove (1973) of local government as ―mere 
agents‖ of central Government, the ―persistence of centralism‖ and the 
―passivity of locality‖ persists up to today. According to Laffin (2008:112) local 
authorities emerged from evaluation studies into the Labour Government‘s 
Local Government Modernisation Agenda (LGMA) begun in 1997 as largely 
passive recipients of central policy initiatives. Central policies eclipsed local 
accountability, and elected members in office reportedly were "following central 
governments lead, rather than setting their own agendas‖. Laffin (2008) quoting 
Martin and Bovaird (2005) suggested that, to date, the LGMA had encouraged 
an environment in which many authorities relied upon strong external pressure 
exerted by Government policies to motivate change. Many local authorities had 
reported that current central policies such as Comprehensive Performance 
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Assessment (CPA) have led them to see themselves as being more 
accountable to central Government and less to their own people (Ashworth and 
Skelcher, 2005). However, the post-1997 Labour Government initiatives were 
perceived by local authorities as being ―broadly congruent with their own local 
priorities‖, unlike those of the pre-1997 Conservative policies (Cowell and 
Martin, 2003). 
 
Research has suggested that local government remains ―curiously passive‖, 
with individual authorities experiencing central policies as imposed, which tends 
to be at odds with metaphors (such as ―partnership‖ and ―resource exchange‖) 
used in the literature to imply interaction in the central-local relationship. There 
is, according to Stewart (2000) little evidence to support the thinking that 
emerged in the 1990s of local authorities developing as locally based networks 
with a ―self-governing‖ momentum as advocated by, amongst others, Rhodes 
(1997). 
 
This deference toward the centre is still perceived to be the norm rather than 
the exception in the history of British local government. Past instances of local 
authority resistance to the centre, notably during the politically turbulent 1980s, 
have been historical anomalies (Laffin, 2008). 
 
Laffin (2008) suggested that the post-1997 Labour Government looked to re-
engineer local authorities as being strategic leaders within their local 
communities, enabling services to be delivered rather than necessarily 
delivering all services themselves. This Government‘s LGMA has included more 
than 20 individual policies, including: 
 New performance management regimes, starting with ―Best Value‖ and 
moving on to CPA. 
 New council constitutions which required authorities to replace traditional 
committee-based decision-making structures with an executive in the 
form of a leader-and-cabinet or an elected mayor, based upon a 
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distinction between an ―executive‖ and the ―legislative‖ role, together with 
new ethical codes for councillors and standards committees for councils. 
 Local agreements between central and individual local authorities 
designed to encourage ―joined-up‖ local strategic partnerships. 
Historically, policy-makers and reformers at the centre have optimized local 
authorities by influencing the office structure and forming alliances with them 
usually against local politicians. Laffin (2008) pointed to the current CPA 
arrangements as working on the basis of requiring the support of chief 
executives and chief officers, rather than among elected members, mainly 
because the career prospects of officers have come to hinge on CPA results. 
CPA, because it is backed by an enforcement system capable of detailed 
monitoring and ability to penalise authorities, requires the support of local allies 
in order for the centre to implement policies. 
 
Dearlove (1973) advanced the argument that an adequate assessment of the 
impact of central Government on the decisional activity of local authorities 
requires information to be assembled on two points: the willingness or 
―disposition‖ of the central Government to use the control techniques that it has 
at its disposal; and the responsiveness of local authorities to control attempts, 
where local authorities may not wish to be seen as being passive responders to 
central direction. In discussing the notion of ―disposition‖, Dearlove (1973) cited 
the Local Government Manpower Committees of 1950 and 1951 as setting the 
ideology of central-local relations, and that this ideology was one prepared to 
allow local authorities considerable amount of autonomy, in part ―reversing the 
policy of the 1945-1948 period‖ which was characterised by the then Labour 
Government‘s programme of social engineering through the introduction of the 
―Welfare State‖. A further argument advanced by Dearlove (1973) was that it 
was not sufficient to deal only with the preparedness of central Government to 
intervene in the work of local authorities; since many different central 
Government departments may be involved they may not share a common view 
as to what should be their role in relation to local authorities. In a systematic 
exploration of the different ―philosophies about local government‖, Griffith (1966) 
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quoted in Dearlove (1973) identified separate attitudes that characterised the 
attitude of central Government departments in their involvement in local 
government activity: laissez-faire, regulatory and promotional.  
 
2.2.8 Councillor/Officer Roles and Rules 
Where the local authority is a ―semi-independent, politically decentralised, multi-
functional body, created by and exercising responsibilities conferred by 
Parliament‖ then the council is the legal embodiment of the local authority, i.e. 
the body of elected councillors who have collectively determined and are 
ultimately responsible for the policy and actions of the authority (Wilson and 
Game, 2006). 
 
Earlier sections described the changing nature of local government, particularly 
since 1979, and Wilson and Game (2006) summarised the current role of 
councillors as being: 
 To represent, to be accountable to, and to advocate for, all of their 
electors; 
 Formulating policies and practices for the local authority; 
 Monitoring their effectiveness; 
 Providing leadership for their community; and 
 Maintaining the highest standards of conduct and ethics. 
Traditionally, local government officers are the paid officials of the council, they 
derive from it their powers and duties and their actions are performed in the 
name of the council. Responsibility for implementing council policy is delegated 
to officers, who tend to be organised into a number of departments, each of 
which has responsibility for providing a particular service or function. A feature 
of the internal organisational structure of local authorities (Redcliffe-Maud and 
Wood, 1974) has been the predominance of professionally qualified officers, 
particularly chief officers. Professional qualifications are then an essential 
feature of career progression. 
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Writing in the 1980s, the Widdicombe Committee (1986) outlined the ―model of 
correct practice‖ in the relationship between councillors and officers to include: 
 The officer‘s right to draw up the agenda and to have sole responsibility 
for the drafting of committee reports and the recommendations contained 
therein; 
 Officers should be provided with the facilities to provide briefings to 
committee chairs and vice-chairs before meetings; 
 Appointment of officers should be on the basis of professional expertise, 
ability and experience; 
 Councillors should channel requests for information through chief officers 
or through their specified deputies, and junior officers would not normally 
have access to members; 
 Councillors should not become involved in the management of 
departments, management should be the responsibility of chief officers; 
 Councillors should concentrate on making policy and leave officers to 
implement those policies; 
 Officers should not expect to have any involvement in the drawing up of 
political manifestos. 
Stewart (2000) suggested that the nature of councillor-officer relationship has 
probably always varied. Snell (1938:68) quoted in Redcliffe-Maud and Wood 
(1974) commented that ―Since...some councillors are liable to be annoyed by 
advice proffered by officials, officials have been obliged to work out more or less 
consciously the tactics of winning the confidence and support of committees‖. 
Similarly, Dearlove (1973) considered it reasonable to suggest that the internal 
sources (i.e. officers) on which councillors relied for their information were not 
likely to provide information that conflicted with their existing ideas and 
commitments, and at the same time councillors avoided external information 
sources where ideas were more likely than those generated internally to clash 
with existing commitments and pose new claims of a different and unwanted 
kind. Senior councillors, according to Dearlove (1973:188) were ―more likely to 
pass on information which was partial and consonant with existing policy, and 
are more likely to question the legitimacy of any new claim which challenges the 
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council‘s existing policy than to question the policy itself.‖ To this end, officers 
could not be regarded as a ―safe‖ source of information because they were 
experts charged with providing councillors with impartial and objective advice 
which should, therefore, take in all sides of a problem or issue. 
 
Stewart (2000) advanced the idea that the assumption of the relationship 
between councillors and officers – that councillors decide policy and officers 
implement it – conceals the reality that policy is often made in implementation, 
that implementation influences the making of policy and that officer advice 
necessarily influences policy. Similarly, while officers carry the burden of 
implementation, this does not mean that implementation is of no concern to 
councillors. 
 
Regarding the internal and informal politics of policy-making with local 
authorities, Wilson and Game (2006) identified three analytical models: 
 The Formal Model – derived from the ―legal-institutional‖ approach, which 
saw power relationships in formal terms and focused on the formal 
structures of decision-making, i.e. the council, its committees and 
departments. Under this model, councillors made policy, while officers 
advise them and carry out the policies. Critics of the model argued that it 
perhaps reflected more what should happen rather that what actually 
happened. 
 The Technocratic Model – viewed officers as the dominant force in local 
politics, with their power residing in their control of specialised technical 
and professional knowledge, which was ―un-possessed by (and possibly 
incomprehensible to) part-time, amateur, generalist councillors‖ (Wilson 
and Game, 2006). Critics of the model argued that while the specialist 
knowledge and complexity of work carried out by officers could appear 
formidable to newer, inexperienced councillors, the same was probably 
not true with regard to leading and longer serving councillors. 
 The Joint Elite Model – maintained that policy-making was dominated by 
a small group of leading majority-party councillors (which under the 
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Labour Government reforms is likely to be constituted by the council 
―cabinet‖) and senior and chief officers. However, critics of this model 
(Young and Mills, 1983) argued that the very exercise of reutilized power 
by those at the top of a hierarchy made them less likely to be sources of 
policy change than those lower down, who have learned from direct 
operational experience. In many ways, this is a re-statement of the 
distinction made by Dearlove (1973) between public policy-making and 
policy decision-making. 
Wilson and Game (2006) suggested that the above three models all dated from 
the era of the committee-system, and that a fourth model would be more 
appropriate for ―post-modern‖ analysis: 
 The ―Dynamic Dependency‖ analysis – where all councillor and officer 
behaviour could be seen as the outcome of the interplay of ―institutional 
understandings‖ – the formal and informal rules within the organisation 
that structure action and influence outcomes, including the departmental 
and hierarchical nature of local government, the understanding that 
officers are (or should be) politically neutral and serve the whole council 
– and the skill of individual ‗actors‘ in exercising their respective 
resources (Gains, 2004). Under ―Dynamic Dependency‖ analysis, there 
is no assumption that values and priorities are shared but it does 
emphasise how local history and political culture can vary between 
different local authorities by virtue of the relative strengths and clout of 
councillors and members. 
The transformation since 1997 of the formal institutional framework within which 
local authorities and local leadership operated included new arrangements for 
executive decision-making, the introduction of CPA, and the spread of 
partnership working and public consultation (Stoker and Wilson, 2004; Wilson 
and Game, 2006). However, Leach and Lowndes (2007) argued that there was 
no one-to-one relationship between these structural changes and the behaviour 
of local government leaders, with different innovations pulling in different 
directions in terms of the incentives and obligations that they place upon 
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leaders. In addition, the recent changes in formal arrangements are being 
interpreted locally through the ―institutional filters of beliefs, assumptions and 
practices that typically emphasize traditional values and ways of working‖ 
(Leach and Lowndes, 2007:184). 
 
Much of the literature relating to councillor-officer relationships focuses on 
higher-level interactions between council leaders and chief executives/chief 
officers. Leach (2010), examining the impact of the Labour‘s local governments 
agenda on relationships, suggested that the move to an executive format 
presented an opportunity for elected members to change the balance of 
responsibility from officers to members, with council leaders also being able to 
strengthen their power with regard to cabinet colleagues and non-executive 
members. The evidence (Leach et al, 2005; Leach 2010) suggested that council 
leaders have tended to avoid the ―enhanced visibility‖ brought about by the new 
political models by exercising their decision responsibilities on a collective basis 
with the executive cabinet members. A consequence of this has been that non-
executive members have reported unfavourable comparisons between the ‗old-
style‘ committee system, where they took decisions, and the new service-based 
or overview and scrutiny panels, where they had no such powers and operated 
as little more than ―talking shops‖. 
 
However, Leach (2010) identified that the Government‘s Comprehensive 
Performance Assessment (CPA), designed to strengthen the performance and 
inspection culture in local government, and was likely to have strengthened the 
role of officers, particularly chief executives, with regard to elected members. 
This was on the assumption that members would want to see their authorities 
rated positively, and so would have to rely on the chief executive to interpret the 
―rules of the game‖ and advise on which steps needed to be taken. Again, the 
reality was suggested to be somewhat different. Where some administrations 
were responsive to some or all of the attempts at influence, others resisted for 
justifiable political reasons. Some chief executives reported a degree of political 
indifference to the CPA process and how it rated the authority, and others were 
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unable to persuade party leaders to present a united front for the CPA 
inspectors. 
 
As part of Labour‘s transformation, the Government also proposed a new 
ethical framework as an important element in the desired culture of local 
government, stating that in a council ―…which puts people first, the culture will 
be one where the highest standards of personal service is valued, and where 
the highest standards of personal conduct are the norm‖ (DETR, 1998:49). This 
framework was established by the Local Government Act 2000, and was stated 
to reflect the report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, also known as 
the Nolan Committee. The Nolan Committee had commented on the 
―…relatively few, but highly publicised, cases where things have gone wrong or 
people have behaved improperly, But it is important to set such cases in the 
context of more than 20,000 councillors and 2,000,000 employees in local 
government‖ (Nolan Report, 1997:3). 
 
2.2.9 Political Structures 
The Labour Government elected in 1997 argued that new political structures 
were required because the traditional culture of local government was 
expressed in and reinforced by political structures based on the committee 
system ―...enclosing the authority rather than opening it up to the public‖ 
(Stewart, 2003:55). The committee system had been part of local government 
since the introduction of elected municipal government in the early 1800s, and 
was based upon the statutory precept that the council was the corporate body 
responsible for all that happened in the authority. The council exercised that 
responsibility through a series of committees, with the work of the council 
divided between the committees, usually according to the main functions or 
services of the authority. 
 
The 1997 Blair administration argued that the committee system had basic 
weaknesses, in that the system was confusing and inefficient with significant 
decisions being taken elsewhere than in councils; councillors were perceived to 
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have little influence over decisions but spent a great deal of their time in council 
meetings (DETR, 1998). 
 
The Maud Committee (Redcliffe-Maud and Wood, 1974) reported on the 
management of local government and highlighted the time-consuming nature of 
the committee system and the volume of paper involved. The Committee went 
on to criticise the lack of co-ordination between grouping of different 
committees, each carrying out its own special duties and championing its own 
causes, relying on horizontal committees, personal contacts, party machinery 
and the efforts of officers to achieve co-ordination. The Maud Report (Redcliffe-
Maud and Wood, 1974) recommended the elimination of the executive 
responsibilities of committees and the establishment of a management board of 
between five to nine councillors as the executive of the council. 
 
Maud did identify some strengths of the committee system, in that they kept 
members informed and gave them and understanding of the working of the 
various services, and proposed that committees should continue as deliberative 
rather than executive bodies that made recommendations to the management 
board and reviewed progress. Whilst the Maud recommendations were not 
adopted by local authorities, there was recognition within local government of a 
need to reduce the number of committees and to improve co-ordination, and 
many of the newly-created authorities in the local government reorganisation of 
1974 adopted a policy committee and streamlined committee structure (Stewart, 
2003). 
 
The Widdicombe Committee (Widdicombe Report, 1986) recommended that the 
system of decision-taking in local government should be one in which the 
council was a corporate body, where decisions were taken openly and on behalf 
of the whole council without any separate source of executive authority, and 
where officers served the council as a whole. 
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The Labour Government elected in 1997 proposed (DETR, 1998) that all local 
authorities would be required to adopt new structures characterised by: 
 Efficiency – where a decision can be taken quickly, responsively and 
accurately to meet the needs of the community 
 Transparency – where it is clear to people who is responsible for 
decision 
 Accountability – where people can measure the actions taken against the 
policies and plans on which those responsible were elected to office 
 High standards of conduct – by all involved to ensure public confidence 
and trust 
 
The Local Government Act 2000 required all authorities in England with a 
population of 85,000 to introduce one of three new structures: 
 Directly elected mayor and cabinet – The mayor appoints a cabinet from 
among the councillors, and can determine the powers to be exercised by 
the cabinet, by individual cabinet members, by officers or by themselves. 
The key argument for and against directly elected mayors is the same 
(Stewart, 2003) in that it creates one clear point of responsibility and 
accountability. This can be a strength, in that it creates a focus for power 
and influence both within the authority and within the community; it can 
be a weakness because of the potential for corruption, and authoritarian 
approach, and the possible neglect of issues that do not command 
mayoral attention; 
 A leader appointed by the council with a cabinet – In many ways this 
similar to the preceding arrangements, where there was an unofficial 
executive based on the leadership of the majority party. This model was 
distinguished by the dependence of the leader on the support of the 
council and vice versa (Stewart, 2003); or 
 A directly elected mayor with a council manager – Under this model, it is 
the council manager, who is appointed by the council, rather than the 
mayor that has executive powers. There is no cabinet in this model, and 
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the mayor and council manager together act as the executive (Stewart, 
2003). 
2.3 Current Role and Functions 
Stoker (2004) commented on the switch in local government from a system 
dominated by elected local government to a system of local governance, in 
which a wider range of institutions and actors are involved in local politics and 
service delivery. Through central Government reforms, councils have lost some 
responsibilities completely, and those it has retained have, almost without 
exception, been exposed to private sector competition. It has been suggested 
(Wilson and Game, 2006) that future role of local government is to be a 
commissioner rather than a direct-provider of services, with councils working 
alongside a range of other service-providers in their localities. Stoker (2004:3) 
referred to this arrangement as being ―...the new string of institutions of local 
governance‖. 
 
Changes to housing policy mentioned above also illustrated the shift in local 
authorities from direct provision of services. Wilson and Game (2006) identified 
three options for getting social housing up to its Decent Homes Standard: 
1. Transfer to housing associations; 
2. Use of Private Finance Initiative, where the council retains ownership but 
the private sector raises the finance required to undertake the required 
activities, and are then repair, typically over 30 years; or 
3. Arm’s Length Management Organisations (ALMO), where, for example, 
the council retains ownership but contracts a not-for-profit company to 
manage the housing stock through a management board comprising 
council representatives and tenants. 
 
2.4 Central/Local Government Relationship 
2.4.1Local Government under the Conservatives 
The Conservative Government elected in 1979 has a claim (Dearlove and 
Saunders, 2000) to be regarded as the most radical administration since the 
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Labour Government elected in 1945, in that it challenged orthodoxies that had 
been accepted up to then by all post-War Governments. According to Dearlove 
and Saunders (2000:524), this Conservative administration set out to the 
reverse the long history of Britain‘s economic decline, which it blamed largely on 
Keynesian economic policies and the politics of ―corporatism‖. In challenging 
these, the Government declared its intent to remove the ―props and crutches‖ 
on which British industry had come to lean in order to expose British firms and 
trade unions to the ―cleansing blast‖ of international competition. The 
Government‘s economic strategy was based upon an analysis of the perceived 
ills of the British economy which emphasised four main contributory causes: 
powerful trades unions; profligate Government spending; an inefficient public 
sector; and inflationary monetary policies. 
 
The Government‘s case against powerful trades unions was that: 
 Resistance against new, labour-saving technologies by refusing to allow 
their members to operate them; 
 Wage rises and other improvements in employment conditions that could 
not be justified by improvements in profitability or productivity; 
 They slowed down production by insisting on arcane demarcation rules; 
 Jealously guarded their own union‘s positions, meaning that employers 
had to negotiate separately with multiple unions before coming to 
agreements covering the whole workforce; and 
 Unions were often in the hands of politically-motivated extremists who 
could – and did – ―wreak havoc‖ by calling strikes and industrial action 
with little regard for democratic procedures. 
 
The Thatcher administration believed (Dearlove and Saunders, 2000) that 
successive post-War administrations had contributed to the power of trades 
unions by adopting Keynesian full-employment policies, which had 
strengthened the bargaining power of the unions, and by developing corporate 
management strategies that included union leaders. From 1979 onwards, the 
Conservative Government set out to weaken the power of the unions by 
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allowing unemployment to rise; by legislating on issues such as the right to 
picket; by reducing union involvement in policy-making bodies; and by resisting 
attempts from public sector workers to breach the Government‘s cash limits on 
public sector pay. 
 
The second ‗ill‘ identified by the incoming Conservative Government was the 
perceived long history of profligate Government spending, based upon a ―bias 
of excessive expectation in democracy‖ (Dearlove and Saunders, 2000:526), 
and the Conservatives determined the need to cut spending and resist special 
pleading from interest groups demanding more money from the public purse. To 
this end, aid to industry was cut (despite pleas from the CBI and TUC); and 
cash limits were imposed on the public sector, which the Government showing 
itself willing to sit-out any ensuing strikes rather than give in to them; and 
welfare spending was cut, despite campaigns on behalf of those on low 
incomes by the ‗poverty lobby‘. 
 
The third ‗ill‘ which the Government set out to tackle was the ―inefficient‖ public 
sector (Dearlove and Saunders, 2000:527), and they believed that public sector 
industries were inherently less efficient than their private sector counterparts, 
and which were a further drain on the public purse through the constant ―drip-
feed‖ of subsidies that were leading to higher taxes on the more efficient private 
sector companies that were in danger of collapsing under the burden. The 
Government took the view that, in the classical, traditional view of Adam Smith, 
the state should be responsible for providing only those goods and services 
which the private sector could not – or would not. Between 1979 and 1997, the 
Government sold off its stake in: car companies, (including ―Rover‖ and 
―Jaguar‖); the national airline (―British Airways‖); the country‘s main airports 
through the sale of the British Airports Authority; transportation companies 
including rail (―British Rail‖), ports, local bus companies and long-distance 
coach travel (including the ―National Bus Company‖ and ―National Express‖); 
and national oil companies (such as ―BP‖). 
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Of particular relevant to this thesis, the Government also privatised the 
provision of utility services including gas, electricity (both generation and 
distribution), telecommunications, and the regional water and sewage service 
providers. 
 
The Government‘s view was that whereas private firms were forced by 
competition to improve their efficiency, reduce costs and stay responsive to 
their customers, the publicly-owned industries were seen as being bureaucratic 
and non-innovative because they were immune from the threat of bankruptcy, 
sheltered from the need for competition, and had no incentive to economise 
because funds could always be relied upon from central Government. The 
Government‘s privatisation programme is discussed further in section 2.4.1.1 
below. 
 
The fourth ―ill‖ targeted by the incoming Government was the commitment to 
maintain low inflation. The Thatcher administration believed that most of the 
other problems that it was trying to address – union power, increasing public 
expenditure, and the inefficiency of the public sector – could be traced back to 
the traditional willingness and ability of Governments to increase the supply of 
money and thereby stoke-up inflation. Whereas most post-War Governments 
had believed that inflation was caused mainly by wage increases pushing up 
production costs and so prices, the Thatcher administration, influenced by the 
work of Milton Friedman, took the view that inflation was caused by the 
Government increasing the amount of money in circulation faster than the rate 
of increase in the actual buying and selling of goods and services, and so 
adopted a policy of tightening the supply of money, i.e. monetarism. 
 
The election of the Conservative Government under Margaret Thatcher in 1979 
has been seen as pivotal for the changing orientation of local government 
(Glynn and Murphy, 1996). According to Glynn and Murphy (1996) the 
Government‘s belief was that the public sector had come to represent too large 
a share of the nation‘s gross domestic product, contained significant 
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inefficiencies and was insufficiently accountable for its activities. The 
Government, therefore, was committed to ―rolling back the frontiers of the state‖ 
and its two main areas of reform concerned finances, where part of the 
Conservative agenda was to reduce taxation and public sector borrowing – the 
two principle ways the public sector raises money – as a percentage of GDP, 
and organisation, where the Government removed a large number of local 
government functions, either to itself or un-elected ―quangos‖, and forced local 
government to privatise significant portions of their functions through CCT. 
 
From a wider perspective, the Conservatives carried out extensive reforms to 
industrial relations, particularly with regard to trades unions. There was a 
systematic exclusion of ―interest groups‖ from the policy making process. Talbot 
suggests that there was an increase in political lobbying, which led to the ―cash 
for questions‖ controversy and the eventual establishment of the Nolan (now the 
Neill) Committee on standards in public life. 
 
2.4.1.1 Privatisation 
As well as looking to reform local government, the Conservative Government 
first elected in 1979 also embarked on a programme of privatising the supply 
and provision of public utility service, i.e. water, gas, electricity and 
telecommunications.  
 
The aims of privatisation (Dearlove and Saunders, 2000) were to: 
 Improve Government finances. Because nationalised industries 
borrowed to finance new investment, this raised the level of public-sector 
borrowing and so of Government debt. Once privatised, companies could 
borrow from the markets without having any effect on the public 
accounts. Furthermore, proceeds from privatisations could be counted as 
―negative spending‖ and so allowed the Government to both reduce 
borrowing and reduce spending; 
 Increase efficiency. With the prevailing economic wisdom being that firms 
operating in competitive markets tended to be more efficient than those 
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in a monopoly position, it was the view of the Conservative Government 
that privatisation would expose monopolistic public sector industries to 
competition and therefore force efficiency gains. Dearlove and Saunders 
(2000:530) pointed out that British Gas was sold in 1986 as one big, 
monopolistic company, rather than being broken up into smaller firms, 
and from then on the Government talked less about the competitive 
benefits of privatisation whilst emphasising that private ownership itself 
made companies more efficient, even if they remained monopolies.  
 Reduce union power. By the late 1970s, some of the most powerful 
unions were in public sector industries, industries which provided both 
basic and essential services and or were monopolistic, meaning that 
Governments lacked alternative suppliers when unions did take action. 
Privatisation offered an opportunity to weaken these unions by ending 
the possibility of state subsidies to pay for additional demands. 
 Improve the quality of management. Nationalised industries had been 
used by successive Governments as part of their macro-economic policy: 
in times of increasing inflation, Governments would prevent industries 
from increasing their prices; conversely, they could force industries to 
raise prices so that they could repay debt to the Exchequer; nationalised 
industries could be forced to buy from domestic suppliers even when 
overseas suppliers were offering cheaper or better products; and 
nationalised industries could be pressed to keep open uneconomic 
plants in politically sensitive parts of the country. The aim of privatisation 
was to de-politicise the management of these industries and so enable 
them to run on strictly commercial principles. 
 
Wolf (2008) summarised the benefits of privatisation as introducing competition 
into the newly privatised industries, as in the case of telecommunications, or as 
a way of allowing ―...essential activities to escape from the dead hand of 
Treasury curbs on public investment‖. Private finance was more expensive but 
at least investments were being made. In Table 2.1 below the author sets out 
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details of the main utility privatisations that were carried out between 1984 and 
1991: 
 
Table 2.1: Privatisations 1984-1990 
Date Company Regulator 
Nov 1984 British Telecom Ofcom 
Dec 1986 British Gas Ofgem 
Dec 1989 Regional Water Companies Ofwat 
Dec 1990 Electricity Distribution Companies Ofgem 
 
The Government‘s privatisation policy, particularly with regard to the public 
utility companies, had implications for the relationship between the utilities 
companies and the local highway authorities. Marvin and Slater (1997) set out 
these implications and the impact that it has had for ―holes in the road‖. They 
suggest that privatisation has resulted in a number of tensions between utility 
companies and highway authorities. 
 Transaction costs to the privatised utility companies arising from their 
use of a ‗public good‘ in the form of road space. 
 Sharing out the limited space under the highway amongst companies 
competing in the same market and providing the same service. 
 ―Blocking‖ behaviours by the more established utility companies with little 
motivation or incentive to work with competitors. 
 Opportunities for innovation by (i) utility companies as they integrate 
horizontally and provide several utility services in a localised area; and 
(ii) by central and local government in managing the highway network. 
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2.4.2 Local Government under Labour (1997-2010) 
Labour came to power in 1997 committed to not changing Conservative 
spending plans for at least two years and to no new tax increases. However, in 
1999, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM, 2005) published an 
assessment of local government‘s weaknesses. They concluded that local 
government was seen as being ‗paternalistic‘, where elected members and 
officers decided what services were to be provided on the basis of what suits 
them as provider, and where authorities operated on an old, effectively 
nineteenth century, framework with ―modernisation‖, e.g. CCT, grafted on. A 
further criticism of the framework was that it relied on a committee-based 
system, which was perceived to have a ―behind closed doors‖ ethos.  
 
There was also a perception that local authorities relied more on increasing 
spending and taxes rather than looking to get more from existing resources, and 
that services were delivered poorly by inflexible and demoralised staff. 
 
In addition, changes were identified in the environment in which local authorities 
operated, with turnout at elections being low – in general elections the UK 
averaged 74%, whereas, for example, Denmark averaged 80%; turnout in UK 
general elections since 1997 has averaged just over 60% (House of Commons 
Research Papers 01/54 and 05/33), and voting did not take into account ―life 
mobility‖, where people moved more frequently and often did not live where 
they worked. 
 
In their White Paper entitled ―Modern Local Government: In Touch With The 
People‖ (DETR, 1998a), Labour identified a number of policies to tackle these 
weaknesses. Part of their approach in the White Paper was to place on councils 
a duty to promote the economic, social and environmental well-being of their 
areas and to strengthen council‘s powers to enter into partnership. As well as 
being service providers, councils were to become ―community leaders‖. 
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A central theme of Labour‘s reforms was that of enhancing the responsiveness 
of services to users. In 1998, there was a re-launch of the ‗Citizen‘s Charter‘ 
entitled ―Service First‖, which included a specific requirement to consult and 
involve users of public services. According to Barnett (2002), this could be 
interpreted as a continuation of the Conservatives‘ ―consumerist‖ stance, with 
their attempts to make the public sector more market-like, and builds on the 
setting of standards of service embodied in the ‗Citizen‘s Charter‘. 
 
―Best Value‖ extended the theme of consultation with service users by requiring 
councils to have an on-going programme of service reviews, and the publication 
of local performance plans, both of which increased the use of performance 
indicators and inspection regimes. Whilst CCT was unambiguous about what 
was required – issue of tender, receipt of tender, selection of provider – ―Best 
Value‖ was more difficult to define. The notion of ―Best Value‖ prior to 
implementation was enshrined within the consultation document ―Modernising 
Local Government - Improving local services through best value‖ (DETR 
1998c), which set out four defining elements of Best Value: 
1. The duty to secure economic, efficient and effective services 
continuously (the ‗3 Es‘). 
2. Service reviews within which the authority must demonstrate that in the 
fulfilment of their duties under ―Best Value‖ they have compared their 
service provision with that of other private and public providers, 
consulted with local business and community, considered competition in 
provision; and challenged the reasons for, and methods of, provision (the 
‗4 Cs‘). 
3. A regime of audit and measurement of performance, with the broad 
expectation that, year-on-year, costs would reduce and quality would 
increase. Performance would be monitored locally through ―Best Value‖ 
Performance Reviews (BVPRs), partly through adherence to locally and 
statutorily determined ―Best Value‖ performance indicators (BVPIs), and 
disseminated annually through Performance Plans (BVPPs). 
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4. Consequence of performance: Government intervention in cases of ―Best 
Value‖ failure, and reward in cases of success. 
 
Table 2.2 below sets out the Transport BVPIs currently in effect: 
Table 2.2: Transport BVPIs
BVPI No. Description
99a Number of people killed or seriously injured in road traffic collisions
99b Number of children (aged under 16) killed or seriously injured in road traffic collisions
99c Number of people slightly injured in road traffic collisions
100 Number of days of temporary traffic controls on traffic sensitive roads
165 Percentage of pedestrian crossings with facilities for diabled people
178 Percentage of total length of rights of way that are easy to use by the general public
187 Percentage of the general footway network where structural maintenance should be considered
source: Kirklees Metropolitan Council, "Council Performance Plan 2007/2008"  
 
Labour‘s concerns about the declining levels of political and civic activity were 
addressed through its proposals for ―democratic renewal‖. This was partly 
derived from Labour‘s adoption of the ―Third Way‖, where inclusion into the 
mainstream of society is to be gained at a price: there are to be no rights 
without responsibilities. Barnett says that these reforms were intended to 
address the role of councils as both objects and promoters of ―democratic 
renewal‖, galvanising public interest by creating new political structures such as 
directly elected mayors, new forms of political executives, and the creation of 
―cabinets‖. 
 
According to Bevir and Rhodes (2003) the way in which the incoming Labour 
Government recognised the need for new policies in response to the dilemmas 
highlighted by ―Thatcherism‖ – welfare dependency, state ―overload‖, inflation, 
and globalisation – whilst maintaining a social democratic vision. In coining the 
term the ―Third Way‖, Giddens (1998) argued that the growth of economic and 
political internationalisation, combined with much greater social diversification, 
and had undermined the ability of the traditional state to promote or control 
social and economic outcomes. He contended that rigid hierarchical state 
structures, often associated with Weberian models of bureaucracy, were 
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incapable of meeting aspirations or fulfilling the needs of an increasingly 
heterogeneous society. According to Giddens (1998:27), the election of Tony 
Blair as prime minister in 1997 confirmed ―...the failure of socialism as an 
economic structure of management ... and the failure of Thatcherism, and neo-
liberalism more generally.‖ The ―Third Way‖ was an attempt to resolve a crucial 
dilemma for the new Labour Government – how to accept some of the key 
reforms introduced by Thatcherism while not turning its back on the idea of the 
welfare state.  
 
The notion of a ―Third Way‖ advocated neither bureaucracy nor markets but 
rather networks based on trust, The ―Third Way‖ was influenced by the idea of a 
society of stakeholders, where the state formed partnerships and networks 
between a range of groups in society, including businesses, employees, and 
voluntary and public sectors. 
 
These pressures lead to a transformation in the management of public-sector 
organisations, moving from traditional bureaucratic systems of public 
administration to a more market-oriented results-driven system of public 
management (Horton, 2003). This management revolution was widely 
described (Lane, 2000; Pollitt, 2003) as being ―new public management‖ (NPM), 
which featured a number of elements, including a shift in the focus of 
management systems and efforts from inputs and processes towards outputs 
and outcomes; a shift towards more measurement and quantification, especially 
in the form of systems of ‗performance indicators‘ and ‗standards‘; and a 
widespread substitution of contracts (or contract-like relationships) for what 
were previously formal, hierarchical relationships. 
 
2.4.3 Local Government under the Coalition Government (2010) 
Glasman (2010) suggested that the financial crash of 2008 intensified the 
general perception of policy failure by New Labour as social problems had 
proved more durable than anticipated. According to Glasman (2010), it was 
against this context of perceived policy failure, financial constraints and political 
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disenchantment with state-drive social democracy that David Cameron, leader 
of the Conservative party, outlined in 2009 his notion of the ―Big Society‖. 
  
Glasman (2010) identified four components to the ―Big Society‖: 
1. Civic responsibility, including volunteering and an active sense of 
community; 
2. Social entrepreneurs – people whose work it is to strengthen society, 
where limited funds have been made available from dormant bank 
accounts to support initiatives or make-up shortfalls; 
3. Mutualisation of public services – where emphasis is placed on 
generating common solutions to problems, and where communal self-
help compliments individual self-help; 
4. Radical localism – particularly with regard to civic government through a 
significant increase in civic autonomy. 
 
The general election in the United Kingdom in 2010 produced a ‗hung 
parliament‘, with no party having overall control. The Conservative party (306 
seats, 36.1% share of the vote) had the most number of seats and largest 
proportion of the vote, and eventually formed a coalition Government with the 
Liberal Democrat party (57 seats, 23% share of the vote). The Labour party had 
258 seats (29% share of the vote), with other parties having 28 seats (11.9% of 
the vote). 
 
The Coalition Government, through the Cabinet Office, issued a ―manifesto‖ in 
May 2010 entitled ―The Coalition: our programme for government‖, in which was 
set out the policies that the two parties in the coalition had agreed. In the 
Foreword (Cabinet Office, 2010:7) the prime minister and deputy prime minister 
noted that: 
 
“...the days of big government are over; that centralisation and top-down 
control have proved a failure”.  
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On the future of local government, the Government stated (Cabinet Office, 
2010:11) that its intention was to: 
 
“...promote decentralisation and democratic engagement, and we will 
end the era of top-down government by giving new powers to local 
councils, communities, neighbourhoods and individuals.” 
 
 
In reviewing the first year in office of the Coalition Government, Lowndes and 
Pratchett (2012) suggested that the Government‘s programme had to be viewed 
against the need to address the country‘s budget deficit and national debt that 
had occurred during the global financial crisis, increased public spending, and 
the previous administration‘s decision to take a share in a number of banks to 
ensure that they did not collapse. To address this, the Government set out its 
intention to eliminate the structural budget deficit by 2015, and measures taken 
to do this included cutting public spending, including a 27% cut in the 
Department for Communities and Local Government budget for local 
government over the period to 2015, and a two-year pay ―freeze‖ for public 
sector workers earning more than £21,000 per annum.  
 
However, in addition to addressing the public finances, the Government has set 
―localism‖ (Wilson and Game, 2011) at key feature of its strategy for local 
government, and its Localism Bill proposed the abolition of a range of large 
scale planning functions which, according to the Government, had blocked 
economic and social development, and included the abolition of Regional 
Spatial Strategies. The Bill also abolished the Standards Board which had 
regulated the activities of elected councillors. Alongside the Bill, the Coalition 
also announced the abolition of the Audit Commission and winding up of its 
performance framework, with Comprehensive Area Assessments no longer 
being the principal measure of local governance performance. The Place 
Survey, which collected and compared information on 18 National Indicators, 
was also to be scrapped and, instead, local authorities and other public bodies 
would be expected to develop their own performance measurement and 
reporting mechanisms, focusing on those issues which their communities want 
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rather than centrally defined or prescribed metrics (Lowndes and Pratchett, 
2011). 
 
2.4.4 Corporate Governance 
As well as direct reforms to the roles and functions of local government, central 
Government, both Conservative and Labour, instituted reforms to the corporate 
governance of private and public sector organisations.  
 
According to Dignam and Lowry (Mostovicz et al, 2011) corporate governance 
can be conceptualised as a set of processes, customs, policies, laws and 
institutions affecting the way a corporation is directed, administered or 
controlled, and its purpose is to influence directly or indirectly the behaviour of 
the organisation towards its stakeholders. This includes institutional settings 
such as terms of reference, articles of association, and other regulations that 
may affect the organisation in question, and the institutional monitoring 
instruments such as regulatory bodies, committees and boards, and auditors 
(Cadbury 1992). Privatisation of governance, which also involved market 
liberalisation and deregulation, can impact on the scope of activities, 
opportunities and threats faced by an organisation. Privatised organisations are 
governed by private institutional bodies. 
 
Within the United Kingdom, alongside the privatisation programme there has 
been a reform of corporate governance for private-sector forms, driven in part 
by the need for uniform practices across the European Union. The broad aims 
of corporate governance reform included (Dunlop, 1998) creating a framework 
for the control of large, powerful companies whose interests might not coincide 
with the national interest, ensuring that companies are answerable to all 
stakeholders, not just to shareholders and ensuring that companies behave in a 
socially responsible way. 
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2.4.4.1 The Cadbury Report 
The Cadbury Committee (the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance) was established in 1991 as a non-government-appointed 
commission in order to address a lack of confidence in financial reporting. The 
Committee‘s aims, founded on a narrow remit of the financial aspects of 
corporate governance, were to put forward practical ways of raising financial 
control and reporting standards, which could then be put into effect without the 
need for legislation.  
 
The Committee reported in 1992 (Report of the Committee on the Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance) and published a code of practice that 
included recommendations for: 
 The conduct of the board of directors, including the need for regular 
meetings and the division of roles and responsibilities between chairman 
and chief executive. 
 The board should comprise a significant number of non-executive 
directors who are independent of management and from any 
relationships within the company. 
 The contracts of executive directors not to exceed three years without 
shareholders‘ approval, and total emoluments to be subject to the 
recommendations of a remunerations committee. 
 The board to have a duty to present a balanced and understandable 
assessment of the company‘s position. 
 Directors should report on the effectiveness of internal controls and that 
the business is a going concern. 
 
2.4.4.2 The Greenbury Committee 
Following particular concern regarding the pay levels at the top of privatised 
utility companies, and an increased concern generally with issues of inequality, 
the Greenbury Committee was appointed to review the arrangements for paying 
directors and to make appropriate recommendations. The Committee reported 
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in 1995 and compliance with its recommendations was made a listing 
requirement with the London Stock Exchange.  
 
One of the key Greenbury recommendations was that the remuneration 
committees, established as part of the ―Cadbury Code‖, should consist entirely 
of non-executive directors ―with no personal financial interest other than as 
shareholders in the matters to be decided‖. This caused considerable adverse 
comment from some public company chief executives, who had regarded it as 
their responsibility to fix the pay of other directors, and that moving this 
responsibility to non-executive directors would weaken the position of the chief 
executive (Dunlop, 1998). 
 
2.4.4.4 The Nolan Committee 
Where the Greenbury Committee looked at issues of governance in the private 
sector, the Nolan Committee (Nolan Report, 1997) recommended that the 
Government draw up a statement of general principles of conduct for local 
authorities, particularly with regard to the conduct of members. The main 
recommendations were that each local authority should adopt a code of conduct 
based on a model reflecting these principles and that each authority should 
appoint a standards committee with powers to recommend disciplinary action by 
the council for breaches of the code, including suspension for up to three 
months. 
 
The main differences between the Nolan recommendations and Government 
legislation described above was in the role of local authorities, where the 
Government recommended that local authorities should have at least one 
independent member on the standards committee from outside the council; and 
that the main responsibility for enforcing standards was placed with a new 
national body, the Standards Board. However, the Coalition Government have 
included a provision in their Decentralisation and Localism Bill to abolish the 
Standards Board for England (Wilson and Game, 2011).  
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2.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has shown the development of local government in England, and 
the development from covering relatively small geographic areas to larger 
municipalities. The functions of local authorities have also changed over time, 
moving from the direct provision of services for collective needs, including 
public health and welfare, to providing services that the private sector either 
could not or would not provide. Whilst the local government framework has 
changed from it being a wholesale provider of services to, today, being more of 
a facilitator or commissioning body, local authorities do retain certain statutory 
powers and duties and, with regard to ‗highway works‘, have a dual role to 
perform – that of (1) a promoter of works to maintain the highway network, and 
(2) of a ‗street authority‘ with a duty to co-ordination the activities of all works 
promoters and to ensure compliance by promoters with the regulations issued 
under legislation.  
 
Alongside the changes in the nature, extent and complexity of services 
delivered by local authorities has developed the notion of the ―post code lottery‖, 
where local discretion within a local authority and between local authority areas 
has been identified. The literature has identified how the notion that certain 
uniform standards should be expected in the quality and provision of local 
authority services across the county is at odds with the literature (Dearlove, 
1973; Burns, 2000) which suggests that uniform provision of services differs not 
only between local authorities and also within local authorities. The extent to 
which such discretion happens links to other parts of the literature review for 
this thesis, particularly around the areas of inter-organisational collaboration 
and policy implementation, where the discretion of the actors involved has been 
shown to have an effect. This is an important point for this thesis, which seeks 
to examine the reasons for differences between local authorities in the 
implementation of central Government legislation. 
 
The ―mix‖ of services delivered or procured by local authorities has changed 
considerably since the establishment in the nineteenth century of today‘s form 
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of local government. Whilst the legislation relating to ‗highway works will be 
discussed more fully in chapter 3, it is worth noting here the change in 
categorisation of local authority highway functions – from convenience (under 
Redcliffe-Maud and Wood, 1974) to amenity (under Wilson and Game, 2006). 
Prior to the mid to late nineteenth century, highways and bridges were a means 
of moving people and good; from then on they also became the conduit for 
underground utility supplies, with the number of utilities being provide 
expanding from water, lighting and heating to also including telecommunications 
and digital technologies, all then forming part of an authority‘s strategic plan.  
 
The literature has shown that central Governments have had a significant 
impact on the structure, operation and functions of local authorities, and have 
used local government as a direct instrument for implementing political 
ideologies. This has included legislation to devolve powers to parliaments and 
assemblies at a sub-national level. As a consequence, legislation relating to 
‗highway works‘ is applied differently in the different countries that make up the 
United Kingdom, with this thesis focussing on the legislation that applies in 
England. 
 
Also included in central Government reforms was the notions of citizens as 
customers who should be able to expect certain standards of service, and who 
could be expected to play a part in the future role of, and services provided by, 
local authorities. This has a relevance to this thesis because it demonstrates the 
identification of members of the public as consumers of services delivered by 
public-sector organisations, and also established that such consumers had 
expectations of minimum standards. Much of the more recent developments in 
legislation relating to ‗highway works‘ has recognised the need to keep people – 
residents, businesses and the travelling public – informed about works on the 
highway. The standards that customers could expect were set down in charters, 
and this established a basis for organisations setting-down in writing the nature 
of non-contractual relationships between them. Again, this links to the literature 
discussed later regarding inter-organisational relationships and policy 
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implementation, where these charters and their contents would need to be 
drawn-up by people within the relevant organisations who had a shared 
understanding of each other‘s goals and expectations. 
 
In addition to central Government reform of local government, this chapter has 
examined Government privatisation programmes, where state-owned 
industries, including utility companies, were sold-off into private ownership 
under the argument that opening them up to commercial pressures and private-
sector thinking would lead to increased efficiency (as well as reducing the cost 
to the tax-payer.) This move significantly increased the number of organisations 
entitled to carry out ‗highway works‘, the complexity for local authorities of co-
ordinating all of the separate activities and managing the effect on the highway 
network as a consequence of demands for road-space to carry-out the works.  
 
Government reforms have not been limited to the role and functions of local 
authorities as deliverers and/or providers of services, they have also redefined 
the role of elected members – now identified as being leaders of their 
communities – and the structures in which they operate. Both of the councils in 
this study have adopted an executive Leader/Cabinet model for policy and 
decision-making, replacing the traditional service committee structure. The 
literature has identified that this arrangement can result in non-executive 
elected members being less informed about subjects than was previously the 
case with the old committee system. The research carried out for this thesis will 
show that consequences arising from these changes include a re-orientation of 
where local councils‘ discuss highways issues and an impact on the level of 
knowledge of elected members. 
 
The chapter also examined the roles, responsibilities of members and officers in 
local authorities, the relationship between them, and how this has influenced 
policy, policy-making and implementation. The literature has established that 
there is a convention that elected members make policy, which officers then 
implement. It has also indicated that the reality is not so clear cut – with policy 
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being made in implementation, the implementation influences policy, and officer 
advice influences policy. It is important here to note a distinction between 
policy-making and policy-maintenance, where in reality elected members are 
more likely to be involved in the latter than the former, particularly with regard to 
the implementation of central Government public policy. This is discussed in 
detail in chapter 4.  
 
The literature described the changes to the administrative structure of local 
authorities as a response to the growth of the public-sector, partly as a result of 
the influence of large departments within authorities, often run by professionally-
qualified officers. It is still the case that within local authorities the ‗highways 
service‘ function tends (1) to have a large proportion of staff and managers with 
civil engineering qualifications that (2) deal with the technical complexities of 
designing and delivering schemes and the legislation surrounding the execution 
and co-ordination of those works on the highway. This has implications for the 
way in which elected members are able to engage with, and officers‘ influence 
on the direction of the service. This influence by officers then links to the 
literature discussed in chapters 4 and 5 regarding the extent to which the 
discretion of officers can affect policy implementation and inter-organisational 
collaboration. 
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Chapter Three – Legislation Relating to Highways and 
Works 
Chapter 2 set out the legislation that has shaped and reformed the roles and 
functions of local government in England, and that of the environment in which it 
has operated. 
 
This chapter will look at how the functions of the highway network have 
developed over time, from being a way of facilitating travel and trade to now 
providing a surface over an underground network of utility pipes and cables and 
being an asset and integral part of a local authority‘s plans for economic and 
social development. The changing function and purpose of the highway network 
has also resulted in ―tensions‖ between local authorities, which have the 
responsibility to administer ‗highway works‘ legislation, and utility companies, 
which are now mainly private-sector organisations, wanting time and space to 
work in highways to install or maintain their apparatus, with new technologies 
bringing with them an increased number of organisations needing to work in the 
highway. These ―tensions‖ and relationships between local authorities and utility 
companies are also explored in this thesis. 
 
This chapter will also examine the main changes relating to the responsibility for 
the maintenance of highways, the ways in which maintenance is funded, and 
the legislation relating to the execution of works in the highway by local 
authorities and utility companies. Concerns expressed by central Government 
about the delay and disruption to traffic, and subsequent cost to both the local 
and national economy, have resulted in two significant pieces of legislation – 
the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 and the Traffic Management Act 
2004 – that form a focus for this thesis. 
  
In Table 3.1 below, the author has summarised and set out the legislation that 
successive central Governments have introduced relating to local government 
and the maintenance of highways, and regarding ownership and provision of 
utility services: 
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Table 3.1: Summary of Legislation and Commissions on Local Government, Highways and Utilities
Year
Municipal Corporations Act 1835 Highways Act
1847 Gasworks Clauses Act; Waterworks Clauses Act
1862 Highways Act
1863 Telegraph Act
1875 Public Health Act
1878 Highways and Locomotives Amendment Act
1882 Electricity Supply Act
Local Government Act 1888
Local Government Act 1894
1925 first joint highway authority & utilities committee
Local Government Act 1929
1938 Carnock Committee
1950 Public Utilities and Street Works Act
Local Government Commission 1958
Royal Commission (Redcliffe-Maud) 1966
Local Government Act 1972
1980 Highways Act
1984 privatisation of BT
Local Government Act 1985 Horne Commission
1986 privatisation of British Gas
1989 privatisation of regional water companies
1990 privatisation of electrricity distribution companies
1993 New Roads and Street Works Act
Local Government Act 1999
Local Government Act 2000
2004 Traffic Management Act
2008 Transport Act
Localism Act 2011
Local Government Legislation Highways and Utility Legislation
 
As mentioned in chapter 1, this study is examining ‗highway works‘ which 
include ‗roadworks‘, which are carried out by local authorities, and ‗street 
works‘, which are carried out by utility companies.  
 
The current situation is that both elements of ‗highway works‘ are regulated by 
the same two items of legislation, namely the New Roads and Street Works Act 
1991 as amended by the Traffic Management Act 2004. ‗Roadworks‘ are 
carried out by the public sector, via local authorities, and ‗street works‘ are 
carried out by the private-sector companies. In addition, local authorities also 
have a role in implementing the legislation to co-ordinate all works on their 
highway network, and ensuring compliance by the utility companies. 
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But this arrangement was not always the case, and the following sections set 
out how both the legislation and how the relationship between the ―local‖ 
council, as an authority with duties and powers, and those organisations 
carrying out works on the highway has changed and developed over time. 
 
3.1 Developments in Highways Legislation 
Parishes had been responsible for keeping their local highways in repair since 
the reign of Henry VIII, and there has been a succession of ―Highways Acts‖ 
designed to set out and delineate the responsibilities of local officers and those 
persons wanting to work on or in them. The main Highways Acts and 
associated legislation and their provisions are: 
  
3.1.1 Highways Act 1835 
The Highways Act 1835 made changes to the administration of highways, and 
from 1836 each parish appointed a surveyor, and was empowered to make a 
rate to keep the roads under its control in good order. The surveyor could be 
convicted and fined by the county justices for failing to keep the highways in 
repair. The 1835 Act also changed the law, with new roads not being declared 
highways, and therefore repairable by the parish, unless they met certain 
criteria. 
 
3.1.2 Highways Act 1862 
The Highways Act 1862 enabled justices of the peace of a county to divide the 
county into Highway Districts consisting of a number of parishes. This was done 
by means of a provisional order confirmed by the Quarter Sessions, which listed 
the parishes to be grouped together, the name to be given to the district and the 
number of ―waywardens‖ to be elected by each parish. The authority governing 
the highway district was entitled a highway board and the membership of the 
board consisted of one or more members elected annually and known as 
―waywardens‖. The highway board took over the property and liabilities of the 
parish surveyors in its district, appointing a clerk, treasurer and district surveyor. 
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The costs of the administration were paid by a rate levied on the district, 
although the cost of repairing highways was still chargeable as a Highway Rate 
to individual parishes. There was no compulsion for districts to be formed, and 
some parishes continued to separately maintain highways until 1894. 
 
3.1.3 Highways and Locomotives Act 1878 
The Highways and Locomotives Amendment Act 1878 created a new class of 
highway - the ―main road‖. The Act provided that all former turnpike roads that 
had become public highways since 1870 were designated as ―main roads‖. 
Other main roads were to be those between "great towns" and those leading to 
railway stations. In addition any other highway could be declared a ―main road‖ 
by the justices of the county in quarter sessions. Half the cost of maintaining 
main roads was to be borne by the county at large. 
 
3.1.4 The Local Government Act 1888 
The Local Government Act 1888 passed responsibility for ―main roads‖ to the 
new county councils, who were to bear all of the cost of their upkeep. The 
highway boards continued to have responsibility for highways other than main 
roads. The Local Government Act 1894 passed all the powers, duties and 
liabilities of existing highway boards, highway authorities or surveyors to the 
newly created rural district councils. Rural district councils continued to exercise 
these powers until 1930, when the Local Government Act 1929 transferred 
responsibility for rural highways to county councils. 
 
3.1.5 Public Utilities Street Works Act 1950 
The Public Utilities Street Works Act 1950 (PUSWA) was enacted in October 
1950 to enact uniform provisions for regulating relations between ―street 
authorities‖, usually the local council, and organisation, usually utility 
companies, having statutory powers to place and deal with apparatus on or in 
the highway. The Act introduced the concepts that while utility companies had a 
statutory right to excavate the highway to install or maintain their apparatus, 
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they should first give notice to the relevant street authority, with longer, advance 
notice being required for ―major works‖. 
 
3.1.6 New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 
The New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 (NRASWA) was a result of the 
―Horne Report‖ (1985), which had reviewed PUSWA in the light of the 
fragmentation of the provision of utility supplies as a consequence of 
privatisation, and of the expansion of types of utility services provided, 
particularly following the emergence and development of information and 
communication technologies. 
 
NRASWA came into force on 1 January 1993 the purpose of the new Act was to 
address the need to balance utility companies working in the highway, providing 
a service to their customers, with the potentially conflicting interests of the 
highway user. One of the most important elements of the new ‗street works‘ 
legislation was the duty on street to co-ordinate all works in the highway, and 
included a parallel duty on all undertakers to co-operate in this process. 
NRASWA set out the objectives of this co-ordination function as being: to 
ensure safety; to minimise inconvenience to people using the highway, 
including a specific reference to people with a disability; and to protect the 
structure of the highway and apparatus in it. 
 
NRASWA introduced a range revised works types, with different notice periods 
required for different types of work, and provided for local authorities to make a 
daily charge on utility companies for each working day of overrun on the agreed 
duration of ‗street works‘. These overrun charges did not apply to the 
authorities‘ own ‗works for road purposes‘. 
 
3.1.7 Traffic Management Act 2004 
The Traffic Management Act 2004 (TMA) came into effect on 1 April 2004, and 
was intended to tackle congestion and disruption on the road network. The Act 
placed a duty on local authorities with responsibility for traffic to ensure the 
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expeditious movement of traffic on their road network and those networks of 
surrounding authorities, and gave authorities additional tools to better manage 
parking policies and moving traffic enforcement, which resulted in the transfer of 
parking enforcement from being a police function, via traffic wardens, to local 
authorities to be carried out by civil parking enforcement officers.  
 
The TMA significantly revised the arrangements for noticing between local 
authorities and utility companies, increasing notice periods for all types of work 
and introducing fixed penalty notice (FPN) fines in order to improve the quality 
of notices and information contained in them. However, FPN fines were not 
payable with regard to noticing for authorities‘ own ‗works for road purposes‘. 
 
Under the TMA, the Government introduced regulations to allow local 
authorities to develop permit schemes, which could be applied to certain or all 
classes of road in an authority‘s area. The purpose of permit schemes was to 
minimise delays arising from works on the highway, and also to allow local 
authorities to tackle issues specific to their area relating to the execution of 
‗highway works‘.  
 
There were three broad classes of permit schemes available (DfT, 2010):  
 Single-authority schemes covered some, or all, of the road network 
managed by an individual highway authority. This option was the most 
flexible, allowing a permit scheme to be designed around the specific 
needs of particular areas and authorities. However it did not allow 
smaller authorities the efficiencies of scale of other options, and for this 
reason the schemes were therefore likely to be most appropriate for 
larger authorities, whose road networks spanned whole conurbations or 
sub-regions.  
 Under common schemes a group of authorities, usually covering a 
particular area or sub-region, agreed to implement functionally identical 
permit schemes, which were then managed separately by the individual 
authorities. This intermediate option offered authorities some flexibility to 
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decide how best to deploy resources within their areas, and allowed for 
important efficiencies in scheme development, management and 
monitoring. However, local authorities working to a common scheme 
could find it less easy to adapt common permit schemes to their specific 
and particular needs, or to agree changes following implementation. 
These types of scheme were considered to be most appropriate for sub-
regional or regional groups of authorities, whose networks were distinct 
in character from each other.  
 The final option was a joint scheme, in which a group of authorities agree 
to implement a single scheme, managed and run centrally on behalf of 
them all. This option was likely to deliver the greatest possible 
efficiencies in administration and the most seamless service to works 
promoters and to the public. Local authorities under a joint scheme would 
need to deliver and resource a defined standard of service that will apply 
throughout the area covered by the joint scheme. Joint schemes are 
likely to be most appropriate for groups of neighbouring authorities, of 
any size, whose road networks are of a broadly similar character.  
 
Local authorities had considerable flexibility, within these categories, to design 
schemes that addressed particular local needs. For example, in all classes of 
scheme, permit fees could be applied to all roads at all times, or to particular 
defined roads and/or at specific times. Discounts on permit fees could be 
applied, for example where works promoters showed they were applying best 
practice and/or achieving greater co-ordination.  
 
3.1.8 Transport Act 2008 
The Transport Act 2008 introduced a statutory requirement for local transport 
authorities to produce a Local Transport Plan (LTP) every five years, and to 
keep it under review, and to produce a new LTP every five years. Prior to 
February 2009, in the six metropolitan counties (Greater Manchester, 
Merseyside, South Yorkshire, Tyne & Wear, West Midlands, and West 
Yorkshire) outside Greater London the duty to produce the LTP was shared 
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between the metropolitan district councils and the Integrated Transport 
Authority (ITA), which replaced the Passenger Transport Authority. Since 
February 2009, ITAs have had sole responsibility for producing the LTP. 
 
The Government (DfT, 2009) recognised that good transport was a vital factor 
in building sustainable local communities by contributing towards: 
 The achievement of stronger and safer communities 
 Healthier children and young people 
 Equalities and social inclusion 
 Environmental objectives 
 Better local economies 
 
The Act removed the requirement for a separate bus strategy but highlighted 
that local bus travel would continue to be a key element of LTPs, and contained 
a number of changes that gave local authorities improved powers to influence 
the provision of bus services in their area. Punctuality was identified as a key 
issue for bus users, where the work of local authorities on traffic management 
issues was seen to have an important effect on the ability of bus services to run 
on time. 
 
3.2 Government Policy on Roads 
The Government‘s current roads policy is set out in two main documents, 
―Managing Our Roads‖ (DfT, 2005) and ―Roads – Delivering Choice and 
Reliability‖ (DfT, 2008). Both of these documents were created under the 
Labour Government and have not been superseded by a Coalition Government 
policy. 
 
―Managing Our Roads‖ (DfT, 2005) was part of the Government‘s 10-year 
transport strategy, and considered the challenges faced by the United Kingdom 
in providing opportunities for people to travel whilst at the same time taking into 
account the impact on the environment.  
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The report described the importance of road transport, and that both road 
freight and car travel had risen over time, with car journeys dominating road 
travel. This reflected factors of convenience – allowing door-to-door travel in an 
environment controlled by the car occupants – and cost – with both cost of car 
ownership and cost per mile having fallen relative to incomes. Roads are also 
the dominant means of freight transport, for reasons similar to those for cars – 
convenience and cost. The report identified that: 
 
 Car ownership was increasing and that people were travelling further, 
both for employment and leisure, often influenced by the policies in the 
1980s and 1990s that addressed housing and shopping centres, 
including ―out-of-town‖ developments. Managing the projected increased 
demand was identified as being crucial. 
 Alternatives to private car usage were being actively promoted by the 
Government. This was to be delivered by: (i) having services closer to 
users, to reduce the need for people to travel and increased the range of 
travel options available; (ii) having plans such as school travel plans, car 
sharing, ―teleworking‖ schemes, cycle and bus lanes that would help to 
reduce car traffic; and (iii) investing in public transport to ensure that 
people were able to make choices about the journeys they needed to 
make, and linking this to the concept of integrated transport systems. 
 Tackling congestion would be helped by the measures described above 
but they would not solve the problem. This lead the report to identify  
further areas where further effort was to be directed, including: 
 
Managing the existing network was seen to be a key step in tackling 
congestion, and the Government identified the need for effective management 
of ‗roadworks‘ and ‗street works‘ by utility companies. 
 
Other areas included dealing promptly with incidents and collisions which 
caused delays, and the Traffic Management Act 2004 introduced uniformed 
Traffic Officers, working under the direction of the Highways Agency, to deal 
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with incidents on motorways and trunk roads, and the provision of information, 
particularly real-time information, to road users about public transport and road 
conditions was also identified as being an important element in tackling 
congestion. 
 
More controversially, the report acknowledged that, particularly with regard to 
urban congestion, due to the layout of towns and cities, there was little scope 
for providing additional road capacity. In inter-urban areas there was seen to be 
the possibility of providing additional road capacity but that continued road-
building was not considered to be a long-term solution. Where new capacity had 
been provided, arrangements needed to be put in place to prevent that new 
capacity from filling up too quickly. A possible solution identified was the use of 
road pricing, to allow motorists to make more informed choices about how and 
when they travelled. Possible road pricing arrangements included a geographic-
charging scheme, such as in London, where motorists have to pay to enter an 
area; toll roads; and payment for use of existing capacity, such as lorry road 
user schemes. 
 
When looking specifically at ‗highway works‘, the report identified two main 
criticisms: (1) work site where no-one seemed to be working, or where the 
works were uncoordinated in their timing; and (2) the seemingly endless 
interruptions to traffic flow from utility companies digging up the road to renew 
their distribution systems or connect new customers. 
 
Road works, carried out by local authorities to maintain the highway network, 
were accepted as being necessary but needed to be carried out in such a way 
so as to minimise the impact on traffic. In order to ensure this, the Government 
required all local authorities to take account of road users in their five-year 
maintenance strategies. Authorities also had a role in managing the ‗street 
works‘ carried out by utility companies, and by applying measures in place to 
improve ‗street works‘ could also drive up their own road works performance. 
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It was acknowledged in the report that while privatisation and deregulation of 
utility operations had brought benefits to customers, it had also created a 
situation where different companies were digging up the same stretches of road 
at the same time, or in quick succession. In some areas, including the City of 
London and Kirklees, strong co-ordination measures were in place to agree 
plans to meet the needs of utility companies and road users, but these were 
seen to be the exception rather than the rule. 
 
The position in 2008, when ―Roads – Delivering Choice and Reliability‖ was 
published, was not much changed: the number of journeys on the highway 
network was increasing, that congestion had a negative effect on journey times 
and reliability, with environmental and economic implications. The solutions 
included alternatives to private car usage and the need for local authorities to 
managing the highway network, including the management of their own works 
and those by utility companies. By this time, the Government was encouraging 
local authorities to apply to operate permit schemes, as outlined above in 3.1.7. 
 
In 2009, the Government held a summit about ‗street works‘. In the ―Street 
works summit: report and action plan‖ (DfT, 2009), the Minister of State for 
Transport said that: 
 
“Tackling the unacceptable disruption on our streets caused by road works 
is my number one priority as Minister for Local Transport” (DfT, 2009:3).  
 
While ‗street works‘ were said to be clearly necessary, the level of unnecessary 
disruption caused by them was too high, estimated as costing the economy as 
much as £4.2 billion each year. The summit included practitioners from local 
authorities, utility companies and their contractors, and the report concluded 
that everyone needed to ―...up their game considerably‖ if public expectations 
on the management of ‗street works‘ were to be met. The summit identified four 
areas for improvement: 
1. Good practice, where initiatives had been driven by individuals who had 
challenged the status quo and demanded change in how activities were 
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carried out. An example was the shift towards first-time permanent 
reinstatement of openings, which benefited road users by reducing return 
visits and reduced the costs to utility companies. The summit identified 
the need for examples of good practice to be shared across the industry. 
2. Better planning and co-ordination. While the focus of the summit was on 
utility ‗street works‘, there was recognition that local authorities‘ own 
works also needed to be better planned and co-ordinated, so that the 
impact on road users was fully considered and minimised. To this end, it 
was agreed that authorities and utilities should make greater efforts to 
plan their works well enough in advance so that they could be co-
ordinated. 
3. Informing road users. There was general agreement that information 
currently being provided was below expected standards, with little or no 
information to pedestrians and other road users about works and when 
they were expected to start and finish.  
4. Utility regulators. There was concern that some of the DfT‘s desired 
policy outcomes did not align with those of the various utility regulators. 
For example, regulators did not appear to consider the economic impact 
on a community of doing works as cheaply as possible, which could, in 
some cases, mean greater traffic disruption. In other areas, for example 
the Environment Agency, there had been more success in persuading 
that regulator to take account of wider social impacts. In addition, utility 
regulators focussed on reducing overheads and the prices paid by utility 
customers. This was seen by utilities as limiting options to them to 
reduce the traffic disruption caused by ‗street works‘ unless the DfT 
worked with regulators to take wider impacts into account. 
 
In order to demonstrate whether or not improvements were being made, for 
‗roadworks‘ as well as ‗street works‘, the report stated that the industry sector 
needed to do a better job of capturing and sharing data on performance so that 
everyone, especially the public, could take an informed view on whether things 
were improving or not. The report then recommended that a simple scorecard 
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should be developed to include measures of planning, timeliness, and road 
performance (DfT, 2009). At the time of writing, a working group of HAUC(UK) 
has prepared an advice note on these ―TMA Performance Indicators‖, and the 
companies responsible for managing the proprietary software, used within the 
industry sector for the electronic exchange of notices between works promoters 
and street authorities, have agreed a common standard for data extraction. 
Data extraction and reporting to DfT commenced in October 2011. 
 
3.2.1 Permit Schemes 
Permit schemes provide a new way to manage activities in the public highway. 
They were introduced by Part 3 of the Traffic Management Act 2004 (TMA) to 
improve authorities‘ abilities to minimise disruption from street and highway 
works. Permit schemes provide an alternative to the ‗notification system‘ of the 
New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 (NRASWA). Instead of informing a 
street authority about its intention to carry out works in the area, a utility 
company would need to book time on the highway through a permit as would a 
highway authority for its own works. To reduce confusion and to ensure 
consistency and better co-ordination, categorisations from key areas of the 
notice system have been carried over to the permits system.  
 
A permit scheme can be operated by a permit authority. Usually, this would be 
the highway authority for the streets concerned but it could cover several 
authorities operating together. Authorities must apply to the Secretary of State if 
they wish to run a scheme on all, or some, of their roads. Permit schemes are 
established individually by an Order, in the form of a Statutory Instrument, made 
by the Secretary of State. The Order contains all the details of the individual 
scheme including those elements which are required by regulations. 
 
Permit schemes differ from existing powers for managing activities on the street 
in a number of key respects: 
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 Rather than informing the authority of the promoters‘ intentions, they 
may be envisaged as schemes to book occupation of the street for 
specified periods and for a specified purpose; 
 An authorities‘ own works are included; 
 Conditions which impose constraints on the dates and times of activities 
and the way that work is carried out can be attached to permits; and 
 The authority‘s control over variations to the permit conditions, 
particularly time extensions, gives a greater incentive to complete 
activities on time. 
 
Under a permit scheme the authority's activities will be treated in exactly the 
same way with regard to co-ordination and the setting of conditions. Authorities 
need to ensure sufficient separation between those operating the permit 
scheme and those responsible for highway activities so that parity of treatment 
is evident. 
 
A set of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) have been developed so that permit 
authorities can show that they are operating the scheme in a fair and equitable 
way. Authorities are required to report against these and this will feed into the 
assessment of an authority‘s performance of its Network Management Duty.  
 
According to DfT guidance (―Permit schemes: decision-making and 
development (second edition)‖, DfT, 2010), there are three key questions local 
highway authorities should try to answer for themselves before taking a decision 
to implement a permit scheme: 
1. What are the nature and scale of the problems in its area arising from 
works in the highway?   
2. Are there ways to tackle those problems that can be introduced quickly, 
in advance of a permit scheme?  
3. Is a permit scheme likely to offer value for money?  
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Local authorities were required first to understand the nature of the problems in 
their area, using informal benchmarking of outcomes, management information 
and processes against those of comparable authorities. It may be that 
comparable authorities had developed solutions available for at least some of 
those problems that could be implemented quickly and simply, without the time 
commitment and costs involved in developing and implementing a permit 
scheme. The benchmarking process might identify common ground between 
authorities, and facilitate joint working, including the development of common 
and joint permit schemes.  
 
Following benchmarking, an authority was asked to consider whether the scale 
and nature of local problems were such that a transformational solution was 
needed. It was at that point that authorities should consider a permit scheme.  
 
All local authorities applying for a permit schemes were required to submit a 
statement of the expected costs and benefits of running their proposed scheme 
on their networks. However, the DfT recommended that a local authority‘s 
consideration of value for money should start well before a decision to apply. 
The dominant benefit of all permit schemes was expected to be the reduction in 
unnecessary delays for road users. The dominant cost would be the cost of the 
additional staffing and facilities necessary for implementation of the scheme. To 
this end, authorities were asked to start with an outline appraisal that simply 
compared only one key benefit with one key cost – the expected reduction in 
delays to road users, set against expected additional staff costs and overheads. 
If this comparison was strongly positive, decision-makers could feel confident 
that further development of the scheme was likely to be worthwhile. If the 
comparison was equivocal or negative, authorities could consider a less costly 
model of permit scheme – for example, a scheme that enabled them to share 
more costs with other authorities, or that focused on the roads and times that 
offered the greatest potential to reduce road user delays. Where the 
comparison was strongly negative, local authorities were recommended to 
consider other options for improving the management of works.  
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3.2.1 Permit Scheme Objectives 
Minimising delays to road users was the key objective of a permit scheme. 
However, while schemes could also be used to help achieve a range of other 
local authority objectives, authorities were asked to be mindful that setting too 
many separate additional objectives could lead to a scheme design that lost 
focus, or that became too complicated to administer. The DfT recommended 
that no more than three or four specific supplementary objectives, in addition to 
the headline road user delay objective and the required ‗parity‘ objective should 
be included in a scheme. 
 
The DfT‘s list (DfT, 2010) of possible objectives of a permit scheme included:  
 Reduction in safety hazards and incidents in and around works sites 
 Reduction in the adverse impact of works on local residents 
 Reduction in the adverse impact of works on local businesses 
 Reduction in the adverse impact of works on disabled people 
 Reduction in the adverse impact of work on bus passengers 
 Protection of the structure of the street and apparatus within it, in a way 
that helps manage long-term maintenance costs 
 Better information for road users about works in the highway 
 Greater compliance with highways legislation by works promoters 
 Greater cooperation between different works promoters 
 Greater adoption of minimally invasive works methods, and measures to 
mitigate the impact of excavations (e.g. plating) 
 Reduction in the environmental impact of works (less noise, greater 
cleanliness, recycling of materials etc.) 
 Productivity of local authority highway services teams 
 Greater road user satisfaction with the management of works 
 
In developing a permit scheme, authorities were required to undertake a wide-
ranging consultation, including utility companies, public transport operators, 
emergency services, health authorities, and community groups.  However, it 
was the view of the DfT that public engagement on a scheme should not be 
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limited to the formal consultation process. It was considered that ―engagement‖ 
should be seen as a practical tool for making sure a scheme was the best one 
possible for the authority‘s area, and for maximising its value for money.  
 
A permit scheme would affect everyone who uses roads, but they were of 
particularly relevance to people responsible for installing and maintaining 
highways and utilities infrastructure, and their contractors. Works promoters 
facing permit schemes whose aims, objectives and methods were unclear 
would, according to the DfT, be justified in having serious concerns about the 
proposals, and would be more likely to challenge a local authority‘s decisions 
about the scheme and operational decisions made under the scheme. The need 
to respond to such challenges would involve increased operational costs and 
would adversely affect the value for money of schemes.  
 
Permit schemes were intended to achieve efficient and considerate behaviour 
from those planning and executing works. Works promoters were identified by 
the DfT as being ―...the greatest experts on their own behaviour, and the 
pressures and incentives that affect their behaviour‖, so they could be seen as a 
source of expertise, offering practical knowledge that can help make permit 
schemes better. 
 
The DfT‘s objective was that permit schemes would change the nature of the 
relationship between works promoters and the permit authority in a more 
profound way. Works promoters who pay permit fees would become, in effect, 
the paying customers of the permit authority, and would receive something of 
value – the right to carry out works in a particular place at a particular time – in 
exchange for payment. Like other customers buying items of value, they would 
expect a particular level of customer service in return, particularly in terms of 
available co-ordination opportunities.  
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3.3 The Changing Relationship between Roads and Utilities 
The Horne Report (Department of Transport, 1985) and Marvin and Slater 
(1997) described the legislation relating to ‗street works‘ up to the 
implementation of NRASWA. Utility companies are statutorily obliged to provide 
and maintain a supply or service (electricity, gas, water, sewerage or 
telecommunications) to the public. These utilities are ‗public utilities‘, denoting 
this public function, even though the companies may be in public or private 
hands. In order to fulfil the function the utilities were given the statutory right to 
break open publicly maintainable highways in order to lay and maintain their 
equipment. 
 
3.3.1 Localisation: 1800s-1930s 
Rapid urbanisation and industrialisation was facilitated by the growth of 
communications networks such as rail, roads and utilities. In the initial stages of 
development these were built and maintained by an ad hoc patchwork of town 
councils, private companies and special public boards.  
 
This facility had to be reconciled with the interests of road users and of the 
highway authorities acting as their guardians. The principle nineteenth century 
legislation that regulated ‗street works‘ included Gasworks Clauses Act 1847, 
Waterworks Clauses Act 1847, Electricity Supply Act 1882, Telegraph Act 1863 
and Public Health Act 1875. 
 
The two 1847 acts contained similar provisions in that they empowered the 
utilities to break open the street to lay/maintain their apparatus; required them to 
give notice to the highway authority and work in accordance with plans given to 
them by the authority; empowered the highway authority to superintend the 
works; and required the utility to reinstate the street, and empowered the 
authority to do so and charge if the utility failed to. 
 
Whenever a utility introduced a Private Bill it was necessary to introduce 
provisions to protect the interests of the highway authority, and these proved to 
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be the cause of contention. By 1870 local government control over 
responsibilities such as highways and utilities was characterised by "...a chaos 
of areas, a chaos of authorities and chaos of rates... the product of a continuous 
patching-up exercise" (Byrne, 1987:13). 
 
However, by the 1900s a local government structure had been established and 
local authorities took on more responsibilities and through the process of 
municipalisation they absorbed many small private utility companies. Prior to 
nationalisation in the 1940s, 60%of gas and 80% of electricity were supplied by 
local authorities. The process of ―municipalisation‖ and utility growth also 
coincided with the growth car ownership and road construction. 
 
The utilities had rights to access the public highway while the highway 
authorities had the role of street 'guardian'. Arrangements for managing access 
to road space varied considerably in terms of inspections, notices and planning 
– generally the utilities would reinstate the road or pay the highway authority to 
do it. These arrangements were particularly unwieldy because of the 
requirement every time a new private or public utility bill was passed then the 
rights of the highway authority had to be re-negotiated.  
 
In 1925 a negotiating committee of highway authorities and utilities was formed 
to agree a standard form of clause that could be included in future Bills and 
Orders promoted by utilities. The committee produced drafts of such a clause in 
1926, 1928 and 1934 but none proved acceptable, and in 1938 the committee 
concluded that they were unable to reach any agreement. The Carnock 
Committee – a joint committee of the two Houses – reported in 1939 that the 
main bone of contention was financial responsibility for moving or altering 
utilities‘ apparatus as a consequence of a highway improvement scheme. 
Legislation was recommended to apply a unified code of working to all the 
utilities and highway authorities, but this was delayed for I0 years due to the 
outbreak of war and the queue of post-war legislation. 
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3.3.2 Nationalisation: 1940s-1970s 
While the new legislation waited to be enacted, many important changes 
occurred in the transport and utilities sectors. Urbanisation and utility and traffic 
growth rapidly picked up and gained momentum, with continued growth after 
the war. At the sometime local authorities lost control over the motorway and 
trunk road programme and all the utilities were nationalised, leading to the 
strengthening of regional and national networks.  
 
The Public Utilities and Street Works Act 1950 (PUSWA) enacted ―…uniform 
provisions for regulating relations as to apparatus in streets between authorities, 
bodies and persons having statutory powers to place and deal with apparatus 
therein, and those having the control or management of streets and others 
concerned in the exercise of such powers…‖. 
 
The Horne Report (Department of Transport, 1985), reporting in 1985, identified 
several major problems. Within local authority and utility companies there were 
autonomies and management hierarchies with differing accountabilities, which 
had implications for communications and relationships between the 
organisations. The Report said that experience since 1950 suggested that 
relationships and individual attitudes within and across organisations ―…are not 
always as good as they could be and may therefore be impeding the efficient 
management of the industry. The need to establish common management 
objectives and principles across all these organisations was, continued the 
report, ―...self-evident‖. 
 
Delays to traffic were reported as being the main concerns of many 
organisations representing road users, including motorists, freight transport and 
public passenger transport. In general, the worst cases were reported to be 
those works interfering with peak commuter flows. In addition, delays were not 
caused just by the works themselves but also by temporary traffic signals set 
incorrectly. 
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One of the greatest concerns of members of the public highlighted in the Report 
was what they saw as a lack of co-ordination between the utilities, and between 
the utilities and the highway authority – where after one excavation is finished, 
someone else comes along. 
 
The Report was one of the first to look at ‗street works‘ from the perspective of 
the cost to the nation, which could arise in a variety of ways, including the cost 
of the works and they cost of the delays to road users. The Report focused on 
the direct cost of carrying out works. 
 
Over the next two decades efforts were made to improve the operation of 
PUSWA. In 1968 the Department of Transport (DoT) set up the PUSWA 
Conference to deal with unresolved issues but "the formula of the PUSWA 
conference crystallised into a poacher/gamekeeper relationship with minimal 
common ground" (Thomson, 1994:12). While Swann (Marvin and Slater, 1997) 
argued that it was "an atrophying creature of the Department of Transport, the 
Conference was brilliant at papering over problems, it was no good at 
addressing them‖ 
 
In1974 the Department of the Environment (DoE) attempted to rationalise the 
process by publishing a model agreement in an attempt to improve the standard 
and timing of reinstatements. However, by 1985 only 34out of 95 highway 
authorities in Great Britain operated the model agreement within their area. 
During this period both local authorities and the utilities became more effectively 
organised. The highways authorities worked through the local authority 
associations established after the 1974 re-organisation of local government. 
The Association of Metropolitan Authorities became the lead association during 
the Home review. The National Joint Utilities Group (NJUG) was made up of the 
water, gas, electricity and Post Office Telecommunications industries in 1977 to 
represent the utilities joint interests.  
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The House of Commons Transport Committee(1983) reported that it was vital to 
make progress on the quality and timing of reinstatement, with issues such as 
compensation and coordination requiring urgent reviewing the light of new 
telecoms systems, the renewal of old networks and the growth in traffic. After 
pressure from both utilities and highway, the DoT appointed Professor Home to 
chair a committee to review all aspects of PUSWA in light of the new changes 
and pressures. 
 
3.3.3 Privatisation – 1980s 
The Horne report was published in 1985 but the resulting legislation did not 
come into effect until 1993. During this period the utilities were going through a 
fragmentation process brought about by privatisation. It was feared that the 
introduction of "commercial interests is most unlikely to result in improved 
relationships. Indeed, the reverse is more likely" (Aylott, 1984:15). Increased 
liberalisation of utilities markets together with new technology had produced an 
explosion in telecom operators, cable TV, district heating and light rail transit 
schemes. Meanwhile there is a relentless rise in traffic, deteriorating roads and 
local authorities‘ cost-cutting exercises and competitive tendering for services. 
 
The main conclusions of the Horne Report were that: 
 Utilities should become responsible for all the excavation and 
reinstatement work associated with their activity in the highway. 
 A simpler and more effective procedure should replace the PUSWA 
notices system. 
 There was the need for agreed national standards for reinstatement and 
a certification system, together with a system of inspection and a national 
register of ‗street works‘. 
. 
The Horne review brought the utilities and highway authorities together on a 
more formal basis through the Highway and Utilities Committee (HAUC), which 
provided a forum for the discussion of subjects of mutual interest by 
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representatives of NJUG and highway authorities represented through the Local 
Authority Associations. 
 
At the local level a patchwork of highways and utilities liaison groups were 
absorbed into 'mini HAUCs' at regional and county levels. These new 
coordinating meetings were essentially providing quick, easy and local 
discussion, deliberately aimed to resolve misunderstandings before trenches 
could be dug and ensuring a joint national approach to particular regional 
issues. Where agreement could not be reached at the regional level, even after 
some form of arbitration, only then were any disputes passed higher up to the 
national HAUC to resolve. Below the regional HAUC all highway authorities at 
county, metropolitan and district authority level have quarterly coordination 
meetings to discuss the highway authorities and utilities work plans. 
 
NRASWA was designed to manage road space, coordination and access to the 
road by utilities and other related matters, and sought to simplify and improve 
upon the previous PUSWA procedures through a more flexible framework of 
management. The Act set out a legislative framework while the detailed 
application is left to regulations and codes of practice. This enabled the 
legislation to appear to be relatively simply expressed and coherent whilst 
enabling the procedural detail to be moulded to particular circumstances in 
regulations. Great flexibility is possible, therefore, within this framework. Part of 
the problem over managing access is the conflicting interests and 
responsibilities, some of which are confused or unclear. This has always been a 
barrier to arriving at a practical solution to managing road space and access to 
it. The NRSWA has had to clarify the complex and often contradictory 
relationships, rights and responsibilities of the utilities and highway authorities. 
 
A general right is now recognised for utility companies operating under statutory 
powers to break open the highway without the need to obtain special consents 
with the relevant local authority. The principal responsibility of the utility 
companies is to ensure that they inform the street authority, and any other body 
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with apparatus which may be affected by the works, of their intention to carry 
out the works and of the dates on which they are going to carry out those works. 
The utility companies are placed under clear duties to operate safety measures 
when carrying out their works, to avoid unnecessary delay or obstruction, to 
ensure that the works are supervised by properly qualified persons, and to 
provide adequate facilities for inspection by the street authorities, which also 
includes adequate signing and guarding to protect the road user and works, and 
given a high degree of accountability by the duty to provide a company sign and 
contact number. 
 
3.4 The Relationship between the DfT, Highway Authorities and Utility 
Companies 
3.4.1 The Department for Transport 
The Department for Transport (DfT) is the Government department responsible 
for the transport network in England (as well for a limited number of un-
devolved transport matters in the other countries of the United Kingdom).The 
DfT is headed by the Secretary of State for Transport, who is supported by a 
Minister of State and Under Secretaries of State, with responsibility for specific 
areas such as Road and Highways and Regional and Local Transport. 
 
Legislation relating directly to ‗highways works‘ goes through the DfT, and they 
issue the codes of practice and statutory instruments that regulate the 
relationship between local authorities and utility companies. 
 
The Eddington Report (2006), conducted for the DfT, highlighted the 
significance of the road network to the nation and the national economy in that a 
comprehensive and high-performing transport system was an important enabler 
of sustained economic prosperity: a 5% reduction in travel time for all business 
and freight travel on the roads could generate around £2.5 billion of cost 
savings – some 0.2% of GDP. Transport networks supported the productivity 
and success of urban areas and their catchments by getting people to work, 
and supported labour markets and businesses within the area. 
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Emissions from the transport sector were a significant and growing contributor 
(around a quarter in 2004) to the UK‘s overall greenhouse gas emissions, 
although the growth in emissions was forecast to plateau in 2010. Those 
emissions impacted on long-term economic growth by contributing to global 
climate change – a point reinforced by the recent Stern Review of the 
economics of climate change. Transport would therefore need to play 
unimportant role in an economy-wide response to that challenge.  
 
Linking back to the conclusions of the Horne Report (1985) discussed above, 
Eddington (2006) also identified that delays and unreliability on the network had 
direct costs to people and businesses, increasing business costs and affected 
productivity and innovation. Eliminating existing congestion on the road network 
would be worth some £7-8 billion of GDP per annum.  
 
The UK transport system in 2006, including aviation and rail, supported some 
61 billion journeys a year. If left unchecked, the rising cost of congestion would 
cost an additional £22 billion worth of time in England alone by 2025. By then 
13%of traffic will be subject to stop-start travel conditions.  
 
Part of the DfT‘s strategy for dealing with road congestion is to use the powers 
of the TMA to minimise disruption caused by ‗highway works‘. 
 
The DfT report ―Managing our roads‖ (DfT, 2008) noted that the privatisation, 
and deregulation, of many utility operations had brought substantial benefits to 
utility consumers. These had in turn been reflected unexacting standards by the 
relevant regulators, both for the prompt connection of new consumers and –in 
some cases in association with the Health and Safety Executive – for the 
renewal of mains supply infrastructure. The latter was particularly important for 
gas distribution, with works scheduled in relation to risk. 
 
Most of these utilities made substantial use of the road, or rather the ground 
under the road, for their distribution networks. As a result, customer connections 
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and network renewals also had an impact on road users. This impact became 
significant when different companies digging up neighbouring stretches of roads 
at the same time, or the same stretch in quick succession. There were also 
wider scheduling issues between utilities‘ work and the relevant authority‘s work 
on road maintenance. 
 
In some areas, noted as including Kirklees and the City of London, for example, 
there were strong coordination mechanisms, which enabled all the relevant 
parties to agree plans which meet their requirements and the needs of the road 
user. But this, the report commented, was the exception rather than the rule, 
and too often there was no-one taking an overview, on behalf of road users. As 
a result, the Government established a programme to provide better computer-
based mechanisms for collecting information on all proposed works on, and 
under, roads. This was identified as a critical step in enabling authorities and 
utilities to plan their works in a way which minimised the impact on road users. 
 
The DfT has introduced regulations which gave authorities the ability to charge 
utilities for access to the roads, as well as implementing powers to charge them 
when works overrun the agreed duration, a further source of tension since the 
charges do not apply to authorities‘ own ‗roadworks‘. 
 
In order to bring together the duties placed on highway authorities to 
strengthened both the powers for authorities to be able to manage the impact of 
utility works, and the corresponding duties on utilities, so as to minimise the 
disruption from ‗street works‘, and to extend authorities‘ ability to control other 
activities taking place on the road, the DfT introduced traffic managers into local 
authorities (or group of authorities), with reserve power for the Secretary of 
State to appoint such a person if an authority failed to deliver for road users. 
Traffic managers have a specific duty to ensure that an authority, or group of 
authorities, secure the expeditious movement around their highway network and 
that of adjoining areas. 
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3.4.2 Highway Authorities 
In the United Kingdom the highway authority is the organisation, usually the 
local authority, responsible for the maintenance of public roads. In England, the 
Highways Agency is the highway authority for trunk roads and motorways. 
 
The national representative body for highway authorities in the United Kingdom 
is the Joint Authorities Group (JAG (UK)). 
 
3.4.3 Utility Companies 
A utility company is an organisation that maintains the infrastructure for the 
provision of public services such as water, gas, electricity and 
telecommunications. 
 
The national representative body for utility companies and their contractors is 
the United Kingdom is the National Joint Utilities Group (NJUG.) 
 
3.4.4 Highways Authorities and Utilities Committee 
The national Highway Authorities and Utilities Committee (HAUC (UK)) is the 
national HAUC and comprises highway authorities (―roads authority‖ in 
Scotland), represented by JAG (UK), the Highways Agency, and utility 
companies and their contractors, represented by NJUG, as well as Network Rail 
and the DfT 
 
The purpose of HAUC (UK) is to provide advice to Government on legislation, 
codes of practice and policy issues relating to ‗street works‘ and ‗roadworks‘. 
This is done through the Strategy & Policy Development Group, which works 
with and advises Government, and through working groups, which produce 
codes of practice and guidance for practitioners. 
 
There are currently nine regional HAUCs in England: (i) Anglian, (ii) East 
Midlands, (iii) London, (iv) North of England (NEHAUC), (v) North West, (vi) 
South East, (vii) South West (SWHAUC), (viii) West Midlands, and (ix) 
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Yorkshire (YHAUC). The regional HAUCs comprise representatives from the 
highway authorities and utility companies operating in that area. Each regional 
HAUC has a highways-side and a utility-side chair, and these joint chairs also 
attend HAUC (UK) meetings. 
 
With regard to the authorities included in this study, Kirklees Council is a 
member of YHAUC, Devon County Council is a member of SWHAUC, North 
Yorkshire County Council is a member of both YHAUC and NEHAUC, and 
Transport for London is a member of London HAUC. 
 
3.5 Access to “Road Space” 
The road network in Britain functions as a surface ―corridor‖ for moving goods, 
services and people, and also as a ―conduit‖ for the movement of energy, water, 
waste, and telecommunications along (usually underground) pipes, cables, 
wires, and sewers (Marvin and Slater, 1997). Hoffman (1974) described the 
―hole in the road‖ as the visible sign of the tension between ―corridor‖ and 
―conduit‖. 
 
Utility sector privatisation brought about radical changes in the ways in which 
services were provided to customers, cities and regions. Marvin and Slater 
(1997) identified a number of key elements for these changes. Competing 
utilities now provided a range of services according to their own internal 
commercial logic rather than wider public regional or local policy objectives, and 
the new utility era was having significant implications for the institutional 
relations and processes of urban management. Whilst these structural changes 
had been made to the way in which utilities could operate, in contrast local 
authorities had been afforded very little statutory or non-statutory influence over 
the ways in which the new utility marketplaces rolled out across their 
jurisdictions.  
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Marvin and Slater (1997) also identified issues developing around the then new 
roles of the utilities as key agencies in the economic, social and environmental 
management of cities. 
 
Firstly, social access to utility networks. There had always been concern about 
low-income households' level of access to essential utility services. Since 
privatisation there had been increasing concern amongst public advocacy, 
consumer and voluntary groups that utility companies may be contributing to 
spatial and socio-economic disparities in levels of access to utilities. Social 
access can be assessed in a number of different ways, including the financial 
cost of connecting to a network, variations in levels of connection to a service 
by spatial area or socioeconomic group, rates of disconnection from the service 
and levels of service use in terms of energy consumption or number of 
telephone calls.  
 
Secondly, with regard to utilities and economic development, the corollary of the 
social dumping of marginal domestic consumers was the intensification of 
efforts to meet the needs of the most profitable sections of the market – usually 
customers. This trend had important economic implications and there was 
increasing recognition that utilities played a key role in regional economic 
development processes. The liberalisation of the telecommunications market, 
upwards of a dozen telecommunications companies were competing for this 
demand, lured by the extremely high profitability of delivering international 
advanced telecommunications services to financial service companies. 
 
Lastly, concerning utilities and the environment, where utility networks were 
responsible for the processing of huge quantities of energy, water and waste 
resources which are consumed within, and extracted from, cities. How these 
resources were managed by the utility had important implications for the 
environmental performance of cities.  
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The fundamental problem over managing access to road space is the limited 
space for utility apparatus and surface traffic. The utilities have the use of the 
public highway as a route and the statutory right to access it, while the highway 
authorities have a duty to try and maintain the roads' function as a surface 
distribution system. The basic issue has been how to achieve a balance 
between the needs of traffic on the surface of the road – vehicles and 
pedestrians – and on the other hand the provision of essential utility services. 
The conflict arises from quite different statutory requirements placed upon each 
of the parties, where the utilities have no freedom in deciding whether or not to 
provide and maintain a service to the public – they are required by law to do so 
and their statutory rights enable them to open and use streets as conduits 
(Marvin and Slater, 1997). 
 
The ―Economist‖ (2002) reported that the ―…country‘s highways are plagued by 
…excavations and street works‖. There are, said the article, some four million 
holes dug in Britain‘s roads at a cost of some £2billion per year. The article 
goes on identify the root problem as being with the New Roads and Street 
Works Act 1991 (NRASWA). Where previously only a handful of organisations 
had the statutory right to dig holes in the road, NRASWA extended this right to 
100-plus companies, including the privatised utilities, cable television and 
telecommunications companies. This extension of rights has ―…predictably 
resulted in chaos (because) all too often the utility just turns up and starts 
digging‖. 
 
In a report to the Department for Transport in 2003, ―Amtec Consulting plc‖ 
(Amtec, 2003) categorised stakeholders by the nature of their interest in 
‗highway works‘: 
 Service deliverers – of the works 
 Asset owners – of plant and infrastructure 
 Providers – of road-related data, systems and services 
 Consumers – of road-related services, utility services and 
information 
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Amtec (2003) highlight stakeholders‘ conflicting interest, in that their individual 
interest in works depends on context and that they might have several different, 
(possibly competing) interests. They give the example of a member of the public 
who may be a resident of an area with an interest in having a new service laid 
to their house. That same person might at the same time be a road user with an 
interest in minimising the delays due to ‗street works‘ encountered on their 
journey to work. The Amtec report concludes that all works affecting roads need 
to be managed – this includes ‗street works‘ carried out by utility companies and 
‗roadworks‘ carried out by local highway authorities – and that all participating 
organisation should work to a standard data format. The report recommends 
that information on works should be made available to the public to aid in route 
planning and to avoid congestion. 
 
The Government has responded to these and other issues by passing the 
Traffic Management Act 2004 (TMA). In its draft guidance notes, the 
Department for Transport (DfT, 2004) acknowledge that road users may have 
differing expectations. Reliable journey times are important for the majority of 
users, but local highway authorities and utilities need to occupy the road in 
order to maintain and upgrade the infrastructure for the benefit of all of their 
customers.  
 
The DfT‘s guidance notes set out the expansion of the role of local authorities in 
the co-ordination and direction of work to include a requirement that local 
authorities would have to ensure that the principles already in use to manage 
utilities ‗street works‘ are also applied to the management of their own 
‗roadworks‘ (paragraph 91). Whilst this requirement had always formed part of 
NRASWA, it had not been part of PUSWA legislation, and so many highway 
authorities either only partially or failed completely to manage and co-ordinate 
their own works in the same way as they did for utility works. This was a further 
source of tension between highway authorities and utility companies. 
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In order to meet this management role, highway authorities would need systems 
to record and co-ordinate both planned utilities‘ ‗street works‘ and planned 
‗roadworks‘ should be established, and it is suggested that use should be made 
of map-based systems (paragraph 92). 
3.6 Utility Regulators 
The programme of privatisation discussed in chapter 2 above had the effect of 
taking the ownership of organisations proving utility services from the public 
sector into the private sector. Once in the private sector, each utility came under 
the auspices of a ―regulator‖. 
 
A regulated utility consists of a set of assets, an operating function and a co-
ordinating function (Wolf, 2008). The operating function can, in turn, be split into 
two activities: the day-to-day running of the business and the planning and 
implementation of investment projects. The cost of running the operations – for 
utility companies this typically involves ensuring continuity of supply and, 
particularly in the case of water, compliance with stringent health and safety 
standards – is known as ―opex‖ (for operational expenditure). The building of 
new assets and the replacement and renewal of existing ones is categorised as 
―capex‖ (for capital expenditure) (Helm, 2008). 
 
After privatisation, the Government established and maintained a series of 
economic regulation to protect consumers of the formerly nationalised industries 
to facilitate competition and to regulate where competition did not exist or was 
unlikely to do so. The Office of Water Services (OFWAT), the Office of Gas and 
Electricity Markets (OFGEM), and the Office of Communications (OFCOM) are 
responsible, respectively, for water and sewage services, energy and 
telecommunications. The duties of regulators were set out in the specific Acts of 
Parliament relating to the privatisation or subsequent regulation of the industries 
concerned. The wording and precise ordering of the duties varies but they all 
required the regulator to protect the interests of consumers in respect of the 
availability, price and quality of service, and ensure that the regulated 
companies can finance their functions. 
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Utility companies have high capital costs and low operating costs. The purpose 
of the regulatory regime is to assure owners of the assets that they will not be 
expropriated. Therefore, regulations need to offer returns sufficient to persuade 
investors to finance existing assets, to operate the business and to develop and 
operate new capital projects (Wolf, 2008).  
 
In the absence of effective competition for the provision of these network 
services, where there was a risk that companies in a monopolistic or strongly 
dominant market position would be able to set excessive prices or provide a 
lower quality of service, each of these regulators introduced price controls using 
an output-based price-capping approach known as ―RPI –x‖, which prevented 
regulated companies from raising prices by more than general price inflation 
less a given percentage factor, i.e. ―x‖. This formula involves the regulator 
forming a judgement on the likely costs that companies should incur to deliver 
expected outputs efficiently during a period of the next five years (four years for 
telecommunications) and setting prices to cover these costs according to the 
formula linked to the retail price index (RPI)  (National Audit Office, 2002). 
 
All of the regulators in the United Kingdom have, over time, widened their 
attention to monitoring the efficient operating expenditure (―opex‖) and capital 
expenditure (―capex‖) of the privatised utility companies. This is partly because 
there is an incentive for firms to minimise costs in order to outperform the cost 
estimate in the ―x-factor‖ and therefore increase profitability. Price caps such as 
―RPI – x‖ rely on an ex-ante assessment of efficient opex and capex (Dassler, 
Parker and Saal, 2006). 
 
If privatisation was seen as one of the great achievements of the Thatcher 
Government, more recent assessments (Wolf, 2008; Helm, 2008) were that the 
transfer of monopolies into the hands of regulated companies that own, run, and 
develop the network assets was flawed. A main criticism was that the current 
model is excessively costly to consumers but that it is also an obstacle to 
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investment in risky, long-term assets such as gas, water and electricity and 
telecommunications networks.  
 
The risks associated with capex and opex are different from those associated 
with managing the ―regulated asset‖, i.e. the operator of the utility company, 
which is a physical bundle of assets where the risks to be managed are 
regulatory and political risks. At stake are the ―rules of the game‖ and 
considerations about whether Governments and regulators will keep to ―their 
side of bargain‖ or whether they will behave opportunistically through windfall 
taxes or ex-post revaluations. For capex and opex there are managerial risks in 
delivery – operations can suffer cost overruns and capital projects can go wrong 
(Helm, 2008). 
 
Table 2.1 above showed the regulator for each utility sector, and their individual 
arrangements are as follows: 
 
3.6.1 Ofgem 
The Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) is the regulator for the 
electricity and natural gas markets in the United Kingdom. It was formed by the 
merger of the Office of Electricity Regulation (OFFER) and Office of Gas Supply 
(Ofgas). Its primary duty is to ―promote choice and value for all gas and 
electricity customers". Its main powers derive from the Gas Act 1986, the 
Electricity Act 1989, the Competition Act 1998, the Utilities Act 2000, the 
Enterprise Act 2002 and the Energy Act 2004. 
 
Any company wanting to supply gas or electricity, run a gas or electricity 
network, or generate electricity must either be exempt from the requirement to 
hold a licence for these activities or be licensed by Ofgem, under its powers in 
the Gas and Electricity Acts. Companies have a range of obligations to both 
customers and industry which they must fulfil under the conditions of their 
licences. Ofgem monitors companies to ensure that they abide by their licence 
conditions. If they are found in breach of these conditions, or their obligations 
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under the Standards of Performance, the options available to Ofgem include 
issuing an enforcement order to ensure companies comply with their licence 
conditions, and/or imposing financial penalties of such an amount as is 
reasonable in all of the circumstances of the case up to 10 per cent of turnover 
of the licensee‘s business. 
 
Electricity is transmitted across a national network of high-voltage cables owned 
and operated by the National Grid, and comprises some 14,000 kilometres of 
overhead electricity lines, 600 circuit kilometres of underground cables, and 320 
sub-stations. The asset value of National Grid is £4.5 billion. This transmission 
network connects to regional distribution networks of low-voltage cables through 
which electricity is transported to individual properties. The regional distribution 
networks are owned and operated by distribution companies, and consists of 
approximately 295,000 circuit kilometres of overhead lines, around 465,000 
circuit kilometres of underground cable, and some 550,000 transformers. There 
are at present 14 licensed distribution network operators, with combined assets 
valued at £12 billion (National Audit Office, 2002; Ofgem, 2012). 
 
Ofgem's has concurrent powers with the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) under the 
Competition Act 1998 to investigate and take enforcement action in relation to 
suspected infringements of UK and EC competition law. If a company or 
business entity is found to have infringed UK or EC competition law, Ofgem has 
a range of options available to it including issuing an order to stop the 
behaviour, and/or imposing a financial penalty of up to 10 per cent of that 
organisation‘s world-wide turnover.  
 
Ofgem's also has powers to issue enforcement orders against companies who 
have breached specific areas of consumer protection law, where that breach is 
found to have harmed the interests of consumers. Legislation covered by the 
Act includes: the Control of Misleading Advertisements Regulations 1998 (as 
amended), the Consumer Protection (Cancellation of Contracts Concluded 
Away From Business Premises) Regulations 1987, the Unfair Terms in 
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Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, and the Consumer Protection (Distance 
Selling) Regulations 2000. 
 
3.6.2 Ofwat 
The Water Services Regulation Authority (Ofwat) is responsible for the 
economic regulation of the privatised water and sewerage industry in England 
and Wales by setting limits on the prices charged for water and sewerage 
services, taking into account proposed capital investment schemes (such as 
building new wastewater treatment works) and expected operational efficiency 
gains. Ofwat was set up in 1989 when the 10 Water Authorities in England and 
Wales were privatised. The resulting companies were known as "the water and 
sewerage companies" to distinguishes them from around a dozen smaller 
companies which only provide water services, which were already in private 
hands in 1989 (having remained in private ownership since their creation in the 
nineteenth century). Before 1 April 2006, all regulatory powers rested with the 
Director General of Water Services. On 1 April 2006, the Director General was 
replaced by the Water Services Regulation Authority.  
 
The water and sewerage network in England and Wales includes some 635,000 
kilometres of mains and sewers (not including those privately-owned). The 
combined value of the 23 water and sewerage companies is estimated as being 
some £30 billion (National Audit Office, 2002). 
 
Ofwat‘s main duties as an economic regulator are to:  
 Protect the interests of consumers, wherever appropriate by promoting 
effective competition. 
 Secure that the functions of each regional water company are properly 
carried out and that they are able to finance their functions, in particular 
by securing a reasonable rate of return on their capital. 
 Secure that those companies with water supply licences properly carry 
out their functions. 
 Promote economy and efficiency by companies in their work. 
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Ofwat sets annual price limits for each company which allow the companies to 
finance their functions. The current price limits were set in 2004 for the period 
covering 2005-2010, and will be next set in 2009. The price limits reflect what 
each company needs to charge to finance the provision of services to its 
customers, and a review of price limits must take place every five years. 
 
Other bodies involved in the regulation of the water industry include the 
Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and the Welsh 
Assembly Government, the Drinking Water Inspectorate, which sets standards 
for the quality of drinking water; and the Environment Agency which regulates 
and enforces water abstraction consents and quality standards in inland, 
estuarial and coastal waters. 
 
3.6.3 Ofcom 
The Office of Communications (Ofcom) is the regulator and competition 
authority for the communication industries in the United Kingdom. Ofcom was 
established in the Office of Communications Act 2002 and the Communications 
Act 2003, and in December 2003 it inherited the duties that had previously been 
the responsibility of five regulatory bodies, including the Office of 
Telecommunications (Oftel). 
 
The physical infrastructure of the telecommunication network consists of a 
―backbone‖ of wires connecting 740 local exchanges and 70 main exchanges, 
each of which connects with lines from households and businesses; BT‘s 
network also connects to the national networks of several other telephone and 
cable companies. There are some 34.5 million fixed telephone lines in the 
United Kingdom (National Audit Office, 2002). 
 
3.7 Highway Legislation/Regulator Conflict 
A point of criticism often aimed at highway authorities is the issue of works 
being carried out by utilities in the same street in quick succession without any 
apparent co-ordination or control being applied by the highway authority in 
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question. This invariably is a function of short notification periods for major 
works and emergency/minor works over which the utilities claim they have little 
control and the highway authority has even less control. The various regulators 
play an important part in the co-ordination equation in that they lay down strict 
conditions and time scales that have to be complied with, which can be at 
variance to the requirements of NRASWA. Examples of the different time-scales 
to which different utilities work when providing new supplies are set out in the 
Table 3.2 below: 
 
Table 3.2 Utility Connection Times 
Utility   New Connection 
    
Electricity   up to 28 days 
Water   
 
within 14 or 21 
days of payment 
Gas   
 
 
within 20 working 
days 
Telecommunications   (i) up to 7 days if 
existing line 
   (ii) ad hoc if no 
existing line 
 
3.8 Chapter Summary 
Within the legislation local highway authorities, or their variously-named 
predecessors, had arrangements where a representative body had 
responsibility for overseeing and paying for road maintenance. The late 
nineteenth century, at the same time as the development of ―modern‖ local 
government as discussed in chapter 2, saw a distinction being made in classes 
of road, with responsibility for maintaining roads between towns and railway 
stations being held at county-level. This links to how the use of the highway 
network itself has changed over time as methods of mechanical travel – 
particularly with cars for individual journeys and commercial vehicles for the 
transportation of goods around the country – have put a premium on the need 
to minimise or avoid disruption to road users. 
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The use and availability of the highway network currently forms the basis for 
council performance plans, ranging from the need to have fast, reliable 
information technology available to schools and businesses, to ensuring that 
businesses are attracted to and remain in an area by ensuring reliable access 
and journey times, and also as a conduit to link people and communities by 
ensuring that people can safely move around the area. 
 
An examination of the legislation shows the on-going ―tensions‖ created by the 
impact of ―new technologies‖ needing access to the highway, ranging from the 
construction of new, underground sewers to the coming of the railway, and from 
the widespread digging up of roads to install gas and electricity apparatus in the 
nineteenth century to the same again in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries to install telecommunications and digital communications networks. 
These ―tensions‖ are also assessed in the context of these utility supplies 
moving from private provision to public provision and then back to private 
provision, but still making use of the same, publicly-funded highway network. 
 
National policy on roads has remained relatively unchanged since the early 
2000s, having been developed under the Labour Government and not changed 
significantly under the Coalition Government. The policy is that the use of the 
highway network is increasing year on year, that providing additional capacity is 
either not a possibility or not a long-term solution, and so the focus is on better 
management of the network, including ‗highway works‘. 
 
The Government has concluded that the disruption arising from ‗street works‘ in 
particular, and, by association, authorities‘ own ‗roadworks‘, is at an 
unacceptable level. In response, the Government has targeted further powers at 
local authorities to co-ordinate works on the highway, including the development 
of permit schemes, and included these in a general network management duty 
on authorities to ensure the ―expeditious‖ movement of traffic around its 
network. 
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This chapter has shown the development of the relationship between local 
highway authorities and utility companies, and has documented the ways in 
which the two ―sides‖ have tried, and sometimes failed, to regulate activities to 
allow utilities to install and maintain their apparatus in the highway and to 
enable local highway authorities to maintain the highway, one of its major 
assets, in good condition and to minimise disruption to highway users. 
 
Due to the unique nature of government at different levels in England, the 
responsibility for implementing national legislation rests with individual local 
authorities. These elements provide a link to the literature discussed in chapters 
4 and 5 regarding public policy implementation and inter-organisational 
collaborations, and the role played in each by the relevant actors. 
 
The privatisation in the 1980s and 1990s of utility companies led to a 
fragmentation of responsibilities, with separate Government departments having 
responsibility for local authorities (currently the Department for Communities 
and Local Government) and utility company regulation (currently the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills). In addition, utility companies 
are subject to oversight and regulation by industry regulators. 
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Chapter Four – Public Policy 
A focus for this study is a comparison of the way in which different organisations 
implement public policy. In order to make comparisons, it is necessary to look at 
what the terms ‗policy‘ and ‗public policy‘ mean. 
 
This chapter will look at the meaning of ‗public policy‘ and policy studies, and 
how the field relates to the wider study of political science. By distilling a 
definition of ‗public policy‘ as representing the process by which public officials 
seek to identify solutions to put in place to deal with a problem, this chapter 
provides a link to the discussion in chapter 2, which examined the policies 
adopted by central Government and its relationship with local government, and 
chapter 3, which looked at the legislation introduced by central Government with 
regard to ‗highway works‘.  
 
The chapter will also examine the different models associated with the 
development of ‗public policy‘, and will focus on the ‗implementation‘ stage in 
order to look later at how local authorities deal with implementing national 
legislation at the local level. 
 
The literature on public policy will also help to establish a focus on the unit of 
analysis for this thesis, by discussion the perspective from which policy 
implementation is viewed and the significance to the process of the people (or 
―actors‖) involved. 
 
The goals of policy may vary widely according to the organisation and the 
context, including environmental, political, competing demands, and the actors 
involved, in which they are made. Broadly, policies are typically instituted in 
order to avoid some negative effect that has been noticed in the organisation, or 
to seek some positive benefit. However, policies also have side effects or 
―unintended consequences‖. Because the environments that policies seek to 
influence or manipulate are typically complex adaptive systems (e.g. 
governments, societies, large companies), making a policy change can have 
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counterintuitive results. The policy formulation process typically includes an 
attempt to assess as many areas of potential policy impact as possible, to 
lessen the chances that a given policy will have unexpected or unintended 
consequences. 
 
As noted by DeLeon (1994), policy studies have a long history and a short past 
in that the actions of government have been a focus of much examination over 
many years, but the systematic analysis of the actions using the conceptual 
framework of policy science dates back only a few decades (Howlett, Ramesh 
and Perl, 2009).  
 
Lasswell (1951) proposed that policy science had three distinct characteristics 
that would set it apart from other approaches: 
1. It would be multi-disciplinary by breaking away from the narrow study of 
political institutions and structures, and incorporating fields such as 
sociology, economics, law and politics. 
2. It would be problem-solving by looking towards solutions to real-world 
problems, rather than engaging in purely academic debates. 
3. It would be explicitly normative in that policy science should recognise 
the impossibility of separating goals and means or values and techniques 
in the study of government actions. 
 
However, a number of writers have observed that the expectation that the study 
of public policy-making would deliver outcomes applicable directly to existing 
social issues failed to match the reality of political necessity (Wildavsky, 1979; 
Fischer, 2003). 
 
Similarly, with regard to being explicitly normative, writers have observed that, 
whilst policy researchers have refused to exclude values from their analyses, 
many of them evaluated policies in terms of simple measures such as 
effectiveness or efficiency without considering the desirability of the goals 
themselves (DeLeon, 2004; Yanow, 2007). 
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A number of definitions of ‗public policy‘ can be found in the literature. Anderson 
(Hill and Hupe, 2002:5) described public policy as being ―… those policies 
developed by governmental policies and officials‖, and Hill and Hupe (2000:7) 
then go on to suggest that what is called public policy can be viewed from two 
perspectives: (i) it is what is seen to be implemented and (ii) it is the product of 
what happened in earlier stages of the policy process. Public policy is a 
complex phenomenon consisting of numerous decisions made by many 
individuals and organisations inside governments, and the influence on those 
decisions by others operating from both inside and outside the state (Howlett, 
Ramesh and Perl, 2009).   
 
This notion of the implementation stage is described by Nutley and Webb 
(2000:26) as being part of a ‗policy cycle‘ which is a tool used for analysing the 
development of a policy item. It is also referred to as a ‗stagist approach‘ 
(Nakamura, 1987) or ‗stages heuristic approach‘ (Sabatier, 1999), for example: 
 Agenda setting – problem recognition 
 Policy formation – proposal of solution 
 Decision-making – choice of solution 
 Policy implementation– putting the solution into effect 
 Policy analysis and evaluation – monitoring results and deciding whether 
to continue or terminate.  
 
The development of such framework is a way in which public policy-making can 
be simplified for analytical purposes, with a set of inter-related stages through 
which policy issues and deliberations flow in a sequential fashion from ‗inputs‘ 
(problems) to ‗outputs‘ (policies) (Howlett, Ramesh and Perl, 2009).  
 
4.1 Public Policy in Local Government 
Public policy can be defined as the substance of what government does; the 
pattern of resources that they actually commit as a response to what they see 
as public problems or challenges warranting public action for their solution or 
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attainment. Public policy is the product or output of governmental activity and 
has consequences primarily outside of government itself. 
 
There are a number of different perspectives on public policy: 
 The citizen‘s view – the extent to which the policy decisions of 
government are being obeyed without the necessity of force; 
 The extent to which the articulated intentions of political decision-makers 
are translated into hard patterns of resource commitments; 
 The effects or consequences of a particular pattern of public policies; 
 Ways in which public policy might be improved; 
 the distinction between policy-making and policy-maintaining;  
Schofield (2001) suggested that British public policy is currently dominated by 
the Labour Government‘s ―Third Way‖ political ideology, leading to a number of 
new challenges for those who study the implementation of public policy, 
including new structures in public services organisations, particularly inter-
agency partnership arrangements, and new and complex linkages between 
Government and the public where that public was highly differentiated and had 
a modified view of citizenship. At the time the policy-cycle was dominated by 
evaluation and the philosophy of ‗what works, counts‘, creating an evidence-
based culture among public services managers. 
 
The problem with emphasis on the process of public policy-making is that it has 
tended to confuse distinctions which need to be borne in mind between public 
policy, public policy-making and different types of decisions. If those distinctions 
are not maintained and that is a danger, not only of equating public policy with 
any decision which made by government, but also of ignoring altogether the 
extent to which the bulk of governmental activity may well involve the 
maintenance and implementation of established policies where there is little or 
no policy making as such. 
 
The distinction between public policy and decision-making is, conceptually at 
least, clear enough. A public policy is a pattern of resources which is committed 
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by government. In this sense all governments must have policies. However, not 
all governments need necessarily be involved in actually making all their 
policies, and no government is for making policies. Any government when it 
comes to power, as newly-elected decision-makers, will invariably face a whole 
range of commitments which are left by their predecessors. In many cases 
these commitments are neither changed nor challenged. Much has already 
been established and must be taken for granted so that certain actions must 
follow on irrespective of what new councillors think should be council policy.  
 
The Labour Government introduced a number of alternative political 
management arrangements for local councils to choose from, and these were 
discussed in chapter 2. Even before those options were available, Dearlove 
(1973) was asking the question as to whether new councillors think that they will 
be involved in ―making policy‖ find that they attend meetings where well-
developed plans are laid before them whether there was little choice other than 
to say ―yes‖; do they in other words, find that they are really servicing a well-
established range of commitments by participating in the making of decisions of 
a non-policy kind? 
 
A public policy is distinct from the particular process of critical decision-making 
which may have established any particular problem of resource commitments. 
However, the actual maintenance of continuance of a public policy does not 
itself require particular decisions. The distinction between public policy-
maintenance and public policy-making comes almost to be a distinction 
between different types of decisions. The decisions which maintain a public 
policy and implement a policy decision are of a different order to those 
decisions which involve innovation and establishment of a new range of 
commitments, or else the complete reversal of an existing patent of 
commitments. That is an important distinction to be made between policy 
decisions and routine decisions. 
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Most decision-making that occurs within governments does not involve the 
taking of policy decisions; policy-making decisions of this kind are important in 
establishing rules for future contingencies and have a long-run implications for 
the organisation but they are relatively rare because, in raising questions about 
organisational purpose, they open up scope for organisational conflict which 
leaders within any organisation would usually rather avoid. A considerable 
amount of activity within organisations is devoted to avoiding the necessity for 
taking trauma-producing decisions of this kind in favour of come finding activity 
to the taking of decisions which are only routine and work within the framework 
of established policies, maintaining the pattern of commitments and 
implementing implications of earlier policy decisions. 
 
However, the distinction between policy-making and policy-maintaining is not a 
clear-cut one. In many organisations, policy changes are often incremental and 
gradual so that there is a lot of the time decisions are being taken which, 
although not strictly policy decisions are not simply routine, since even though 
they do not really establish a new commitment, they do shift the existing pattern 
so over time the particular pattern of resource commitments is quite drastically 
changed without there ever having been a consciousness of this or one or two 
decisions which clearly established the break. In practice it is difficult to 
distinguish and categorize the different decisions, but nevertheless it is 
important to be aware of the distinction, as this can draw attention away from 
considering policy-making alone and in to the importance of more prevalent 
activity of policy-maintenance. 
 
4.2 Public Policy Implementation 
Schofield (2001) argued that public policy implementation studies need to 
address the contemporary problems facing the management of public services, 
and goes on to identify four areas to assist with this: 
1. Knowledge, learning and capacity in implementation – where knowledge 
and learning can refer to both how to implement policies and assessing 
the outcomes as part of a policy loop; 
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2. The processes of implementation – where policy becomes action through 
various dynamic effects such as decision-making, communication, 
bargaining, negotiation and conflict; 
3. The role of actors and agents – whilst the various models of 
implementation emphasise the importance of individual and groups of 
actors, little in the literature addresses how actors‘ goals and priorities 
impact on policy outcomes; 
4. Bureaucratic discretion – focussing on the discretion and interpretive 
power exercised by ‗lower-level bureaucrats‘ in respect of policy 
implementation, and contrasting this with questions of organisational 
governance and the requirement for command, control and 
accountability. 
  
The changes in the local government environment described above have been 
driven partly by political ideology but they also represent responses to wider 
social changes. In 1998, the prime minister commented that: 
 
“The days of the all-purpose (local) authority that planned and delivered 
everything are gone…It is in partnership with others…that local 
government’s future lies…their distinctive leadership role will be to weave 
and knit together the contribution of the various local stakeholders.” 
(Wilson and Game, 2006) 
 
This concept of partnerships in delivering public services has also been linked 
to the idea that some issues facing governments are a reflection of the 
complexity or intransigence of the ―wicked issues‖ facing government. Leach 
and Percy-Smith (2001) use the term ―wicked issues‖ to describe policy 
problems that have proved to be intractable, persistent and not amenable to 
simple solutions, and which share certain characteristics in that they are 
multifaceted, they cannot be resolved by any one level of government, at a local 
level many agencies may be involved to address certain facets of the problem, 
they do not fit in easily within an organisation‘s existing structure, and they 
require long-term interventions. The literature regarding the collaborative or co-
operative working of organisations, particularly with regard to dealing with 
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―wicked issues‖, i.e. those issues that have proved not to be amenable to simple 
solutions and cannot be resolved by any one level of government, was covered 
in chapter 5. 
 
Policy implementation studies have been categorised (Mazmanian and 
Sabatier, 1983) as the understanding of what actually happens after a 
programme or policies are enacted or formulated, i.e. it relates to those 
activities and events that occur after “...the issuing of authoritative public policy 
directives, which include both the effort to administer and the substantive 
impacts on people and events‖. This definition covered not only the behaviour of 
the administrative body that has responsibility for the policy and the compliance 
of the target group(s), but also the network of direct and indirect political, 
economic, and social forces that bear on the behaviour of all those involved. It 
also acknowledged the effects and consequences – both intended and 
unintended – for the original policy. 
 
Implementation studies have been classified by reference to different 
orientations (John, 1998; Hill and Hupe, 2002), which are discussed below. 
 
4.2.1 “Top Down” approaches 
This, the ―classical‖ approach, stressed the perspective of higher-level 
bureaucrats and executive decision-makers, where policy is decided by the 
centre. Then lower-level organisations carry out – or do not – the policy, as the 
case may be. 
 
4.2.1.1 The “Founding Fathers” 
The ―founding fathers‖ of implementation studies are often cited as being Jeffrey 
Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, who, in their 1973 book ―Implementation: How 
Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland; Or, Why It's 
Amazing that Federal Programs Work at All‖ analysed the policy implementation 
of the Economic Development Administration's (EDA) plan to hire hard-core 
unemployed minorities in Oakland, California. The EDA quickly chose the 
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projects that it would endorse and grant or loan money in order to create jobs. 
After examining the situation in Oakland, the authors drew a number of 
conclusions about policy implementation in general. 
 
They concluded that policy makers cannot separate implementation from policy. 
The problem was that policy makers did not make implementation an initial part 
of the formulation of policy. 
 
They identified a need to view policy implementation as more of an evolution 
than a revolution. Frequently, implementers said that what they accomplished 
and did with the program was what they had always meant to do, but this was 
rarely the case. Implementation was a process that must evolve. Leaders of 
programs made decisions after the act of creating the policy as well as before 
and during the policy creation. The process was not solely about getting what 
you once wanted, but rather about getting what you have learned to prefer. 
Preferences and the proper decisions changed over time and it was necessary 
to evolve the policy and implementation with these changes.  
 
Where action depended upon a number of links in an implementation chain, the 
degree of co-operation between agencies required to make those links had to 
be close to absolute if a situation was not to occur in which a number of small 
deficits cumulatively created a large shortfall. 
 
The importance of the Pressman and Wildavsky study was, according to 
Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) the focus on factors that distinguished the 
emerging policy implementation literature from the preceding literature on public 
administration by having an explicit concern with policy evaluation as well as 
with political behaviour by examining the extent to which the various policy 
objectives were achieved as well as the reasons for the performance. 
 
Pressman and Wildavsky focused on the ―complexity of joint action‖, i.e. the 
myriad of actors in various public and private institutions involved in the 
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implementation of a decision rather than the more traditional concern with the 
actors within a single agency and its immediate political environment. This led 
to a requirement for a careful analysis of the causal assumptions behind the 
original policy decisions which would have to be met if policy goals were to be 
attained. 
 
4.2.1.2 System Building 
Van Meter and van Horn (1975) developed a theoretical framework that built 
upon the studies of inter-governmental relation, as in Pressman and Wildavsky, 
1973, but ―...were guided by three bodies of literature...‖ (1975:453): 
1. Organisational theory, in particular work on organizational change, where 
they recognized the importance of the concerns about organizational 
control and studies of bureaucratic resistance to change and of forms of 
compliance. 
2. Studies of the impact of public policy and particularly of the impact of 
judicial decisions in the United States. 
3. Studies of inter-governmental relations. 
 
Meter and Van Horn (1975) concluded that there was a need to take into 
account the amount of change required and the level of consensus, and they 
hypothesized that implementation would be most successful where only 
marginal change is required and goal consensus was high. They went on to 
argue that it was vital that the study of implementation should be conducted 
longitudinally, with relationships identified at one period of time not extended 
causally to other time periods. 
 
4.2.1.3 Process Modelling 
Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) and Sabatier (1986) took the starting point of 
analysing the ―top‖-level policy decisions and then asked four questions: 
1. To what extent were the actions of implementing officials and target 
groups consistent with the policy decision? 
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2. To what extent were the objectives attained over time, i.e. to what extent 
were the impacts consistent with the objectives? 
3. What were the principal factors affecting the policy outputs and impacts? 
4. How was the policy reformulated over time on the basis of experience? 
 
This identified a clear distinction between policy formulation and policy 
implementation, and recognised the need for feedback (Hill and Hupe, 2002).  
 
Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) suggested that the ―classical‖ approaches to 
governmental studies focussed on the processes of policy formulation up to the 
point of legislative enactment. However, they went on to argue that this limited 
focus excluded the examination of two distinct lines of enquiry that led towards 
a greater appreciation of the importance of policy implementation. 
 
The first area was that of classical public administration. The simplistic view of 
public policy held that the administration of policy was non-problematic, simply 
being a matter of handing over a settled legislative decision to civil servants to 
be carried out ―faithfully and efficiently‖. Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) 
pointed out that, particularly in the United States of America, a number of post-
World War II studies had revealed the effects on intended policies of the legal 
mandate of the governmental administration, by the pressures of concerned 
interest groups, by the intervention of legislators, and by a number of other 
factors in the political environment. 
 
The second line of enquiry important to the development of a distinct literature 
on policy implementation was the development of a ―systems approach‖ to 
political life. According to Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983), ―systems theory‖ 
allowed policy analysts to break out of the organisational perspective of public 
administration and start thinking in terms of inputs from outside the 
administrative area, including new legislative and policy directives, changing 
public preferences, and new technologies. 
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4.2.2 “Bottom Up” Approaches 
This approach stressed the involvement of lower-level bureaucrats and others 
who carry out public decisions, where the ideas and influence of these ―actors‖ 
feed-back to the higher-level decision-makers to influence policy choices. 
 
4.2.2.1 Street-level Bureaucracy 
The ―founding father‖ of this approach is considered to be Michael Lipsky 
(1980), who developed the idea of the ―street-level bureaucrat‖. These ―street-
level bureaucrats‖ are public officials, typically police officers or teachers, who 
have face-to-face dealings with the public, and who appear to have a great deal 
of discretionary freedom and autonomy. The decisions of ―street-level 
bureaucrats‖, the routines that they establish, and the devices that they invent 
to cope with uncertainties and work pressures effectively become the public 
policies that they carry out. Lipsky (1980) also argued that ―street-level 
bureaucrats‖ adjust their work habits to reflect the realities of, rather than their 
aspirations for, their area of work. Thus, the implementation of public policy is 
about street-level workers exercising discretion under pressure, and so different 
approaches are needed to secure the accountability of implementers (Hill and 
Hupe, 2002). 
 
4.2.2.2 Implementation Structures 
Hjern (1982) and Hjern and Porter (1981) concluded that policy implementation 
depended upon interactions between several different organisations, and the 
way in which people from the different organisations construct working 
relationships across formal organisational boundaries. Hjern (1982) coined the 
term ―implementation structures‖ to identify the networks within which field-level 
decision-making actors carried out their activities. 
 
4.2.2.3 Policy and Action 
These developments in organisational theory, challenging the hierarchical 
perspectives on the way in which organisations work, also formed the basis of 
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the work by Barrett and Fudge (1981), who argued that ―action‖ depended upon 
compromises between people in various parts of a single organisation or related 
organisations. Policy ―…is mediated by actors who may be operating with 
different assumptive worlds from those formulating the policy, and, inevitably, it 
undergoes interpretation and modification and, in some cases, subversion‖ 
(Barrett and Fudge, 1981:251). 
 
4.2.3 “Synthesizers” 
Hill and Hupe (2002) suggested that recent work on implementation studies 
have synthesized, as well as built upon, the ‗top-down‘ or ‗bottom-up‘ 
approaches. 
 
The notion of ―policy networks‖ (Klijn, 1997) looked at the way in which the 
people that make and implement policies (the ―state actors‖) also live alongside 
and have constant contact with groups that represented societal interests. As a 
consequence, the interests of ―state actors‖ developed along with the interests 
of group actors. Scharpf (1978) concluded that policy networks may be crucial 
in order to bridge the ―implementation deficit‖ identified by Pressman and 
Wildavsky (1989), and that effective implementation may depend upon the 
development of collaborative networks, as was suggested, amongst other by 
Hjern. Hill and Hupe (2002) argued that, in the British experience, the 
discontinuity between policy formulation and implementation, perceived as 
being problematic in the ‗top-down‘ approach, is largely eliminated through the 
continuity of the relationship that exists between the government and its specific 
partners in a policy network. 
 
Ripley and Franklin (1982:9), drawing on the experience of the United States 
federal government, also emphasised the importance of networks in addressing 
the ―implementation deficit‖, and identified five features of implementation: 
1. The implementation process involves many important actors, who 
2. Hold diffuse and competing goals, and who 
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3. Work within a context of an increasingly large and complex mix of 
government programmes, which 
4. Require participation from numerous layers and units of government, and 
who are 
5. Affected by powerful factors beyond their control. 
 
Ripley and Franklin argued the importance of the political nature of 
implementation, and that while the implementation process could be seen as a 
flow of activities, there is not necessarily a logical sequence and the intervention 
of interest groups is not structured in hierarchical terms. 
 
Sabatier (1986:31), an earlier advocate of the ‗top-down‘ approach, later 
recognised the effective approach of the ‗bottom-up‘ approach to the study of 
networks, but was less willing to concede the distinction between policy 
formulation and implementation, arguing that such a distinction made it difficult 
to distinguish the relative influence of elected officials and civil servants, and the 
―…view of the policy process as a seamless web of flows without decision 
points‖ precluded policy evaluation and analysis of policy change. As a way 
forward, Sabatier (1986) argued for an ―advocacy coalition framework‖ that took 
the ‗bottom-up‘ unit of analysis, i.e. the whole range of actors involved in a 
policy area, and their concerns and perspectives, and combined this with the 
‗top-down‘ concern with the socio-economic conditions and legal instruments 
that constrain behaviour 
 
Sabatier (2007) summarised the criticism the ―stages heuristic‖ models of public 
policy analysis because they do not reflect the causal drivers that work within 
and across policy stages; that the proposed sequence of stages is often 
descriptively inaccurate, with evaluations of existing programmes taking place 
at the same time as new policies are being implemented; the focus tends to be 
on a legalistic, ‗top-down‘ approach which neglects the interaction of 
implementation and evaluation of policy; and there is an assumption that there 
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is a single policy-cycle focused on a single area of legislation, which fails to 
recognise the interactions between different policy proposals. 
 
Ostrom (Sabatier, 2007) discussed the ―institutional rational choice‖ framework, 
in which ―institutions‖ are represented by rules, norms and strategies used by 
people within organisations, rather than physical institutions, e.g. an 
organisational entity. Within this framework, individuals are characterised as 
being participants in an ―action situation‖ – an analytic concept that isolates the 
boundaries of the process being studied. These individuals (or ―actors‖) engage 
in behaviours and are motivated – to process information and make choices – 
which can be analysed against existing frameworks such as game theory, 
economic theory or choice theory (Williamson, 1985).  
 
The discussion as to whether implementation is an end state/policy 
achievement or a process/policy execution was tackled by Lane (1987:543), 
who concluded that the implementation process ―…is a combination of 
responsibility and trust‖. Without the notion of implementation as a policy 
accomplishment, then there is no basis for evaluating policies and holding 
politicians and administrators to account; however, implementation as policy 
execution relies on trust and a degree of freedom for politicians and 
implementers to make choices about alternative means for the accomplishment 
of goals. 
 
4.2.4 Third-Generation Implementation Theory 
Where Sabatier (1986) recognised the need to reconcile the ‗top-down‘ and 
‗bottom-up‘ approaches to policy implementation, Howlett, Ramesh and Perl 
(2009) also characterised the two approaches as being not contradictory but 
complimentary and, taken together, help to get to the reality of policy 
implementation. The ‗top-down‘ approach started with the decisions of 
government, examined the extent to which administrators carry out (or not) the 
decisions, and sought to find reasons underlying the extent of the actual 
implementation, whereas the ‗bottom-up‘ approach began at the other end of 
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the implementation chain, and advocated that the activities of ―street-level 
implementers‖ should be fully taken into account. 
 
Both approaches required a theory of why specific tools and policy mechanisms 
are used in specific circumstances, and not others, and of why implementers 
behaved the way they do in carrying out their tasks. This, then, was the focus of 
―third-generation‖ implementation studies, which linked to the recognition that 
some societal issues were particularly difficult to tackle because of their 
complex, novel or interdependent nature, i.e. the so called ―wicked‘ issues‖ 
(Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001). 
 
In dealing with such issues, where the problem might be complex or difficult, 
administrative discretion was required in order to deal with the range of potential 
solutions. In addition, there was greater leeway for policy subsystem members 
to evade or fail to comply fully with procedures. This administrative discretion 
can be assessed by the use of game theory or principal-agent theory. 
 
4.2.4.1 Game Theory 
Game theory allowed analysts to assess how behavioural discretion influenced 
implantation. Looking from a regulatory perspective, Hawkins (1984) noted how 
different levels of discretion could lead to different regulatory styles in specific 
sectors and issue areas, and that, consequently, regulators could opt for 
oversight systems based on either coercion or persuasion. 
 
However, according to Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009), game theory failed to 
take into account a factor in the ‗top-down‘ versus ‗bottom-up‘ debate – the 
divisions within the state itself that affected the ability of implementation on the 
ground to match the aims and expectations of the enacting politicians, leading 
to the application of a second type of game theory model. 
 
 141 
4.2.4.2 Principal-Agent Theory 
As a consequence of the variations in implementation contexts – social, 
economic, technological and political – the administrators who support the 
enacting politicians, for example, civil servants or local government officer, can 
acquire considerable discretion in pursuing policy goals. Such administrators 
tend to become experts in specific administrative areas, and so can decide how 
and to whom the policies will be applied, placing politician and administrators in 
a type of principal-agent relationship, where the principal is dependent upon the 
goodwill of the agent to further their interests when it might not be in the interest 
of the agent to do so (Howlett, Ramesh and Perl, 2009).  
 
Principal-agent theorists have argued that the efforts of governments have 
―foundered‖ on the realities of implementation, where the actions of agents 
diverged from the intentions of their principals and, therefore, distorted policy 
outcomes. 
 
4.2.5 The Importance of Actors and Agents 
Both the ‗top-down‘ and ‗bottom-up‘ models emphasized the importance of 
actors and groups of actors giving implementation. However, according to 
Schofield (2001), the implementation literature does not fully address 
behavioural or socio-psychological studies of actors designed to discover how 
actors‘ goals and priorities impact upon implementation outcomes. 
 
Lipsky (1980) established that lower-level bureaucrats had a wide range of 
discretion and interpretive power in respect of how policy affected the citizens 
with whom they had contact. Schofield (2001) noted that an important factor in 
Lipsky's thesis was that many of the street-level bureaucrats were in fact 
professionals in their own right. Hill (1993) emphasized the potential dilemmas 
for professionals in terms of their autonomy, responsibilities and duty to 
implement policy is direct and by their superiors. 
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This debate can be characterized as discretion was desirable and necessary 
(Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975) or discretion being anti-democratic and 
reflected inadequate top-down control, acting to subvert policy (Mazmanian and 
Sabatier, 1983).  
 
The exercise of discretion has been identified with a form of ―adaptive 
implementation‖, and Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) believed that the 
exercise of discretion acted as a check and balance to hierarchical control and 
offered the possibility of innovation and creativity within implementation. 
Sabatier (1991) concluded that the role of street-level bureaucracy would 
always be important, and probably most so in terms of its effect on final policy 
outcome rather than ―official‖ policy making. He maintained that the complexity 
of the links between policy makers, street-level bureaucrats and citizens could 
be embodied in terms of an overall bargaining structure predicated upon power, 
dependency and exchange. 
 
Schofield (2001:259) commented that, given all the approaches by the research 
and in the literature, a seemingly very simple question of ―how do actors know 
what to do when implementing a policy‖ does not appear to have been asked. 
The opposite is suggested – that actors are raring to go and implement, and all 
that is getting in their way is the policy itself, communication channels all the 
political processes of organization. The fact that implementing agents may be in 
a state of ignorance about what to do is not referred to. Schofield (2001) goes 
on to suggest that there needs to be an understanding of the competencies and 
capacity issues of individuals and their organization in dealing with policy 
requirements. 
 
4.3 Perspective 
The implementation of any policy involves the effort of a policy-maker to affect 
the behaviour of one group of actors, for example, council officers or Lipsky‘s 
(1980) ―street-level bureaucrats‖, to provide a service to, or regulate the 
behaviour of, another target group (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983). Therefore, 
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the implementation of a policy – particularly those involving many organisations 
and/or governmental organisations – can be viewed from three different 
perspectives – the initial policy-maker, field-level implementing officials, and the 
people at whom policies are directed. 
 
From the perspective of the initial policy-maker, i.e. the centre, implementation 
involved the efforts of higher-level officials to obtain compliance from lower-level 
organisations or individuals in order to provide the required service or to change 
behaviour. If the policy was not working then either adjustments have to be 
made, sanctions invoked, or the basic policy reformulated. For field-level 
implementing officials, the focus was the manner in which local implementing 
officials and institutions responded to the disruptions in their environment 
caused by the efforts of outside officials to achieve a new policy. The 
perspectives of actors at whom the policy was directed, i.e. the target group, 
were likely to range from the extent to which intended policy outcomes are 
actually delivered to a focus on the difficulties encountered in complying with 
rules and regulations. 
 
4.4 Implementation Research 
Schofield (2001) summarized the different approaches taken to study policy 
implementation, and recognized that the case study approach – at either macro 
or micro levels – dominated. Other approaches in the literature included 
network analysis, content analysis, social experimentation, and semiotics. 
Implementation studies also fostered a more interpretive approach, and in doing 
so were able to encompass policy ambiguity and policy irresolution. The 
implications of taking this approach to implementation research require an 
understanding of the detail of day-to-day working and working practices. 
 
Bearing in mind the distinction drawn between policy formation, i.e. formulation 
and decision-making, and policy implementation, it is the latter that has to be 
given attention in the design of research, with a need for the researcher to 
clarify ―what is being implemented‖ (Hill and Hupe, 2002). 
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A number of authors (Lester and Goggin, 1998; DeLeon, 1999; Winter, 1999) 
argued that policy implementation is a process – a series of decisions and 
actions directed to putting decisions into action – with the essential 
characteristics being the timely and satisfactory performance of certain 
necessary tasks. This means rejecting a conceptualisation of implementation as 
simply ‗success‘ or ‗failure‘. Rather, the process of implementation needs to be 
explained by its outputs.  
 
Hill and Hupe (2002) suggested a framework to highlight the key issues about 
ways to segment or separate the empirical analysis of implementation. It 
identifies ―dependant variables‖, which can be seen to be influenced by the 
perspective of the research, and relates to the ‗top-down‘/‘bottom-up‘ argument; 
and it describes ―independent variables‖ in a way similar to the approach used 
in ‗top-down‘ or ―stagist‖ models of the policy process. The framework they 
presented set out to address questions about the role of staff at or near the 
bottom of the system or about how they receive and transform the efforts of 
others to ―mandate‖ them. It also recognised that there was always a ―top‖, in 
the sense that somewhere is formulated and decided what has to be 
implemented, but the location of that ―top‖ may vary (and in some cases the 
―top‖ might be at the ―bottom‖). 
 
4.4.1 Dependant Variables 
Clear identification of dependant variables is reliant upon two considerations: 
policy characteristics and the extent of policy formation. Definition of dependant 
variables then raises questions about the extent to which legislative intent can 
be readily identified. Hill and Hupe (2002) cited research into child support 
legislation which used differing dependant variables, including: successful 
enforcement, bureaucratic discretion and error rates, appeals and complaints. 
Looking at a larger selection of research areas, they identified that many studies 
use outcomes as dependant variables (but these can be influenced by the 
extent to which goals identified in the studies were shared), and examples given 
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included unemployment levels, child employment, equal education 
opportunities, pollution levels, crime levels, and road accidents. 
 
However, outcomes may be influenced by factors other than the policy being 
studied, meaning that it is also important to consider factors independent of the 
implementation process. O‘Toole (1989) showed how problems of ―goal 
multiplicity‖ were likely to arise. 
 
With regard to the dependent variable, problems can arise because of the 
confusion between issues about ends (goals), issues about the relationship 
between means and ends (whether means chosen are appropriate) and issues 
about success in adopting means. Researchers looking at the effectiveness of 
policies tend to ask two related questions: are the specified activities 
established and do they have any effect on the problem? These two alternative 
groups of dependent variables are generally defined as outputs or outcomes.  
 
In specifying the dependent variables, researchers need to be aware of a 
number of problem areas. Outcomes may be influenced by factors that have 
nothing to do with the policy intervention, and a judgment about outcome may 
be a judgment about the appropriateness of the policy and not about its 
implementation, so the policy might be an inappropriate response to the 
problem. They also questioned whether unambiguous and agreed outcome 
variables could be established where outcomes might be disputed. The choice 
of an outcome variable may require the researcher to recognize competing 
policy goals. 
 
4.4.2 Independent Variables 
Hill and Hupe (2002) grouped independent variables into seven categories: 
1. Policy characteristics – Lowi (1972) identified four main policy types: 
distributive, redistributive, regulatory, and constituent. Where some policy 
types appear to be harder to implement than others, difficulties cannot be 
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predicted and depend upon an interaction with elements from the other 
six categories below. 
2. Policy formation – looking at the content and shape that a policy should 
take to ensure its successful implementation, going back to van Meter 
and van Horn‘s (1975) specification of the importance of policy standards 
and objectives. 
3. Issues about ―layers‖ in the policy-transfer process – Pressman and 
Wildavsky (1989) highlighted the impact of vertical links in the chain from 
policy formation to the street level. 
4. Factors affecting the responses of implementation agencies, including 
the behaviours of front line (street-level) staff – taking into account the 
overall characteristics and disposition of the agencies involved, 
particularly issues – the history, resources, policies and systems – of 
organisational and inter-organisational control, and issues about the 
influence of staff including ―street level bureaucrats‖ (Lipsky, 1980). 
5. Horizontal inter-organisational relationships where collaboration is 
required – a particular feature being that there may or may not be a 
hierarchical accountable relationship between the various organisations 
involved. 
6. The impact of responses from those affected by the policy – which have 
an influence on the implementation process. Studies of regulatory 
policies have shown this influence to be high (Hill and Hupe, 2002) 
where those regulated are powerful, large companies, for example. 
However, even the responses of ―weaker‖ actors can feed-back into the 
implementation process. 
7. Wider macro-economic factors – and the extent to which policies can 
address issues that may be influenced by phenomena over which 
legislation can have little or no change, for example, demographic 
change and globalisation forces. 
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4.5 Conducting Implementation Research 
The sub-title of Pressman and Wildavsky‘s book made reference to the 
―implementation deficit‖, and Hill and Hupe (2002) related how this led to much 
implementation research being described as ―misery research‖, and with what 
Linder and Peters (1987) described as the ―horrors of war‖ approach to 
implementation. A danger identified with implementation research is that there 
will be a taken-for-granted assumption that aspirations will not be achieved, that 
policies will not live up to the rhetoric of those who formulate them and that 
‗disasters‘ will occur. Similarly, there has been a tendency to work with the 
notion of ―perfect administration‖ – a condition in which external elements of 
resource availability and political acceptability combine with ‗administration‘ to 
produce perfect policy implementation (Hood, 1976) – so that adjustments, 
compromises and short-falls in the real world are used to challenge the 
aspirations of policy-formers or to condemn the efforts of the implementers. 
 
4.5.1 Quantification 
Hill and Hupe (2002) asked about the extent to which systematic 
implementation research could involve quantification. They concluded that (i) it 
was appropriate to is a questions about ―what happened‖ using quantitative 
methods whenever multiple observations were available, and (ii) and that the 
argument between quantitative and qualitative methods was sterile since there 
was a case to be made the use of either or both depended upon the situation 
and on the data that were available. 
 
4.5.2 Layers and Levels 
There is a need to be aware of the implications of ―layers‖ of potential analysis 
in implementation studies, and that activities within specific organisations could 
be analysed as subordinate policy-making. Pressman and Wildavsky (1989) 
highlighted how the handling of policy issues in an inter-organizational context 
could be seen as making a distortion of the original policy goals more probable. 
However, Hill and Hupe (2003) suggested that there was likely to be what they 
described as ―interpretive space‖ within complex inter-organizational 
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frameworks, which allowed agencies and actors to exercise discretion. This, 
they argued, was similar in concept to the notion of ―implementation deficit‖ but 
examined from a different perspective. 
 
Hill and Hupe (2003) went on to propose that there may be distinguishable 
goals applicable to parts of a total system - including, for example, central 
government, local government, and other organizations. Questions about the 
success of any one part of that system in imposing its goals upon other parts 
needed to be separated from questions about the capacity of the stakeholders 
in any single part to secure the implementation of those goals. This further 
highlights the link between implementation studies and inter-organizational 
collaboration. 
 
In the same way that it may be useful to split the examination of implementation 
into separate parts when there are distinct layers involved, it may also be 
important to recognize that the understanding of implementation can be 
enhanced by attention to specific levels, for example, the behaviour of street-
level bureaucrats. Lester and Goggin (1998) argued that in order to understand 
more fully the strategic choices of implementers and to be able to explain 
outcomes, it was necessary to know what were the interests, motives, and 
resources of individual implementers. 
 
4.5.3 Horizontal Inter-organisational Relationships 
A variety of research ideas have been previously identified with regard to inter-
organizational collaboration - these include collaborative capacity and purpose, 
trust, and about ways in which collaborative roles are demonstrated at street 
level. Powell et al (2001) conceptualized the importance of three streams: 
1. Policy streams concerning the extent to which local goals were 
shared. 
2. Process streams concerning the mechanisms or instruments to 
achieve the goals. 
3. Resource streams, i.e. money. 
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According to Hill and Hupe (2002) research in to these issues was dominated 
by qualitative work, and suggested that areas of study would likely including the 
salience of a collaborative relationship with others where the behaviour of one 
(lead) agency is under scrutiny and the quality of collaborative relationships 
within and implementation system depending upon a network. They also 
identified attitudes to collaboration and the extent of trust of other organisations 
and the extent to which collaborative roles were developed, for example, the 
importance of the presence of ―reticulists‖. 
 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
Public policies studies in general highlight the number of perspectives involved 
– including the views of citizens – and this corresponds with the discussion in 
chapter 3 regarding the different views that people have of ‗highway works‘, for 
example, depending on whether they are benefiting from the works as a 
customer or having their journeys disrupted as a road user. Recent public policy 
in the UK has been influenced greatly by the ―Third Way‖ ideology, resulting in 
the greater involvement of the public in policy-making and an increase in 
different ways of working, particularly inter-agency working, to deliver better 
outcomes for the public. 
 
The link with the policy science field, and the work of Lasswell (1951) supports 
the research methodology adopted by the author of this thesis in that it is multi-
disciplinary, in drawing from of number of other academic areas, is seeking to 
examine real-world issues, rather than treating the subject as purely an 
academic exercise, and recognises that the goals and values of the people and 
organisations forming this study cannot be separated. 
 
The literature and studies regarding public policy have variously characterised 
the processes by which policies move from problem recognition to analysis and 
evaluation as being represented by ‗cycles‘ or ‗stages‘, reflecting the need to 
have a framework by which policies could be analysed. One of the elements of 
this framework is the implementation stage, which is the stage at which the 
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chosen solution is put into effect, and it is the policy implementation stage – 
specifically the legislation designed by Government to deal with the way in 
which ‗highway works‘ are regulated, implemented by the local authorities that 
have been shaped by, and involving private-sector organisations created by 
other Government policies – which forms the main focus for this study. 
 
Public policy implementation literature has developed over the years. The 
―classical‖ approach to studying the field stressed the ‗top-down‘ perspective, 
where policy is handed down for others to implement, or not. This contrast with 
the ‗bottom-up‘ approach, where policy is developed or influenced by people 
closer to service users. Where the advocates of the ‗top-down‘ perspective 
anticipated that policy implementation could be analysed by looking at the 
actions of officials in implementing the policy, and looking at the extent to which 
policy outcomes were achieved. The expectation of these advocates was that 
officials involved would implement the policy in the same way, and any different 
outcomes identified would relate back to the original policy. In some ways, this 
approach had originated to allow policy implantation studies to be used to 
inform and improve the policy formulation stage of the process.  
 
By contrast, the ‗bottom-up‘ approach suggested that implementation would 
depend on the involvement of individuals, for example, Lipsky‘s (1980) ―street-
level bureaucrats‖, who would use their discretion, influenced by their individual 
goals and values, and those of the organisations for which they worked, in 
implementing policy. Furthermore, those organisations and the way in which 
they interacted, formally or informally, with other organisations would also play a 
part. The consequence of these factors was that the policy implemented was 
likely to vary from that intended. 
 
Both approaches recognised that the process of implementation needed to take 
into account other factors when looking at how and why the reality of 
implementation differed from the intended policy. These factors include the 
degree of co-operation between organisations involved, their relative power and 
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influence, and the extent to which the policy to be implemented aligned with 
their individual goal. Many of these factors are picked up again in chapter 5 
when looking at inter-organisational collaborations. 
 
The literature for both perspectives highlighted the importance of individuals in 
the policy formulation and implementation. This is a key part of this thesis, 
where case studies will be presented to illustrate the similarities and differences 
that local authorities take in implementing public policy. 
 
As well as providing a link to the literature on officer/member relationships, this 
chapter also builds on the local government reforms discussed in chapter 2 by 
examining the extent to which local authority elected members engage with the 
policy-making process, which concluded that members tend to maintain rather 
than make policy. It was already been established in previous chapters that the 
legislation relating to ‗highway works‘ applies nationally in England and Wales, 
and is implemented by local authorities. For the purpose of this thesis it is 
important to draw a distinction between the policy-making (into which, it is worth 
noting, local authorities would have had the opportunity to contribute via an 
earlier consultation stage) which resulted in the legislation and regulations and 
the duty of local authority elected members and officers to apply that legislation. 
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Chapter Five – Inter-organisational Collaborations 
Chapter 3 described the implication of central Government reforms of local 
government with regard to their organisation, management and increasing 
requirement for inter-agency partnerships. Chapter 4 looked at the significance 
for public policy implementation of the role of individuals and their perspective. 
This chapter will identify a number of concepts relating to the study of individual 
organisations, how organisations compete with each other in order to secure 
resources, and the factors involved in causing organisations to collaborate. A 
common theme that emerges is the lack of either general theories of 
‗collaborations‘ (Wood and Gray, 1991) or ‗partnership working‘ (Armistead and 
Pettigrew, 2004). 
 
5.1 Organisational Theory 
In modernist organisational theories, the organisations are conceptualised as 
being bounded by its ―environment‖, which influences organisational outcomes 
by imposing constraints and demanding adaptation. Consequently, the 
organisation faces uncertainty about what the environment demands and so 
experiences ―dependence‖ on a variety of elements that comprise its particular 
environment. It is this ―dependence‖ and uncertainty that inform the discussion 
surrounding organisational structures and actions (Hatch, 1997). 
 
Much of the extant literature on organisational theory places the individual 
organisation at the centre of the theory, but this perspective is at odds with the 
empirical evidence and developing literature on ‗collaborations‘ (Gray and 
Wood, 1991).  
 
Before reviewing the literature relating to inter-organisational collaborations, it is 
also necessary to look at some of the ―theories of the firm‖ and organisational 
theories relating to how organisations are seen to operate, but also how these 
have been developed (or need to be developed) to reflect the theory and 
practice of ‗collaborations‘, particularly by shifting the focus from individual 
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organisations to that of the inter-organisational domain, where organisations are 
linked to a particular problem (Trist, 1983). Refocusing existing theories from 
the organisational to the domain level may provide a foundation for developing 
theories of collaboration (Gray and Wood, 1991). 
 
5.1.1 Organisational Theories 
Prior to the 1950s, organisations were viewed as being ―closed systems‖, and 
treated as if their internal operations were the sole concern of the organisation‘s 
management. The ―scientific management‖ school (Taylor, 1947) set out to 
prescribe how organisations should work but ignored the influence of people 
and of the external environment (Handy, 1999). Weber (1947) characterised 
organisations with regard to the ―authority‖ relationships within them, having a 
concern with why individuals obey commands and why people do as they are 
told. Weber (1947) drew a distinction between power, the ability to force people 
to obey, regardless of their resistance, and authority, where orders are 
voluntarily obeyed by those receiving them. Weber (1947) then distinguished 
organisational types according to the way in which authority was legitimised, 
outlining three ―pure‖ types: 
 Charismatic – based upon the personal qualities of the organisation‘s 
leader, who is set apart as having specific powers or abilities; 
 Traditional – where order and authority are based upon precedent and 
usage; and 
 Rational-Legal – based upon bureaucratic (see paragraph 5.2.1 below) 
forms of organisation: rational because means are expressly designed to 
achieve certain specific goals, and legal because authority is exercised 
by means of a system of rules and procedures through the office which 
an individual occupies at a particular time. 
 
Attention after World War II was on the ―systems approach‖ to management and 
organisational theory, where researchers argued that organisations should be 
seen as whole systems of interrelated parts. Furthermore, the organisation 
could be viewed as an ―open system‖ in constant interaction with its 
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environment. With the concept of ―systems thinking‖, holistic techniques for 
studying systems could be developed (Jackson, 2000). 
 
Studies included the concept of the organisation‘s environment into 
organisational analysis, drawing on observations which showed that 
organisations differed considerably depending upon whether they operated in 
stable or rapidly changing environments. Burns and Stalker (1961) identified 
that in stable environments, organisations specialised in routine activities with 
strict lines of authority and distinct areas of assigned responsibility. Applying a 
machine metaphor, such organisations were characterised as being 
mechanistic. In contrast, organisations in rapidly changing environments 
required flexibility and encouraged employees to apply their skills as needed. 
This type of organisation was characterised as being organic because, like 
living things, they adapted flexibly to changing circumstances. 
 
By the 1970s, ―contingency theory‖ had become established in organisational 
theory, and this viewed organisations as consisting of a series of 
interdependent subsystems (Jackson, 2000). Between the 1960s and early 
1980s, studies produced theories on ―bounded rationality‖ (Cyert and March, 
1963) and ―resource dependency theory‖ (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 
1981), among many others. 
 
A brief summary of ―resource dependency theory‖ below will help to provide a 
later link between the work of organisational theorists and later work on 
collaborative working. Organisational success in resource dependency theory is 
defined as organisations maximizing their power (Pfeffer 1981), and is 
characterised by the links among organisations as a set of power relations 
based upon an exchange of resources. This exchange is required because 
organisations are not self-directed and autonomous. They need resources, 
including money, materials, personnel and information, and to get these they 
must interact with other organisations that have the required resources.  
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5.1.1.1 Resource Dependency Theory 
Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) suggested that, in 
order to understand organisational behaviour there was a need to understand 
how the organisation related to other ―social actors‖ in its environment. 
Organisations comply with the demands of others or act to manage the 
dependencies that create constraints on organisational actions. In order to 
survive, organisations require resources and that acquiring resources means 
that organisations must interact with others who control those resources. 
Control over resources provides others with power over the organisation. 
Therefore, organisations attempt to alter their dependence relationships by 
minimizing their own dependence or by increasing the dependence of other 
organizations on them. The survival of the organisation is partly explained by its 
ability to cope with environmental contingencies and negotiate exchanges, and 
the extent to which  
 
Within this perspective, organisations were viewed as being coalitions of 
varying interests which alter their structures and patterns of behaviour to 
acquire and maintain the external resources which they require, and that the 
environment in which the organisations operated was assumed to contain 
scarce and valued resources essential to organisational survival. As such, the 
environment posed the problem of organisations facing uncertainty in resource 
acquisition. Therefore, organisations were assumed to work toward two related 
objectives: acquiring control over resources that minimize their dependence on 
other organisations and control over resources that maximize the dependence 
of other organisations on themselves.  
 
Although resource dependency theory was originally formulated to discuss 
relationships between organisations, the theory is applicable to relationships 
among units within organisations. Gray and Wood (1991) suggest that this 
theory showed considerable promise for explaining some domain-level 
phenomena, since the focus of the theory was on minimising inter-
organisational dependencies and preserving individual organisational autonomy 
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while recognising that inter-organisational relationships were necessary to 
acquire resources. However, at the domain level, the focus changes from a 
single organisation‘s resource configuration to the overall allocation of 
resources in the domain field and among all the players in the domain. 
 
Organisational studies encompass the study of organisations from multiple 
viewpoints, methods, and levels of analysis. Distinction is between the study of 
micro organisational behaviour – which refers to individual and group dynamics 
in an organisational setting – and macro organisational theory which studies 
whole organisations, how they adapt, and the strategies and structures that 
guide them. To this distinction, some authors have added an interest in meso – 
primarily interested in power, culture, and the networks of individuals and units 
in organisations – and field level analysis which study how whole populations of 
organisations interact.  
 
5.2 Theories of the Firm 
With the current situation being that utility services in England are provided by 
private-sector organisations, it is necessary to include a review of the literature 
on ―theories of the firm‖, in order to understand how those theories might 
influence the collaborative capability of those firms. 
 
The theory of the firm consists of a number of economic theories which describe 
the nature of the firm (company or corporation), including its existence, its 
behaviour, and its relationship with the market. 
 
Finn (1996) outlined the basic assumptions of ―the firm‖ that, he maintained, 
apply whether the issues involved either the private or public sectors, and 
suggested that organisations were not altruistic but were motivated by profit or 
mandate, were competitive because they were constrained by profit 
requirements or public monies. The consequence was that organisations looked 
for ―competitive advantage‖ because they tend to be successful, and so 
dedicate their resources to endeavours that they have the understanding and 
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expertise to accomplish. A combination of these factors suggested that 
organisations were reluctant to take on a problem that they do not perceive as 
being ―theirs‖, do not understand what they can do about, or will not be fairly 
compensated for.  
 
Within these ―theories of the firm‖, the focus is on how individual organisations 
can achieve efficiency in its transactions with other organisations but without 
considering the dynamics of those other organisations‘ relationships among 
themselves or the overall efficiency of the social system within which the 
organisations operate. From a domain perspective, the focus shifts to the 
consideration of how organisational collectives can overcome ―free-rider‖ effects 
and other impediments to efficiency in their transactions, and how a 
collaborative alliance affects the overall efficiency of resource-use within the 
inter-organisational network include in the domain-area (Gray and Wood, 1991). 
 
5.2.1 Bureaucracy 
Bureaucracy is the structure, and set of regulations in place to control activity, 
usually in large organizations and government. It is represented by 
standardized procedure, formal division of powers, hierarchy, and relationships. 
In practice the interpretation and execution of policy can lead to informal 
influence. Max Weber (1947) described the ideal type bureaucracy in positive 
terms, considering it to be a more rational and efficient form of organization than 
the alternatives that preceded it, which he characterized as ―charismatic 
domination‖ and ―traditional domination‖. According to his terminology, 
bureaucracy is part of ―legal domination‖. However, he also emphasized that 
bureaucracy becomes inefficient when a decision must be adapted to an 
individual case. 
 
According to Weber, the attributes of modern bureaucracy include its 
impersonality, concentration of the means of administration, a levelling effect on 
social and economic differences and implementation of a system of authority 
that is practically indestructible. A bureaucratic organization is governed by a 
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number of principles, including that of recognising that official business is 
conducted on a continuous basis and in strict accordance with rules. These 
rules state that it is the duty of each official to do certain types of work is 
delimited in terms of impersonal criteria, and that the official is given the 
authority necessary to carry out his assigned functions. Every official's 
responsibilities and authority are part of a vertical hierarchy of authority, with 
respective rights of supervision and appeal. However, officials do not own the 
resources necessary for the performance of their assigned functions but are 
accountable for their use of these resources. To this end, official and private 
business and income are strictly separated, and offices cannot be appropriated 
by their incumbents (inherited, sold, etc.) Weber (1947) also suggested that 
control within bureaucracies by non-technical specialists would be possible only 
to a limited degree, so trained permanent officials, for example, civil servants, 
were more likely in the long-run to get their way than their nominal superior, for 
example a government minister, who was not a specialist 
 
It is this type of organisational structure that best represents the current image, 
if not the reality, of local government in the United Kingdom (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2004). Gray and Wood (1991) indicate a further connection between 
organisational structures and domain-level analysis in developing a link to 
―institutional theory‖, in which organisations seek to achieve legitimacy from 
institutional actors by structurally adjusting to institutional influences by 
complying with institutional directives, by copying others‘ responses to 
institutions, or by conforming to institutional influences (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). At an individual organisation level, ―institutional theory‖ can help to 
answer questions as to why organisations adopt certain structural 
configurations, but at the domain level the focus shifts to how collaborative 
alliances can interact with the institutional environment, and whether such 
alliances are shaped by institutional environments or whether alliances can 
influence the institutional environment (Gray and Wood, 1991). 
 
 159 
5.2.2 “Street Level Bureaucrats” 
The concept of street-level bureaucracy, first coined by Lipsky (1980), was 
discussed above in section 4.2.2.1 with regard to public policy implementation. 
Lipsky (1980:3) characterised ―street-level bureaucrats‖ as being public 
employees, including the police, social workers, and others who "walk the 
streets" with regular citizens, and who grant access to government programmes 
and provide services within them, and argued that "policy implementation in the 
end comes down to the people who actually implement it". 
 
Relevant to this aspect of inter-organisational collaborations, Lipsky (1980) 
identified several problems with street-level bureaucracy, including: 
 
"…the problem of limited resources, the continuous negotiation that is 
necessary in order to make it seem like one is meeting targets, and the 
relations with (non-voluntary) clients".  
 
However, some commentators have challenged Lipsky's model. Evans and 
Harris (2004) argued that "the proliferation of rules and regulations should not 
automatically be equated with greater control over professional discretion; 
paradoxically, more rules may create more discretion." They also argue that the 
exercise of professional discretion by street-level bureaucrats is not inherently 
"bad", but can be seen as an important professional attribute. Impartiality is 
perceived as being a quality that is sought after when employing ―street-level 
bureaucrats‖. An impartial street-level bureaucrat will fairly implement the law, 
and apply it to all citizens, and not just a select few. 
 
In assessing the relevance today of Lipsky‘s work, Taylor and Kelly (2006) 
identified three levels of discretion available to employees at work in 
organisations, including rule discretion where the employee is bounded by legal, 
fiscal or organisational constraints. In theory, the more rules the less discretion 
there is at street level. However, rules still need to be interpreted and tested, 
particularly in situations where they cannot be applied to the letter. In the case 
of value discretion, the employee‘s notions of fairness and justice are the focus, 
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where professionals abide by established practices but are expected to exercise 
judgement based on training, knowledge and experience. With task discretion, 
focus is on the actual ability to carry out prescribed tasks, where some tasks 
may be complex and require discretionary action which cannot be easily 
monitored. 
 
5.3 Collaborations 
In 1991, Gray and Wood (1991) and Wood and Gray (1991) looked at the then 
extant literature on ‗collaborations‘, which they identified as being an area of 
rising academic interest. Wood and Gray (1991) suggested that whilst there is 
no single theoretical perspective that provides a foundation for a general theory 
of collaboration, by synthesising elements from organisational literature then 
key features of collaborative working may be identified, and these key features 
are set out in Table 5.1 below: 
 
1) Stakeholders, with common interests/shared goals
2) Seeing different aspects of a problem/having differences
* acting/deciding/managing/exploring/addressing constructively
* via shared institutions/rules/norms,
* a temporary structure, and
* an interactive process
* with respect to a problem domain/issue
* to search for solutions/to produce change
* beyond their own limited visions and abilities
* to decide the future of the shared domain
based upon Wood and Gray (1991:147)
Table 5.1: Common Elements of Collaborations
 
 
5.3.1 Collaborative Domains 
These common elements derived from the literature indicate that conditions for 
collaborative working are more favourable where a number of stakeholders 
work constructively in a common domain to seek solutions through appropriate 
mechanisms.  In earlier research, Trist (1983:270) characterised ‗inter-
organisational domains‘ as being those where an organisational population 
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engages with a set of problems which ―…constitute a domain of common 
concern for its members‖. 
 
Gray and Wood (1991:4) go on to draw a further distinction between 
collaborations, which is the: 
 
“…process through which parties who see different aspects of a problem 
can constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that 
go beyond their own limited vision of what is possible”, 
 
and collaborative working, which they describe as being: 
 
“…an interorganizational (sic) effort to address problems too complex 
and too protracted to be resolved by unilateral organizational action”.  
 
Thus, where collaboration refers to the process, collaborative working is 
represented by the different forms taken. 
 
The literature on collaborations can be further distinguished between that which 
focuses on collaboration between solely private sector organisations, where 
relations tend to associate more with the competition principles described above 
(Kanter, 1994). However, within such collaboration individual organisations 
have to have defences against allowing exchanges from revealing more than 
bargained for (Hamel, Doz and Prahalad, 1989). Collaborations involving 
private firms, public sector organisations and the voluntary sector tend to be 
associated more with collaboration principles, where the individual 
organisations involved look for ―Win/Win‖ outcomes (Armistead and Pettigrew, 
2004). 
 
Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) developed a further categorisation of collaboration 
where the primary imperative is to realise benefits for the community, rather 
than for special interests, and which they characterised as being public-purpose 
collaborations. Such collaborations typically operate at a sub-regional, city or 
neighbourhood level, and are created in response to some public policy 
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objective, including public infrastructure provision. Performance within these 
collaborations has a particular salience in the wider political environment, 
possibly supported by elected office-holders with an interest in the success of 
the collaboration in order to maintain the support of the electorate. 
 
5.3.1.1 Stakeholder Theory 
Traditional theories of the firm assumed that, taking a profit-maximising stance, 
in a private-sector organisation the shareholders in the business should be 
given first priority and be the major consideration in decision-making and 
organisational strategy. This assumption arose because early economic 
theorists saw a business‘s owner and manager, and their interests, as being 
synonymous. However, studies of market models demonstrated the importance 
of competitors and government as restraining factors, and also the impact on 
business from suppliers, distributors and the organisation‘s own manager and 
employees. Newbould and Luffman (1979) argued that an organisation‘s current 
and future strategies were affected by external pressures from the marketplace, 
including competitors, buyers and suppliers, shareholders, pressure groups, 
government, internal pressures from existing commitments, managers, 
employees, and trade unions; and the personal ethical and moral perspectives 
of senior managers. 
 
Freeman (1994) categorised any groups or individuals who could affect or be 
affected by the achievement of an organisation‘s objectives as ―stakeholders‖. 
The stakeholder approach to understanding the firm in its environment was a 
way for the managers of an organisation to broaden its outlook beyond the 
profit-maximisation function. 
 
Stakeholders may have a commonality of purpose at a general level, for 
example, providing a service or improving quality, at a more detailed level they 
might wish to impose different purposes and priorities on an organisation 
because they see different things as being important, and their interests are not 
always consistent (Johnson and Scholes, 2001). Stakeholder theory takes the 
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concept of ―stakeholders‖ and is a method by which managers can assess the 
relative power of various stakeholder individuals or groups, how to establish a 
hierarchy of relative importance amongst all the stakeholders, and how to 
―trade-off‖ one against another. 
 
The Labour Government‘s adoption of ―Third Way‖ policies, as discussed above 
in chapter 2, incorporated the idea of a ―stakeholder society‖, where the state 
formed partnerships and networks based on trust between a range of groups in 
society, including businesses, employees, and voluntary and public sectors 
(Richards and Smith, 2002). 
 
Where Labour‘s intention was to create skilful, loyal, flexible, and literate 
citizens, it did so primarily by administrative means, with rights being exercised 
within a framework of individual responsibilities (Glasman, 2010). Glasman 
(2010) noted that the ―New Labour‖ model had come under strain, with social 
problems of teenage pregnancy, obesity, class disadvantage, inequality, 
antisocial behaviour and a lack of social mobility all proving more durable than 
expected. In response to this, and the financial crisis of 2008, David Cameron, 
leader of the Conservative party and British Prime Minister following the 2010 
general election, put forward the notion of ―the big society‖, the elements of 
which were identified in chapter 2 and involve a focus on local communities, 
including developing a sense of community in individuals, groups, and devolving 
greater powers to local authorities to deal with local issues. 
 
5.3.2 Collaborative Working 
―Wicked issues‖ were discussed in chapter 4 above, with regard to public policy 
implementation, and Lowndes and Skelcher (1998:315) say that ―wicked issues‖ 
can only be tackled by ―…bringing together the resources of a range of different 
issues and interest groups‖. Innovation can arise in the: 
 
“…form of strategies to develop interrelationships, trust and collaboration 
in an environment of resource scarcity where organisations would 
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typically be orientated to defence and self-protection behind their 
bureaucratic ramparts”. 
 
These ‗problems‘ are also characterised as being ―meta-problems‖ (Chevalier) 
or ―messes‖ (Ackoff), and are issues that are too extensive and too many-sided 
to be coped with by a single organisation and where the response-capability 
required to deal with a ―mess‖ is inter- and multi-organisational. 
  
The literature on partnerships tends to agree that there is no single definition as 
to what constitutes a ‗partnership‘ (Armistead and Pettigrew, 2004). 
Partnerships can be prescriptive (i.e. top-down) or evolutionary (i.e. bottom-up), 
formal or informal, can be comprised of public bodies, private firms, community 
or voluntary groups, can vary by size, function or service area, be statutory or 
voluntary, executive or non-executive, strategic or operational, limited 
companies or charitable trusts (Armistead and Pettigrew, 2004; Hill, 2001; 
Wilson and Game, 2006). Armistead and Pettigrew (2004:573) offer a definition 
that further links the nature of partnership working to tackling ‗wicked issues 
when they define a partnership as being: 
 
“…a cross-organizational group working together towards common goals 
which would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve if tacked 
alone.” 
 
‗Partnership‘ is one of a number of different terminologies used in the literature 
to describe inter-organisational collaboration (Huxham, 2003), which also 
includes alliance, collaboration, and network. According to Huxham (1996), 
collaborations have been identified as a logical and necessary response to 
turbulent conditions, where organisations become highly interdependent with 
others in unexpected but consequential ways. Turbulence, which occurs when 
organisations, acting independently on diverse directions, create unanticipated 
consequences for themselves and others, cannot be managed individually 
because disruptions and their causes cannot be adequately anticipated or dealt 
with by unilateral action. The ability of a single organisation to plan is limited by 
the unpredictable consequences of other organisations. Through collaboration 
 165 
(Huxham, 1996), stakeholders gain appreciation of inter-dependencies, pool 
their insights into the problem, increase the variety of responses to issues, and 
achieve increases reciprocity, efficiency and stability amongst themselves. 
 
Interactions between organisations can be identified broadly from two 
organising principles (Armistead and Pettigrew, 2004), i.e. competition, where 
alliances arise in response to threats from competitors or perceived 
opportunities to expand domains – the competition principle is developed from 
resource dependency theory, where individual organisations are orientated 
towards the acquisition and defence of an adequate supply of scare resources 
(Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002); or collaboration, a synergistic gain from sharing 
resources, risks and rewards, and promoting collaborative advantage. At its 
simplest, collaboration refers to any situation where people are working across 
organisational boundaries although there are no simple prescriptions for ‗best 
practice‘ (Huxham and Vangen, 1996). 
 
Williams (2002) suggested that a distinction could be drawn between inter-
organisational relations at different levels – macro and micro, where at the 
macro level, a number of writers typified relationships along a continuum ―…of 
varying degrees of sophistication from co-operation to collaboration…‖ 
(Williams, 2002:109) and, at the micro level, the focus of research was on the 
role of individual actors, their behaviour patterns and motivations (Williams, 
2002: 107). 
 
In presenting a view of how public organisations could adopt the best 
managerial and organisational response in order to deal with ―wicked issues‖, 
as discussed earlier in this chapter and also in chapter 4, Williams (2002) 
described a move from the ‗traditional‘ (i.e. bureaucratic) to ‗post-modern‘ 
arrangements such as networking, collaboration and partnership. 
 
Williams‘ (2002) notion of the micro aspects of collaborative working is 
supported by existing literature which seeks to describe taxonomies of those 
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elements required to ensure successful outcomes (or that are lacking in 
collaborative ‗failures‘.) Huxham (2003) described a taxonomy based upon: 
 Goal ownership – collaborative, organisational, individual 
 Openness – explicit, assumed, hidden 
 Means of achievement - collaborative, organisational, individual 
 Power – identifying the points of power in a collaboration, and that these 
can change over time 
 Trust – common wisdom suggests that trust is precondition for 
successful collaboration; common practice shows that suspicion is 
usually the starting point. This leads to the importance of trust building. 
 Membership structure – where structures are conceptualised by: 
 Ambiguity – organisations not clear as to who they are collaborating with 
 Complexity – where organisations are also members of other 
(competing?) collaborations 
 Dynamics – shifting roles of collaborative members 
 Leadership – the mechanisms by which things are made to happen in the 
collaboration 
 
A key element in initiating and developing collaborations is a person (or 
persons, known variously as the ‗boundary spanner‘, the ‗reticulist‘ or the 
‗convenor‘ (Armistead and Pettigrew, 2004; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Gray 
and Wood, (1991), who are those people within individual organisations working 
behind the scenes, influencing and persuading, building interpersonal trust, 
anticipating issues and limiting potential damage. These are the people who 
bring networks together and help others to identify relevant linkages between 
them and other ‗actors‘. 
 
If the ‗boundary spanner‘/‘reticulist‘ is a key individual in successful 
collaborations, Trist (1983) suggests that within inter-organisational 
collaborations there is likely to be a ‗referent organisation‘ which regulates the 
relationships, activities and values of the ‗domain organisations‘ and look for 
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emerging future trends in order to develop and shape the image of the 
‗domain‘s‘ future. 
 
As a caveat against the assumption that collaborative working should always 
been seen as an ideal for which organisations should strive, Huxham (2003) 
defined two concepts from her research: 
 Collaborative advantage – something achieved out of the collaboration 
that could not have been attained by any of the organisations acting 
alone; and 
 Collaborative inertia – where the outputs from the collaboration appear to 
be negligible or appear to be extremely slow. 
 
According to Hill (2001:219), partnerships require a different set of managerial 
skills to those traditionally used in the public sector; and that organisations 
should address the extent to which a partnership would be a ‗strategic fit‘, i.e. 
developing a strategy by identifying opportunities and adapting resources and 
competencies so as to take advantage. One of the ‗lenses‘ through which an 
organisation‘s strategy can be viewed (Johnson and Scholes, 2002:24) is that of 
strategy as ideas, where strategy is not so much planned from the top but is 
emergent from within and around the organisation as people cope with 
uncertainty and change. 
 
The ‗traditional‘ organisational structure adopted by public organisations, i.e. 
bureaucracy, is questioned in the literature on both public policy and inter-
organisational collaboration, where the suggestion is made that in order to 
address the challenges of dealing with ―wicked issues‖ in the age of 
governance, organisations need to look to adopting a ‗post-modern‘ 
perspective, including different organisational structures and processes, in what 
Armistead and Pettigrew (2004:575) describe as a ―cultural shift‖. 
 
The research discussed above has tended towards showing public policy and 
inter-organisational collaborations from a ‗top-down‘ point of view, where they 
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can be seen to represent a strategy choice adopted by organisations in order to 
tackle the ―wicked issues‖ or ―messes‖.  
 
This ‗top-down‘ perspective is also seen in the implications for control in 
bureaucracies where the hierarchical nature of the organisation means that 
control is ensured by the exercise of authority from the top and where coherent 
and consistent orders are passed down the line (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). 
This arrangement can be contrasted with alternative types of control and co-
ordination including networks, where relationships between essentially equal 
social agents and agencies are more informal and where organisational units 
operate co-operatively and markets, where the price mechanism regulates and 
co-ordinates the activities of sellers and buyers. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) 
suggested that the main thrust of the NPM reforms, in Britain at least, was the 
de facto substitution of market forms of co-ordination for hierarchical co-
ordination.  
 
Another perspective can be added by considering the input of the ‗social actors‘ 
involved in the various processes. There is extensive literature on 
organisational behaviour and the behaviour, motivations and goals of 
individuals in organisations. An examination from the perspective of goal-setting 
and decision-making would help to form a link between public policy research 
and organisation behaviour literature. Goals can be defined as being a future 
expectation or a desired future state and, from an organisation perspective, are 
the basis for objectives, policies and strategies pursued. Individuals within 
organisations have different, possibly conflicting, goals, and as a consequence 
the goals which an organisation actually pursues (the informal goals) can be 
distinguished from the officially stated goals (the formal goals) (Mullins, 2002). 
However, Simon (Ouchi, 1980) maintains that individuals within organisations 
rarely have a common understanding of goals.  
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5.3.3 Collaborative Performance 
Skelcher and Sullivan (2008) addressed the question of how to explain the 
different ways in which collaborations might be expected to perform, and 
whether it would be possible to set out the expectations about the main 
performance domains for ―public-purposive collaborations‖. They defined 
(Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002) ―public-purposive collaborations‖ as being 
collaborations where the primary interest was to realise benefits for the wider 
community rather than for special interests, with such collaborations operating 
at a sub-regional, city or neighbourhood level. Key elements in the creation of 
these collaborations are that they are created in response to a public policy 
objective and are legitimised through a civil administrative body. 
 
Laffin and Young (1990:27), talking about professionalism in local government, 
identify mutuality – the broad consensus on goals – as a key relationship 
between officers and members. Professionalism in local government has 
several levels of meaning including that of an occupational group which has 
substantial authority in the workplace, the day-to-day freedom from external 
control, and the ability to proffer advice and exert influence (Laffin and Young, 
1990:8). The environmental changes – market reforms, audit and performance-
measurement culture – discussed above have also changed the context of 
‗professionalism‘ in local government in response to new-style Members 
wanting to pursue their own agendas driven by external policy developments 
(such as national political party manifestos and policies) and their own (rather 
than that of officers) assessments of citizens‘ needs, leading to a move away 
from the notion of local government officers acting as autonomous and rational 
individuals (Laffin and Young, 1990; Gleeson and Knights, 2006). In addition to 
these ‗top-down challenges to professionalism, ‗bottom-up‘ pressures include 
the increased role of users in evaluating service delivery and the need for 
‗professionals‘ to be more aware of the effect of their actions on ‗customers‘ 
(Taylor and Kelly, 2006). 
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5.4 Chapter Summary 
This study has already established the environment in which, with regard to 
‗highway works‘, a number of organisations are involved. The main focuses of 
this study are local authorities and predominantly private-sector utility 
companies. In addition, a number of other Government departments, i.e. the 
Department for Transport, and representative bodies, including regional and 
national joint authorities group (JAG) and joint utility groups (JUG) separately 
and together within highway authority and utility committees (HAUC), are 
involved in setting the agenda and developing legislation and regulations. 
 
The literature on organisational theory described the way in which organisations 
are bounded by their environment, and the implications that this has for the way 
in which it operates, and identifies the dependencies on other organisations for 
resources. The significance of the work on organisational theory to this thesis is 
that, by looking at the organisations involved, it helps to explain the reasons 
why organisations would seek to collaborate (or not) with others, and how these 
reasons then help to explain the behaviours of the people within those 
organisations and the extent to which they then collaborate (or not) across 
organisational boundaries. 
 
The literature has established that there are a number of bases for authority, i.e. 
getting people to do things, in organisations, and that in some cases, for 
example rational-legal (Weber, 1947) they are related to the bureaucratic nature 
of the organisation itself. The post-Second World War work in the field began to 
conceptualise organisations in terms of metaphors, likening them to systems or 
machines or organisms, and that concluded that the nature of the organisation 
would have an effect on the way in which the people within the organisation 
behaved, with particular types of behaviour being predicted for certain types of 
organisation operating in certain types of environment.  
 
In addition to organisation theories, this chapter has also looked at theories of 
the firm, which concluded that organisations are reluctant to take on a problem 
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that they do not perceive to be ―theirs‖, do not understand what they can do 
about it or will not be fairly compensated for dealing with it. Private-sector firms 
are assumed to be motivate by profit or mandate, but not by altruism; and they 
are competitive because they are constrained by the requirement to make a 
profit or because they are dealing with public monies. Stakeholder theories 
have also added to the discussion by identifying a number of factors, including 
external and internal pressures, and the perspectives of senior managers in 
organisations, which can result in an organisation looking beyond engaging 
simply in profit-maximising behaviour. This thesis will address some of the 
issues encountered by the private-sector utility companies in executing their 
‗street works‘, where their expenditure and income is set by industry regulators, 
and will look at the factors that people within those organisations take into 
account when deciding when to go above and beyond the basic minimum 
required by legislation. Similarly with regard to the local authorities involved, this 
study will investigate the considerations that might be involved in going beyond 
a demand for strict compliance with the legislation by the utility companies. 
 
With regard to collaborative working between organisations, the literature has 
identified that a number of different definitions as to what ‗collaboration‘ means, 
and the working arrangements that collaboration might take, exist. Armistead 
and Pettigrew (2004) offer a definition that is helpful in light of the subject matter 
for this study, which seeks to address the benefits of a partnership approach to 
managing ‗highway works‘, by describing a partnership as a cross-
organisational group working together towards common goals which would be 
difficult, if not impossible, to tackle alone. Chapter 3 described the changes to 
the legislation that regulates ‗highway works‘. The number of recent changes to 
regulations and introduction of new legislation, together with the results of 
studies carried out by the Government and an increase in the amount of traffic 
using the roads, indicates that the issue of ‗highway works‘ is not an easy 
problem to solve. The way in which the regulations are applied, i.e. legislation 
introduced by Government from work carried out by representative bodies, 
applied by individual local authorities for works carried out by themselves and 
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numerous private-sector utility companies, means that solutions to problems 
arising cannot be tackled by one or a few of the organisations involved. 
 
There are a number of features (Huxham, 2003) which have been identified in 
both successful and unsuccessful inter-organisational collaborations, and these 
have been used in developing the questions for the semi-structured interview 
used in this study to collect primary data. Elements of successful collaborations 
identified included having shared goals, issues of openness, commitment and 
trust, and a key element was shown to be those ―actors‖ who cross 
organisational barriers to develop relationships and build commitment to making 
inter-organisational collaborations work. These factors also link back to the 
literature discussed earlier in this chapter relating to organisational theories and 
theories of the firm, which looked at how the structure of the organisation would 
affect the behaviours of individuals, the extent to which they understood and 
shared their organisation‘s goals, and the extent to which those organisational 
goals were motivated by the need to compete or collaborate with other 
organisations. 
 
The literature on inter-organisational collaborations particularly highlights the 
significance of individuals, particularly of ―street-level bureaucrats‖, to either the 
success or failure of a collaborative venture. These ―street-level bureaucrats‖, 
those actors who are involved in implementing policy, provide a link with the 
literature on inter-organisational collaborations. 
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Chapter Six – Research Methodology 
6.1 Research Methods used in this Study 
Table 6.1 below summarises the research approach, methodology and methods 
used in this study. The Table shows that whilst the approach was mainly 
inductive and qualitative, in order to meet the research aims of exploring the 
reality of the area of study, a number of methods were utilised in order to make 
the study more rigorous and to bring greater validity and reliability to the results. 
 
Table 6.1 Research Methods for this Study 
Research Method/Methodology Purpose 
Research Stage 1 - 
Research Philosophy Social-Constructivist 
research aims to increase the 
general understanding about 
'highway works' 
Research Stage 2 - 
Research Approach 
Inductive  
to collect data and develop theory 
Research Stage 3 - 
Research Strategy 
Case study 
used previously in studying Devon 
County Council; enables the 
collection of data about reasoning 
and motivation of the individuals 
Research Stage 4 - Time 
Horizon 
Cross-sectional 
to study the phenomenon at a point 
in time 
Research Stage 5 - Data 
Collection: 
Qualitative 
to gain insight and understanding 
about individuals' reality 
  Quantitative to triangulate interview findings 
Fieldwork: 
Semi-structured 
Interviews 
to explore individuals' reality 
  
Observation 
to help with context; used in the 
absence of interviewee availability 
  
Multiple sources 
to provide additional rigour to 
support the use of the case study 
approach 
Deskwork: Document analysis to triangulate the interview findings 
Validity 
  clear focus on relationships 
between authorities and utility 
companies with regard to 'highway 
works'; extent to which findings 
align with the literature 
Reliability 
  consistency of data analysis and 
presentation 
Generalisability 
  limited by the narrow focus of the 
study 
Data Analysis: 
comparable data 
sources 
interviewees were at comparable 
levels within organisations 
  
coding 
to identify patterns; to identify 
relevant data; to support validity 
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6.2 Identification of the Research Methodology for this Study 
The identification and definition of the research questions represents the start of 
the process to identify a suitable research methodology. Since there are a wide 
variety of research methods available to social scientists, there is also a need to 
consider the type of study that is appropriate to reach an understanding of the 
research area. 
 
Research design is the basic plan of the research and the logic behind it so that 
it makes it more possible and valid to draw more general conclusions from the 
research. The researcher must then identify an appropriate technique for 
collecting data. 
 
Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (2002) identified the key choices of research 
design, and these are summarised in Table 6.2 below: 
 
Researcher is Independent vs Researcher is Involved
Large Samples vs Small Numbers
Testing Theories vs Generating Theories
Experimental Design vs Fieldwork Methods
Universal Theory vs Local Knowledge
Verification vs Falsification
source: Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 2002:43
Table 6.2 - Key Choices of Research Design
 
 
Research design will be informed by whether the researcher is involved with, or 
remains distant from, the material that is being researched. The choice stems 
from a philosophical view about whether it is possible for the observer to remain 
independent of the phenomena being observed, but also whether the observer 
can remain independent. 
 
Yin (2003) summarised the research design as being a more than a work plan, 
with the main purpose of the design being to help avoid a situation where the 
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evidence does not address the initial research questions. It is a logical model of 
proof that allows the researcher to draw inferences concerning causal relations 
among the variables under investigation (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1992).  
 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2003:83) described the research process as 
being like an onion, in that it is revealed by peeling away a number of layers: 
 The first layer relates to the research philosophy adopted by the 
researcher. 
 The second layer flows from the first and addresses the research 
approach. 
 The third layer identifies the research strategy to be used in the study. 
 The fourth layer identifies the time horizon of the research, which may be 
cross sectional, where a phenomenon is studied at a particular time, or 
longitudinal, where the study is carried out over a period of time in order 
to document changes and developments. 
 The fifth layer includes data collection methods.  
 
Each of these layers is examined below to explain how and why they were 
applied to this study. 
 
There is also a need to consider the design of the research project whilst at the 
problem definition stage, to ensure that the method(s) chosen is capable of 
identifying the research objectives. This requires the researcher to select a 
method capable of collecting useful data and of providing analytical tools from 
which consistent, relevant, significant and valid conclusions can be drawn. With 
the many research methods available to researchers, according to Arbnor and 
Bjerke (1997:5) a researcher can never 
 
“... empirically or logically determine the best approach. This can only be 
done reflectively by considering a situation to be studied and your own 
opinion of life.”  
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Different types of research approaches produce different kinds of knowledge 
about the phenomena being studied, and underpinning the different research 
methods are more general philosophical questions about how social reality is 
perceived, which leads to an identification of the most appropriate methods for 
studying it (Blaxter, Hughes and Tight, 2001). 
 
6.2.1 Literature Review 
An important element in selecting an appropriate methodology is the literature 
review, whereby the current study can be related to previous work that has 
been carried out within the research field. 
 
The focus for this study is to examine the ways in which local government 
departments in England deal with their responsibilities under legislation relating 
to the co-ordination of ‗highway works‘. The literature reviewed in chapters 2 to 
5 covered four distinct areas: (1) the development of local government, its 
relationship with central Government, and how central Government has re-
defined the role of local government; and (2) the development of legislation 
relating to ‗highway works‘ in response to changes in the function of highways, 
i.e. from being a conduit for surface transport to also being a conduit for 
underground apparatus, and the consequential need to balance the demands of 
road users and the owners of underground apparatus. These two areas overlap 
in the area of (3) public policy, which provides literature on how polices are 
developed and implemented and also provides an additional context through 
central Government‘s privatisation programme in Britain in the 1980s and 1990s 
which had the effect of increasing the numbers and types of now private-sector 
organisations that had rights to keep their apparatus under the highway. As a 
consequence of the extension of these rights, and the changes to legislation 
regulating activities for ‗highway works‘, the local government departments have 
to engage with the utility companies, and with their own works-promoting 
departments, in order to co-ordinate works effectively, leading to (4) the review 
of the literature on inter-organisational collaborations. 
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In three of the above areas, the development of local government, public policy, 
and inter-organisational collaborations, the author reviewed printed sources, 
including academic texts and journals. In many cases the authors of those 
sources had adopted qualitative research methodologies involving interviews 
and case studies in order to explore their research areas. 
 
The literature on inter-organisational collaboration examined the factors that 
motivated organisations to collaborate, the factors that were present in 
successful (or unsuccessful) collaborations, and the significance for policy 
implementation of the individual, both within an organisation and also spanning 
organisational boundaries, and how collaborative working involving both public- 
and private-sector organisations could be examined. 
 
Similarly, the literature on public policy and policy implementation studies also 
offered suggestions regarding an appropriate research strategy for this study. In 
the literature, ‗top-down‘ approaches to policy studies examine policy 
implementation from political decision to administrative execution, and seek to 
be predictive or make recommendations regarding future policies, while 
‗bottom-up‘ approaches examine implementation from the perspective of the 
people implementing the policies, and seek to be more explanatory. Thus, they 
reinforce the identification in the literature on inter-organisational collaboration 
about the significance of the individuals involved in the implementation process 
and the extent to which they can influence it. 
 
These two areas of literature suggested a method by which this study could 
explore the issues involved by: 
 Identifying the people involved with, and their approach to, ‗highway 
works‘ within the different organisations; and 
 Looking at the contextual factors involved – including the changes and 
development in local government and legislation relating to ‗highway 
works‘ identified in the other parts of the literature review –  that could 
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have an effect on how legislation was applied (by local authorities) or 
complied with (by utility companies). 
 
6.2.2 Research “Layer 1” – Research Philosophies 
Research philosophies have implications for the way in which the researcher 
thinks about the development of knowledge, about what knowledge can be 
judged to be acceptable, and so will influence the way in which research is 
carried out. 
 
6.2.2.1 Positivism 
Positivism assumes that the social world exists externally, and that its 
properties can be measured through objective methods rather than being 
inferred subjectively through sensation, reflection or intuition (Easterby-Smith, 
Thorpe and Lowe, 2001). Positivist research brings with it a number of 
implications: 
 The researcher in this approach assumes the role of an objective 
analyst, making detached interpretations about data that has been 
collected in a value-free manner, and where emphasis is placed on a 
highly-structured methodology to allow for replication and on quantifiable 
observations that lend themselves to statistical analysis (Gill and 
Johnson, 1997; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2003). 
 The positivist philosophy is then associated with a deductive research 
approach, which involves the development of a theory that is then 
subjected to a rigorous test. Under the deductive approach, concepts 
need to be ―operationalised‖ in a way that enables facts to be measured 
quantitatively and reduced to the simplest possible elements. The 
deductive approach requires a sufficiently large sample to allow for 
generalisation about regularities in human social behaviour (Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill, 2003). 
 
 179 
6.2.2.2 Social Constructionist 
On the other hand, researchers critical of the positivist approach argued that 
rich insights are lost by reducing the results of investigations into a series of 
law-like generalisations. Remenyi et al (1998) argued for the need to 
understand that individuals and organisations are unique and that there was a 
need to understand the reality working behind them, leading to social 
constructivism, which focuses on the way in which people make sense of the 
world through sharing their experiences with others via language (Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill, 2003). 
 
The essence of this approach is that ―reality‖ is determined by people rather 
than by objective and external factors. In contrast to the positivist approach, 
social scientists using the social constructivist approach would focus on the 
different constructions and meanings that people place upon their experience, 
both individually and collectively. The purpose of this approach to research is to 
try to understand and explain why people have different experiences, rather 
than to search for external causes and fundamental laws to explain their 
behaviour (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 2001). 
 
Table 6.3 below summarises the contrasts between positivism and social 
constructivism. 
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Table 6.3 - Contrasting Positivism and Social Constructivism
Attribute Positivism Social Constructivism
The observer Must be independant Is part of what is being observed
Human interests should be irrelevant Are the main drivers of science
Explanations Must demonstrate causality Aim to increase general
understanding of the situation
Research progress through Hypothesis and deductions Gathering rich data from which
ideas are deduced
Concepts Need to be operationalised Should incorporate stakeholder
so that they can be measured perspectives
Units of analysis Should be reduced to May include the complexity of
simplest terms "whole" situations
Generalisation through Statistical probability Theoretical abstraction
Sampling requires Large numbers selected Small numbers of cases chosen for 
randomly specific reasons
source: Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 2002:30
 
In undertaking this study the author, due to the nature of his full-time 
employment, was a part of what was being observed and was already known to 
the Yorkshire-area authorities and utility companies as a practitioner. The aims 
of the study were to increase the general understanding of the situation 
regarding ‗highway works‘ and how different organisations applied the same 
national legislation. In order to do this, a number of stakeholder perspectives 
were taken into account but these were based around a small number of cases 
chosen to allow differences to be explored. For these reasons, the study‘s 
research philosophy tended more toward the social constructionist approach. 
 
6.2.3 Research “Layer 2” – Research Approaches 
The design of a research project can take either a deductive approach, where a 
theory and hypothesis are first developed and then tested via a research 
strategy, or inductive approach, where data is collected first and then theories 
are developed from the data analysis. 
 
The deductive approach can be related to scientific research, where theories 
are subjected to rigorous testing, and is the dominant research approach in the 
natural sciences (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2003). An important 
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characteristic of this approach is that concepts need to be operationalised in a 
way that enables data to be measured quantitatively. 
 
The inductive approach has its origins in the emergence of social science 
research, where researchers were critical of the deductive approach that 
enabled a cause-effect link to be made between variables without an 
understanding of the way in which individuals interpreted their social world. 
Research using an inductive approach is concerned with the context in which 
events take place, and so lends itself more towards the study of a small sample 
of subjects. 
 
In the same way that the social constructivist philosophy contrasts with the 
positivist, the research approach most closely associated with social 
constructivism is that of induction rather than deduction. Under the inductive 
approach, theory follows data as a way of accounting for the way in which 
humans interpret their social world, and to find alternative explanations about 
what is going on. 
 
Within this study the intention was to investigate how different organisations 
applied national legislation, with particular focus on the role and contribution of 
individuals within those organisations. The findings could then be analysed to 
look for explanations about similarities and differences. These aims were best 
supported by an inductive approach. 
 
6.2.4 Research “Layer 3” – Research Strategies 
The research strategy is the general plan by which the researcher will go about 
answering the research question(s), and should contain clear objectives, 
specifies the sources for data collection, and constrains on the research 
(including access to data, time, location, cost, and ethical issues).  
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6.2.4.1 Experiments 
Using this strategy, the researcher defines a theory or hypothesis, selects a 
sample from a known population and then manipulate an independent variable 
is to produce a change or effect. The experimental method is the only research 
strategy that can, in principle, yield causal relationships, and control of the 
variable can clarify the direction of cause and effect (Bowling, 1997). 
 
The experimental method is associated more with physical sciences, on 
materials amenable to experimentation, although is used in some social science 
areas such as psychology. However, within the social sciences, 
experimentation is used with more caution due to the ethical considerations 
around the use of experiments involving people (Blaxter, Hughes and Tight, 
2001). The experimental method would not have been an appropriate strategy 
for this study due to the difficulties in setting up an experiment within the time 
and cost constraints, and other strategies were available.   
 
6.2.4.2 Surveys 
Survey research is a method of collecting information by asking a set of pre-
formulated questions in a pre-determined sequence in a structured 
questionnaire, to a sample of individuals, drawn so as to be representative of a 
defined population (Hutton, 1990).Questionnaires, interviews and literature 
reviews are also types of survey that are used in social science research.  
 
Survey strategies do allow for the collection of large amounts of data from a 
sizeable population in an economical way, and by using standardised 
responses, allows for each comparison. However, much time needs to be spent 
on designing and piloting the research instruments, and data collected by the 
study may not be as wide ranging as those collected by other research 
strategies (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2003). 
 
A survey strategy was considered for this study but was discounted because, 
while it might have yielded a larger volume of data, it would not have provided 
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the in-depth examination about the involvement of individuals within the 
organisations. 
 
6.2.4.3 Case Studies 
There is no consensus on a precise definition of what is a ‗case study‘ but a 
working definition can be constructed around the notion that it relates to the 
idea of having cases as the building blocks for data collection and analysis into 
a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context and using 
multiple sources of evidence (Burton, 2000; Robson, 2002).  
 
Many scholars have regarded case studies as ―... an inferior method of inquiry, 
being of little use and of minimal significance, since they allowed very little 
quantification and no generalisations‖ (Sarantakos, 1997:192). The key criticism 
concerned the issue of ―representative-ness‖ and the extent to which the 
research findings can be generalised to a wider population beyond the case 
study (Burton, 2000). Evidence from multiple-case studies was, therefore, 
regarded as being more compelling and more robust.  
 
Case studies have also been criticised on the basis that they often lack rigour, 
are too time consuming and generate large and unreadable documents (Yin, 
2003). These criticisms can be challenged on the grounds that they can be 
levelled at any badly designed and executed research project and are not 
confined solely to case study research (Burton, 2000). 
 
However, case studies have been advocated as the preferred strategy when 
‗‗how‘‘ or ‗‗why‘‘ questions are being posed, when the investigator has little 
control over events and when this focus is on a contemporary phenomenon 
within some real life context (Yin, 2003). Descriptive case studies can be 
deployed if there is little published research on the topic (Burton, 2000). 
 
A case study approach was chosen for this study as the aims of the research 
involved looking in-depth at a small selection of organisations in order to gain 
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an understanding about how they went about implementing national legislation, 
and particularly how individuals within the organisations influenced that 
implementation. In addition, Cole (2004) had already utilised the case study 
approach for a number of studies into the working of Devon County Council, 
involving a number of in-depth interviews with managers within the council 
together with a questionnaire given to the same people. 
 
6.2.4.4 Ethnography 
The purpose of this research strategy is to interpret the social world that 
research subjects inhabit in the way in which they interpret it. A consequence of 
this is that research is time-consuming and takes place over an extended period 
(Gill and Johnson, 1997).Researchers using this strategy become participant 
observers in the organisations being studied, and tend to use open or semi-
structured survey instruments. However, research outcomes tend not to be 
replicable or generalisable (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2003). 
 
The author of this study works for Kirklees Council in its Street Works Team, 
dealing with utility companies and the authority‘s own road works departments. 
As a consequence, he was already known to the utility companies and 
authorities in the Yorkshire area, and introductions to organisations in 
Yorkshire, Devon and London were made through his work role, although it was 
made clear to interviewees that the research was not being carried out on 
behalf of Kirklees Council. 
 
6.2.4.5 Action Research 
This research strategy has three common themes (Cunningham, 1995; Eden 
and Huxham, 1996): 
 It focuses on the management of change 
 There is a need for a close collaboration between practitioners and 
researchers 
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 Action research should have implications beyond the immediate project, 
and that results could inform other contexts 
 
Action research as a strategy commences with the identification of an initial idea 
for a change intervention, which is followed by fact finding and analysis in order 
to generate an overall plan and decision about the first steps to be taken. 
Subsequent cycles involve revising the change intervention to ensure that it 
meets the needs of the organisation. Planned action steps are amended and 
implemented to take account of unforeseen changes (Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill, 2003). 
 
The strengths of an action research strategy are a focus on change, the 
recognition that time needs to be devoted to observation, monitoring and 
evaluation, and the involvement of employees (practitioners) in the process. 
However, as with the experimental method, action research was not considered 
to be the most appropriate strategy for this study as there were other methods 
that were likely to be more effective in allowing the research aims to be met 
within time and cost constraints. 
 
6.2.5 Research “Layer 4” – Time Horizon 
Research can be either a ‗snapshot‘ taken at a particular time – a cross-
sectional study – or a ‗diary‘ that represents events over a given time – a 
longitudinal study (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2003).  
 
The main strength of a longitudinal study is its capacity to study change and 
development over time. It does, however, need to be carried out over a period 
of time sufficient to allow changes and developments to be observed. 
 
On the other hand, a cross-sectional approach allows for the study of a 
phenomenon at a particular time. 
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This study was constrained by time, to carry out the research, analyse and 
write-up the findings, and submit the completed thesis, and by cost, with the 
research being self-funded and so needing to focus on a small, selected 
sample. It was, therefore, considered that this study adopt a cross-sectional 
approach to study the implementation of ‗highway works‘ legislation at a 
particular time rather than study in detail changes and developments over time. 
 
6.2.6 Research “Layer 5” – Data Collection Methods 
All research involves the collection and analysis of data, which can involve: 
reading, observation, measurement, asking questions or a combination of 
these. However, data collected during the research process may vary 
considerably in their characteristics (Blaxter, Hughes and Tight, 2001): 
 Data may be numerical, consist of words or a combination 
 Data may be ―primary‖, in that the information has not previously been 
collected, or ―secondary‖, in that the information has already been put 
together by someone else but used in a different way for the current 
research 
 Data may consist of responses to a questionnaire or interview 
transcriptions, notes or other recording of observations or experiments, 
documents, or a combination 
 
6.2.6.1 Qualitative or Quantitative? 
Quantitative research methods and Qualitative methods are often seen as being 
competing views about the ways in which social reality ought to be studied, and 
so are divergent clusters of epistemological assumptions. Quantitative research 
is empirical research where data is collected and analysed in numeric form, and 
tends to emphasize relatively large-scale and representative sets of data, and is 
often presented as being about the gathering of ―facts‖; whereas qualitative 
research implies a direct concern with ―experiences‖, is concerned with 
collecting and analysing information in as many forms, mainly non-numeric, as 
possible, and tends to focus on exploring, in as much details as possible, 
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smaller numbers of examples which are seen to be interesting or illuminating 
(Sherman and Webb, 1988; Baxter, Hughes and Tight, 2001). 
 
Stainback and Stainback (1988) identified the main differences between the two 
approaches to research, and these differences are summarised in Table 6.4 
below: 
 
Attribute
Purpose Prediction and control Understanding
Reliability Stable - reality is made up of Dynamic - reality changes with 
facts that do not change changes in perception
Viewpoint Outsider - reality is what Insider - reality is what people
quantifiable data indicates perceive it to be
Values Values can be controlled Values will impact on
understanding the phenomena
Focus Defined by the variables studied Holistic
Orientation Verification Discovery
Data Objective Subjective
Conditions Controlled Naturalistic
Results Reliable Focus on design/procedures
to gain real, rich and deep data
source: Stainback and Stainback, 1988:8
Table 6.4 - Differences between Quantitative and Qualitative Research
Quantitative Qualitative
 
 
There has been widespread debate within the literature over the relative merits 
of quantitative versus qualitative research methods, and whether they should be 
viewed as being entirely distinct or whether it is possible to combine elements 
from the different approaches. Qualitative strategies have been perceived as 
being more ―scientific‖ or ―objective‖, whereas qualitative strategies have 
become more popular over the last 30 years as a way to explore the 
complexities resulting from human interactions (Blaxter, Hughes and Tight, 
2001). 
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The research aims for this thesis were to examine the way in which local 
authorities in England deal with the implementation of central Government 
policy by looking at the authorities internal arrangements, including 
organisational structures and strategies, and by examining stakeholder 
involvement, particularly that of the utility companies. 
 
Primary data would be gathered from interviews with highway authority officers 
and elected members, utility company representatives (particularly water and 
gas) and with the chairs (highways and utility sides) of joint highway authority 
and utility committees, with the interviews being carried out with persons in 
similar positions in the relevant organisations. This research would be 
supplemented by an examination of published documents and reports. With 
regard to documents relating to ‗highway works‘, including the councils‘ 
Strategic Vision, Performance Plans, Local Transport Plan, Committee Reports 
and utility reports.  
 
Having established that a qualitative approaches allow researchers to view the 
area of study through the lens of the people involved, and to a greater depth, 
the author of this thesis identified this as the better approach in order to capture 
the complex issues relating to understanding the reasoning and motivations of 
the different organisations involved in carrying out ‗highway works‘, which would 
otherwise have been difficult to analyse with quantitative research instruments. 
 
This qualitative approach to collecting primary data is to be supported by 
content analysis of secondary documents. 
 
6.2.6.1.1 Analysing Qualitative Data 
Qualitative data are associated with concepts that are ambiguous and elastic, 
and are characterised by their richness and fullness based upon the opportunity 
to explore a subject in as real a manner a possible (Dey, 1993; Robson, 2002). 
The nature of qualitative data has implications both for its collection and its 
analysis. To be able to capture the richness and fullness, they cannot be 
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collected in a standard way and so the data will need to be classified into 
categories before they can be analysed (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2003). 
 
There is no one, standard approach to be analysis of qualitative data and many 
different strategies dealing with data collection (Dey, 1993; Miles and 
Huberman, 1994; Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). Tesch (1990) grouped strategies 
into four main categories: 
 Understanding the characteristics of language; 
 Discovering regularities; 
 Comprehending the meaning of text or action;  
 Reflection. 
The categories indicate a spectrum of approaches to qualitative analysis 
ranging between high to low levels of structure or highly formalised to relying on 
the researcher‘s interpretation (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2003).  
 
Where research seeks to utilise a deductive approach then existing theory is 
used to guide the research process and formulate the research questions and 
objectives, and the theoretical propositions may also be used to devise a 
framework to help organise and direct the data analysis (Yin, 2003). In order to 
devise a theoretical framework, the researcher needs to identify the main 
variable, components, themes and issues in the research project and the 
predicted or presumed relationships between them (Miles and Huberman, 1994; 
Robson, 2002; Yin (2004): a descriptive framework will rely more on the prior 
experience of the researcher and what they expect to occur (Saunders, Lewis 
and Thornhill, 2003).  However, this approach has been criticised (Bryman, 
1988) because the prior specification of theory gives rise to the possibility that 
issues could be closed before being fully investigated and that theoretical 
constructs could depart excessively from the views of participants in a social 
setting. 
 
An alternative to the deductive approach is to start to collect data and then 
explore them to see which themes or issues should be followed up (Glaser and 
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Strauss, 1967). In this inductive, grounded approach, theory emerges from the 
process of data collection and analysis, and so whilst a pre-defined theoretical 
framework is not required, a clear research purpose is essential (Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill, 2003). Critics of the inductive approach point out that such 
a strategy is difficult to follow, particularly where research simply collect data 
without examining them to assess which themes are emerging in order to then 
develop an on-going conceptual framework to guide subsequent work (Yin, 
2003). 
 
A number of strategies for analysing quantitative data take a ―steps‖ approach 
(Dey, 1993; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Strauss and Corbin, 1998), involving 
the categorisation of the data into meaningful categories derived either from the 
data or from a pre-existing theoretical framework. Into these categories can 
then be attached units of data – some ―chunk‖ of textual data that fits the 
category or categories – and this can be done in a number of ways including 
both computer and manual approaches. By re-organising the data into 
categories, the data can be analysed to identify key themes and patterns. This 
should lead to patterns within the data that can be used to develop hypotheses 
as testable propositions (Silverman, 2000). 
 
The testing of hypotheses that emerge inductively from the data allows the 
researcher to check for alternative explanations and negative examples that do 
not conform to the pattern or relationship being tested (Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill, 2003). This will further reinforce the validity of the final conclusions. 
 
6.2.6.1.2 Analysing Qualitative Data in this Study 
In this study, interviewees were selected based upon the following criteria: 
 Councillors – lead member with responsibility for Highways Service plus 
others with an interest in ‗highway works‘ 
 Highways Service officer – officer with day-to-day responsibility for the 
co-ordination of ‗highway works‘ in their authority‘s area or highways-side 
chair or their regional HAUC 
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 Utility companies – regional HAUC representative from their company or 
utility-side chair of their regional HAUC 
 
This would allow data to be collected from people at comparable levels in the 
respective organisations across the two areas, and would help with the 
subsequent analysis. The method for data analysis is set out in Table 6.5: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In reality, these steps were not always followed sequentially with interviews 
being carried out and transcribed; this helped to inform the coding process and 
subsequent interviews. 
 
Dey (1993) suggested that researchers needed to protect themselves from 
prejudging the data by adopting a ―null hypothesis‖ until the data showed 
otherwise, and recommended consideration of data based upon factors 
including credibility (frequency), coherence (internal cohesion), and empirical 
Step 4 - Refine interview 
template
Step 10 - Similarities and 
differences identified
Step 5 - Conduct "live" 
interviews
Step 11 - Results displayed 
as appropriate
Step 6 - Interviews 
transcribed
Step 12 - Conclusions 
drawn and cross-checked
Step 3 - Develop pilot 
interview template
Step 9 - Responses copied 
into pre-coded spreadsheet
Table 6.5 - Analysis of Qualitative Data
Step 1 - Literature review to 
identify previous approaches
Step 7 - Transcripts 
analysed
Step 2 - Review qualitative 
methods
Step 8 - Index of response 
categories established
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scope (evidence). These factors were used by the author to ensure that the 
data from which conclusions were drawn were not ―cherry-picked‖, were 
consistent with other sources, even if they disagreed with them, and that they 
were supported by other evidence. 
 
Validity is discussed below with regard to the research methodology. The same 
considerations – demonstrating how the data generated relates to the research 
questions and how the data has been interpreted – can be applied to the 
qualitative analysis. The author addressed this by utilising the semi-structured 
approach to the interviews to develop a methodology for categorising the 
responses, and then identifying the similarities and differences from those 
responses. In addition, the responses were analysed empirically to see whether 
they ―made sense‖ in the context of other interviews and secondary sources. 
 
This also helped the author to guard against taking data out of context to help 
support a particular theory or argument. Yin (2003) argued the use of multiple 
sources of evidence and examining data as a whole would offer case studies 
greater reliability and validity, and the author was mindful of the need to 
consider all of the data generated when drawing conclusions. 
 
6.2.6.2 Fieldwork or Deskwork? 
An alternative way of distinguishing research strategies looks at ways in which 
researchers collect data.  
 Fieldwork refers to the process by which researchers go out to collect 
data, where such data may be described as original or empirical, and 
may involve the researcher in visiting institutions to conduct interviews, 
distributing questionnaires, or making observations.  
 Deskwork includes those research processes which do not require the 
researcher to go into the field, and may include the administration, 
collection and analysis of postal surveys, the analysis of data collected 
by others, and literature surveys. 
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Blaxter, Hughes and Tight (2001) argued that, as with the 
quantitative/qualitative distinction, the fieldwork/deskwork distinction is both 
false, because most research projects will make use of both sets of 
approaches, and ambiguous because some methods, for example, those 
involving information and communication technologies such as e-mail,  cross 
over the ―boundaries‖. 
 
Within this study, interviews were carried out at the interviewee‘s place of work 
(with the exception of one interview that was carried out after a meeting at a 
separate local authority‘s offices) and so involved fieldwork, but the interviews 
were preceded by telephone calls and e-mails to arrange the interviews. There 
was an element of deskwork in this study in order to source and analyse the 
documents and reports in chapter 7. 
 
6.2.6.3 Triangulation 
Notwithstanding the differences in approaches, both positivist and relativist 
positions assume that there is a reality which exists independently of the 
observer, and it is the task of the researcher to identify the pre-existing reality 
(Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 2002). Utilising a positivist approach would 
involve the design of experiments in which key factors were to be measured 
precisely in order to test pre-determined hypotheses; whereas the relativist 
position, assuming the difficulty of gaining direct access to ―reality‖ means that 
multiple perspectives would normally be adopted, including ―triangulation‖. 
 
Triangulation refers to the use of different data collection methods within one 
study to ensure that conclusions drawn reasonably reflect the data (Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill, 2003). Abrahamson (1983) pointed out that using different 
approaches in the same study prevented the research from becoming method-
bound; and with any method having some flaw to counter its strengths, research 
designs and strategies can be offset by counter-balancing strengths from 
others. 
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A number of authors (Jick, 1979; Bryman, 1988; Robson, 2003) have identified 
the benefits of triangulation, including; 
 It allows researchers to be more confident in their results; 
 It can stimulate the creation of new methods to balance conventional 
data-collection methods; and  
 Can potentially generate ―holistic‖ research. 
The use of triangulation in research has been criticised due to problems that 
can arise where different methods and data sources are used and the 
researcher is ―...highly unlikely to be able straightforwardly to use the ‗products‘ 
of different methods or sources to corroborate each other‖ (Mason, 1996:149). 
However, Mason went on to suggest that adopting multiple research methods 
does enhance the validity of studies in the sense that it suggests that social 
phenomena is more than one-dimensional and that multi-method research 
would capture more than one dimension. Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe 
(2002) identified four distinct categories of triangulation: 
1. Theoretical triangulation – which involves borrowing models from one 
discipline and using them in another to reveal insights into data that may 
not have been apparent from other methods of data collection or 
analysis. 
2. Data triangulation – where data is collected over different time frames or 
from different sources, and is typically used in cross-sectional research 
designs. 
3. Triangulation by investigators – where different people collect data on the 
same situation, and where data and results are then compared. 
4. Methodological triangulation – involving the use of both quantitative and 
qualitative methods of data, such as the mixed use of questionnaires, 
interviews, telephone surveys and field studies. 
Researchers need to be mindful of the opportunities for combining the most 
suitable research methods at specific and appropriate stages of research in 
order to derive from them the benefits associated with those methods, whilst 
ensuring that the methods are appropriate to the overall research approach. 
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Within this study, interview data has been triangulated by comparing the 
findings from interviews from the two case study areas – Kirklees and Devon – 
with interviews from other organisations. Data was also triangulated by 
reference to the documents analysed in chapter 7. This triangulation has 
allowed the interview findings to be assessed against an organisation‘s written 
statements, and also allowed those written statements to be assessed against 
what the individuals involved said.  
 
6.2.6.4 Interviews 
An interview is a purposeful discussion between two or more people (Kahn and 
Cannell, 1957) in order to gather valid and reliable data (Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill, 2003).   
 
Qualitative interviews can range from being totally non-directive to a prepared 
list of questions (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 2002), and may be 
summarised as follows: 
 Structured/Standardised – similar to questionnaires where the research 
reads out the same questions to each interviewee and notes the 
responses, often to pre-coded answers. 
 Semi-structured – where the researcher has a list of themes and 
questions to be covered but which might vary between interviewees. 
 Unstructured/In-depth – where the researcher wants to explore in depth 
a general area. 
Jones (1985) highlighted the need for researchers to consider the degree of 
structure to put into interviews in order to be able to build on the patterns 
emerging from the data and using that grounded understanding to explore 
further in particular directions rather than others. So structured interviews could 
be used to gather data and identify general patterns, semi-structured interviews 
could then be used to understand the relationships between variables, and in-
depth interviews might then help to find out what is happening and to find new 
insights (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill,2003). 
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Qualitative interviews are considered to be appropriate research instruments 
where the study includes an exploratory element and, in such cases, where the 
researcher would want to be able to infer causal relationships (Cooper and 
Schindler, 1998). Semi-structured and in-depth interviews allow the researcher 
to probe answers in order to explain or build on responses. Research has found 
that managers are more likely to agree to being interviewed rather than 
completing questionnaires, and that the interview situation also provides an 
opportunity for interviewees to receive feedback and assurances about the way 
in which information will be used (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2003). 
 
Baker (1982) raised a number of issues with regard to the status of interview 
data, including: 
 What is the relationship between interviewees‘ accounts and the world 
they describe? Are accounts potentially ―true‖ or ―false‖ or are those 
concepts not appropriate? 
 How is the relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee to be 
understood? Is it governed by standardised techniques of ―good 
interview practice‖ or is it based upon conversational practices used in 
everyday life? 
 
In order to collect data for this study, it was considered that semi-structured 
interviews would allow certain areas to be identified in advance, so that a 
coding structure could be developed to allow the subsequent analysis of the 
data, while also allowing the interviewees the scope to discuss the issues that 
were significant for them and their organisations. Other factors in the decision to 
adopt an interview approach were that the in-depth nature of the study meant 
that the time required and information being sought would be better done face-
to-face rather than by telephone or questionnaire. 
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6.2.6.5 Sampling 
Whilst the terms ―sampling‖ and ―selection‖ tend to be associated with survey 
strategies, there will be elements of these involved whatever approach taken by 
a researcher.  
 
There are a number of sampling strategies available to the researcher but these 
are divided into two main groups: probability and non-probability sampling 
(Blaxter, Hughes and Tight, 2001): 
1. Probability sampling involves selecting cases at random or 
systematically from a group based on, for example, percentiles or 
stages of a process. 
2. Non-probability sampling approaches include sampling cases that are 
most convenient or self-selecting or to a quota, and these approaches 
tend to be used where the researcher lacks a sampling frame for the 
population in question. 
 
The unit of analysis in research is the entity that forms the basis of the sample. 
Research adds power to everyday observations due to the rigour and focus on 
a particular aspect of social or organisational life, and any single study needs to 
be conceptualised around a single unit of analysis (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and 
Lowe, 2002). Once that level of analysis has been clarified, then the researcher 
faces a choice of whether to sample widely or in depth. In-depth studies tend to 
be based upon direct observation and personal contacts, generally through 
interviews, and take place within single organisations. The unit of analysis in 
such studies would be either the individuals involved or specific events involved, 
such as informational exchanges or strategies. 
 
The two authorities that are the main case studies for this study were selected 
on the basis that (i) the author had knowledge about Kirklees Council and (ii) 
Devon County Council appeared to operate differently with regard to how it 
implemented the same national legislation; North Yorkshire County Council was 
selected for inclusion because (iii) it operated in the same geographical area as 
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Kirklees Council, working with the same utility companies, and was a county 
council, like Devon, and so the findings would help to triangulate those from 
Kirklees and Devon; and (iv) Transport for London was added in order to 
explore findings from interviews pointing towards London in the development 
and direction of ‗highway works‘ legislation. 
 
The study identified the unit of analysis as being the individuals that 
represented their organisations at their regional HAUC, in order that direct 
comparisons could be made. In London, the interviewees were officers that 
could comment on how policies were developed and implemented. 
 
6.2.6.6 Observations 
The observation method involves the researcher in watching, recording and 
analysing events of interest, with a range of different approaches available: 
 The events may be recorded by the researcher or recorded mechanically 
 The observation may be structured in terms of either a pre-determined or 
open framework 
 The observer may also be a participant in the event being studied or may 
act solely as a ―disinterested‖ observer 
 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2003) identified two main types of observation: 
participant observation, which is qualitative in nature and emphasises the 
discovery of the meanings that people attach to their actions, and structured 
observation, which is quantitative and focuses more on the frequency of those 
actions. 
 
Using observation as a data collection method can be time-consuming, 
including the time taken in the observation, and then the subsequent 
interpretation and analysis of the information collected. This can be off-set by 
pre-categorising and structuring the observations, although this risk losing both 
detail and flexibility (Blaxter, Hughes and Tight, 2001). 
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The author has already commented on his position as a participant-observer. 
 
6.2.6.7 Questionnaires 
The use of questionnaires is mainly used in survey strategies but is also used in 
experiment and case study strategies. Consequently, there are various 
definitions of the term ―questionnaire‖. Kervin (1999) reserved it exclusively for 
surveys, while Bell (1999) used it as a more general term to include interviews 
that were administered either face to face or by telephone. DeVaus (2002) used 
it as a general term to include all techniques of data collection in which each 
person is asked to respond to the same set of questions in a pre-determined 
order. 
 
The advantage of using questionnaires as a data collection method derive from 
the fact that each respondent is asked to respond to the same set of questions, 
and so provides an efficient way of collecting responses from a large sample 
prior to analysis. However, it is argued (Bell, 1999; Oppenheim, 2000) that it is 
hard for a researcher to produce an effective questionnaire in order to collect 
the precise data required to answer the research question(s). In addition, the 
design of the questionnaire will affect the response rate, reliability and validity of 
the data collected. 
 
Questionnaires work best with standardised questions where the researcher 
can be confident that the questions have been interpreted the same way by 
respondents (Robson, 2002). They are not particularly effective for exploratory 
or other research that requires large numbers of open-ended questions. 
 
Questionnaires were not considered the most appropriate form of data 
collection instrument for this study, which was focussed on a small, selected 
group to obtain in-depth information rather than seeking to obtain data from a 
larger group but that contained less detail.  
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6.2.7 Validity, Reliability and Generalisability 
This study needs to address questions of validity, reliability and generalisability 
of the findings. Perspectives on validity, reliability and generalisability were 
originally developed for use in quantitative social science research (Kirk and 
Miller, 1986), and a number of different approaches and definitions have been 
identified.  
 
Validity can be separated into three main kinds (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and 
Low, 2002): 
1. Construct validity – which asks whether research instruments are 
accurate measures of reality; 
2. Internal validity – which asks whether the research design is capable 
of eliminating bias and the effect of extraneous variables; and 
3. External validity – which involves defining the domains to which the 
results of the study may be generalised. 
There has been a reluctance to apply these ideas to qualitative research 
characterised by the social constructionist approach because that might imply 
the acceptance of one (positivist) reality (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Low, 
2002). Silverman (2000) identified a potential danger of the qualitative approach 
where the methods were dismissed as being akin to undisciplined journalism 
because there were few safeguards to prevent researchers from picking 
evidence out of the mass of data to support a particular prejudice, and 
suggested several principles that researchers could use in their defence, 
including: 
 Refutability – utilising Popper‘s (1959) logic and looking for examples 
which might disconfirm current beliefs. 
 Constant comparison – looking for new setting in order to stretch 
theories. 
 Comprehensive data treatment – which involves carrying out an analysis 
of all of the data available before drawing conclusions. 
 Tabulation – to apply greater rigour in organising the data. 
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The different perspective on validity, reliability and generalisability are 
summarised below in Table 6.6: 
 
Validity Do the measures correspond Does the study clearly gain access
closely to reality? to the experiences of those in the
research setting?
Realiability Will the measures yield the same Is there transparency in how sense
results on other occasions? was made from the raw data?
Generalisability To what extent does the study Do the concepts and constructs
confirm of contradict existing derived from this study have any
findings in the same field? relevance to other settings?
source: Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 2002:53
Table 6.6 - Perspectives on Validity, Relaibility and Generalisability
Positivist Social Constructionist
 
 
Yin (2003) defended the case study method against criticism in relation to these 
three areas by suggesting that: 
 Validity – using multiple sources of evidence 
 Reliability – building cases over time in order to eliminate alternative 
explanations 
 Generalisability – case studies rely on analytic rather than statistical 
generalisability 
 
6.2.7.1 Validity, Generalisability and Reliability in this Study 
The ―external validity‖ of a study involves defining the domains to which the 
results may be generalised (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Low, 2002). This study 
was clearly focused on the relationships involved between local highway 
authorities (their officers and councillors) and utility companies with regard to 
‗highway works‘. The two local highway authority areas that formed the basis of 
the study will limit the ―generalisability‖ of the study to the extent that they are 
representative (or not) of the general population. The author does not propose 
to generalise the findings outside the framework of the study. 
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―Internal validity‖ looks at the extent to which the research design is capable of 
eliminating bias and the effects of extraneous variables (Easterby-Smith, 
Thorpe and Low, 2002). The questions asked in the semi-structured interviews 
were the same for council officers, councillors and utility company personnel in 
both Devon and Kirklees, with the opportunity to probe further to explore 
differences in the two areas. Data from the answers given were triangulated 
using secondary data from published documents, and by checking against 
experiences in other local highway authority areas. 
 
―Construct validity‖ seeks to address whether the research instruments are 
accurate measures of reality (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Low, 2002). This can 
be seen by the extent to which the data obtained aligns with the literature 
reviewed in earlier chapters. 
 
Silverman (2000) recognised the difficulties in addressing validity in qualitative 
studies, and the author was mindful of the need to ensure that all of the data 
obtained was analysed before drawing conclusions to avoid ―cherry-picking‖ to 
support a particular position. 
 
―Reliability‖ relates to consistency, the extent to which measure would yield the 
same results on other occasions, and, from a social constructionist perspective, 
the extent to which there is transparency in how sense is made from the raw 
data (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Low, 2002). In this study, the primary data 
obtained through the semi-structured interviews has been analysed in a 
consistent way and is presented in context with data derived from secondary 
sources. 
 
6.3Discussion of the Research Methodology Framework for this Study 
6.3.1 Stages of Research 
The aims of this study were to examine the implementation of public policy with 
regard to ‗highway works‘ by local highway authorities in order to identify 
similarities and examine divergences, and to assess the extent to which a 
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collaborative-working approach between highway authorities and utility 
companies was a benefit. 
 
Stage 1 – Identification of a Research Methodology 
The identification of an appropriate research methodology for this study began 
with the identification and definition of the research question:  
 
To what extent is a partnership approach to managing 
‘highway works’ an advantage in implementing public policy? 
 
In order to answer the question it would be necessary to look at the policies 
involved, how they were interpreted and implemented by local highway 
authorities, and how those authorities interacted with utility companies. 
 
This author gave consideration to making the research question and aims of the 
study ―researchable‖ by setting up the study in a way that would produce 
specific answers to the research questions by considering: 
 What data sources and methods of data generation were potentially 
available or appropriate? 
 What could these methods and sources tell? 
 Which research questions do they help to address? 
 
With regard to data sources, the local government structure in England means 
that the country has defined geographic areas which are administered by a 
district or county council, and a council in that area will be designated as the 
highway authority for that area. The author, who is employed full-time by a local 
authority and is, therefore, a part-time student, was limited by time and 
resources available to conduct the research and then to collate and analyse the 
resulting data. A research methodology involving an approach to a large 
number or all local highway authorities and utility companies would be difficult to 
achieve within the time and resources available, and would be too wide to be 
meaningful. 
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The author discussed this issue with academic supervisors and decided on a 
research methodology that would allow for an in-depth study of the issues 
involved. It was then necessary to select local highway authorities to form the 
basis of the study. Kirklees Metropolitan Council was selected because that is 
the highway authority in which the author is employed, and so access to 
interviewees and data collection would be more readily available. Devon County 
Council was identified as being a local authority with a reputation in academic 
and political circles for taking an independent line regarding the implementation 
of public policy, and also because of information in the public domain regarding 
its approach to the management of ‗street works‘. Devon County Council has 
prosecuted utility companies for ‗street works‘ offences and obtained 
convictions in over 289 cases since 2003, resulting in fines of over £180,000 
and costs totalling over £115,000; Kirklees has not prosecuted any utility 
companies under NRASWA since the mid-1990s. This highlighted a potential 
area for research in order to examine differences in policy implementation 
between authorities. 
 
With regard to data generation, a quantitative approach would allow statistical 
data to be collected from a number of or all highway authorities and utility 
companies against pre-selected criteria; a qualitative approach would allow data 
to be gathered to explore the perceptions of the people involved. The 
differences in approach between Devon and Kirklees suggested that a 
quantitative approach would not necessarily explain the differences, and that a 
qualitative approach would help to explore and explain the differences. 
 
Stage 2 –Research Methods 
The literature review, particularly that in chapter 5 which looked at inter-
organisational collaboration, included examples of earlier research carried out in 
a number of different ways but mainly including case studies, interviews and 
surveys. They also suggested that there were no readily available or agreed 
definitions to describe the ways in which organisations work together. 
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The need to study organisations and their interactions with others indicated that 
fieldwork methods would need to be employed. The author, therefore, chose to 
utilise a case study approach in order to look at the way in which the two local 
authorities identified deal with ‗highway works‘ and with the other organisations 
involved, such as utility companies and regulators. The case study approach 
would provide a richer insight into the dynamics of the relationships between the 
organisations involved. Evidence would be sought through the use of semi-
structured interviews with people working within the different organisations, and 
at similar levels in order to allow meaningful comparisons to be made, in order 
to gain an insight into their perceptions of how ‗highways works‘ are carried out 
within their areas and their understanding of the relationships between the 
organisations involved. 
 
The interviewees were identified and categorised in order to ensure that both of 
the geographical areas to be examined in this research were covered. This 
meant that interviewees needed to be drawn from the officers and elected 
members within those councils who were responsible for ‗highway works‘, 
representatives from the utility companies that operated in the areas, and the 
joint chair of the regional HAUCs (highway authorities and utilities committees) 
that covered the areas.  
 
Three distinct but related interview templates were developed to collect data 
from elected members, local authority officers, and utility company 
representatives. The interview templates were prepared to allow for data to be 
collected in the following areas: 
1. The roles and responsibilities of the interviewee. 
2. The organisation‘s policies relating to ‗highway works‘, and the extent to 
which the interviewee could influence them. 
3. The nature of the relationship between the interviewee‘s organisation 
and highway authorities and utility companies, depending on whether 
that organisation is a highway authority or utility company. 
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The questions within these three areas were developed following the literature 
review discussed in section 6.1.1 above. The three areas were then broken-
down into sub-questions which were put to the interviewees in semi-structured 
interviews. The interviews were recorded and then transcribed, and the 
transcription sent back to the interviewee for any corrections to be made or 
additional explanation provided. Once the transcription had been received back 
from the interviewee, the content was analysed against themes previously 
identified. 
 
Data from these interviews was then triangulated by reference to secondary 
data identified from published documents and by looking at how ‗highway 
works‘ are managed in other English local highway authorities. 
 
Stage 3 – Survey Instrument Piloting 
Having identified local highway authorities and utility companies as being the 
main sources of primary data required for the study, consideration was given to 
the development of semi-structured interview templates, with separate 
templates being used for highway authority officers, councillors and utility 
company personnel. 
 
The interview templates were prepared to allow for data to be collected in the 
following areas: 
 The roles and responsibilities of the interviewee. 
 The organisation‘s policies relating to ‗highway works‘, and the extent to 
which the interviewee could influence them. 
 The nature of the relationship between the interviewee‘s organisation 
and highway authorities/utility companies (as appropriate). 
 
These areas were then broken-down into sub-questions to allow the data 
collected to be analysed subsequently to identify themes and patterns. 
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The templates were then piloted by conducting interviews with people who 
would not form part of the actual study, in order to assess the effectiveness of 
the questions and the utility of likely responses. Following this piloting exercise, 
modifications were made to the templates to remove ambiguities in the 
questions arising from the author‘s assumptions about how interviewees would 
understand and interpret the questions being asked. 
 
The author also visited an academic who had carried out extensive research 
into political structures at Devon, to discuss their experience in conducting 
research in the area. The discussion prompted consideration of widening the 
scope of the study but, following discussion with academic supervisors, the 
author decided against this as it would have resulted in data being obtained 
from non-comparable organisations. 
 
Stage 4 – Organisational Consent and Ethical Considerations 
Yates (2004) discussed the issues surrounding researchers‘ ethical and 
practical concerns in relation to data collection, and identified seven key ethical 
issues: 
1. Gaining access to participants: what is the researcher‘s route in? 
2. Getting past ‗gatekeepers‘: who controls access? 
3. Informed consent: how much does the researcher tell participants? 
4. Are there grounds for deceiving the participants? 
5. The right to privacy. 
6. The right for participants to withdraw from the research. 
7. Self-presentation in the interview/research context 
 
In addition, Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2003) discussed the implications of 
respecting privacy in business and management research, setting out a number 
of rights for individuals and organisations in deciding whether or not to 
participate. These included the right to expect anonymity and confidentiality to 
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be observed in relation to the discussion of findings with other participants and 
during the reporting of findings. 
 
The author sought and obtained approval from the head of Highways Service at 
Kirklees Council to use that authority as one of the case study organisations. An 
approach was made to the highways service in Devon County Council and 
agreement was reached. However, the original contact died shortly afterwards 
and a new approach had to made and a number of discussions were held 
before a new agreement to use Devon was agreed. 
 
In addition, the author contacted the highways-side and utility-side joint chairs of 
the regional Highway Authority and Utility Committees (HAUCs) in Yorkshire 
(YHAUC), of which Kirklees Council is a member, and in the South West 
(SWHAUC), of which Devon County Council is a member, in order to introduce 
the research and to obtain contact details for council officer and utility company 
representatives. 
 
The author arranged interviews by initially telephoning the interviewees as an 
introduction and overview of the research. This was then followed-up with an e-
mail, setting out further information about the researcher and the research, 
details of the areas to be explored in the interview, and asking for the 
interviewee to suggest a date and time convenient for them. Interviewees were 
informed that they would be identified by job title/organisational position but not 
by name in the thesis, and that a copy of the thesis would be placed in the 
University library. 
 
Prior to the commencement of individual interviews, the author explained the 
nature and purpose of the research being undertaken, that confidentiality would 
be respected, and ensured that the interviewees were still willing to proceed. 
The interviews were then carried out and recorded using a digital voice-
recorder, and the recordings were subsequently transcribed written up and a 
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copy was sent back to the interviewee for them to review and correct any 
misunderstandings. 
 
The author was mindful of his position as an employee of Kirklees Council, 
working in the ‗street works‘ sector. In telephone calls and e-mails to 
prospective interviewees, and prior to the commencement of interviews, the 
author ensured that interviewees were aware that the research was self-funded, 
that it was not being carried out on behalf of Kirklees Council, and that nothing 
discussed during the interview would be used by the author for purposes other 
than for this research project. 
 
The author was also mindful of the need to adopt and present, as far as 
possible, a ―detached scientist‖ face in dealing with all interviews. This was 
important in order to maintain a professional detachment when dealing with 
people in the Yorkshire area with whom the author has dealing with on a regular 
basis, and to ensure that SWHAUC-interviewees did not perceive any 
judgemental bias as the author explored similarities and difference between the 
two areas. 
 
Stage 5 – Data Collection 
Interviews were arranged by the author through initially telephoning the 
prospective interviewees as an introduction and overview of the research. This 
was followed-up with an e-mail, setting out further information about the 
researcher, the research and the areas to be explored during the interview, and 
asking for the interviewee to suggest a date and time convenient for them. 
Interviews were carried out and recorded using a digital voice-recorder, and the 
recordings were subsequently written-up and a copy sent back to the 
interviewee for comment or correction. 
 
There were 12 interviews, carried out between February 2010 and December 
2011, for the purpose of collecting data for this study: 1 with an elected 
member, 6 with street authority representatives, and 5 with utility company 
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representatives. All of the interviews were carried out at the interviewee‘s place 
of work, with the exception on one interview that was carried out in a council 
office following a separate meeting. For the purposes of this research, the 
following interview arrangements were made: 
 For the Yorkshire area, interviews with: 
o The lead elected member with responsibility for highways in 
Kirklees Council. At the time of undertaking the interviews for this 
thesis, Kirklees Council was going through a reorganisation and 
there was no permanent officer in the ―street works manager‖ role. 
The officer information for Kirklees is provided by the author of this 
thesis as acting Street Works Manager; 
o Representatives for the main four utility companies, i.e. water, 
gas, electricity, and telecommunications; 
o The joint chairs of YHAUC (Yorkshire HAUC); and 
o Officers from North Yorkshire County Council – as members of 
both YHAUC and NEHAUC, this interview would help to 
triangulate interview findings because (i) it was an authority 
operating in the Yorkshire area and so interacting with the same 
utility companies as Kirklees, and (ii) it was a large county council 
like DCC. 
 For the Devon area, interviews with: 
o An officer responsible for the management of‘ highway works‘ in 
Devon County Council; and 
o The joint chairs of SWHAUC (South West HAUC). 
 For the London area, interviews with: 
o An officer dealing with transportation policy issues at the Greater 
London Authority; and 
o An officer from Transport for London (TfL) with responsibilities for 
―surface interventions‖. 
 
Details of the interviews carried out are contained in Appendix D. 
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The interviews with authority officials in London were added to the schedule 
because findings from interviews carried out for this study were pointing to the 
significance of London in shaping national legislation on ‗highway works‘. 
 
The recording of interviews allowed the author to return to the data collected in 
its original form (Silverman, 2001). This has a benefit over field notes, where a 
researcher has only the form in which the notes were recorded originally. Sacks 
(1984) maintained that researchers could not rely on notes or recollections of 
conversations. 
 
6.3.2 Research Constraints 
The main constraints on this study are that: 
 
1. It focused on only three geographical areas (Yorkshire, Devon and London) 
and four local authorities (Kirklees Council, North Yorkshire County Council, 
and Transport for London). It would, therefore, be difficult to generalise from 
the findings but the findings do give an indication about issues relating to the 
management of ‗highway works‘ and with regard to the factors that influence 
inter-organisational collaboration between local authorities and utility 
companies. 
2. The research focused only on one local authority service area, i.e. 
Highways. The findings have shown that the road network is viewed as an 
asset, the effective management and maintenance of which has implications 
for other areas of an authority and its strategic plans. The research has not 
directly addressed these other areas of local authority service delivery. 
3. There were access problems in the Devon area. The aims of the research 
were to conduct interviews with people at comparable levels in the different 
regions but it was not possible to conduct interviews representatives of utility 
company representatives to match those carried out in the Yorkshire area. 
This may mean that some similarities and differences between the two were 
not identified in the findings. 
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Chapter Seven – Document Analysis: Context and 
Triangulation 
In this chapter the author has reviewed documents relating to the operation of 
„highway works‟ policy in the Yorkshire and Devon areas, including past, current 
and potential future policies. The chapter also examines documents from two 
areas where permit schemes are in operation, including London and Kent. The 
purpose of this chapter is to provide additional information about the 
implementation of policies by authorities, as well as giving context and 
identifying sources of triangulation for the interview findings set out in chapters 
8 to 10.  
 
7.1The Historic Application of Legislation 
In undertaking research for this thesis, the author looked at a number of historic 
records in Kirklees that documented the development of roads, their 
maintenance, and the effect of utility works and new technologies. These 
documents help to illuminate the discussion about the current situation 
 
The General Highways Act of 1835 introduced a number of reforms to the way 
in which local roads were to be maintained and repaired. These reforms 
included professional “surveyors”, supervised by an elected board and the 
opportunity for parishes to come together in union with other parishes for the 
purpose of road building and maintenance. The Huddersfield vestry 
“...eschewed the idea of uniting with other parishes...” (Griffiths, 2008:33) but, 
from 1835, did agree to pay two surveyors to collect the highway rate and 
oversee repairs. From 1837, the Huddersfield vestry established a 14-man 
Board of Surveyors to oversee the “...paving, draining etc. of the Streets and 
Highways in the Town of Huddersfield” (Board of Highway Surveyors, 1837-
1848). 
 
The Minutes of the Board of Surveyors for Huddersfield (1837-1848) recorded a 
resolution “...that the Streets are generally in a very dilapidated condition and 
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that they shall be repaired and reset with all possible dispatch”. The Minutes 
also recorded: 
 The repair and resurfacing of roads and streets, prioritised by periodic 
surveys. Between 1843 and 1847, over 10 miles of the town‟s streets 
were paved. 
 Construction and reconstruction of roads and footpaths (but not the side-
of-road pavements, responsibility for which remained with the frontage 
owner.) 
 Production of materials, with stone being quarried locally and bricks 
manufactured on rented land. 
 Control of „street works‟ by others. In May 1837 the Board agreed to print 
and distribute 50 handbills requiring applications from anyone wishing to 
open “...any drain or common sewer or making any other opening in any 
of the streets shall give notice thereof to the Board of Surveyors and that 
any person neglecting to do shall be summonsed as the Law demands”.  
 Notices were served on the Gas Company manager to repair a footpath 
previously excavated. From 1848, the Board undertook openings on 
behalf of the Gas Company. 
 Removal of obstructions. Notices were served by the Board to remove 
stones from streets, required builders to board off and enclose their 
works, and prevented encroachment by cellar entrances. 
 
The Minute Books also show how the Board had to deal with change and 
modernisation: 
 The Board devised a common specification for cutting new sewers to the 
benefit of public health, and “...resolved to solicit...” the aid of builders 
towards the expense of cutting sewer to new properties being built as 
“...that will so much improve the properties in that street”. 
 The Board had to deal with claims for compensation from the owners of 
properties for “...alleged injuries done to their property by raising and 
improving...” various roads around town. 
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 In 1845, the Board received notices from solicitors for railway companies 
giving notice of their intention to apply to Parliament to make a number of 
railway lines around the town. The Board noted the destruction and 
interference likely to be caused to the existing infrastructure. The Board 
gave permission to the “Huddersfield & Manchester Railway” company to 
erect viaduct pillars on the highway but gave clear conditions regarding 
the provision that had to be retained for traffic using the carriageway, and 
that a way had to be maintained for foot passengers, and that it was 
“...the intention of the Board to prosecute to the utmost rigour of the law 
all deviations from the above named conditions and all other 
encroachments on the highway”. 
 The Board recorded similar concerns with the activities of the Canal 
Company, particularly in dealing with resolving and removing 
obstructions caused by canal bridges.  
 
The Minute Books go on to record a vestry meeting in June 1846 to discuss 
proposed changes to the Highways Act 1835 requiring the locally paid-for 
professional surveyors to be responsible for more than just the local area. The 
minute resolved that it “...can conduce to no good end to take their Highway 
Officers to some distant Town to interfere concerning the Highways of some 
twenty other places of which they have no personal knowledge, nor can it either 
wise or beneficial to have some twenty persons, similarly circumstanced as to 
knowledge, interfering in our concerns.” The meeting further resolved that 
Huddersfield was “...deeply attached to the principles of voting their own taxes 
and of having control over their own expenditure”. The Board duly wrote to 
Parliament to say so. 
 
7.1.1 Discussion of Historic Application of Legislation 
The implementation of legislation as described above by Kirklees Council (then 
Huddersfield Board of Surveyors/Corporation) highlight a number of areas that 
are still relevant to this current study: 
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 The nature of the relationship between the local authority and companies 
working in the highway, with the authority being the “custodian of the 
highway”, and being responsible for upgrading and maintaining streets, 
and then dealing with the consequences of companies coming along and 
digging holes in them. This is the same situation as exists now but with 
the number of companies working in the highway having increased 
dramatically since the early days, and even more since the 1980s as a 
result of privatisation, with authorities now having to balance their dual 
roles of being the highway authority, carrying out works to maintain the 
highway, and street authority, and so co-ordinating all „highway works‟. 
 The need to accommodate new technologies into the structure of the 
highway. Prior to the early part of the 1800s, the main reason for anyone 
needing to excavate in the public highway would be in order to provide a 
sewer (the records examined made no reference to the installation of 
pipes for the supply of clean water), and the records indicated that a 
specification was required to ensure that this was done in a proper way. 
The mid- to late-1800s saw the development of gas and electricity as 
utility services that could be provided to business and domestic 
customers, and also the introduction and expansion of the railways. The 
records show the response of authorities in applying the law as it then 
stood in order to restrict or mitigate the impact of works.  
 
The situation today is, in some ways, not dissimilar, with new 
technologies such as cable television and high-speed broadband being 
licensed to companies who then install their apparatus in the highway. 
However, the Government has highlighted peoples‟ dissatisfaction with 
disruption, and cost to the economy, arising from „highway works‟, and 
has given additional powers to authorities to allow them to better co-
ordinate and control works. Authorities and utility companies now 
recognise this dissatisfaction, and the “reputational” implications of 
negative performance or publicity is a motivating factor in driving 
improvements in how works are co-ordinated and carried out. 
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 The need to provide a highway network as a basis for trade. The records 
show how, in the 1800s, the upgrading of roads was related to the need 
to maintain and increase trade, both within and between villages and 
towns. The same is true today (1) on a greater scale, with the road 
network carrying goods and services across the country and 
internationally; and (2) local and regional economic considerations 
forming part of local authorities‟ priorities and objectives. 
 
7.2 Political Structures 
In chapter 2, central Government reforms of local government were described, 
including the most recent arrangements put in place regarding the alternatives 
for political structures. In this next section the current arrangements in Kirklees 
and Devon are examined. 
 
7.2.1 Political Structure in Kirklees 
Kirklees Metropolitan District Council has adopted the “leader and cabinet” 
model. The council is composed of 69 councillors with one third elected three 
years in four. As at May 2010 (Kirklees, 2010) the council comprised: Labour 
24, Liberal Democrat 20, Conservative 19, Green Party 4, and Independent 2. 
 
All councillors meet together as the council. Meetings of the Council are 
normally open to the public, and it is here where councillors decide the 
Council‟s overall policies and set the budget each year. The council appoints 
the Leader and members of the Cabinet and it also appoints the various 
committees of the council. At council meetings, members of the council may put 
forward motions for debate on issues of concern, question the members of the 
Cabinet on their functions and the council‟s services, or ask questions of the 
chairs of other council committees and council representatives on joint 
authorities such as the West Yorkshire Police Authority. 
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Some council functions, such as decisions on planning applications or licensing 
matters, are the responsibility of the council itself. The council has committees 
to deal with most of these. However, the Executive, which is known as the 
Cabinet, is the part of the council which is responsible for most day to day 
decisions. It is made up of the Leader and between 2 and 9 other council 
members appointed by the council. When major decisions are to be discussed 
or made, these are published in the Cabinet‟s forward plan insofar as they can 
be anticipated. If these major decisions are to be discussed with council officers 
at a meeting of the Cabinet, this will generally be open for the public to attend, 
except where personal or confidential matters are being discussed. In practice 
all decision-making by the Cabinet is similarly open to the public. The Cabinet 
has to make decisions which are in line with the council‟s overall policies and 
budget which have to be decided by the council as a whole. If the Cabinet 
wishes to make a decision which is outside the budget or policy framework, this 
must be referred to the council as a whole to decide.  
 
The council appoints the Overview and Scrutiny Management Committee from 
among the non-executive councillors to support the work of the Cabinet and the 
council as a whole. The Overview and Scrutiny Management Committee co-
ordinates and manages the work of any scrutiny panels which may be set up. 
They look into matters of concern and make reports and recommendations 
which advise the Cabinet and the council as a whole on its policies, budget and 
service delivery. They also monitor the decisions of the Cabinet and can call in 
a decision which has been made by the Cabinet but not yet implemented. This 
enables them to consider whether the decision is appropriate. They may 
recommend that the Cabinet re-consider the decision. They may also be 
consulted by the Cabinet or the council on forthcoming decisions and the 
development of policy.  
 
The council has created a structure of area committees. They involve 
councillors for each particular area and may have local people co-opted onto 
them. The role of area committees is to consult local people and consider 
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issues of local concern or significance and to advise the Cabinet and the council 
on them. They also have the role of drawing up a local community action plan 
designed to address the particular needs of the area. The council or the Cabinet 
may give any area committee specific delegated powers to make decisions on 
some matters relating specifically to that area. Area committees each cover one 
or more wards of the council.  
 
7.2.2 Political Structures in Devon 
For most of the twentieth century Devon County Council has been in formal 
terms non-partisan or controlled by independents, but Stayner (1989) noted that 
there was no evidence that in general elections the county‟s voters were less 
partisan than elsewhere, with turnout in Devon being generally higher than in 
much of the rest of the country. While in national and European elections, 
Devon was overwhelmingly Conservative, this was not always the case. Until 
the First World War, and to some extent during the interwar period, Liberalism 
held its own, with Labour making slow progress. 
 
In its early years Devon County Council (DCC) was a relatively small 
organisation, discharging many of its functions through other public agencies 
and had a very small permanent staff. The first major event to affect the council 
was the Education Act 1902, which changed the scale of financial operations of 
the council and gave it a major administrative department of its own. This 
created pressure for the rationalisation of common services and the 
employment of full-time staff in other spheres. The expansion of staff and 
departmental organisation brought eventually and reluctantly unions, national 
pay agreements and superannuation to the county. 
 
The evolution of a leadership system with the county council involved two lines 
of development; one within the elected membership and one within the 
employees, and each of these required people as individuals and organisational 
“devices” through which they could work. The council‟s officer-structure 
developed towards greater elaboration and there was an increasing tendency to 
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make use of modern management techniques. The committee system settled 
down into a regular structured pattern. Relations with outside bodies were also 
systemised by formal agreements covering exchange of members through co-
option and negotiation agreements. Cole (2001) described the factors by which 
DCC adopted the “leader and cabinet” model: 
 
 Firstly, DCC had established a reputation as an innovative authority, for 
example it had “...devolved substantial powers to seven partnership 
committees based on district authority areas...and acquired pilot status 
for the Best Value and Better Government for Older People 
programmes.” (Cole, 2001:20).  
 
 Secondly, the organisational culture at DCC was seen to be favourable 
for the establishment of more rigorous scrutiny mechanisms. The council 
“...had a reputation for openness, lacked a „blame culture‟, was „well 
managed‟ and “...sets and maintains high standards in whatever it 
does...” (Cole, 2001:20). 
 
The Council is currently composed of 62 councillors. As at June 2009 (Devon, 
2010), the council was comprised as follows: Conservative 41, Liberal 
Democrat 14, Labour 4, Greens 1, and Independent 2. 
 
The Cabinet is the part of the Council responsible for most day-to-day 
decisions. It is made up of a Leader and no more than nine other members 
(Cabinet Members), appointed by the Leader of the Council. When major 
decisions are to be discussed or made, these are published in the Cabinet's 
Forward Plan in so far as they can be foreseen. These major decisions will be 
taken with council officers present at meetings of the Cabinet which will be open 
to the public except where personal or confidential information is discussed. 
The Cabinet has to make decisions which are in line with the Council‟s overall 
policies and budget. If it wishes to make a decision which is outside the budget 
or policy framework, this matter must be referred to the full Council to decide.  
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Overview and Scrutiny Committees support the work of the Cabinet and the 
Council as a whole. They look at the effectiveness of the Council's own policies 
and inquire into matters of local concern. These investigations lead to reports 
and recommendations which advise the Cabinet and the Council on its policies, 
budget and service provision. Overview and Scrutiny Committees also monitor 
the Cabinet‟s decisions. They can "call in" a decision which has been made by 
the Cabinet but not yet implemented. This enables them to consider whether 
the decision is appropriate and they may recommend that the Cabinet 
reconsiders it. They may also be consulted by the Cabinet or the Council on 
forthcoming decisions and the development of policy.  
 
A number of Local Strategic Partnerships have been created to work with other 
local authorities and organisations in their respective areas. These are based 
on District Council areas and are responsible for overseeing the development of 
community planning in those areas. 
 
7.4 Adoption of Legislation 
The main legislative focus of this study is the New Roads and Street Works 
1991 (NRASWA). This legislation was modified by the Traffic Management Act 
2004 (TMA), and was preceded by the Public Utilities Street Works Act 1950 
(PUSWA). An examination was made of the Minute books in both Kirklees and 
Devon to look at how these legislative changes were recorded in the respective 
authorities: 
 
7.4.1 PUSWA – Kirklees Council 
The County Borough of Huddersfield, Council Proceedings for the Highways 
Committee recorded on 22 February 1951 that he Town Clerk “...reported on 
the provisions of this Act which becomes operative on the 26th April 1951, and 
on a recent meeting of local authorities and the Gas and Electricity Boards 
hereon.” It was resolved: (1) that a Sub-committee should be empowered to 
deal with applications from undertakers proposing to execute code-regulated 
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works. (2) That undertakers be notified of the Council‟s intention to carry out all 
works of permanent reinstatement. 
 
At the meeting on 21 May 1951 of the Highways (Special) Sub-committee, the 
Borough Engineer submitted plans and sections provided by the Huddersfield 
Corporation Waterworks Department under Section 3(1) of the Act in respect of 
the execution of code-regulated works at Nopper Lane and School Hill, South 
Crosland and Fernside Estate. It was resolved that notices be given approving 
in each case, the plans and sections without modification. The Borough 
Engineer also submitted notices from the Huddersfield Corporation Waterworks 
Department, the North Eastern Gas Board, the Yorkshire Electricity Board and 
the Post Office Telephones, in respect of the execution of code-regulated 
works, under Section 3(2) of the Act that did not require the settlement of plans 
and sections. 
 
7.4.2 PUSWA – Devon County Council 
The meeting of the Roads Committee on 19 July 1950 noted that the Act had 
now come into operation and, as a result, “...before statutory undertakers can 
break up a County Road, they have to serve Notices on the highway authority”. 
The County Roads Committee delegated the power to deal with this matter to 
District Councils. 
 
7.4.3 NRASWA – Kirklees Council 
On 14 November 1991 the Highways and Transportation (Road Safety) Sub-
committee, under an item from Mirfield Voluntary Road Safety Group, made 
reference to the “Safety Code” issued under NRASWA. This was prior to the 
implementation of NRASWA 
 
On 19 February 1992 the Highways and Transportation Committee noted that 
NRASWA would come into effect on 1 July 1992. 
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7.4.4 NRASWA – Devon County Council 
At their meeting of 23 September 1991, the Planning and Transportation 
Committee “...considered the report of the county engineer and planning officer 
on the financial, resource and staffing implications of the Act, especially in 
relation to the proposed national computerised street works register.” 
 
7.4.5 TMA – Kirklees Council 
The first mention of TMA in Kirklees appears in the record of the meeting on 7 
May 2008 of the Cabinet, but this note is in connection with the provisions in the 
Act for dealing with decriminalised parking enforcement. 
 
From 2008 onwards, the Planning and Highways Committee is dealing mainly 
with applications relating to the diversion of Public Footpaths and Bridleways. 
 
7.4.6 TMA – Devon County Council 
On 3 June 2008, the Environment, Economy & Culture Overview/Scrutiny 
Committee considered the report of the Director of Environment, Economy and 
Culture “...on new powers being introduced which would enable councils to 
reduce congestion/disruption caused by roadworks. The Government 
announcement about the regulations highlighted that from early 2008 councils 
would be able to use additional powers to impose conditions and co-ordinate all 
roadworks.” 
 
7.4.7 Adoption of Legislation Discussion 
The information gathered from the Minute books highlights two keys points: 
 
1. The significance of roads with local authorities; and 
2. The involvement of elected members. 
 
In 1950, the relevant committees in both KMC and DCC are named as either 
the “Roads” or “Highways” committee, and they dealt in detail with all matters 
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relating to the council‟s responsibilities for providing and maintaining the 
highway network. In addition, the members of the Highways Committee of the 
County Borough of Huddersfield, subsequently incorporated into Kirklees 
Council, were dealing with individual Notices submitted by utility companies 
wanting to execute „street works‟. 
 
By the 1990s, the relevant committee was, in Kirklees, “Highways and 
Transportation” or, in Devon, “Planning and Transportation”. This indicates a 
shift in emphasis over time from a focus from just providing and maintaining 
highways. The discussion on the matter by both councils centred on the likely 
costs involved in complying with legislation, particularly the need to have 
compliant software. 
 
Towards the end of the 2000s, in Kirklees the “Planning and Highways 
Committee” was no longer involved with the provision and maintenance of 
highways. That committee‟s role had moved to dealing solely with the legal 
process of diverting public rights of way. The responsibility for the highway 
network, and activities on it, resided with the Cabinet Committee. A similar 
situation can also be inferred at Devon, where the TMA minute is from a 
committee scrutinising the executive. The title of this scrutiny committee, the 
Environment, Economy & Culture Overview/Scrutiny Committee, is also 
indicative of a further move to deal with the highway network has part of an 
authority‟s overarching strategy. 
 
7.5 Local Transport Plans (LTP) 
7.5.1. LTP – Kirklees Council 
The LTP currently in place in Kirklees is “LTP2”, which covers the five years 
from 20062007 to 2010/2011 (Metro, 2006). The plan was created by the 
Passenger Transport Executive, “Metro”, in conjunction with the five West 
Yorkshire metropolitan district councils, including Kirklees. 
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The stated aims of “LTP2” are to develop and maintain an integrated transport 
system that supports economic growth in the West Yorkshire region by: 
 Delivering accessibility to improve access for everyone to jobs, education 
and key services; 
 Tackling congestion to reduce delays to the movement of goods and 
people; 
 Safer roads to improve safety for all highway users; 
 Better air quality by limiting transport emissions of air pollutants, 
greenhouse gasses and noise; and 
 Effective asset management by improving the condition of the 
infrastructure. 
 
Under “LTP2”, some £296,000,000 in funding has been allocated over the five 
years of the plan, to be spent across the five authority areas on projects to 
deliver the aims of the plan, including the funding of local authority „roadworks‟ 
on schemes including carriageway and footway patching and surfacing. 
 
“LTP2” also recognises the effect of utility works on the highway network and 
says (Metro, 2006: 108) “Any excavation in the existing highway generates a 
weakness, even when reinstated to the proper specification. The volume of 
utility works is massive. Around 64,000 holes are dug in West Yorkshire each 
year. These result in a poor ride quality, water ingress, an increase in the 
number of trips and depressions, and are detrimental to the street scene.” 
 
“LTP2” set out to deliver a more sustainable transport system that would 
encourage the use of alternatives to private car use, including public transport, 
cycling and walking. This, then, formed part of the strategy adopted by the West 
Yorkshire authorities in dealing with their own works and in managing utility 
company „street works‟. 
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7.5.2 LTP – Devon County Council 
The current Devon LTP 2006-2011, entitled “Devon on the move” (Devon, 
2006), notes that transport in Devon is a “function of its geography, its 
environment and its social and economic make up” (Devon, 2006: 19). It 
comments on the need to balance tourism in the area with the need for 
economic regeneration, and that while the south and east of the region are 
accessible to national and regional road and rail networks, the north is less well 
served. The size of the county, at over 12,800 km of roads, gives it the most 
extensive highway network in England. The LTP says that “This [highway] 
network is a key asset to local communities and its maintenance is a priority for 
ensuring accessibility and safety” (Devon, 2006:19). 
 
The aims of DCC‟s LTP include: 
 Ensuring the safety of users on Devon‟s transport networks; 
 Enhancing the accessibility of services and facilities so that no-one is 
socially excluded; 
 Balancing the provision of different means of transport so that, wherever 
possible, the car is not the only option; 
 Provide everyone with accurate and accessible information about 
transport choices available to them; and 
 Manage Devon‟s transport networks so that journey times are consistent 
and reliable. 
 
DCC‟s LTP mentions road works as one of the causes of congestion on the 
highway network, and recognises the role of the Traffic Management Unit 
(TMU), established under the Traffic Management Act. The role of the TMU is 
set out (Devon, 2006: 41) as involving the co-ordination of planned works and 
events, and communicating information to road users and interested parties, in 
order minimise disruption on the network, including taking enforcement action 
against utility companies and contractors, although such enforcement action is 
expected to be a “last resort” (Devon, 2006:42). The LTP states that “Devon has 
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gained a reputation for applying the New Roads and Street Works Act 
(NRSWA) with rigour” (Devon, 2006:260). 
 
With regard to asset management, the LTP also notes that properly planned 
highway maintenance by the council, carried out at the right time “...during the 
life cycle of the asset...” (Devon, 2006:223) would mean fewer instances of 
unplanned occupation of road space for reactive maintenance work, and so 
further help to tackle congestion. 
 
7.5.3 Discussion about LTPs and „Highway Works‟ Policy 
The review of the respective LTPs for West Yorkshire and Devon demonstrate 
how these policies help to inform the approach that the street authorities in 
Kirklees and Devon adopt. 
 
7.5.3.1 Kirklees Council 
The West Yorkshire LTP discussed „highway works‟ with the disruption caused 
to journey times by on-going works, how this had implications for journey-time 
reliability for public transport operators, and that sub-standard reinstatements 
resulted in poor ride quality and further works caused by the need for utility 
contractors to carry out remedial work. The findings set out in chapter 8 
regarding Kirklees‟ policy on „highway works‟ established that the focus of the 
authority‟s Streetworks Team was on reducing delay and disruption, and also 
on maintaining the highway network asset. 
 
7.5.3.2 Devon County Council 
The Devon LTP includes elements similar to those in West Yorkshire – reducing 
delay and disruption from works, journey-time reliability – but it also identifies 
the role of the authority‟s Traffic Management Unit in co-ordinating all planned 
events on the highway, not just „highway works‟, and recommending that the 
Unit takes appropriate enforcement action against utility companies and 
contractors. The findings in chapter 8 about Devon‟s arrangements for dealing 
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with „highway work‟ confirmed that their Streetworks Team had a wider role in 
co-ordinating all highway-related events, and that enforcement action was being 
taken, although the number of instances has reduced. 
 
7.6 Permit Schemes 
In chapter 3, the Government‟s current policy on roads was examined, and one 
of its latest ideas, permit schemes, was described.  
 
7.6.1 Extant Permit Schemes 
To date, only a small number of permit schemes have been approved by the 
Government. At the time of writing, schemes are in operation in London (started 
January 2010), Kent (started January 2010), and Northamptonshire (started 
January 2011). There are a number of other schemes that are either with the 
Secretary of State for Transport for approval or are currently being developed, 
including St. Helen‟s Permit Scheme and the Yorkshire Common Permit 
Scheme (started April 2012). The Secretary of State for Transport approved the 
St. Helen‟s scheme in December 2011, and approved the Yorkshire Common 
Permit Scheme in March 2012 to start in June 2012. 
 
7.6.1.1 London 
The London Permit Scheme (known as “LoPS”) was the first permit scheme to 
be approved in the United Kingdom. The scheme was developed at the 
instigation of the Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, a Conservative politician, 
who criticised the privatisation policies of the Thatcher administration in causing 
the problem of road works affecting the capital city. Speaking in January 2010, 
at the launch of “LoPS”, Johnson said (Guardian, 2010) “I am afraid it goes 
back to Mrs Thatcher. She decided – entirely reasonably – that these new 
concerns [privatised utility companies] should be given every possible help in 
maximising efficiency and delivering services... So they were given quite 
amazing powers to dig up the road. That might have been sensible in the 80s, 
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when there were only two or three privatized utilities. It looks utterly crazy 
today... The whole system is a disgrace”. 
 
The “LoPS” applies to all roads within authority areas operating the scheme. 
Under “LoPS”, Transport for London (TfL) and 16 of the 33 London Boroughs 
began operation of a common permit scheme. The introduction of the scheme 
was justified (LoPS First Year Evaluation, 2011) in the Cost Benefit Analysis on 
the basis that the introduction of the scheme would reduce the direct delay 
attributable to works by 10%. TfL have provided data on Average Journey Time 
and Journey Time Variability across London, which indicated that permitting had 
delivered a large portion of the expected levels of benefits for these two 
indicators. However this analysis was only based on five months‟ worth of 
available data. 
 
The successes reported for the first year of operation included;  
 An increase of 147% in the number of recorded days of disruption saved 
through joint working and collaboration from 726 in 2009 to 1793 in 2010, 
corresponding to a benefit of approx. £2.7 million in congestion saved in 
2010; 
 An increased discipline amongst highway authorities in recording their 
own works. This has led to a 237% increase in the proportion of works 
that are formally recorded by highway authorities, providing more 
opportunity for collaborative working and enhanced public information on 
road works via the “LondonWorks” Public Register; 
 A reduction in the total number of works undertaken by utilities of 17% 
within permitting authorities as compared to only 7% in non-permitting 
authorities, saving approximately 149,136 days of „street works‟ within 
those authorities; 
 Better quality of information available to make considered coordination 
decisions.  
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“LoPS” members have a commitment to continuous improvement of the scheme 
by promoting closer working relationships between permitting authorities and all 
promoters. It is the intention of the permitting authorities to closer align their 
processes and also to continue to work with the utility promoters to address 
issues as they arise. It is anticipated that this will lead to a reduction in the 
number of permit applications refused for reasons that can be easily avoided. 
 
7.6.1.2 Kent Permit Scheme 
The Kent Permit Scheme (KPS) was launched in July 2009 for own works 
promoters and on 25January 2010 for statutory undertakers, and Kent County 
Council was the first local highway authority outside of London to introduce a 
Road permit scheme. The staggered start between permits for the authority‟s 
own works and permits for „street works‟ enabled the Street Works Team within 
Kent Highway Services to ensure that, as the „enforcer‟ of the scheme, it could 
be confident that it was working with the best possible information to achieve 
the best possible outcome from the start (Kent, 2011). 
 
The KPS covers the whole of the county, covering all roads, and covering some 
3,736 square kilometres and with over 8,000 km of highway. The experience in 
Kent was that, under NRASWA, utility companies sent a notice of intended 
works to the council, as highway authority. Unless an obvious problem was 
brought to its attention, the authority was not obliged to respond and the utility 
company could progress their proposed activities. However, under the 
provisions of the permit scheme, the utility company has to receive permission 
before they can commence with proposed works. In addition, special conditions 
can also be required, including covering working hours, traffic management 
measures or co-ordination with other works. 
 
Although Kent County Council is the permit authority that administers the KPS, 
Kent County Council is also a promoter of its own maintenance and other 
highway and traffic activities in its role as highway authority. As both the 
highway and permit authority, Kent County Council (KCC) can choose to require 
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conditions to be attached to a permit, grant a permit, apply conditions to a 
granted permit or decline permission for work. 
 
According to its first year Annual Review (Kent, 2011), the introduction of the 
KPS has enabled KCC, as permit authority, to adopt a proactive stance in the 
coordination of „street works‟ activities and those of other promoters. KCC‟s 
reasons for introducing a permit scheme were: 
 To enable the council to manage activities on the highway more 
effectively with the ultimate aims of: 
o Carrying out works more effectively and limiting disruption. 
o Improved consideration of people who live near, or travel through 
works. 
o Providing safer Road Works. 
 
Ultimately, the permit scheme was established to improve management of all 
works on local road networks and to significantly reduce unnecessary disruption 
to road users. 
 
In reviewing its first year of operation, KCC noted (Kent, 2011) that, as part of 
the process of implementing a permit scheme, the authority was committed to 
introducing ways to measure the benefits of the KPS. These measurements 
were designed to assess the overall effect that the permit scheme would have 
on the roads in Kent, specifically: 
 Journey times and reliability 
 Safety on the roads 
 Reduction in road works occupation 
 
The above points were expanded on by reference to information presented in 
the report “Application to operate the Kent Permit Scheme: Cost Benefit 
Analysis”, which showed that the average annual cost of vehicle collisions at or 
near road work sites between 2005 and 2008 was approximately £6million, 
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indicating the potential for substantial safety cost benefits from a permit 
scheme, and gave a basis for quantifying this. 
 
Journey time reliability both for cars as a means of private transport and buses 
as a means of public transport had been derived from a range of journey time 
data, directly surveyed or derived from validated strategic and transportation 
modelling, particularly taking into account baseline reliability of waiting times at 
bus stops when works were in operation. 
 
7.6.1.3 Discussion about Existing Permit Schemes 
The documentation supporting permit schemes is extensive and includes a 
statutory instrument which enact the permit scheme provisions set out in the 
Traffic Management Act; a code of practice, which sets out the information 
which schemes must contain, including a range of objectives which might be 
appropriate to schemes and a number of parity measures which must also be 
included; statutory guidance linking the code of practice to the statutory 
instrument, and an advice note about making a submission to the secretary of 
state for transport for approval to operate a scheme. In reviewing this 
documentation, it becomes apparent that there are inconsistencies in 
terminology used in, and between, different documents. 
 
Both the London and Kent permit schemes share a degree of commonality in 
their purpose and objectives, in that they seek through improved co-ordination, 
and providing information to the public and others about works and their likely 
impact, to minimise delay and disruption arising from works helping to support 
journey-time reliability. The schemes differ with regard to the conditions that the 
respective authorities can attach to granted permits. These differences in 
conditions reflect the differing demands on the authorities‟ highway network. 
This situation is similar to that discussed by interviewees for this study as 
presented in later chapters with regard to the ambiguities in the legislation and 
associated regulations, and how it then makes it difficult for works promoters to 
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work consistently and the consequential administrative resource required by 
authorities and utility companies in getting the processes right. 
 
7.6.2 Yorkshire Permit Scheme 
Six authorities within the Yorkshire area – Barnsley, Doncaster, Kirklees, Leeds, 
Rotherham and Sheffield – formed the “Yorkshire Permit Planning Group” 
(YPPG) and worked together to produce the Yorkshire Common Permit 
Scheme (YCPS) (YCPS Consultation Report, 2010). The remaining three West 
Yorkshire authorities – Bradford, Calderdale and Wakefield – are, at the time of 
writing, undertaking a separate cost-benefit analysis to examine the feasibility 
for them of applying to operate the YCPS. Other authorities in the Yorkshire 
region have no immediate plans to make an application to operate a permit 
scheme but will be monitoring the YCPS once it is approved and operating.  
 
DfT regulations required authorities considering a permit scheme to consult with 
certain organisations and any other persons that the authority might consider 
appropriate. Each of the authorities in the YPPG identified the relevant 
consultees for their area. Each participating authority analysed their Street 
Works Register to identify all utility companies that had undertaken any work 
since the commencement of NRASWA. Every effort was made to contact all of 
these organisations to give them the opportunity to take part in the consultation, 
and, in addition, participating authorities ensured that adjacent local authorities 
were included in the consultation, as well as organisations such as bus 
operators, freight organisations and the emergency services. In total some 337 
consultees were identified, including access groups, action groups, area 
partnerships, businesses/trade organisations, fire service, central 
Government/agencies, local authorities, parish councils, police service, public 
transport authorities/operators, town councils, and utility companies. 
 
In total, 186 responses were received of which 18 were positive, 151 were 
neutral and 17 were against the scheme. Many of the 151 responses, the 
majority of which were from utilities, were seeking points of clarification in either 
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the scheme documentation or the permit scheme procedures. With regard to 
the 17 negative responses, these were mainly from utility companies and other 
works promoters and the majority related to the detailed provisions of the 
proposed scheme.  
 
As a result of the consultation, changes were made to the scheme. An 
application to the Secretary of State for Transport to operate a permit scheme 
was submitted, individually, by each of the six participating authorities in August 
2011. The proposed Yorkshire Permit Scheme is a common scheme, which 
means that while the rules of the scheme are the same responsibility for 
operating the scheme rests with the individual authorities. The Secretary of 
State for Transport gave approval to each of the six authorities in March 2012 to 
operate the scheme. 
 
An examination of the individual authority objectives was undertaken. 
7.6.2.1 Barnsley 
Barnsley Council decided (Barnsley, 2011) to consider a permit scheme due to 
its central location within two City Regions, Leeds and Sheffield. Barnsley styles 
itself a “21st Century Market Town”, and “... a hub of creativity and digital 
capability at the centre of the digital region”. At the same time, the council is 
looking to raise aspiration, improve standards, and increase employment skills 
through a borough-wide infrastructure of Advanced Learning Centres and the 
continued development of Barnsley College and the Barnsley Campus of the 
University of Huddersfield. To complement this, the council considers that the 
requirement for excellent internal and external connectivity paramount, with 
transportation issues interwoven into all aspects of society. 
 
An efficient and accessible transport system is identified as having a vital role in 
providing access for all to health care, employment, education and other 
services and facilities. Providing for the efficient movement of customers and 
goods is seen as being crucial for maintaining a vibrant economy, allowing the 
council to continue working towards making the area “...a more pleasant, 
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vibrant, safe and healthy town in which to live, work and visit, while also 
contributing to improving the environment and economy, at a local, regional and 
national level”. Beyond the town itself, the borough has quite a dispersed 
settlement pattern, with many former mining villages, and a large semi-rural 
area to the west on the Pennine fringe. Employment locations are dispersed. 
There is seen to be a difficult geography to operate public transport efficiently 
and affordably, and bus services are often infrequent, with accessibility a 
challenge. Residents of the borough are heavily reliant on cars to get to work, 
with 79% travelling in this way compared with 71% nationally. 
 
Barnsley has a stated ambition (Local Development Framework) to regenerate 
itself as a “21st Century Market Town”, focusing on creating an economy which 
complements and supports and makes the most of the economic role of places 
outside the borough, including the two City Regions. The council‟s Local 
Development Framework (LDF) has an agenda which envisages making 
available additional land for of employment land houses, and, in doing so, has 
identified that it faces a number of key transport challenges in both the short, 
medium and long term. The permit scheme is intended to improve the planning, 
co-ordination, execution and duration of all activities carried out in the roads 
covered by the scheme, to ensure that they do not cause avoidable disruption 
to road users.    
 
The council is also looking to impose conditions on and monitoring works to 
ensure that any works carried out in sensitive areas are reinstated promptly and 
on a first time basis to reduce the number of interim reinstatements. It is an 
identified priority for the council that works promoters should provide accurate 
and timely information to members of the public and highway users with regard 
to on-going works, proposed works and potential delays, as part of the 
authority‟s Network Management Duty. 
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7.6.2.2 Doncaster 
Doncaster Council identifies itself (Doncaster, 2011) as one of the largest 
metropolitan areas in the United Kingdom, comprising 220 square miles. The 
council strategies recognise that many different factors affect residents‟ “quality 
of life”, including employment opportunities, crime rates, the natural 
environment, and quality of housing, schools and hospitals. Doncaster has 
recognised that there will be a significant reduction in funding for the public 
sector over the next few years, with all organisations having to deliver value for 
money from the limited resources available, but with the public sector providing 
the main support mechanisms in education and training, health provision, 
housing, social care, and community safety, all enabled by its highway network. 
 
Doncaster‟s aim is to be one of the most successful boroughs in England by 
being a “...gateway to opportunity locally, nationally and worldwide”, where a 
strong local economy will support progressive, healthy, safe and vibrant 
communities. The council has identified efficient management of the highway 
network as one of the key factors in delivering the “... many aspirations of the 
people”.  
 
The council‟s strategy “A Plan for Doncaster 2010-2015” provides a number of 
challenges, and is the key long-term document for improving quality of life in 
Doncaster; for residents, visitors and people considering moving, working or 
investing in the area. It aims to develop communities where people want to live 
and work, now and in the future, and provides the „big picture‟ of the area‟s 
challenges, ambitions and how priorities are to be delivered.  
 
Of the seven themes in the strategy, three are particularly relevant to efficient 
management of the highway network and the provision of a permit scheme to 
manage „street works‟, and these are: 
 Theme 1: Creating a strong, connected and inclusive economy. The 
council sees that all types of businesses are directly affected by works on 
the highway, and local business in particular can be affected with a 
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reduction in customer activity. Others that rely on the transportation of 
goods and resources will have increased costs as a result of being 
delayed or re-routed due to the congestion. The potential for managing 
works through a permit scheme would have positive benefits in reducing 
the costs that result from delays and maintaining business links. 
 Theme 4: Protecting and improving children‟s lives. The council see it 
important that road safety is considered at all locations where works are 
carried out, with works in the highway impacting on all classes of road 
user with children forming one of the most vulnerable groups. The 
provision of unfamiliar traffic management layouts may impact on the 
regular users of a route, delays will create frustration and lead to road 
users taking risks, traffic diverted on to other routes may be unfamiliar 
with that route and the risk of collisions will be increased. 
 Theme 7: Creating a cleaner and better environment. The reduction of 
congestion is likely to reduce the carbon emissions created by vehicles, 
and so any reduction in the delays encountered at „street works‟ and 
„roadworks‟ will have reduction in emissions. 
 
7.6.2.3 Kirklees 
In developing the permit scheme, the Kirklees Council has taken account 
(Kirklees, 2011) of the local issues identified in its “Local Development 
Framework Core Strategy”, which identified the need to make space available 
for housing and businesses over a 15 year period, including 37,000 new homes 
to be provided between 2004 and 2026 and providing 250 hectares of land for 
jobs. This level of development will result in activities, including „roadworks‟ and 
„street works‟, which will have a significant impact on the highway network 
within the area. 
 
The permit scheme is proposed to enable the council to take advantage of 
opportunities to minimise disruption arising from these works. The council, 
along with the other four West Yorkshire districts, is currently working with the 
Integrated Transport Authority (Metro) to develop the “MyJourney West 
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Yorkshire” plan for 2011-2026, which will replace the existing LTP2 (Local 
Transport Plan). The permit scheme would allow the council to meet and 
support the ITA‟s plan. 
 
Kirklees Council has identified four priorities that inform its policies and 
relationships with partners. These priorities are: 
 Enhance life chances for young people - Working in partnership to 
improve educational attainment for the under 16s and help them to reach 
their full potential. 
 Support older people to be healthy, active and involved in their 
communities - Helping people to improve their health and well-being, with 
the focus on preventative work and empowering people to make 
informed decisions. 
 Lead Kirklees out of recession - Making sure the area emerges from the 
economic downturn with a stronger economy and better paid jobs. 
 Provide effective and productive services - Ensuring services are 
focused on the needs of the community and are value for money. 
 
The council has identified that the permit scheme would enable to contribute to 
these priorities in the following ways: 
 Enhance life chances for young people and support for older people: 
Young people will be better able to take up training and employment 
opportunities if they can have a greater certainty in bus journey time 
reliability. They will be better able to enjoy an independent social life if 
bus services are more predictable. 
 Older people will have more confidence in travelling in their daily lives 
and enable them to maintain social contacts. If they lose confidence in 
travelling then they may become tied to their homes and become 
increasingly reliant on services brought to them. 
 
Passenger surveys by the Integrated Transport Authority (ITA) show that 
punctuality is a top priority for customers, and works on the highway and traffic 
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congestion have major impacts on bus punctuality. The options of the ITA and 
bus operators for responding to disruption to their services include: adding more 
buses (which would incur more costs and lead to higher fares), reduce 
frequency (which would result in fewer passengers being carried and higher 
fares), cut services (again, resulting in fewer passengers being carried and 
increased isolation for communities and individuals), or road management. The 
first three options are not considered to be commercially viable or acceptable in 
terms of service provision, which leaves managing the road space better. The 
permit scheme would help the council to work towards this objective. 
 
 Business (leading Kirklees out of recession): Surveys by the Federation 
of Small Businesses indicate that costs increase due to increased time 
taken for journeys and working hours lost. 
 
The operation of a permit scheme will encourage effective and productive 
service delivery by the council and the promoters working in the street. For the 
first time the council would be funded to ensure that people working in the street 
do so with the minimum impact on road users and residents. 
 
7.6.2.4 Leeds 
The Leeds Metropolitan District area (Leeds, 2011) covers 217 square miles, 
and is the largest authority in the Yorkshire and Humber Region. The “Leeds 
Strategic Housing Land Availability Assessment Final Report” (2009) supports 
the authority‟s “Local Development Framework” by identifying the opportunities 
and likely timing for housing growth across Leeds. The report identified a 
potential for an additional 46,100 dwellings across Leeds in the medium term 
(up to 2020). 
 
Leeds City Council produced a City Priority Plan which set out the key 
outcomes and priorities to be delivered by the council, and its partners, over the 
period 2011 to 2015. The City Priority Plan comprised five action plans, one of 
which, the Sustainable Economy and Culture action plan, identified improved 
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journey times through maximising the efficiency of the network, and minimising 
congestion through effective network management as a priority for the city. 
Leeds City Council‟s Network Management Plan sets out in detail how the 
council intends to fulfil the Network Management Duty obligations under the 
Traffic Management Act 2004. The implementation of a permit scheme would 
provide the authority with stronger powers to regulate works on its most critical 
streets to secure the expeditious movement of traffic, thereby contributing to the 
aim set out in the plan. 
 
The Integrated Transport Authority (Metro), has prepared the “My 
Journey West Yorkshire” plan for 2011-26, which sets out the approach of the 
contributing local authorities to managing the road network in West Yorkshire. 
The plan was prepared following an extensive stakeholder and public 
consultation, and includes a key proposal to use new network management 
practices to minimise congestion and ensure efficient recovery from disruption. 
The introduction of a permit scheme is identified in this proposal to manage 
„roadworks‟ and „street works‟, to minimise the potential negative impacts upon 
the network and travel choices. 
 
The objectives for Leeds City Council from a permit scheme are to 
 Improve the planning, co-ordination, execution and monitoring of all 
activities covered by the scheme; 
 Ensure certainty of work dates and deliver a regular update of work 
plans, to improve the quality of information passed to all road users and, 
in particular, public transport operators. 
 Public consultation identified that the image, attractions and environment 
of the city centre are important in terms of attracting investors, 
employers, employees, residents, shoppers, visitors and tourists to the 
city - and in encouraging them to return. Consequently, the quality of the 
public realm is seen as being fundamental to the city centre‟s ability to 
compete successfully with other cities. Leeds City Council has invested 
heavily in high-specification surfacing materials, both in the city centre 
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and in outlying townships. This council wants this investment to be 
maintained to the highest standards. 
 
7.6.2.5 Rotherham 
Rotherham Council (Rotherham, 2011) is responsible for the operation and 
maintenance of over 1100km of highway across its geographical area, and 
contributes to the South Yorkshire Integrated Transport Authority‟s current Local 
Transport Plan (LTP), which set out the approach of the four South Yorkshire 
authorities to managing the road network across the sub-region. The authorities 
have developed a strategic network which comprises routes within the Sheffield 
City Region which link the major towns, provide key connections with other city 
regions, and accommodate the strategic public transport network. The South 
Yorkshire Local Transport Plan objectives have been developed further to 
produce a South Yorkshire Network Management Plan.  
 
Rotherham intends to tackle congestion on its roads by: 
 Improving conditions for bus operators by tackling reliability and 
punctuality through its “Bus Punctuality Improvement Plan”. 
 Developing Urban Traffic Control and Intelligent Transport Systems. 
 Operating Decriminalised Parking Enforcement. 
 
In the council‟s view, successful management of the road network plays a vital 
role in the day to day operation of Rotherham, and also with respect to links 
with the neighbouring city of Sheffield. The commuting route between 
Rotherham and Sheffield has the highest 2-way “travel to work” trips within 
South Yorkshire, and it is considered essential that activities on the highway 
network are both well planned and monitored. A permit scheme for Rotherham 
would form part of the overall strategy to manage effectively the highway 
network and would include all routes in Rotherham within the Strategic South 
Yorkshire Network. 
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7.6.2.6 Sheffield 
Sheffield City Council (Sheffield, 2011) wants a transport system in Sheffield 
which will empower people to make informed choices about the way they travel, 
and will help contribute towards the social, economic and environmental 
improvements the Council wishes to achieve in the city, including; 
 Increasing opportunities for everybody 
 A competitive low-carbon economy 
 A better environment 
 
The City Council‟s corporate plan for 2010-13, “A City of Opportunity” contains 
ambitions to lead the city‟s transformation and to protect the environment. 
Priorities contained within these ambitions include reducing traffic congestion 
and the city‟s carbon footprint, public transport that is easy for people to use 
and delivering for business and encouraging enterprise. 
 
The reduction of unnecessary traffic congestion and the certainty of reliable 
journey times for all forms of transport are seen as being key steps towards 
achieving a competitive, low carbon economy. It is anticipated that a permit 
scheme would help to achieve this through well planned, co-ordinated works. 
 
7.6.2.7 Discussion about the Yorkshire Common Permit Scheme 
The Yorkshire Common Permit Scheme (YCPS) developed by the six 
authorities is a common scheme, in that the same rules apply to anyone, 
authorities and works promoters, operating under the Scheme. The review of 
the individual “Scheme Supplementary Information” documents identified a 
range of (i) motives for introducing the Scheme and (ii) anticipated benefits 
arising from the operation of the Scheme. These motives and anticipated 
benefits are summarised in Table 7.1 below: 
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Table 7.1 - Yorkshire Common Permit Scheme 
Authority Reasons for Implementing Anticipated Benefits 
Barnsley 
(i) Authority located in two City Regions; 
(ii) Importance of managing the highway 
network for developing education and 
employment skills; (iii) Supporting an 
efficient and accessible transport 
system; (iv) Supporting employment; (v) 
Supporting residential and business 
development. 
(i) Improvement in the planning, 
co-ordination, execution, and 
duration of all 'highway works'; 
(ii) Ensure that works do not 
cause unavoidable disruption to 
road users. 
Doncaster 
(i) Reductions in public spending will 
affect service delivery, which are all 
enabled via the highway network; (ii) To 
support a strong, local economy; (iii) 
Linking to council policies about 
improving the quality of life in the area. 
(i) Efficient management of the 
highway network. 
Kirklees 
(i) Links to the authority's "Local 
Development Framework" in supporting 
business and residential developments; 
(ii) Supporting the Integrated Transport 
Authority plan; (iii) Enabling efficient use 
of the highway network to promote a 
stronger economy and providing journey 
certainty. 
(i) Better management of road 
space; (ii) Reduce delay and 
disruption arising from works; 
(iii) Minimise the impact of 
works on residents and 
businesses. 
Leeds 
(i) Links to the "Local Development 
Framework identifying housing growth: 
(ii) Improved journey times through 
maximising the efficiency of the 
network; (iii) Minimising congestion 
through effective network management. 
(i) Improvement in the planning, 
co-ordination, and monitoring of 
all 'highway works'; (ii) Ensure 
certainty of work dates; (iii) 
Improve the quality of 
information provided to road 
users; (iv) Help to maintain the 
quality of the appearance of 
'public realm' spaces. 
Rotherham 
(i) Links to the Integrated Transport 
Authority Plan for managing the 
strategic routes across the county; (ii) 
Improving conditions for bus operators. 
(i) Efficient management of the 
highway network, including the 
Strategic South Yorkshire 
Network. 
Sheffield 
Support council priorities in (i) reducing 
traffic congestion; (ii) reducing the city's 
'carbon footprint'; (iii) helping to make 
public transport easier for people to use; 
(iv) supporting delivery for businesses 
and encouraging enterprise. 
(i) Reduction in unnecessary 
traffic congestion; Increased 
certainty of journey-time 
reliability; (iii) Well-planned and 
co-ordinated works. 
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7.6.2.6.1 Motivations for Implementing the YCPS 
The motives set out in authorities‟ documents for implementing a permit scheme 
indicate a common element in that doing so provides a link between the 
authority‟s responsibilities relating to the management of „highway works‟ with 
other council policies including development (both residential and commercial), 
supporting the local economy, health and well-being of people in the area, and 
supporting non-car methods of travel and public transport in particular. 
 
These findings are informative about the positioning of the management of 
„highway works‟ within an authority, in that they indicate a strategic function for 
the role that goes beyond managing an individual job to ensure that it carried 
out and reinstated correctly.  
 
7.6.2.7.2 Anticipated Benefits from Implementing the YCPS 
The anticipated benefits identified can be seen to correspond with both the 
Government‟s policies for „highway works‟, which include features such as: the 
better co-ordination of works, minimising delay and disruption, and providing 
better information about the impact of works. These features were also present 
in the findings set out in earlier chapters from the interviews carried out.   
 
7.6.2.7.3 Authority Objectives 
The reasons for each of the six participating authorities wanting to introduce the 
Yorkshire Common Permit Scheme contain some common elements, as 
identified above, but also include a range of authority-specific objectives. In 
Table 7.2 below the author summarises these elements: 
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Table 7.2 - Permit Scheme Implementation     
  
     
  
  
 
National Legislation 
   
  
  
 
(Regulation, Code of Practice, 
Guidance) 
   
  
  
 
 
 
 
   
  
  
     
  
  
 
Local Authority 
  
Policy Drivers   
  
    
(including: council 
plans, LTP)   
  
     
  
  
     
  
  
 
Officers 
  
Utility Company 
Performance   
           
 
 
The Table shows how the same national legislation, including the DfT‟s Code of 
Practice for Permits, the regulations and guidance issued, is accessed and 
applied by individual local authorities in order to develop a permit scheme that 
will (i) satisfy the DfT and Secretary of State for Transport and (ii) will deliver 
benefits to the authority with regard to its specific requirements as identified in 
its, and associated, policies and plans. With regard to the Yorkshire Common 
Permit Scheme, the scheme was developed by officers who were directed „top-
down‟ by the authority‟s plans whilst at the same time proving a „bottom-up‟ 
insight informed by their interactions with utility companies and the authority‟s 
own works department, the associated performance issues, and knowledge of 
how „highway works‟ impact on the authority‟s highway network. 
 
An examination of the ways in which local authorities created and implemented 
permit schemes also helped to illustrate the differences between policy-making 
and policy-maintaining in local authorities, and the difficulties in drawing a 
distinction. Permit schemes were provided for in the Traffic Management Act 
2004, and were designed to give local authorities additional powers to manage 
all works on the highway to minimise disruption to highway users, taking into 
account any regional-specific considerations such as geographic, economic or 
environmental. All local authorities in England and Wales would have had the 
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opportunity to contribute to the “problem recognition” stage in this policy area. 
Then, as the responsible authority, would have had to take a policy view within 
as to whether to implement a permit scheme in their authority‟s area. This would 
be policy-making for the authority. Contrast this with the pre-existing 
requirements of the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991, where local 
authorities had a duty to comply with requirements that came into force in 1993, 
almost 20 years ago. In those intervening years, elected members would likely 
have been maintaining existing policies and procedures. 
 
7.7 Chapter Summary 
The findings in this chapter have confirmed that the function of a local 
authority‟s highway network has changed over time, moving from a concern 
mainly with the maintenance of road surfaces, bridges and drainage to finding 
ways to incorporate additional demands required in placing new and developing 
technologies under the surface. These “new technologies” are driven by public 
demand and central Government direction. To accommodate them involves 
consequential delay and disruption to highway users whilst apparatus is 
installed and maintained, but having good utility and service provision now 
forms part of an authority‟s strategic plan for their area. The literature reviewed 
earlier suggested that the role of local authorities was changing, and these 
findings support that view, showing that authorities are complying with central 
Government reforms that placed a requirement on authorities to set the 
strategic direction for their areas. 
 
The findings have also demonstrated changes in how local authorities structure 
themselves in order to deal with their responsibilities for maintaining their 
networks, with the name of “roads” and/or “bridges” becoming less prominent in 
the title of the council body with responsibility for their oversight. These changes 
can be viewed against the literature on changes to how authorities run 
themselves, including moves to the “leader/cabinet” model, and how these 
changes have resulted in a move away from traditional committee structures, 
 246 
with the result that members other than “cabinet” members are less involved in 
the day-to-day operation of local authority functions. 
 
That local authority officers have been able to use discretion in shaping their 
organisation‟s policies regarding managing „highway works‟, where permit 
schemes have been prepared for approval by their own council initially, 
demonstrates a more traditional view of officer/member relationships, in that 
members are relying on the expertise and knowledge of officers in a particular 
area in order to develop an appropriate scheme. Not quite so evident from the 
findings is the extent to which the idea of developing a permit scheme is „top-
down‟ from members or „bottom-up‟ from officers. This is an area examined 
further in chapters 8 to 10. 
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Chapter Eight – Yorkshire-area Interview Data Analysis 
8.1 Introduction 
The next three chapters will analyse the findings from the in-depth interviews 
carried out. There were 12 interviews carried out between February 2010 and 
December 2011 across three geographical areas in England – Yorkshire, 
Devon, and London – and they were semi-structured (the questions asked can 
be found in Appendices A, B and C) to enable qualitative data to be collected to 
explore the role and contribution of individual “actors”. People were identified for 
interview on the basis of their involvement with „highway works‟: for elected 
members, this meant the portfolio-holder with responsibility for highway; from 
local authorities and utility companies in Yorkshire and Devon, the interviewees 
were the people who attended their area regional „highway authority and utilities 
committee‟ (HAUC). This was so that data from the findings could be compared. 
The interviewees from London were identified on the basis of their ability to 
comment on „highway works‟ policies. 
 
This chapter will analyse the data from the interviews carried out in the 
Yorkshire area, chapter 9 will analyse the data for the Devon area interviews, 
and chapter 10 will analyse the data from the London interviews. The findings 
will then be discussed in chapter 11. 
 
For the Yorkshire area, interviews were carried out with: 
 The lead elected member for highway in Kirklees Metropolitan Council. 
At the time of undertaking the interviews for this thesis, Kirklees Council 
was going through a reorganisation and there was no permanent officer 
in the “street works manager” role. The officer information for Kirklees is 
provided by the author of this thesis as acting Street Works Manager; 
 Representatives for the main four utility companies, i.e. water, gas, 
electricity, and telecommunications; 
 The joint chairs of YHAUC (Yorkshire HAUC); and 
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 Officers from North Yorkshire County Council (NYCC).NYCC interacts 
with the same utility companies as Kirklees but is also, like Devon, a 
largely rural county council. 
 
Three distinct but related interview templates were developed to collect data 
from elected members, local authority officers, and utility company 
representatives. The interview templates were prepared to allow for data to be 
collected in the following areas: 
1. Roles and responsibilities of the interviewee. The purpose of this part of 
the interview was to identify the roles and responsibilities of the 
interviewees with regard to „highway works‟ in order to be able to 
examine and explain how these might account for subsequent similarities 
and differences in how the organisations dealt with the legislation relating 
to „highway works‟. 
2. The organisation‟s policies relating to „highway works‟, and the extent to 
which the interviewee could influence them. The purpose of this part of 
the interview was (a) for street authorities to identify their organisation‟s 
policies relating to their own „roadworks‟ and to utility company „street 
works‟, the organisational factors that drove the policies, and the extent 
to which the interviewees felt that they could influence the policies; and 
(b) for utility companies, to identify their organisation‟s policies relating to 
their „street works‟ activity, the factors that drove the policies, and the 
extent to which the interviewees felt that they could influence the policies. 
3. The nature of the relationship between the interviewee‟s organisation 
and highway authorities and utility companies, depending on whether 
that organisation is a highway authority or utility company. The purpose 
of this part of the interview was to establish the factors that influence, 
either positively or negatively, relationships between authorities and 
utility companies at both individual and regional levels. 
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8.2.1 Roles and Responsibilities 
8.2.1.1 Elected Member, Kirklees 
The councillor interviewed was the Cabinet Member for Environment, Transport 
and Regeneration, with the role in reality being shared between three 
councillors. The councillor interviewed does the “day-to-day” highways work, 
which incorporates Streetscene & Housing Service. Within this Service sits the 
Streetworks Team, carrying out the co-ordination functions relating to „highway 
works‟, and also the Design & Construction team which plans and executes 
„roadworks‟ on behalf of the council. 
 
The councillor identified the importance of having some form of measurement to 
identify where council‟s should target resources, and cited an example of the 
Performance Indicators for the number of accidents per head of population. The 
councillor said that the Government has scrapped a lot of indicators but there 
are still some against which authorities are assessed, and the authority 
“...should be looking to say which we want to maintain and be measured 
against” and “...there is a need to be mindful of these in the current times of 
reduced budgets. When budgets are cut, it can be done by spreading the 
budgets equally over the wards, and everyone gets the same, but not everyone 
has the same need. There is a learning process to get the public to understand 
this”. 
 
While the councillor believed that there was a need to explain this to people so 
that they understand “... the vast majority, 95-99% of people, are not interested 
and do not want to get involved in the process”. However, to cater for the 
people who do want to get involved, the councillor identified a need to have 
access to the information and that “...the councillors have a duty to try and get 
that majority to understand what the authority is doing and why”. 
 
According to the councillor, the council has chosen not to devolve powers to 
individual members, although they could have done so under legislation. This 
means that decisions are devolved to officers after consultation with the 
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relevant lead member. The question has never arisen as to what would happen 
if there was a conflict of interest where the officer wanted to do something and 
the councillor, as Cabinet Member, did not, and it has never got to a situation 
where disagreements could not be resolved. 
 
8.2.1.1.1 Discussion about Elected Member Roles and Responsibilities 
It was not possible to carry out interviews with elected members in the other 
geographical areas included in this study in order to make comparisons. 
However, the interview with the Kirklees councillor confirmed that there was 
political oversight of the „highway works‟ function within the authority and that 
decision-making can be devolved to officers. 
 
The councillor at this part of the interview identified their role in terms of how 
they engaged with the public (and the extent to which the public wanted to be 
engaged) and how performance information was used within the authority to 
help determine spending priorities. The interview highlighted the importance to 
the councillor of proving information to people about the council‟s performance, 
and about how this performance information was particularly important when, as 
now, the council was going through a period of budget cuts, with the 
consequential dilemma for elected members about how budgets should best be 
allocated, with options including either equal amounts across all wards or 
targeting areas of most need. 
 
8.2.1.2 Street Authorities 
8.2.1.2.1 Kirklees  
The Street Works Team at Kirklees comprises an acting Street Works Manager 
(ASWM), two project officers who are responsible for the co-ordination of all 
„highway works‟ across their respective geographic areas, four highway 
inspectors who monitor the performance of utility companies against the codes 
of practice for signing, lighting and guarding and for reinstatement. There are, in 
addition, “business support” officers who deal with the administrative processes 
relating to NRASWA, including receipt and processing of notices served by 
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works promoters and the invoicing of charges, for example, for inspections 
carried out. 
 
The Street Works Team is part of the Operational Unit within the council‟s 
Streetscene & Housing Unit, which deals with the council‟s own „roadworks‟ 
from design to on-site construction.  
 
The responsibilities of the ASWM are to ensure compliance with legislation, 
including NRASWA and TMA, to protect the council‟s highway asset by 
ensuring that reinstatements are carried out to specification, and to integrate the 
legislative requirements of NRASWA and TMA with the council‟s priorities. 
 
8.2.1.2.2 Regional HAUC, Highways Chair‟s Authority 
An interview was carried out with the joint chair (highways-side) of the regional 
HAUC (YHAUC), who was a Group Leader (GL) within the authority‟s Strategic 
Highway Maintenance Unit. The responsibilities of the GL relating to „street 
works‟ included 10% of their time spent managing the street works team and 
works co-ordination, being responsible for highway maintenance, highway 
enforcement, and statutory highway functions. One of their roles was to 
formulate the authority‟s policy and agree it with Elected Members. 
 
8.2.1.2.3 North Yorkshire County Council (NYCC) 
Two interviews were carried out in NYCC: one with the Highway Asset Manager 
(HAM) and one with the Street Works Manager (SWM). 
 
The HAM manages a group of teams covering a number of areas, one of which 
is the Streetworks Team. Other areas include the county‟s searches function, 
corporate flood risk management function (NYCC is now the lead local flood 
authority for North Yorkshire), and the Network Management Team which is 
split in two: a Network Information Team to manage the authority‟s electronic 
records, lists of streets, highway plans, and highway maintenance networks, 
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and a Network Survey Team which undertake a range of condition surveys and 
also participate in investigations on highway fatalities.  
 
The SWM identified that „street works‟ function as comprising the maintenance 
of the Street Works Register and the inspection of works on the highway. The 
team comprises the Street Works Manager, a Co-ordinator, three Technical 
Assistants and eight Inspectors across the county. Each of the inspectors is 
based at an area office, which is the hub of the patch that they cover in North 
Yorkshire. There are seven area offices; one is a fairly major one that covers 
Harrogate and its environs. 
 
8.2.1.2.4 Summary of Street Authority Roles and Responsibilities 
The interviews with street authority representatives highlighted a number of 
similarities and differences in the ways in which the authorities interviewed 
approach their duties. These are set out in Table 8.1 below: 
 
Table 8.1Yorkshire Authorities – Street Authority Roles & Responsibilities 
Authority 
Streetworks 
Team Functions Officers 
  
  (Y/N)     
 
Kirklees 
Y 
Street Works Register 
functions 
Streetworks 
Manager; Co-
ordination officers; 
Inspectors; Business 
Support officers   
  
Co-ordination of all 
'highway works' 
    Inspection of works 
    initiation of charges 
YHAUC Joint 
Chair’s Authority Y 
Street Works Register 
functions 
Establishment not 
specified 
  
  
Co-ordination of all 
'highway works'   
North Yorkshire 
Y 
Street Works Register 
functions 
Streetworks 
Manager; Co-
ordination officer; 
Inspectors 
    Inspection of works 
    initiation of charges 
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8.2.1.3 Utility Companies 
8.2.1.3.1 Water utility 
The person interviewed at the water utility was the Contract Manager (CM) who 
works in the Customer Service and Networks Unit, one of a number of business 
units in the business. The CM was also the joint chair (utility-side) of the 
regional highway authorities and utilities committee, YHAUC. 
 
The „street works‟ responsibilities of the CM range across a number of major 
contacts, including: Water Service Agreement, Repair &Maintenance Waste 
Water, and a number of other, small value/volume contracts, for example, pest 
control and sewer lining, but these have more limited impact on the travelling 
public. 
 
The CM identified having seven main responsibilities with regard to „street 
works‟: 
1. Writing legislative and codes of practice requirements into the 
contracts themselves, and then monitoring performance to make sure 
that partners are adhering to requirements; 
2. Driving excellence and standards of performance in health and 
safety, risk management, and the control of works from the 
perspective of a clear and understood performance management 
process. 
3. Responsibility for leading the street works team, which includes a 
TMA [Traffic Management Act] compliance manager, who manages 
and administers „street works‟ on behalf of the whole business, not 
just for the Customer Service and Networks unit but across the other 
business units as well. 
4. Encouraging appropriate behaviours and relationships with key 
stakeholders, including local authorities, and ensuring that the 
business applies appropriate influence where required in determining 
and delivering best practice within the industry. 
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5. Ensuring an adequate reporting regime across the business to tell 
people how well they are doing, against NRASWA [New Road and 
Street Works Act]/TMA requirements, and there are a host of 
measures in place to do that. 
6. Chairing responsibilities, including the regional HAUC (YHAUC), 
North of England JUG (joint utilities group), the HAUC(UK) Good 
Practice working group, and the “3 HAUCs Roadshow”. 
7. Driving innovation to change the way that the business does „street 
works‟ and the impact of those works. 
 
8.2.1.3.2 Electricity utility 
The person interviewed for the electricity utility was the Street Works Manager 
(SWM), whose duties entailed responsibility for a Compliance Team comprising 
inspectors, who inspect the operations of service providers and the company‟s 
own direct labour staff, and a noticing and administration team. 
 
The SWM‟s other responsibilities involve keeping abreast of legislation and 
keeping the company‟s directors informed so that they can dictate policy, and 
attending regional HAUCs and JUGs, and HAUC(UK). The SWM has the 
backing of the directors to be involved at a comprehensive level because 
involvement in all of these takes time and the company wants to be one of the 
leaders in the „street works‟ arena, and so they afford the SWM the time to do 
this. 
 
With the deregulation of the electricity industry in 1990, the company has a 
number of different operating units. The parent company owns a number of 
electricity distribution companies in England, including the one that covers the 
Yorkshire area, and therefore Kirklees. The split in the industry saw the supply 
and metering and charging for electricity go off to a supply business, which now 
sits with an unrelated company. The distribution company is owned by an 
American company, which itself is part of a bigger corporation. The American 
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owners only wanted the distribution part of the business – they did not want the 
supply part. 
 
8.2.1.3.3 Gas utility 
The NRSWA Delivery Manager (NDM) within the regional gas distribution 
company was interviewed. The NDM oversees a team that deal with all noticing 
issues, handling reports of defective works and sites, transferring reinstatement 
details to the company‟s reinstatement contractors, charges for overruns, fixed 
penalty notices and inspections, and compliance with legislation, including 
measuring performance, and is responsible for a team of about 18 people. 
 
8.2.1.3.4 Telecommunications utility 
The person interviewed within a main telecommunications provider was the 
NRASWA Compliance Manager for the North of England (NCM). Their main 
responsibilities with regard to „street works‟ include keeping the organisation 
compliant with legislation, including NRASWA and TMA, which involves root-
cause analysis of overrun charges, reinstatement defects, fixed penalty notices, 
and permit schemes where they are in operation.  
 
The role also involves attending regional HAUCs and RAUCs (in Scotland), and 
looking at the development and implementation of codes of practice under 
NRASWA, advice notes, and best practice. 
 
8.2.1.3.4 Summary of Utility Company Roles and Responsibilities 
The interviews with the utility company representatives interviewed in the 
Yorkshire area highlighted that there was a greater degree of commonality of 
approach than was evident with street authorities. Details are set out in Table 
8.2 below: 
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Table 8.2Yorkshire area – Utility Roles & Responsibilities 
Utility Interviewee's Role Streetworks Responsibilities 
Water 
Contracts Manager; Regional 
HAUC joint chair 
Writing legislative requirements 
onto contracts; Leading the 
street works team; 
Performance 
monitoring/reporting; 
Stakeholder engagement; 
Driving innovation 
 
Electricity 
Street Works Manager 
Responsible for Compliance 
Team; Legislative awareness; 
Performance 
monitoring/reporting 
 
Gas 
NRSWA Delivery Manager 
Dealing with all noticing and 
compliance issues; 
Performance 
monitoring/reporting 
 
Telecommunications 
NRSWA Compliance Manager 
Ensuring that the organisation 
is compliant with legislation 
(covering the North of England) 
 
8.3.1 Policies and Influence 
8.3.1.1 Elected Member, Kirklees 
With regard to legislation regulating utility „street works‟, the councillor was fully 
aware of the Public Utilities and Street Works Act 1950 regulations, which were 
superseded by NRASWA in 1993, and considered them to be “... great and 
worked well until the Thatcher Government got rid of them” and that “...the 
balance has now gone too far over to the utilities, and they don‟t really pay for 
the damage they do.” The councillor was aware that utility companies have to 
give notice of their works, and also that there is a need to notify other people to 
see if they are planning to work in the same location so that organisations can 
work together, although he was not sure whether this aspect was working fully. 
 
The councillor did not consider that the penalties which can be imposed on 
utilities as being sufficient because “...you can get some utilities digging a hole 
and leave it for six months unless someone reminds them of it when they are 
doing work”. It should be noted that this is no longer the case under NRASWA, 
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where utility companies do incur a financial penalty if their works overrun the 
duration agreed with the local authority for the works. 
 
The councillor identified issues regarding letting the public know who it was that 
were carrying out works on this highway. He was aware that road closure 
information is made public because it is the council that have the legal powers 
to put the order on but, if it is for utility company works, it is for the benefit of 
someone else but there was not thought to be enough information to the public 
explaining that it is not the council that might be digging the road up. There is a 
requirement for all organisations carrying out works on the highway to display 
an information board but the councillor considers that, with the way the industry 
is structured now, where there are no longer single “gas boards” or “electricity 
boards” operating in an area, it is difficult for people to know “...who is who, and 
so people are never really sure who it is that is digging the road up because it is 
just a company name”. 
 
As a cabinet member the councillor is involved in discussions about large 
works, and cited the example of a replacement of a bridge which carried a busy 
local road and was going to be out of use for several months. This was going to 
cause a lot of disruption for a long time, and so the councillor needed to be 
aware because he would get questions about the work, why it was being done 
and how disruption could be mitigated. 
 
The councillor accepted that utility companies have got a statutory right to dig 
the road up “...but we‟ve got a right to moan about the reinstatement not being 
correct” but “...we haven‟t the powers we used to have to do the reinstatements 
ourselves and charge the utilities for it”. The councillor considers that this 
problem of poor reinstatements has led to the pot-holing problems that all local 
authorities have encountered over the last two harsh winters, where the pot-
holes were alongside where the road had been dug up. 
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As a ward councillor, the councillor did not see „street works‟ as an item that 
cropped up a lot from constituents, but was the sort of thing that people would 
fall back on “...if they feel obliged to complain about something”. As people see 
it, one of the duties of councillors is “...to accept people‟s complaints because 
they believe that they have to complain to you about something”, and one of the 
easiest things is about the state of the roads, but the councillor said that he did 
not receive many specific complaints relating to „street works‟. Sometimes 
businesses would complain and ask why they could not be paid compensation 
which, in most cases for council „roadworks‟, is not payable. 
 
The councillor did not think that „highway works‟ in general impacted on other 
council policies. They are not really discussed in cabinet or other committees, 
and are not considered to be a big issues unless there was going to be 
disruption. 
 
The councillor believed that where frustration does arise with „highway works‟ it 
was with regard to why the works co-ordination function could not tie in with the 
planning function to require, for example, when an new estate was being built, 
the utilities to be put in a channel down the sides of the road so that there was 
no need for digging-up the road up in the future. But, again, this was not 
something discussed by the council. According to the councillor, “...certain 
members have certain interests, but members are probably more aware of 
planning issues than they are of general highways issues”. The councillor stated 
that in Kirklees only about 3% of planning decisions go to the Planning 
Committee, which meant that there was no longer the local member input. 
 
With regard to the extent to which the councillor, as Cabinet Member and ward 
councillor, felt that he could influence policies and strategies relating to „street 
works‟ and „roadworks‟, he considered this to be “...difficult because what the 
council does goes back to the bit about devolving things down to an area 
committee and looking and checking the robustness of the formulas”, and there 
is a temptation that “...if you‟ve got a mathematical formula that you can apply to 
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something and it‟s working, don‟t touch it”. With highways matters, members do 
get involved when things go wrong. As Cabinet Member, the councillor acts as 
a back-stop because if a member feels they have not got the required response 
from an officer they will then go to him as cabinet member and he will take it up 
with the service director and try and resolve issues that way. The councillor has 
regular meetings with senior officers in Highways at unit manager and 
operational manager level. Contact about specific issues tends to be through 
the unit manager or through the reactive works manager – not for them to 
resolve, but to ask them to pass it to the right person to come back to the 
councillor. 
 
With regard to access to general information as to how „street works‟ are going 
and performance information, the councillor gets more information on the 
council‟s own „roadworks‟, via the Highways capital plan, and is consulted on 
the plan and will look through the information. The councillor is mindful of the 
need to avoid being parochial as it would be easy to push things into his area, 
and so is conscious of the need to divorce ward work from cabinet work.  
 
The councillor does not consider that the performance of utility companies has a 
great impact on Kirklees as an area, other than with regard to the works on the 
road and the problems with maintenance mentioned previously. His view was 
that “...if you ask people about the road surface the usual response is that “my 
authority is the worst one in the country”, and a lot of that has to do with if 
people are driving out of the area they tend to be in rural areas, and rural areas 
do not tend to have as many openings and so the roads tend to be smoother. 
Also, when people travel outside the council‟s area they tend to be on trunk 
roads and motorways, which also do not have as many openings but have more 
maintenance. When they get home, they are on side streets which have a lot of 
openings and not as much maintenance”. 
 
Also, the councillor was of the view that the roads in this country have got a 
complicated network of underground pipes, and “...people don‟t know what‟s 
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underground half of the time”. The councillor felt that the situation had got better 
in recent years, with geographical information systems having been developed 
over the last 10-15 years, but that there was a lot of “mess” under the roads that 
would not apply to a new town, leading to consequential problems and issues 
with utility works. 
 
With regard to the nature of the relationship between the councillor, as an 
elected member, and officers, the councillor considered that there was a 
retrograde step when the council changed from the committee system. Under 
that arrangement, more elected members met more officers, and the Highways 
Committee had about 18 members on it – it used to be about 24 before that, 
and met monthly and officers presented reports – about 8 or 9 – “...and there 
was a lot more interchange”. The councillor considered that the loss of the 
committee system has had a massive impact on the level of members‟ 
knowledge and awareness, explaining that a lot of members who went to 
committees did not take a lot of interest in what was happening but a lot did. 
Where there was a monthly committee that sometimes lasted two hours, 
members got the papers and 20 or 30 items that were discussing issues, they 
had much more understanding than now, where ordinary members, if they‟re 
not on the cabinet, see nothing – they get no papers – and nothing goes to 
council, so they do not see anything at that level, and even cabinet members 
see very little. According to the councillor, there are a very small amount of 
decisions that go to Cabinet, and the councillor thinks that knowledge across 
the board has gone: “...the current Government is talking about reducing the 
number of councillors and at the same time talking about wanting local 
decisions”.  
 
8.3.1.2 Summary of Elected Member View on Policies and Influence 
The interview with the councillor reinforced findings in the literature that the 
changes to the structure of councils, including moving away from the old 
committee system to cabinet and leader models, have had implications for the 
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level of knowledge of members and on the nature of relationships between 
councillors and officers. 
 
The councillor‟s view of „highway works‟ was as an overview – an awareness 
that utility „street works‟ had to be carried out in order to provide the utility 
services that people needed, and was informed about the plans for the 
authority‟s own „roadworks‟ – and that elected members wanted to be kept 
informed about any works that might cause delay in their wards.  
 
There was, however, no identified linkage between what works were being 
carried out and the council‟s wider objectives, and there appeared to be no 
evidence of widespread interest from the public to councillors about „highway 
works‟ in general, other than specific works that might cause delay or disruption. 
This can be contrasted with the situation in London, discussed below, where the 
current Mayor has „highway works‟ as one of his three top priorities and the 
consequences of this for the way in which street authorities and utilities operate. 
 
8.3.1.2 Street Authority 
8.3.1.2.1 Kirklees  
The council‟s approach to managing „street works‟ is based on ensuring 
compliance with the relevant legislation to minimise disruption to highway users 
whilst the works are on-going, and monitoring reinstatements carried out by 
utility companies, to ensure that reinstatements meet the specification, so that 
condition of the highway asset is maintained and the council does not have to 
incur the cost from its maintenance budget of carrying remedial work on utility 
reinstatements. 
 
The council‟s policy with regard to its own „roadworks‟ is set out in the “Highway 
Maintenance Plan”, which sets out that the main purpose of highway 
maintenance is to maintain the highway network for the convenient movement 
of people and goods. The council‟s roads that are classified as A, B or C roads 
are subject to machine-based condition surveys, and the data is used to 
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prioritise roads for treatment. Unclassified roads are prioritised for treatment 
based upon ward-member input.  
 
The main driver for the council‟s policies on „highway works‟ is the council‟s 
Corporate Plan, which sets out the council‟s priorities, including enhancing life 
chances for young people; supporting older people to be healthy, active and 
included; focussing on preventative work; leading Kirklees out of recession; and 
providing effective and productive services. These aims are linked to the staff 
appraisal process and, since 2008, when the financial crisis led to a reduction in 
central Government funding for local government, a review of all the council‟s 
functions to ensure that resources are deployed in areas of work that address 
the priorities. 
 
The council views the road network as an asset, and an asset that contributes 
towards a number of the council‟s priorities, with all goods, services and people 
moving around the district at some time use the road network. Any works that 
are carried out in the highway affect the life-span of the highway, with studies 
showing that even where excavations are reinstated to the required 
specification there is still long-term damage that reduces the period where 
resurfacing would be required, and can also have the potential to cause 
disruption and delay to highway users. This is, for example, an issue when the 
council and the public transport operator are trying to encourage people to use 
non-car alternatives but then journey-time reliability is affected by the presence 
of works. In terms of managing the work of utility companies and the council‟s 
own works-promoters, the Street Works Team takes a parity approach, treating 
both sets of promoters equally. 
 
With regard to how the council‟s activities were influenced or affected by elected 
members, each February the council sets the budgets for both capital and 
revenue highway maintenance schemes. This also takes into account capital 
allocation from central Government via the Local Transport Plan (LTP). Once 
the budgets have been allocated, schemes are designed and at that point come 
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into the co-ordination process, where the intention is to co-ordinate the 
authority‟s works with those of the utility companies. 
 
Ward members are informed about any temporary road closures that need to be 
put in place for any „highway works‟, and are also consulted in advance about 
works that are likely to have a significant impact in their ward. 
 
Looking at targets and performance measures for „highway works‟, for the 
council‟s own „roadworks‟ there are two national performance indicators that 
identify roads where maintenance should be considered, and the council has to 
report on these. However, these are outside the scope of the council‟s Street 
Works Team. With regard to utility „street works‟, the Street Works Team 
provides a quarterly report to utility companies on their performance against the 
random sample inspections undertaken to monitor compliance with the safety 
and reinstatement specifications, and holds performance meetings with utility 
company representatives to discuss the results. 
 
In the early years of NRASWA, an annual report was submitted to the council 
on the operation of NRASWA but, more recently, no report has been prepared. 
 
The setting of targets for the Street Works Team is done through the annual 
staff appraisal process, where the ASWM and their line manager discuss the 
priorities for the Team, which include ensuring that inspection of utility works is 
carried out and that non-compliance by utility companies is addressed, to 
ensure that the integrity of the highway network is maintained. The ASWM then 
has appraisal meeting with the project officers and inspectors, reviewing the 
previous year‟s performance and setting out the targets and expectations for the 
next 12 months. 
 
The ASWM is able to suggest and implement changes to procedures with 
regard to „highway works‟. As an example, the ASWM is currently dealing with 
the council‟s application to operate a permit scheme, and with the 
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implementation of new systems of working that will be required where the 
Department of Transport gives its approval. 
 
8.3.1.2.2 Regional HAUC, Highways Chair‟s Authority 
The Group Leader (GL) was asked about authority‟s policies regarding „highway 
works, and stated that their “...number one aim” was that all works and activities 
carried out on the highway should involve minimum disruption to the public, with 
the public being kept informed of any delays or possible delays. The GL looked 
for different ways for works to take place, both council and utility works, to 
ensure that roads were not closed “just for the sake of it” – roads are only 
closed if they “100% have to”, if there were other ways of doing works without 
closing roads then they would look to do that. 
 
The policy is to: 
  Ensure that all works are co-ordinated; including changing works 
programmes in order to accommodate other works. There are internal 
works programmes meetings with the various internal sections doing 
works to make sure that they are co-ordinated with utility works if 
possible; 
 Works need to be well managed on site, including information boards 
setting out who is doing the work and how long it will take, with advance 
information about schemes being provided to residents, including letter 
drops and possibly radio information. 
 Policies are on the council‟s website to tell people what they can do and 
how they can find the information. 
With regard to how the policies and strategies are developed, the GL‟s team are 
encouraged to contribute to anything they think will make things better for the 
highway users. Any initiatives are taken to the assistant director, director and 
Cabinet spokesperson to endorse, and then implemented. The Cabinet 
spokesperson shows a great interest in what happens on the highway, 
providing he understands why.  
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Policies, other than national legislation, rarely come from top down. The GL‟s 
position on national HAUC and working groups gives a feeling for what 
legislation is coming through. However, top-down direction is given in ensuring 
that income is maximised, including Sample and Defect inspection fees, where 
the council aims to ensure that it is “...recompensed for what they do on the 
street works front”. 
 
The GL said that there were no differences in policies applying to the council‟s 
own works for road purposes and utility „street works‟, as it clearly set out that 
parity applies to anyone working on the highway, whether it is the council‟s own 
works or utility works. The GL identified that there were pressures where council 
schemes might lose their funding but notices still need to be served with start 
dates. Communication was considered to be vital, and the council‟s own works 
teams “...sometimes have the attitude that they know best and they can go in 
when they want, but that‟s not the case these days. Utility companies also have 
major schemes so there has to be co-ordination” 
 
According to the GL, the main areas that drive the authority‟s policies and 
strategies relating to „highway works‟ are the Council‟s polices for attracting 
investment and new developments into the borough, and for new 
developments, where „roadworks‟ and „street works‟ are required to provide 
access and utility services. 
 
When asked about how the organisation‟s policies were influenced or affected 
by elected members, the GL described how, over last 18 months, there had 
been a new “neighbourhoods agenda” based on five Area Partnerships, where 
each Area Partnership comprised four or five wards. Each ward had a quarterly 
“ward panel” and a “Highways” representative went to each ward panel to 
discuss with ward members their priorities for their ward, including highway 
schemes, traffic-calming, and to discuss any „street works‟. Local politics does 
come into things where the three ward members might be from different parties 
and might not agree on policies. Currently, Labour has overall control and is 
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forward-thinking about the benefits of gas-main replacement and high-speed 
broadband installation to help generate jobs and investment. The last six years 
in the authority‟s area has seen new schools, new developments and office 
blocks, bringing money and jobs into the authority‟s area. 
 
With regard to formal reports to members, there is an Annual maintenance 
report (done in April/May), setting out spending which goes to Cabinet for 
approval, and the quarterly performance reports on „street works‟ operations 
reporting on KPIs. The performance targets for „roadworks‟ and „street works‟ 
are to keep durations to a minimum (to minimise disruption to the highway) and 
for first-time permanent reinstatements to minimise return visits). There are no 
consequences at the moment if these targets are not met. 
 
With regard to the extent to which as an individual they could influence their 
organisations policies and strategies relating to „highway works‟, the GL felt that 
„street works‟ and co-ordination were not given as much emphasis as they 
should within the highways department, with more focus being put on getting 
the council‟s own works done. The Council leadership does appreciate the 
money being spent on the highway, and in public surveys highways and the 
condition of the roads tends to be the third priority behind children and social 
services and education, and the condition of roads is a “hot topic” across the 
country, particularly following the recent harsh winters and the damage caused 
to roads. 
 
8.3.1.2.3 North Yorkshire County Council 
The Highway Asset Manager (HAM) identified that the evolution of policy and 
strategy in North Yorkshire County Council (NYCC)with regard to „highway 
works‟ had been driven by the perceived statutory and non-statutory 
requirement of various activities. In terms of „street works‟, for NYCC the 
legislation “...to all intents and purposes is policy. It is how we actually deliver 
that in terms of our central function based at County Hall and our operational 
function that‟s our strategy”.  
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About 10 years ago, there had been “...certain misunderstandings” about the 
legislation. The HAM, in conjunction with Street Works Manager (SWM) has “... 
refocus[ed] the requirements of the Street Works Team, so we‟ve, as a 
consequence of a couple of restructurings, strengthened the Team in the centre 
so that we are more proactive with the management of the electronic street 
works register in terms of, where appropriate, electronic interaction with utility 
companies. Also, in terms of the „street works‟ inspection regime... we have the 
ability to meet the statutory minimum sample inspection regime”. 
 
In identifying the policies and strategies, the HAM said that the organisation‟s 
current mantra was to “...manage, maintain, and improve” in that order”. The 
authority was doing very little “improvement” works but was prioritising 
resources on “managing and maintaining”; financial resources on “maintaining” 
and intellectual thought in terms of “management”. These policies and 
strategies are driven by the Highway Asset Group for the whole of the County, 
being proactive rather than reactive although there are some instances where 
they have to be reactive.  
 
The “misunderstandings” mentioned earlier were around senior officers in the 
past not being “...prepared to accept that the delivery of a sample inspection 
regime was a statutory requirement. They thought it was something you could 
put down and pick up as you wished”. When it was pointed out to them by the 
authority‟s Legal Services that a sample inspection regime was a statutory 
requirement, it then put the recruitment of street works inspectors further up the 
agenda than it had been previously. One of the things that helped NYCC is 
dealing with misconceptions around „street works‟ legislation was the 
introduction of the Traffic Management Act (TMA), because it gave local 
authorities a statutory Networks Management Duty and it created a statutory 
post of Traffic Manager within an authority, “...and that is almost always 
guaranteed to raise the profile ... of the service for a while”. 
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Geographically, North Yorkshire is large. There are seven District councils in 
the county, and NYCC delivers the bulk of its highways service on a District 
council-basis but „street works‟ boundaries have been altered so that NYCC can 
better resource street works inspections. 
 
The realignment of staff, together with the appropriation of additional staff, 
allowed NYCC to “...take a more proactive stance with regard to the delivery of 
the „street works‟ service”. Primarily this is focussed on utility activity and 
ensuring that proposed works durations are challenged. Utility companies are 
managed “... proactively – there is an interaction with utilities and we are not, I 
don‟t think, perceived as being dictatorial, and that‟s not the way that we would 
wish to operate”. As a consequence of this stance, NYCC have also applied the 
same challenges internally to their own „roadworks‟.  
 
According to the HAM, the “...underlying philosophy” that he and the SWM have 
developed and implemented is that “...we understand where the utilities are 
coming from. We know they have to do their work and we‟re understanding of 
that. We also understand that there are challenges in working on the North 
Yorkshire network, which itself has evolved over time, and therefore we need to 
be fairly pragmatic in how we monitor activities and direct our resources ... and 
then we apply exactly the same criteria to our own works as well”. 
 
When asked about the “challenges” of working on NYCC‟s network, the HAM 
identified that their surface network was about 8,200 km, varying from a very 
heavily-used principal road network (PRN) to elements of NYCC‟s network that 
“...are lucky if they see a horse and cart on an annual basis but they are 
surfaced roads and consequently have evolved differently over a long period of 
time”.  
 
While the core, heavily-use portion of NYCC‟s network, about 15%, has been 
subject to design standards, the rest has evolved over time. The issue here for 
the HAM is that there is little, traditional construction to support the vast majority 
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of the network, and so to better protect it the authority has identified that it 
needs to inspect where utility companies work and carry out reinstatements. In 
terms of an inspection regime, NYCC inspects more than the set quota in terms 
of sample inspections. Non-compliance identified by these inspections 
“...continues to be a concern and this is something that is being looked to be 
covered more appropriately over the next year or so”. In addition, the HAM sees 
that changes in material specifications have resulted in “... a great deal of 
ignorance with the highway authority‟s staff and also with utilities‟ staff, and we 
need to “up the ante” in terms of levels of technical competence”. In order to 
deliver this NYCC expect more from the utility companies, which is why the 
authority believes that “...a co-operative effort is better than a dictatorial one”. 
 
According to the HAM, „highway works‟ policies and strategies were developed 
jointly with the SWM. They are not written down, and this gives officers flexibility 
in dealing with issues.  
 
With regard to how activities were influenced by elected members, either 
individually or as a council, the HAM cited an example of the current 
consultation on “lane rental”. As a highway authority, NYCC has a duty to 
respond to the DfT consultation, “...whether the authority is for, against or 
indifferent, to their proposals”. A number of years ago, the County Council made 
a requirement for all responses from the council to be given approval by the 
appropriate Executive Member, and in some cases, for example, where top-
level funding was affected, that approval had to be given by the council‟s 
Executive or, sometimes, the full council. Also, if something was policy then it 
had to be approved by members at full council level. Officers make 
recommendations in terms of service delivery and, as yet, “[we] have not had 
one of our recommendations overturned”.  
 
Looking at whether members take a particular interest in „highway works‟, the 
HAM said that it depending on what was happening at the time but that, 
generally, “... the answer is “no””. However, there are members who live in 
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areas where traffic congestion is fairly high and if there are any works – either 
the council‟s or utilities‟ – or there are temporary road closures in place to 
facilitate activities, then local concerns and sensitivities are raised. Generally, 
members are concerned where there are long road closures and associated 
diversion routes, and members want to be kept in the picture. 
 
The HAM commented on the need for officers to work in conjunction with 
elected members and respond appropriately to their issues. Examples of this 
include advertising signs on the highway, which is a key issue where local 
businesses are not doing particularly well. Where businesses place an “A-
board” outside their premises, NYCC‟s current policy as it stands is to have it 
removed but this generates friction and members have asked officers to review 
the policy. Any changes in policy have to go through full Council and Executive 
Committee level, whereas strategies generally stay “in house”. 
 
Looking at NYCC‟s targets and performance measures for „highway works‟, the 
HAM identified that there were some default reports available from their 
management information system, and that the SWM and his team have been 
active in identifying key performance data captured within the system allowing 
the performance of the street works inspectors to be managed on a monthly 
basis, bench-marking their activities against the other inspectors, and looking at 
the performance of utility companies – both individual performance and bench-
marking them across the area. They also compare the council‟s in-house works 
activities on the highway with utilities, so individual highway authority 
operational areas can be monitored and bench-marked across them. 
 
With the start of the authority‟s new Highway Maintenance Contract, which will 
run from 2012 for 10 years, for the authority‟s own „roadworks‟ activities, there 
have been included some key performance indicators relating to „street works‟-
type activity, for example, noticing and the issue of fixed penalty notices, and 
the importance of performance with regard to these areas. If the contractor fails 
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to perform in this general „street works‟-type arena, it could potentially reduce 
the extent of their contract.  
 
The SWM noted that they treat everyone equally – no promoter, including the 
council‟s own works, are favoured over others. Performance is measured 
against the occupation of the highway, including agreed and un-agreed 
durations; the number of FPNs issued to utilities or “shadow” charges for the 
council‟s own works so that performance can be compared; and the number of 
inspections of works undertaken to monitor performance by all works 
promoters. These are reported to the HAM, the director and deputy director, 
and the area offices. NYCC are also looking “...to display parity – a level playing 
field – by undertaking the same regime against everybody, which generally 
works”. 
 
The approach taken by NYCC with regard to prosecuting utility companies for 
„street works‟ offences is, according to the SWM, “... to take a pragmatic view 
on that. If we can avoid prosecution by other means, we will do so”. This is 
because they see that prosecution can be very time-consuming and not 
necessarily having the desired outcome at the end. However, in instances of 
continued poor performance, prosecution is the route that NYCC would take. 
 
According to the HAM, the “...perpetual challenge we face with regard to utility 
performance is being asked why we are not prosecuting.” The HAM and SWM 
both perceive that court action is a reflection of failure on officers in delivering 
the „street works‟ service, and that here are other more appropriate ways and 
means of getting the utilities and their contractors to improve their performance. 
The HAM said that they had “... never yet failed to drive a desired performance 
improvement forward; the utility companies have always responded 
appropriately and in the way that we would wish them to, and therefore we have 
never felt the need to resort to court action”. In addition, the HAM noted that, 
even with successful prosecutions, “...the local authority doesn‟t benefit – it 
might get costs but the fine goes to the Ministry of Justice.  
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NYCC see monitoring performance and getting utilities in for meetings is far 
more effective. The HAM identified this as “... another underlying philosophy – 
it‟s about having a continual dialogue and, on the basis that we haven‟t failed 
yet to get the desired improvements, hopefully it will be a long time before we 
get call for us to prosecute somebody”. 
 
Another aspect regarding NYCC‟s view on prosecutions was that frequently 
court action results in the dismissal of utility company contractor‟s teams and 
gangs but that this did not necessarily address the underlying issues. The SWM 
said that “...if you can get the utility and contractor on side, you can drive 
performance forward, drive safer working practices as opposed to the utility 
dismissing that gang, and then the gang turns up somewhere else in the „street 
works‟ world, with a different name, and continuing with the same poor 
performance. It‟s just moving the problem around rather than addressing it, 
which is probably more important”. 
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8.3.1.2.4 Summary of Street Authority Policies and Procedures 
The policies adopted by the street authorities interviewed in Yorkshire in relation 
to utility „street works‟ and authorities‟ „roadworks‟, and the targets and 
performance measures adopted, are set out in Table 8.3 below.  
 
Table 8.3 Yorkshire Authorities – Policies & Performance Measures 
Authority Street Works 
Policy 
Policy on 
Authority's own 
Roadworks 
Targets/Performance 
Measures 
Kirklees 
(i) Ensuring 
compliance with 
legislation; (ii) 
Maintain the 
highway asset 
Written "Highway 
Maintenance Plan"; 
roads identified for 
treatment based on 
surveys and 
member input 
(i) Random sample 
inspection results for 
'street works'; (ii) 
National 
performance 
indicators for 
'roadworks' 
 
Regional HAUC, 
Joint Chair’s 
Authority 
(i) Ensure that all 
works are co-
ordinated; (ii) 
Works are well-
managed on site, 
including the 
provision of 
information 
Links to the 
council's policies 
for attracting new 
businesses and 
developments into 
the borough 
(i) Random sample 
inspection results for 
'street works'; (ii) For 
both 'street works' 
and  'roadworks', 
keep job durations 
and delay to a 
minimum 
 
North Yorkshire 
The legislation is 
the policy, i.e. 
NRASWA and 
TMA 
Statutory and non-
statutory 
requirements 
(i) Random sample 
inspection results for 
'street works'; (ii) 
Parity measures for 
'roadworks'; (iii) 
'Roadworks' 
performance affects 
contract payments 
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With regard to (a) the level of political involvement in their regarding „highway 
works‟ and (b) the extent to which they were able to influence their 
organisation‟s policies relating to „highway works‟, the main points from the 
Yorkshire interviews are set out in Table 8.4 below:  
 
Table 8.4 Yorkshire Authorities – Policy Influence 
Authority Level of Political Involvement individual Ability to 
Influence Policy 
Kirklees 
(i) Highway authority - 
members set budgets which 
affects the volume of work; 
(ii) Street authority - ad hoc 
reports and specific 
information 
requests/provision 
Can suggest and 
implement changes to 
procedures for dealing 
with 'highway works' 
 
Regional HAUC, Joint 
Chair’s Authority 
(i) Highway authority - ward 
panels identify priorities, 
including highway works; (ii) s 
Street authority - quarterly 
utility performance reports 
As regional HAUC joint 
chair, awareness of 
developments in 
legislation.  
 
North Yorkshire 
(i) Street authority - members 
want to be kept informed 
about works/road closures 
that might affect their ward 
Procedures were 
developed by officers 
interviewed. 
 
8.3.1.3 Utility Companies 
8.3.1.3.1 Water utility 
The Contracts Manager (CM) was asked about the business‟ policies and 
strategies relating to „street works‟, and replied that the policy was quite straight 
forward and had been in existence for some years, and was part of the 
company‟s strategic objectives, and was, “...where economically efficient to do 
so, is about 100% compliance with legislation”. The policy is a written policy that 
also covers regulatory issues with Ofwat, the Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI) 
and the Environment Agency (EA). 
 
With regard to the strategies that go with the policy, the CM identified the 
following key areas: 
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a) Previously strategies were around a “Z3S”, with “Z1” being zero 
interruptions to supply, “Z2” being zero excavations, “Z3” being zero 
traffic congestion, and “S” being savings realised. 
b) There were moves within the business to refresh this strategy, with them 
now being described against five areas but still keeping the previous 
themes, the five new areas being: 
i. Excellent Sites – which is about the business being able to deliver 
a consistent, high-quality service safely, and this was “...quite 
significant at the moment”, with a series of “tool-box” talks to 
partners about what this means and how they can deliver it. 
ii. Working with key stakeholders to minimise disruption. 
iii. Communication with those living, working in, and using the street, 
hence the participation in the HAUC (UK) Good Practice working 
group, which “...fits in nicely with what the company wants to do”. 
iv. Reduction in the number and size of excavations undertaken, and 
the time that the site is occupied, through innovation and best 
practice – a continuation of the “Z3S” themes. The average 
duration of the company‟s works has reduced from over 10 to just 
over three working days as a result of focusing on durations. 
v. Performance management of „street works‟ to maintain focus on 
performance and targets, and responding where targets are not 
being met is a key part of performance management. 
 
When asked about how policies and strategies were developed within the 
organisation, the CM noted that they were developed in consultation with the 
key stakeholders, including the regulator, elected officials, service partners, 
opinion groups and customers.  
 
The CM said that policies could be developed from both „top-down‟ and „bottom-
up‟. Policies and strategies that relates to the operation by local authorities of a 
permit scheme, for example, was more of a „bottom-up‟ piece, so “...we are 
talking to our senior directors currently about the permit scheme, and what 
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strategy we need to deploy”. But regulator-driven requirements tends to be „top-
down‟. 
 
The CM identified the four industry regulators that drive the business‟ policies 
and strategies relating to „street works‟ as being Ofwat (“...the main regulator), 
the Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI), the Environment Agency, and the 
Health & Safety Executive (HSE). The CM explained how the organisation‟s 
activities were affected or influenced by the regulator(s): 
 DWI – this is about delivering water quality standards, and those 
standards have in the past driven a rehabilitation investment strategy, of 
the network, rather than replacement strategy. Under the rehabilitation 
investment strategy, the company were able to bring more of the network 
up to standard, with commitments being made to improving quality for 
the customer, and this had an impact on the volume of „street works‟ 
being carried out by the company because there was more activity on the 
street. 
 Ofwat is about monitoring and measuring the company‟s performance in 
key areas, ensuring compliance with the Water Industry Act, and 
ensuring that service is delivered at a fair price. The company has to 
report regularly to Ofwat on leakage, meaning that it then has to be quite 
reactive where there is a network failure because the longer leaks are left 
the more impact this has on targets, which are based on volume loss. 
Ofwat has recently introduced a new “serviceability” measure, which is 
not just about volume loss but is also about the numbers of failures. 
Because this is becoming a measure on water utilities, it means that the 
company needs to re-think its investment approach. As a consequence 
of ageing water supply network, the company needs to think about how it 
stems the number of leakage jobs, leading to turning the investment 
strategy to replacement rather than rehabilitation. During the current 
Asset Management Period, known as “AMP5”, there will still be water 
quality standards to meet and rehabilitation activity, but also more 
renewal activity, and so more impact on the travelling public although 
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possibly to a lesser degree (“...because the money won‟t go as far”) but 
the company will be occupying sites and be more visible. 
 The Environment Agency look at pollution incidents and the company 
needs to invest in reducing these, for example, investment in sewerage 
pumping stations and combined sewer overflows. 
 HSE is about making sure that things are done safely, keeping RIDDORs 
[reportable accidents] to a minimum. 
The other main drivers of policies and strategies as given by the CM were: 
 Legislative requirements and compliance with codes of practice 
associated with NRASWA and TMA, which come out of the Department 
for Transport 
 The business‟ vision, which is a “...clear driver for policies and strategies” 
and which currently is “to be clearly the best”, and to set them aside from 
other utility organisations across the UK, which is why the company like 
to talk about “excellent”, for example, “Excellent Sites”. 
 Having levels of customer service that are “second to none”, and these 
are also driven by regulatory targets around customer service. This also 
forms part of the company‟s “SIM” measures – Service Improvement 
Measures, something new that is being trialled but providing customer 
service has been part of the company‟s approach for many years. 
 Being effective and efficient because the company has got to deliver a 
fair price to customers so is continually looking at ways to be more 
efficient and effective. 
The company has a range of different performance measures and targets 
relating to „street works‟, all at different levels within the business. The higher-
level ones that run through all the business units include performance against 
the Random Sample Inspection regime, which is identified as being a key 
measure because it is a test of safety across how the company‟s activities in the 
street impact on the travelling public. There is currently a target of 95% 
compliance against the regulatory requirement of 90%. The ultimate aim is to 
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get to 100% across the three inspection categories but this is a staged 
approach to get there. Results are showing that getting to 100% is possible. 
 
Other measures currently being developed include work around the 
effectiveness of co-ordination, which scores 10 elements, and is likely to go 
onto the balanced scorecard. The company also measures safety, including 
RIDDORs (incidents that are reportable to the Health & Safety Executive), 
minor accidents, near misses, and utility strikes (damage to underground 
apparatus belonging to another utility). 
Performance is measured through a series of „balanced scorecards‟, with 
information being extracted from systems and with different scorecards at 
different levels in the organisation. „Street works‟ is on the highest level – Level 
1 – which goes to the directors and the chief executive officer. There are 
consequences for the business in failing to achieve targets and these include, 
for the contractors (“service partners”), performance measures are linked to a 
“gain and pain” mechanism, where service partners are set annual targets, 
which are stretching. The consequence of not meeting the annual targets – the 
“paid” element – is a financial penalty to the contractor. The “gain” element is a 
financial incentive for meeting or exceeding targets “...which is reasonably 
attractive”. Continual failure can lead to a series of warnings, potential dispute 
and, ultimately, if no change in behaviours (i.e. performance), then termination 
of the contract. The company “...is a great believer in relationships”, and will 
work with to help contractors, but if contractors blatantly fail to perform then this 
will impact on the company‟s vision of being the best. 
 
With regard to consequences for the company if targets are not met, the CM 
identified three: consequences from street authorities, including the issue of 
improvement notices or prosecution; safety issues, which have regulatory 
implications; and customer service, which is now linked to SIMs and so there is 
a non-compliance (financial) penalty that can be applied by the regulator to the 
business. 
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As an individual, the CM felt that he was “...very influential” in being able to 
influence the organisation‟s policies and strategies relating to „street works‟. 
Examples of this included participation in the group developing a permit scheme 
in Yorkshire, where engagement has helped in thinking about how the company 
will go about applying a permit scheme. As joint chair of the regional HUAC, the 
CM also attends HUAC (UK), and these close links help to get information 
about what‟s happening at a national level back to the business. 
 
8.3.1.3.2 Electricity utility 
When asked about the organisation‟s policies and strategies with regard to 
„street works‟ and how they were developed, the Street Works Manager (SWM) 
said that policies were all driven by the legislation, and that the company looked 
proactively at things as part of the new “self-regulation”, where Government is 
looking for practitioners to make the existing legislation work rather than 
introducing new regulations. 
 
Any costs associated with legislative requirements are part of the case put 
forward to the regulator, Ofgem, and any allowances for costs that are available 
is governed by Ofgem. This was identified by the SWM as one of the problems 
of the industry when looking at “self-regulation” or doing things over and above 
the minimum legal requirement, it is the cost associated with that and whether 
you can get it back from the regulator. If something is governed by regulation 
then there is no issue. 
In deciding whether a cost is allowable or not, the regulator takes into account 
customer service and stakeholder engagement, which is new at the moment 
and is about involving councils, councillors and businesses in seeing how the 
business operates and what is involved. Allowances for these costs are 
recoverable from the regulator. A major part of the SWM‟s job is stakeholder 
engagement, for example, with council officers about „street works‟, and the 
regional and national bodies and groups. 
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The company‟s policy relating to „street works‟ is set out in its Street Care 
Charter, which was launched some years ago. The Charter contains 10 
elements to drive behaviour and improvements: 
 
1. Safety 
2. Communication – informing those that might be affected by the works 
3. Co-ordination – with highway authorities and other utilities 
4. Training – of staff 
5. Planning – of works and durations 
6. Environmental – keeping sites tidy. Inspection under the random sample 
regime are measured under this category because „street works‟ are in 
the public environment 
7. Courtesy 
8. Inspections – carried out by own inspection team 
9. Equipment – the right equipment to do the job 
10. Innovation – around fault work and the accuracy of locations to minimise 
the number of excavations and to reduce durations, and introducing new 
equipment 
These policies and strategies are developed „bottom-up‟ because the directors 
do not have the same detailed knowledge as the SWM. The SWM gives 
presentations to senior managers on legislation that is coming up and they then 
are able to put their steer on things. With the Street Care Charter mentioned 
above, the SWM had a free hand in what went in. Senior managers did want to 
know, with regard to the 10 elements, how they would be implemented, how 
they would be measured, and how things would be corrected if not going right. 
Senior managers give support and also strong challenges, so reports cannot 
just be a few words written on a piece of paper, and the directors take a strong 
interest in „street works‟. 
 
A while ago the distribution company had several “improvement notices” [an 
improvement notice is served on a utility company by a local authority where the 
company‟s performance as measured by the sample inspections falls below 
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90% compliance] against them and did not seem to be able to turn the situation 
around. Business managers within the company were burdened with issues that 
they could not resolve on their own – there were collective behavioural issues. 
The chief executive officer gets a weekly report – the “400 Report”, which 
contains 400 items – and will invariably come back with questions – “...which is 
good because it means that you‟re not just writing a report for the sake of it”. 
The report also goes across to America for them to comment on, but as long as 
the company is on target to meet their required rate of return then “...they tend 
to stay out of it”. However, the SWM noted that the American owners “...did not 
like being in court and do not like their name brought into disrepute [because] 
they have strong ethical values”. 
 
The company has a 10 year plan, looking for strong returns, and has an 
operating plan with key priorities that focus on the five-year regulatory period 
and funding available. The company also has an annual operating plan, which 
includes „street works‟, particularly inspections performance under 
“Environmental” and compliance levels, which are currently set at greater than 
90%.Other targets are set by directors for things such as Traffic Management 
Act compliance, including Fixed Penalty Notices. 
 
The SWM was asked about the role played by the industry regulator, Ofgem, 
and replied that there were a number of measures relating to „street works‟, 
mainly around performance and penalties. When new legislation was introduced 
which would impact on the business, they will agree with the regulator what is 
an acceptable level of performance, for example, when Fixed Penalty Notices 
(FPNs) were first introduced, the regulator was persuaded that 100% 
compliance was not achievable unless a lot of money was thrown at it, and that 
95% compliance would be an acceptable level. However, this did not mean that 
95% compliance was expected because not every council was giving FPNs to 
the extent that they could but, just in case, the business had to invest in more 
people, and better systems and processes, and sought to get to 95% 
compliance. To get over and above that was seen as something that could be 
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claimed from the regulator but there has been no drive to do this at this time. 
The company cannot budget for failure, and the regulator would not allow that, 
but 95% compliance was seen as a good level of service. 
 
The regulator looks across the industry at how different companies are 
performing and so can benchmark everyone. The SWM was currently doing the 
annual report, including reporting on the numbers of notices served, penalties 
incurred, defects received, overrun (Section 74) charges, and permits applied 
for. 
 
The SWM stated that there had been “...a lot of debate last year about how 
much would be allowed for permits but this was eventually taken out as there 
was too much uncertainty”. Some distribution companies had put in “worst 
case” scenarios, where a permit scheme would cover all streets and all works 
types, meaning more staff would be required. The regulator said that they would 
look again once companies had full year‟s costs if permits are introduced in 
their area, so companies would need to spend the money first but then claim it 
back. Permits are an example of a genuine operating cost to the business, not a 
failure, particularly where that cost can‟t be passed onto a customer. An FPN is 
considered by the regulator to be a failure to operate correctly, and so the cost 
cannot be passed onto the customer, but if company was operating at over 95% 
compliance then the regulator might make an allowance for operating a “gold” 
service. Where a permit scheme operates then the permit fee would have to be 
passed onto the customer. However, for asset replacement or repair works, 
there is no customer, and so the cost is part of managing the network. 
Other than the regulator, the other areas that drive the company‟s polices and 
strategies were identified by the SWM as being any customers or stakeholders, 
including highway authorities. 
 
When asked about the company‟s targets and performance measures with 
regard to „street works‟, the SWM identified inspection results, including the 
Random Sample inspections and the company‟s own internal signing and 
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guarding and quality inspections, where inspectors walk the jobs after they have 
been finished. Members of the company‟s management team are even required 
to themselves carry out a number of on-site checks per year, and all service 
providers also carry out their own checks. The SWM expects that all of the 
audits should align, taking out any subjectivity from either the inspections 
carried out by the highway authority or their own checks, so if one view is out of 
line then the company can look at why – they had found that some individuals 
were putting defects right and not reporting it but the company wanted the 
leaning points, not looking to blame people. By looking at sites critically, 
performance dropped initially to about 40% compliance but quickly recovered 
and is now about 80-85% against an internal target of 95%. 
 
The SWM identified that sample size for inspections with a local authority was a 
factor with regard to reporting performance because if it was small then one or 
two failures could affect the percentage performance. Different authorities were 
giving different results, highlighting issues of consistency in the way that 
inspections were carried out by highway authority inspectors, but it was  
presumed that the same method of inspection within that authority would be 
used for all utility inspections in that area. The SWM felt that performance 
reporting at the regional HAUC was seen as being an important factor in driving 
improvements in utility performance. 
 
With regard to the consequences for the company in failing to achieve targets, 
the SWM identified the potential for highway authorities serving an improvement 
notice issue on the company, noting that “...the impact of this is minimal 
compared to the internal “aggravation” because the CEO and the Americans 
would be straight onto it – would be seen as a failing”. The SWM felt that this 
was not a bad thing because it then helped to get the ears of business 
managers from other areas, to “...nudge someone „upstairs‟ to get support. 
 
Failure to achieve targets also raised issues with service providers, because 
they were being paid to provide a quality service. The SWM said that it was not 
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so easy to get rid of poorly performing contractors because of the way that 
contracts are written, and so were looking to get into partnering which was 
considered to be “...a better way than fighting with each other”. 
 
Other specific areas where failure had a consequence were overrun (Section 
74) charges and FPNs, which were seen as failure somewhere in the process 
and so all of them were investigated to see if they could have been planned-out 
earlier in the process. The company had formed an Exceptions Team to deal 
with anything that costs money, including defects, Section 74s and FPNs. This 
was not just about the money (“...because it‟s not much and can often be 
passed onto the contractors”) but it is a failure somewhere in the process and it 
therefore impacted on the company‟s reputation. The company had been in 
court in other areas, and had been formally cautioned in others, and these were 
seen as being more of an issue than financial penalties because the business 
was quite protective of its reputation and did not want it damaging. 
 
When asked about the extent to which they felt that they could influence the 
company‟s policies and strategies relating to „street works‟, the SWM felt 
fortunate that they were in a position to be the influencer on policies, and has 
the director‟s ear and the CEO‟s ear if required. The problem tended to be the 
“boy who cried wolf”  when briefing senior managers on upcoming issues, for 
example, when Section 74 first came in there was a potential liability to the 
company of £9m, then FPNs then TMA, and “...if I‟d have said we need 
additional staff to deal with [only] 81 FPNs then they‟d say goodbye to me” 
 
The same was identified when looking at permit schemes. The company 
needed to be ready but then nothing happened; no authorities in the area 
introduced a permit scheme. The SWM had identified significant investment in 
IT and staff training required, built this into the business plan but then slips and 
managers started asking “...when‟s it going to happen? Is it still going to 
happen? Do we need to be bothered?” The SWM felt that, in some ways, this 
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was a good thing because it meant that the “...worst case hasn‟t happened”, 
and why it was important to watch what was happening in the industry. 
 
The SWM identified that the London-centric view of „street works‟ gives an idea 
of the worst-case scenarios and behaviours and of “...what can kick off”, and 
that what goes on in London is a major influence on how we do things here. As 
a consequence the utilities had recently joined together the North of England 
and Yorkshire JUGs (joint utilities groups), looking to develop business plans 
and strategies to look at local issues, what affected people on the ground where 
they operated, not just driven by what was happening in London. 
 
8.3.1.3.3 Gas utility 
The NRASWA Delivery Manager (NDM) was asked about their organisation‟s 
policies and strategies relating to „street works‟ and identified that they had 
“internal processes that we adopt to comply with all the different legislations, so 
internally we‟ve built processes for the defect side, to make sure we doing the 
meetings that we need to within the timescales, and these are issued to our 
contractors for them to comply with as well”. 
 
There are policies for site audits, which involves a safety team checking on site 
when jobs are in progress, and internal processes within the department for 
dealing with signing, lighting and guarding and defects. 
 
The organisation‟s strategy is that “basically...we want to be one of the top 
utilities, achieve good performance and reduce our costs. So this is based 
around achieving compliance and performance issues”. 
 
The NDM was asked about how policies and strategies were developed and 
replied that the organisation was constantly reviewing its performance, what 
issues they had, what needed to be addressed looking at legislation that is 
coming in, any changes to existing legislation, and anything from the regulator 
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that might drive a difference through the business and could have a knock-on 
effect.  
 
Changes that come from the regulator, and changes in how the business is 
going forward, such as changes to gas main replacement policy, are driven 
from the „top-down‟. 
 
With regard to how „bottom-up‟ changes from teams might come about, issues 
would go in the first instances to the relevant supervisor, to see if it potentially 
required a change to a process or if there were just training issues.  
 
The NDM said that the policies and strategies were not documented anywhere 
but that processes were. 
 
Other than the regulator, the main factors that drive polices and strategies 
relating to „street works‟ were identified by the NDM as being mainly the street 
authorities and complying with legislation; any non-compliance was identified 
through the management information being fed back from authorities. The 
company‟s directors do get involved, and at the moment are becoming involved 
with a proposed permit scheme that is due to be implemented to make sure that 
the company is prepared and that it will be able to comply. There is no single 
director associated solely with „street works‟ compliance. 
 
The NDM said that awareness of „street works‟ was being raised within the 
company. From 16 December [2011] there will be a meeting with the chief 
executive officer at least every month, which is something that has not been 
done before, looking at all the management information. If there are issues, the 
meeting could go to fortnightly or weekly. Because there have been issues with 
things like signing, lighting and guarding in some authority areas, and with 
permits coming in with potential costs and changes, the „street works‟ area is 
something that the chief executive officer, who is relatively new, has picked up 
on. 
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The NDM said that their industry regulator, Ofgem, had” quite a significant 
influence on what we do”. As at November 2011, the company is currently going 
through its pricing strategy at the moment and has submitted its business plan 
for the next price control formula. The NDM said that what comes back from the 
regulator can drive changes in the business, for example, the changes in the 
policy on 8” cast-iron main replacement, which came initially from the Health & 
Safety Executive, has an impact on how much workload the company is going 
to do and how much it invests in different types of work. The regulator sets an 
allowance for how much the business can spend on certain types of work and 
the company needs to deliver efficiencies at doing that work to reduce the costs 
against what has been received.  
 
When asked about the organisation‟s targets and performance measured with 
regard to „street works‟, the NDM replied that performance was measured 
internally through management information and key performance indicators, 
from feedback from highway authorities, and from performance information from 
the regional HAUC. 
 
The NDM was asked about the extent to which they as an individual felt that 
they could influence the organisation‟s policies and strategies relating to „street 
works‟, and replied that “I can probably influence it quite a lot because I know 
how we are doing in terms of performance and where we are complying, and it‟s 
my role to bring that awareness to our asset operations managers... A joint 
approach is needed but I do think that me and my team can have a big impact 
on that because we are the ones that will see the root causes, or can provide 
the information on the root causes such as signing, lighting and guarding”.  
 
8.3.1.3.4 Telecommunications utility 
The NRASWA Compliance Manager (NCM) was asked about their 
organisation‟s policies and strategies relating to „street works‟, and gave these 
as: “...maximising compliance and minimising expenditure, and working 
together to deliver tomorrow‟s network of choice”.  
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The policies and strategies are developed at general manager level with input 
from team members who make suggestions about operational issues, such as 
ideas about handling defects, and these are then looked at by Compliance 
Managers with regard to costs and benefits. If adopted, the team members are 
then rewarded. Issues relating to legislation come from the „top-down‟ to the 
Compliance Managers, who understand the implications, for implementation. 
There is a separate regulatory team that looks at legislation but they tend not to 
understand the detailed implications of it and have a lot of other issues to deal 
with.  
 
According to the NCM, other than the industry regulator, the main areas that 
drive the organisation‟s policies and strategies relating to „street works‟ are 
finance and the company‟s “scoreboard”, which operates at different levels 
within the company, including general manager level, looking at compliance, 
and the regional compliance managers feed into this, looking at issues such as 
noticing compliance. The managers in the area teams feed into compliance 
mangers, looking at specific metrics such as noticing, overrun charges, and 
reinstatement defects, and this management information is intended to be used 
by them to drive down charges from authorities. These metrics are also 
mirrored at contractor level. There are weekly telephone discussions at general 
manager level about issues such a signing, lighting and guarding and noticing 
compliance. 
 
The “scoreboard” also covers service delivery, for example, the number of new 
high-speed broadband cabinets that have been “lit up”, and staff bonuses are 
also tied into scores. 
 
The NCM said that he was not close enough to policy decisions to be able to 
comment of how the organisation‟s activities were influenced or affected by the 
industry regulator, Ofcom. 
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The organisation‟s targets and performance measures for „street works‟ were 
described earlier by the NCM by reference to the “scoreboard”. The 
consequences for failing to achieve targets mentioned by the NCM include, for 
staff, coaching plans and potential loss of bonus; for the company, it could 
mean involvement by the regulator. There are also remedies in the contract that 
the organisation has with its main contractor, in that they have to pay money 
back if targets are not met. 
 
When asked about the extent to which, as an individual, they felt that could 
influence the policies and strategies of the organisation, the NCM felt that “it 
depends on the situation”. For example, when permits first started they were in 
the south of England (London and Kent) and the Midlands (Northamptonshire) 
but they are now moving north into DP‟s area, e.g. Yorkshire, St. Helens and 
Liverpool).  
 
Within the company there are compartmentalised arrangements for dealing with 
areas such as permit schemes, overrun charges and fixed penalty notices, and 
the NCM said that information does not flow easily between the compartments. 
Every instance of non-compliance has an associated cost, including the cost of 
having people to deal with it; so compliance brings savings. But it might need 
extra staff to get that compliance and so managers need convincing of the 
need. Within the company, the number of staff has gone down and non-
compliance has gone up. There have been 4 posts lost in the NCM‟s team, and 
this makes it difficult to deal with non-compliance at the same time as workloads 
to contractors are increasing. 
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8.3.1.3.5 Summary of Yorkshire area Utility Company Policies and 
Procedures 
The utility interviewees in Yorkshire were asked about their company‟s policy 
drivers, and performance measures, with regard to „street works‟ and these are 
summarised in Table 8.5 below: 
 
Table 8.5 Yorkshire area – Utility Policies and Performance Measures 
Utility Policy Stance Policy Drivers Targets/Performance 
Measures 
 
Water 
Compliance 
with 
legislation; 
company aim 
"to be the 
best". 
Regulator 
(Ofwat) 
requirements, 
including 
financial 
penalties; 
Drinking Water 
Inspectorate; 
Environment 
Agency; Health 
& Safety 
Executive 
(i) Highway authority 
random sample 
inspection results; (ii) 
Balanced scorecards; 
(iii) Contractual 
arrangements 
 
Electricity 
Compliance 
with 
legislation; 
looking to 
make "self-
regulation" 
work. 
Regulator 
(Ofgem) 
requirements, 
including 
financial 
penalties; 
Street Care 
Charter 
(i) Highway authority 
random sample 
inspection results; (ii) 
Internal inspection 
results; (iii) 
Reputational impacts; 
(iv) Contractual 
arrangements 
 
Gas 
Compliance 
with 
legislation; 
company aim 
to be a top 
utility, achieve 
good 
performance 
and reduce 
costs 
Regulator 
(Ofgem) 
requirements, 
highway 
authority 
requirements 
Management 
information and KPI, 
including feedback 
from highway 
authorities 
 
Telecommunications 
Maximise 
compliance 
and minimise 
expenditure 
Regulator 
(Oftel) 
requirements; 
finance; 
"scoreboard" 
(i) "Scoreboard"; (ii) 
Contractual 
arrangements 
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In the interviews, the utility company representatives were asked about the 
extent to which they felt that they could influence their organisation‟s policies 
relating to „street works‟, and about the extent to which company directors were 
“interested” in „street works‟ issues in order to compare with the level of political 
“interest” in local authorities. The details are summarised in Table 8.6 below: 
 
Table 8.6 Yorkshire area – Utility Policy Involvement 
Utility Director 
Involvement 
individual Ability to Influence Policy 
 
Water Yes 
Very influential, including within the 
company, within the region HAUC, 
and nationally 
 
Electricity Yes 
Yes, supported by the director and 
CEO as required; also attends 
national forums 
 
Gas Yes Quite a lot 
 
Telecommunications Yes 
Depends on the situation and 
circumstances 
 
8.3.1 Inter-organisational and Regional Relationships 
8.3.1.1 Street Authority 
8.3.1.1.1 Kirklees 
Looking the nature of the relationship between the Street Works Team and the 
authority‟s works promoting units, there has been a shift since the introduction 
in the Traffic Management Act (TMA) of the requirement for authorities to give 
notice for their own works to the same standards as that required of utility 
companies, meaning that the council‟s own works needed to be co-ordinated 
along with utility works. 
 
The co-ordination of the authority‟s own „roadworks‟ is influenced by a number 
of factors, including the amount of time available from the design stage to 
getting the works carried out on site. This can be affected in turn by factors such 
as when the budget-holders, who are sometimes the local ward councillors, 
decide on which schemes to fund. Additional funding is also made available late 
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in the financial year, such as when central Government has provided money to 
local authorities to deal with damage caused to the road network by following 
recent severe winter weather. Another factor influencing co-ordination is the 
requirement to keep a stream of work available for the Service‟s direct labour 
organisation. From the outset of the changes introduced by the TMA, the Street 
Works Team has adopted a parity approach to the co-ordination of the 
authority‟s own works by providing performance measures to allow comparison 
between its own works promoting teams and utility companies. 
 
This relationship can have an impact on the council‟s service delivery, 
particularly where the delivery of schemes have to be delivered within a specific 
time period. The TMA changes have helped to raise internally within the 
Service‟s works promoting and construction teams an awareness about the 
need to co-ordinate the works within the wider perspective of authorities‟ 
network management duty, and the level of information provided for co-
ordination and attendance by officers at co-ordination meetings has improved 
since 2008, when the changes started to come into effect. 
 
By adopting the parity approach, the Street Works Team is able to establish 
principles for the management of all „highway works‟, to ensure that they are 
carried out with the minimum delay to journey times and disruption to highway 
users, and that all works promoters see that the requirements are applied 
equally to the council‟s own works as well as to utility works. For the council‟s 
own works, this means more consideration is given at both planning and 
construction stages to the likely impact of works and what can be put in place to 
mitigate that impact. The „cost‟ of this approach is the additional effort that does 
now have to be put in, and balancing this against the need to deliver schemes 
as economically as possible. 
 
The relationship between the council as street authority and utility companies 
has, historically, tended to be one based on an appreciation by the council that 
the utilities‟ works have to be carried out in order to maintain and provide the 
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services required by residents and business, but that the works need to be co-
ordinated where possible, and carried out in a way that minimises delay and 
disruption to highway users. Empirical feedback received from utility companies 
is that the council‟s Street Works Team is regarded as having a good 
understanding of „street works‟ legislation, and is fair in its interpretation and 
application. In a number of key areas, including charges where works overrun 
the agreed duration (known as Section 74 overruns) and the application of fixed 
penalty notices, where an undertaker has failed to comply with their 
administrative requirements under NRASWA, the Team has adopted a 
“shadow” charging approach at the outset, to provide information about 
potential offices and discuss this with each utility company in order to help them 
to identify issues likely to result in charges and adapt their processes and 
procedures accordingly. 
 
By adopting this approach the council has potentially lost out on recovering 
some charges that it could have applied to utility companies, but is consistent 
with the council‟s approach of understanding that utility works need to be 
carried out and looking to work with the utility companies to help them improve 
in the way that their works are planned and carried out. Within the Street Works 
Team, the project officers and inspectors tend to have good relationships with 
their counterparts in the utility companies. This means that they are able to 
meet on site or discuss issues over the telephone in order to deal with problems 
that have arisen or site or to deal with the planning and co-ordination of 
upcoming works. 
 
Relationships with utility companies can change depending on their levels of 
performance, mainly with regard to how a utility‟s works are managed and 
monitored. Issues of concern for the Street Works Team can be categorised as 
either site-specific, where there are problems with a particular set of works or 
project, or systematic, where there are issues with certain aspects of a utility 
companies exchanges information with the council. Site-specific issues can be 
dealt with immediately, either by the inspectors or project officers on site and 
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both site-specific and systematic issues are addressed at the quarterly 
performance meetings, where the Street Works Team officers provide 
management information to utility companies in advance of the meeting, issues 
are then discussed and action plans agreed. Part of the management challenge 
is maintaining effective relationships between council officers and utility 
company representatives. 
 
The charters that had previously been agreed with the water and gas utility 
companies appear to have been superseded by a move to standardising 
reporting arrangements across the regional HAUC area. There is no evidence 
that the charters are still in use. 
 
8.3.1.1.2 Regional HAUC, Highways Chair‟s Authority 
When asked about the nature of the relationship between the GL‟s team, as the 
street authority, and other units within the council that promote works on the 
highway, the GL identified the need for team work and partnership, where as 
soon as works were on a programme the promoting units should come to the 
street works team to look at how the job was going to be done. The GL felt that 
management do need to be firmer in implementing outcomes from such 
meetings because internal departments had been working on some schemes 
on major routes that had not been done when they ought to have been done, for 
example, done in winter but should have been done in the summer when days 
were longer, and so more working hours/shorter overall duration, but there were 
other pressures to do certain things in certain areas. The co-ordination 
relationship with the works promoting departments did not affect council 
performance and service delivery as there was a service delivery plan to make 
sure that targets were met – “...but getting there could be easier”. 
When asked about the nature of the relationship between the council and 
utilities, the GL described it as a positive one “...because it‟s a two-way street 
with utilities”. Where the council undertakes highway improvements schemes 
and needs the utilities to divert their apparatus, it needs the utilities to be 
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flexible, and utility companies have also amended their programmes to suit 
highways schemes. The GL said that the only way is to work with utilities – “... 
[we] can‟t be working against them because they have services that they need 
to provide, which means digging the road up”. 
 
The GL identified two main benefits to the council of adopting that partnership 
approach: it gets the works done in an organised and efficient manner with less 
disruption to the public, and keeps works in the highway to a minimum and 
ensure that they are done to standard. This can mean that staff can be involved 
in discussions but a strict, rigid approach to enforcement would also take time. 
 
When asked whether the nature of the relationship with individual utilities 
change depending on their performance, the GL replied “clearly, yes. There are 
some good performers and some bad performers”. It can get frustrating when 
the bad performers are not prepared to come on board and understand that 
they need to improve their performance. The council‟s role was seen as being 
to monitor utility performance, not to supervise their works, but this did 
effectively happen with poor performers but at a cost to them. “Human nature 
means that if someone is obstructive with you then you‟re not as keen to agree 
to their request, for example, for early starts or revised durations or assistance”. 
Where someone was willing to change, it was easier to work with them. 
 
Looking at the regional HAUC, the GL was asked about the key factors that 
affect the relationship between authorities and utilities. The GL thought that it 
should be easier to work across Yorkshire with utilities but that some utilities 
were national organisations who did not want to sign-up to the “local” 
agreements that YHUAC wanted to implement, citing “...that‟s not in the national 
code of practice so we‟re not doing it”. That to the GL was not collaborative 
working, where members should be looking through YHAUC as to what was 
best for the public: organisations should be looking for arrangements that were 
the best for both sides but utilities were private companies and so their 
instructions come from their board of directors. 
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The GL did think that through YHAUC authorities and utilities have shared or 
mutually beneficial objectives, which were for minimum disruption to the 
highway – get off the highway as quickly as they can, and do a first-time 
reinstatement if they can. 
 
When asked whether highway authorities should have to enforce legislation on 
utilities, the GL considered it better if they did not have to do it because then it 
would mean that utilities would be doing the job properly, but if utilities were not 
doing the job correctly then legal action would have to ensue. However, national 
legislation has never been clear cut about what authorities are entitled to do if a 
utility company is not performing. A national performance scorecard might 
“name and shame” poor performers but there are costs associated with taking 
utilities to court that “...really should be spent on the highway network”. 
 
When asked for their view as Highways-side chair of the regional HAUC of 
utility performance, the GL identified a gradual improvement over last 5 to 10 
years, due to performance measures brought in at YHAUC and “naming and 
shaming” poor performers. With the information in a league table, you can see 
who is performing and who is not. The information also shows what the 
problems are and whether they are regional or local to a particular authority 
area. Quarterly performance indicated around 90% compliance by utilities, and 
standards of signing and guarding were now acceptable. The problem now is 
not with „street works‟ but rather with the condition of the highway network. 
When asked to what extent as Highways-side chair they had influenced and 
direct these changes, the GL felt that they had a great influence on changing 
policies – “I think that people respect what I say and I‟m fair-minded person who 
appreciates that we‟ve all got issues”. The GL is conscious of resources and 
that not everyone has them to the same extent and so looking for shared or 
common practices helps to get there. The works have to be co-ordinated but 
they do have to be done (“...can‟t not do them, we all want gas, electricity and 
water, and we all want highway improvements and maintenance of highways to 
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be done”). But people want information about why it has to be done and to keep 
it to a minimum. 
 
8.3.1.1.3 North Yorkshire County Council 
When asked about the nature of the relationship between the street authority 
and units within the council that promote works, the Highway Asset Manager 
characterised it as being “confrontational, intentionally so” because the authority 
would not accept a solution that would allow the Street Works Team to be 
autonomous and manage the network, “which in many respects would be an 
ideal response, i.e. to challenge everybody that wanted to work on the network”. 
Due to the Street Works Team having a lot of performance-related data 
associated with the utility company activities, and with works promoter 
colleagues in the council‟s Operations teams being told they had to issue 
notices for works on the highway, “we were then in a position to compare their 
performance with utilities”.  
 
The Operational Management Group (OMG) within the authority comprises the 
County Council, the engineering consultant and the works contractor, and they 
are responsible for delivering the service on the ground, and performance in 
terms of noticing is discussed by OMG. If they do not perform satisfactorily, they 
are asked to explain why and then identify what they are going to do to sort it 
out – “so there is an element of antagonism”. 
 
In terms of the authority‟s approach to its duty to co-ordinate works for road 
purposes, the HAM identified two tiers: (1) an external co-ordination activity, 
where the authority publishes it highway programme as best it can so that there 
is a top-level identification of potential conflicts and co-ordination, which is done 
through the Street Works Manager‟s (SWM) team at County Hall; and (2) local 
network co-ordination, done by the area offices, where key participants are the 
local street works inspectors, which brings an element of conflict because it 
dilutes the inspectors‟ role and time. The SWM noted that inputs tended to vary 
between areas, meaning that some inspectors had a heavier co-ordination 
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workload compared with areas where the area office staff take a bigger interest 
and have a bigger input into co-ordination issues.  
 
According to the SWM, there are occasions where his team gets overruled, 
although “generally the system works quite well”, and the factors that might 
cause a decision to be overruled generally comes down to the council‟s own 
works: where they have not got the noticing together, where there has been 
little in the way of forward planning and potentially impact on other proposed 
works.  
 
When asked whether the relationship with individual works promoting 
departments change depending on their level of performance, the SWM said 
that “if their performance is poor the relationship is going to change to some 
extent: putting heavier demands on them, inspecting at a higher level. So it 
must change to some extent although generally we are considered to be fair in 
99.9% of situations. We tend to get compliance because of that”. 
 
Looking at the relationship the between the street authority and the utility 
companies, the SWM felt that the authority was generally “... seen to be fair and 
comply with the legislation. On the occasions where we ask them to do things 
outside the requirements of the legislation, they tend to comply and understand 
why we‟re requesting it”.  
 
In approaching its duty to co-ordinate the activities of utility companies, the 
SWM mentioned the Network Management Duty, which dictates that authorities 
should keep as much of the network available for users as possible. The 
authority generally looks at least a year ahead, and where it is feasible, to pull 
utility works forward to enable the council‟s own works to take place last. The 
SWM considered that “so long as you‟ve been consulting with them reasonably 
well in advance” then utility companies were generally amenable to moving their 
programmes around to facilitate this. However, very short notice could cause 
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them problems where utility companies already had gangs, equipment, etc. 
committed 
 
Looking at regional HAUC relationships, and the key factors that affect, either 
positively or negatively, relationships between street authorities and utility 
representatives, the HAM mentioned that the authority was a member of two 
HAUCs. Officially, they are members of Yorkshire HAUC but because the 
authority has a large boundary to the north they are also members of the North 
of England HAUC. “So we are quite lucky and we sit as a buffer between the 
two. Without a shadow of a doubt there is a difference in the underlying 
philosophy of both of those HAUCs”. 
 
The HAM identified that the areas to the immediate south were more dense 
conurbations than in North Yorkshire, which only has about 600,000 people 
living within the county. Immediately to their north there is Durham and 
Cumbria, and from the Tees Valley authorities. The HAM said that the authority 
“...probably had greater affinity with the likes of Cumbria, Durham and 
Northumberland than with the urban authorities to the south”.  
 
The urban authorities “are, we feel, generally more prone to dictat than 
ourselves who feel that we ought to be sitting down at the table and having a 
perpetual dialogue”. The basic requirements of the authority‟s networks were 
seen to be different: in North Yorkshire how traffic affects the network is 
different and “therefore, both in terms of „street works‟ and the network 
management duty, our underlying philosophy and ethos is different to those that 
have very heavily used networks. Command and control can‟t be achieved by 
dictat in North Yorkshire, and we need to go back to the underlying philosophy 
of perpetual dialogue, and I think there are people on the Yorkshire HAUC and 
North of England HAUC who are at the opposite end of that spectrum”. The 
SWM noted that “because the requirements are so different, it‟s bound to 
engender differences in how you‟re going to undertake and achieve potentially 
the same result” and cited permit schemes as an example of this, where there 
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are more authorities in the West and South Yorkshire areas going for a permit 
scheme than there are in the North East/North of England area (“currently, the 
number in the North of England is zero”. But the SWM said that these areas 
have different requirements and different traffic problems to the more urban 
areas. 
 
When asked about the differences between the two HAUCs, the SWM identified 
that “...primarily, the Yorkshire HAUC is driven to a greater extent by the larger 
urban authorities, e.g. Leeds, which has totally different traffic problems to North 
Yorkshire‟s. On a day to day basis, getting around Leeds is going to be different 
to getting around North Yorkshire, even including Harrogate. The sheer volume 
of people and traffic causes its own problems, never mind throwing in „street 
works‟”. The SWM said that the NYCC network tends to be different and the 
people visiting tend to be different, tending to drive at slower speeds and, to a 
greater extent, because they are in a “...slower frame of mind, the fact that they 
are delayed for 10 minutes by a set of works is probably of no consequence to 
them. A person in Leeds delayed by 10 minutes is going to be thumping the 
steering wheel and shouting at everybody, particularly those that happen to be 
at the end of the telephone, either a utility or more likely the council”. So this 
drives different needs and different requirements, and probably drives different 
views on whether Permits will work or not and, potentially, lane rental. There‟s 
probably a greater requirement for that type of legislation in the more urban 
areas than there is in rural areas, where there isn‟t the same type of problem on 
the same scale. 
 
When asked whether within the two regional HAUCs authorities and utilities 
shared objectives, the SWM had identified that, because of the different mind-
sets in the different authorities, the utility companies also needed a different 
mind-set, and this was “...down to the way in which people react and work”. 
Potentially, in North Yorkshire, there might be more time to think about things, 
whereas in a city centre. An example was given using a 16” water main burst 
which would cause major problems in a city centre that would need to be 
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addressed straight away but in North Yorkshire it would not have the same 
impact. There would have to be thought put into dealing with the impact but 
using a different mind-set – “not necessarily easier but approached differently”. 
 
The SWM also identified that the way in which the two regional HAUCs worked 
was different, with a more legislative emphasis in the YHAUC area than in 
NEHAUC, due to the different issues they encounter, and the urban areas 
tended to resource „street works‟ quite heavily compared to the more rural 
areas. Also in the NEHAUC areas, highway authorities‟ street works teams 
tended to be smaller in size, meaning that implementing fixed penalty notice 
and increased inspection regimes would not be as feasible for those authorities, 
and so they who have to look more closely at what they were going to do and 
how they were going to do it, “...which is why they possibly take a more 
“relaxed” view because they know they can‟t go in hard because they don‟t 
have the resource to do it and get the information together.” 
 
The SWM noted that Durham County Council was still prosecuting on a number 
of instances but felt that this was “not necessarily achieving any greater 
performance improvement with utilities, and it can sometimes wind utilities up 
so that their performance doesn‟t improve. It depends on the authority‟s policies 
and on who dictates them. Durham‟s could be a completely different regime to 
North Yorkshire‟s. It might be led by members rather than the officers who 
actually understand the legislation”. 
 
According to the HAM, what NYCC wants to get out of the regional HAUCs is 
consistency with regard to two specific issues: (1) accreditation of suppliers for 
materials used in reinstatements, which “would help everyone, not just utilities 
but also the SME [small and medium size enterprises] suppliers or providers of 
recycled materials”; and (2) to resolve the issue of publishing authorities 
information onto the internet to comply with Government requirements to 
publish „highway works‟ information regionally. In addressing this, the HAM 
queried how many people would actually use such websites, and considered 
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“the figures quoted appear over estimated. People use motorway matrix 
information or [traffic reports] on radios – any difficulties are well signposted. 
For local diversions, people don‟t use the web. Is all the debate about which 
system to use actually worthwhile?” 
 
When asked about the current legislation relating to „highway works‟, the HAM 
felt that it was “fit for purpose” with “sufficient latitude for authorities to make up 
their own mind how they want to deliver through both NRASWA and TMA”. The 
HAM noted that there were no national standards for the delivery of highway 
maintenance “so, in reality, why should other highway-related legislation impose 
a defined, national standard?” The current situation allows for service levels to 
be set locally “to a certain degree” about how and what is delivered. The SWM 
felt that “if there had been full implementation of NRASWA from the beginning 
by all parties, and buy-in from the utilities, I don‟t think we would have got the 
TMA. A lot of authorities didn‟t buy into „street works‟ fully and a lot of utilities 
tried to shy away from their requirements under it.” 
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8.3.1.1.4 Summary of Yorkshire Authority Inter-organisational 
Relationships 
The street authority representatives were asked about the relationships with the 
works-promoting department, and implications for the authority‟s service 
delivery, and relationship with utility companies, and Table 8.7 below 
summarises the responses: 
 
Table 8.7 –Yorkshire area – Street Authority Relationships 
Authority Relationship with 
own works 
promoting teams 
Implications for 
council service 
delivery 
Relationship with 
utilities 
Kirklees 
Changed since the 
introduction of 
TMA 
requirements; 
issues in being 
able to co-
ordinate works 
Balancing duty to 
co-ordinate works 
with need to keep 
work 
flows/scheme 
delivery 
Feedback from 
utilities is good; 
authority seen as 
being reasonable 
 
Regional HAUC, Joint 
Chair’s Authority 
Needs partnership 
and team-work 
Making sure 
service delivery 
plan is met 
Needs to be 
positive in order 
to be effective 
 
North Yorkshire 
Confrontational in 
order to compare 
and drive 
performance 
Using the same 
performance 
measures for own 
works as for 
'street works' 
Seen as being fair; 
acceptance that 
'street works' 
have to be carried 
out 
 
8.3.1.1.4.1 Regional HAUC Relationships 
The street authorities‟ representatives in the Yorkshire were asked about 
relationships generally between authorities and utility companies at their 
respective regional HAUCs.  
 
In discussing the role of the regional HAUCs, the interviewees identified a 
number of common elements, including: members being open and honest, 
members being knowledgeable about the legislation, and providing a forum for 
discussing interpretations of the legislation and regulations. The findings also 
identified that different region HAUCs prioritise different aspects of „highway 
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works‟, and that this may be related to the type of authority area, i.e. the extent 
to which they are urbanised or rural, and the consequential implications for the 
demands on the road networks. 
 
Because street authorities are only one half of a regional HAUC, the findings 
will be summarised more fully below in section 8.3.1.2.6 after the findings for 
utility companies have been examined. 
 
8.3.1.2 Utility Companies 
8.3.1.2.1 Water Utility 
When asked about the nature of the relationship between the company and 
street authorities, the CM characterised it as being “...proactive, one of 
honesty”. The CM believes that the company is reasonable, friendly to deal with 
and are influential, because they believe that this approach benefits not only the 
company and local authorities but also the general public since “...we do 
everything together in their interest [and] without the honest approach we 
haven‟t really got anything”. 
 
The company‟s approach to its duty to comply is that “...it will always endeavour 
to comply and to engage with street authorities to resolve problems”. It would go 
beyond a “basic minimum” where there was a driver to do that, for example, 
where it is economically beneficial to do so. The CM cited the example of 
working to improve performance against the random sample inspection regime, 
where going beyond 90% compliance had no huge additional cost but was 
beneficial to do so. The business would not go beyond compliance at any cost – 
“...like any business, there is a cost influence”. Achieving 90% compliance 
“...doesn‟t set you apart as a business but achieving 97% does because it “puts 
you up there among the best – or the best”. 
 
The company does have to make a certain level of return – it has owners who 
expect a return on their investment. The price to customers is determined by 
Ofwat but, from that, the company needs to think about innovation and being 
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more and more efficient, which is the way that the business can “maximise” the 
return to its owners. 
 
The CM was asked about whether the business‟ service delivery was influenced 
by the relationship with street authorities. From the company‟s perspective, 
service was driven by meeting the needs of the customer, and this could 
sometimes be in conflict with „street works‟ requirements, for example, the 
noticing regime might conflict with the priorities of a customer. Key to this for the 
CM was recognising the needs for proactive co-ordination and communication 
between utility and authority, and applies to both major schemes (for co-
ordination) and reactive works (for communication). Because the company is 
focussed on the customer there needs to be some “give and take” in order to 
meet customer needs, and there can start to be problems where the 
relationship means it is not possible. This “give and take” does exist because 
there is trust in the relationship – “...not trying to pull a fast one, need to work 
together to sort things out” – and this avoids confrontation which neither “side” 
wants. 
 
When ask whether there were any local authority areas the company worked in 
where the authority insisted on a strict compliance only approach, and would 
prosecute otherwise, the CM replied that some years ago the answer might 
have been “yes” but that this was no longer the case. One thing that has caused 
the change is the Traffic Management Act, because local authorities are now 
“...living the experience” that the utilities have had for years and are recognising 
that “...this is tough”. From the company‟s perspective, things are not as 
confrontational as they used to be.  
 
The CM identified a number of benefits to the company from a “give and take” 
relationship with the local authority. Where there was an open relationship, it 
was possible to talk freely about new ideas, for example, the work currently 
being done by the company on the way that we want to do the co-ordination, 
and the response to it from Kirklees. Without the positive relationship, the 
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company probably would not have sent it to Kirklees because they would not 
have felt comfortable doing that. The open relationship breaks down barriers to 
thinking about doing things differently and kicking new ideas about. 
 
Talking to each other also perceived by the CM as helping to add value – by 
talking about performance it helps to increase it, and standards have improved 
because “...we have learned things from [highway authorities]”, “...understood 
[highway authority] needs better and the importance of things to you”, and “... 
[highway authorities] are seen as being part of the utilities‟ performance” – you 
get loads of contacts and complains, so we‟re helping each other”. The CM felt 
that “...we‟re stronger together because we can do things together and be more 
influential on both a local and national level”. 
 
The company does not measure the “cost” of the relationship with authorities. 
The street works team goes at least quarterly to each local authority to talk 
about the relationship anyhow things are going, which is “...time consuming, but 
it‟s so important”. The service partners are encouraged to the same thing and 
that is not “costed” either. The costs are not segregated out because to do so 
might drive the wrong behaviours, and then people might start thinking from the 
perspective of “...what value do we get for it and is there a potential for saving?” 
 
When asked whether the relationship with street authorities changed depending 
on the level of performance of your organisation, the CM hoped that the 
relationship would not change in terms of the honesty, fairness and 
reasonableness between the organisations. Where they saw performance 
deteriorating then there would be a greater level of engagement with authorities, 
and the company would become far more proactive, so performance meetings 
might become far more regular depending on the severity of the performance 
gap. The CM did recognise that if a utility continued to under-perform then the 
relationship with the authority would come under strain. The CM identified 
recent changed in legislation that had helped to develop relationships because 
 307 
“...we‟re now all behind a common purpose – doing our best for the travelling 
public”. 
 
With regard to the key factors that influenced relationships between utilities and 
street authority representatives at the regional HAUC (YHAUC), the CM 
identified having a sense of purpose, and cited the YHAUC business plan as an 
example where there were initiatives to work on. There was, however, a need 
for a good debate to resolve common issues but that it was sometime difficult to 
get that debate going because people are sometimes reluctant to participate 
“...which, as the chair, I find frustrating and negative sometimes, and it does 
appear to be the same people that do participate”. This was thought to be 
possibly down to the pressure of that person‟s role within their own 
organisation, that they simply have not got time to invest in something that 
others would see as a benefit. Also, the regional HAUC, when all the members 
attend, is a big group and participation does depend on the subject matter – 
people are passionate about different things. Working groups have brought 
members together to develop relationships and betterment, and there have 
been quite a number of these over the years. The meetings do highlight where 
individual authorities might have issues with the approach taken by a utility or 
utilities. 
 
The regional JUG (joint utilities group) is exploring a more extensive balanced 
scorecard, of which the random sample inspection performance is still part, but 
will also cover items such as co-ordination and safety.  This will give the 
regional JUG an improvement purpose which will help to drive performance 
improvements through ranking the participants. 
 
Looking at whether utilities and street authorities within the regional HAUC had 
shared or mutually beneficial objectives, the CM thought that YHAUC provided 
a positive environment for utilities and authorities to work together, whether or 
not they all wanted to contribute. The shared objectives were identified as being 
around compliance with „street works‟ legislation and codes of practice; 
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minimising disruption through co-ordination and communication; safety at „street 
works‟; developing and implementing sustainable good practice solutions; 
influencing local and national „street works‟ issues for the benefit of all; and 
resolving common issues. Performance measures include the quarterly 
performance information and, for the regional JUG, the new balanced 
scorecard, looking at utility self-monitoring, where not all measures were 
necessarily visible to highway authorities. 
 
At one time it had been envisaged that YHAUC would have a reporting 
“dashboard”, based on a common format for authorities and utilities. The CM 
recalled that some work was done on this a couple of years ago but were 
waiting for the regional JUG performance measures that were currently being 
developed, so it got “...put on the back burner”. However, that approach has 
gone into the North of England JUG thinking anyway. The CM reflected a 
personal view that it was difficult trying to get all utilities signed up to something 
like the performance management “dashboard”, possibly because they don‟t 
want to expose themselves as to where they are in terms of performance, 
because they are so bad at it. 
 
When asked about the extent to which as an individual they felt that they could 
influence or direct these objectives at the regional HAUC, the CM felt that “...as 
chair, highly effective because if I can‟t...”. The CM did consider that it was time 
to review the regional HAUC objectives to realise a different sense of purpose, 
to get the group back together again, so that it is achieving something again. 
The permit scheme and getting ready for it was thought to have tied up a lot of 
time. 
 
8.3.1.2.2 Electricity Utility 
When asked about the nature of the relationship between their company and 
street authorities, the Street Works Manager concluded that it was generally 
“...pretty good ... and [we] do try to go in there if there are problems”, although 
there were problems communicating with some authorities, and the company 
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was currently developing a customer service plan for each authority, based on 
work that had been done in America with key account customers of the owner‟s 
other companies. 
 
The company does try and avoid having different processes in different 
authority areas, and work has been done through the regional HAUC to get 
common approaches, but to improve the customer service side there will be 
issues specific to individual local authorities, possibly geography or some other 
area. The SWM felt that it was easier to do this where there were regular 
performance meetings held with an authority, but with some authorities it was 
difficult to “get a foot in the door” – “...they say that they‟ve got no issues but 
then at the next HAUC meeting they [raise an issue]”. The SWM identified that 
Kirklees were heavily engaged in some of the work that goes on and 
communicate and are involved in working groups, but some authorities only 
raise issues at regional HAUC, saying “...this is a blight on the industry”, rather 
than raising it direct with the company when it happened. 
 
When asked whether the nature of the relationship affected how the company 
approached their duty to comply with legislation, the SWM said that it did, and 
that the company would go over and above requirements sometimes and work 
in a more co-operative and collaborative way, even if might cost more money. If 
relationships were to break down then people would revert to legislation and the 
SWM felt that this would be a great loss and damaging “...because the 
legislation doesn‟t cover everything”. Reverting to legislation would not have a 
massive impact on the company‟s service delivery for customers as there are 
statutory obligations to allow the company to do what it needs to do, and there 
are not too many areas where these obligations conflict with „street works‟ 
regulations. 
 
The SWM stated that even in areas (“... Kent, Devon and Cumbria”) where 
there are perceived breakdowns in relationships, colleagues from other 
distribution network operators have said that the work still gets done, it is just 
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more difficult and awkward for each other, and probably costs more because 
the companies are having to go and have meetings with highway authorities 
and are under the microscope. 
When asked about the benefits their company got from having a collaborative 
and partnership approach, the SWM identified the main benefit as being that 
they have the site meeting with the highway authority and sort things out and 
address potential problems before they arise. Where there was a good 
relationship, “...you can keep talking to each other and gain a better 
understanding of what each other requires and why. Highway authorities and 
utility companies are both serving the same people, and where they were seen 
to be working together then that “...keeps everyone happy and reduces 
complaints, although we‟ll never get too much praise”. 
 
The SWM said that there might be additional financial costs associated with 
collaborative working (“...because you might be doing things over and above 
what you‟d normally want to do”), but the payback on that could be jointly 
providing a better service and jointly avoiding any customer service issues that 
might arise. 
 
The SWM did not think that the relationship with street authorities changed 
depending on their company‟s performance. Performance issues tended to be 
around signing and guarding where there was face to face contact between the 
operative and highway authority inspector. The company had concentrated on 
“...raising the bar” which meant behavioural changes and which takes time. 
Some highway authorities were keener to look at certain aspects in more detail, 
and this was where the customer service plan would help to understand why. 
 
When asked about how prosecutions and cautions affected the relationship 
between the company and highway authorities, the SWM concluded that some 
authorities choose to go down the prosecution route and the statutory 
undertaker has to accept responsibility even though it is a contractor doing the 
work. The company cannot watch all jobs “24/7” and, where the company were 
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prosecuted, the offences were serious enough (“...bang to rights”) and the 
councils had been reasonable in their approach. 
 
Looking at the regional HAUC, the SWM was asked about the key factors that 
affected relationships between authorities and utilities. Negatives included 
highway authorities that would not say anything in HAUC, and that would not 
have open discussions, but would criticise utilities in a forum that could be 
damaging, tarring everyone with the same brush, when they had not looked in 
depth at the issues they had identified. Positives included opportunities for 
discussions and to have working groups looking at problems and sharing 
information, where utilities could learn from each other, and highlight differences 
in the ways that authorities inspect. This happened in YHAUC and lead to 
authority training packages being developed. The SWM felt that there was a 
need to engage people in organisations that could take decisions to make 
things happen. The SWM said that YHAUC was proactive in looking ahead, 
where other HAUCs were more reactive, and was an excellent forum for sorting 
out the grey areas in legislation and agreeing common approaches but could 
“...be frustrating where there isn‟t positive input from everyone”. 
 
When asked whether highway authorities and utilities at the regional HAUC had 
shared and mutually beneficial objectives, the SWM identified the mix and 
experience of members, both from highway authorities and utility companies, as 
helping to deal with anything “outlandish” from either side. Anything not mutually 
beneficial is likely to be in legislation so cannot be changed anyway. HAUC is a 
good forum for the way in which authorities apply legislation “...because utilities 
won‟t do things they don‟t need to – human nature”. 
 
When asked whether the „street works‟ legislation worked for their company, the 
SWM said that, to a large extent, it did. When new legislation comes along, 
utilities look at it in the national and regional JUGs (joint utilities groups) and say 
“...if we do that then there must be some benefit”, which might include making 
the company more productive. The SWM did feel it was “galling” where the 
 312 
Department for Transport‟s impact assessment for new regulations under-
estimate the cost of changes to the utility companies, for example, saying that 
they only need an additional 1.5 people or it will only cost £25 per vehicle to put 
chevrons on vans. 
 
The SWM discussed a perceived misconception regarding the time that utility 
companies take to complete works, saying that that while ever their operatives 
were out there taking longer than people think it should take, it was costing the 
organisation money, so operatives were not out there longer then they needed 
to be. The issue was that the company was just not communicating why they 
are there as long as they need to be. Sometimes things will go wrong and 
teams have had to go onto another job but the organisation wants their people 
being productive, not standing around. Communication is a big issue and all 
parties need to get better at that. 
 
8.3.1.2.3 Gas Utility 
When asked about relationships between the company and street authorities, 
the NRASWA Delivery Manager (NDM) identified that relationships were 
“…different with each street authority. From the street authorities‟ point of view, 
all utilities probably operate differently, but from a utilities point of view we 
communicate with 24 highway authorities, and each of those work in different 
ways”. There are differences in processes at lower levels, for example, with 
regard to how the company requests a revised duration extension, where each 
authority might require this in a different way.  “It‟s a case of trying to balance 
everybody‟s requirements and build up a reputation and relationship with them”.  
 
The NDM noted that authorities focus on different aspects of the legislation, for 
example, some authorities may be more focussed on defects and coring, some 
focus on S74. For the utility, “…it‟s trying to understand your customer and 
trying to get that balance of working to achieve the right standard with 
everybody and address everybody‟s issues that might be different, whilst still 
maintaining compliance”.  
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Relationships can also be dependent upon the performance level within an 
authority‟s area as “... where we are performing badly in an area this can cause 
a strain on the relationship”.   
 
When asked about how the company approached its duty to comply with the 
legislation, the NDM said that they make sure that they train all staff so that they 
are fully aware of the requirements, whether that be the field engineers and 
having the correct accreditation, or whether in the office, including ensuring 
awareness of the legislation and standards expected in order to achieve 
compliance. 
 
The NDM was asked whether their organisation‟s service delivery was 
influenced, either positively or negatively, by the relationship with authorities. 
The NDM noted that where there was a good relationship between a utility and 
street authority this meant better communication between both parties, and this 
often meant better service delivery to the customer through joint approaches. 
Where relationships were not as positive, this could mean that service delivery 
suffered whilst time and effort were put into challenging the authority or 
responding to challenges from the authority.  The likely outcome of such 
deliberation was that no involved parties actually benefited from this. 
 
8.3.1.2.4 Telecommunications Utility 
The NRASWA Compliance Manager (NCM) was asked to characterise the 
nature of the relationship between their organisation and street authorities, and 
noted that the company uses a highway authority perception survey where the 
output from the „scorecard‟ would identify any authority-specific issues. 
 
With regard to how the company approached its duty to comply with street 
authorities, according to the NCM the company is a national organisation and 
so needs a strict compliance approach in order to ensure that the company‟s 
processes are followed nationally. However, “…staff can use common sense if 
there‟s a benefit”. Issues in some authority areas have highlighted different 
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perceptions, and addressing the issues involves breaking down barriers and is 
starting to move away from strict compliance.  
 
The NCM noted that there had been a high “churn” in senior managers across 
the company, meaning that they are not able to build on knowledge of 
legislation or of the potential consequences arising. 
 
The NCM felt that relationships with street authorities had gone down since the 
introduction of S74, which introduced an additional financial cost to utilities and 
the perception that some authorities were using it as way of generating income. 
This meant that utility companies now have to look at „street works‟ issues and 
ask “…is that going to cost us money”.  
 
Looking at how the company‟s service delivery was influenced, either positively 
or negatively, by the relationship with street authorities, the NCM identified that 
service delivery could be affected depending on the relationship with authorities. 
On the positive side, a good relationship, for example, made it easier to get 
early starts without having to wait the full notice period. Internal issues between 
the company and their main contractor, for example, “…lack or slow resolution 
to S74s” can have a negative effect on relationships. 
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8.3.1.2.5Summary of Yorkshire-area Utility Inter-organisational 
Relationships 
The findings relating to utility company relationships in the Yorkshire area with 
street authorities, and the drivers for them, are set out in Table 8.8 below: 
 
Table 8.8 Yorkshire Area – Utility Relationships with Street Authorities 
Utility Relationship drivers Implications of 
relationship on 
utility service 
delivery 
Drivers for "going 
beyond" the legal 
minimum 
 
Water 
Utility aim: to be 
reasonable, friendly 
to deal with, and 
influential. Positive 
and proactive 
relationships with 
authorities. 
Business driven by 
meeting customer 
needs. Good 
communication 
with authorities is 
essential. 
Where 
economically 
beneficial to do so 
- cost is an 
influence. 
 
Electricity 
Developing a 
customer service 
plan for each 
authority. Generally 
good relationships 
but problems 
communicating with 
some authorities. 
No massive impact 
- there are still 
statutory 
obligations that 
allow works to be 
done. 
Providing better 
customer service 
and reducing (all) 
customer 
complaints. 
 
Gas 
Different 
relationships with 
different authorities 
- due to differing 
authority priorities. 
Poor performance 
can strain 
relationships. 
Positive 
relationships allow 
company to 
provide better 
customer service; 
poor relationships 
take up resources 
in addressing them. 
Better customer 
service; meeting 
targets. 
 
Telecommunications 
Use of highway 
authority perception 
survey; authority-
specific issues can 
then be identified. 
Positive 
relationship makes 
service delivery 
easier; negative 
relationship can 
result in greater 
scrutiny by 
authorities and 
increased charges 
for non-
compliance. 
Meeting service 
delivery targets. 
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8.3.1.2.6 Summary of Yorkshire-area Regional HAUC relationships 
In sections 8.3.1.1.4 and 8.3.1.2.5 above, the inter-organisational relationships 
between street authorities and utility companies were discussed. This was in 
the context of the direct relationships between the two organisations. There is a 
further level at which relationships between the organisations can be examined, 
and this is the regional HAUC forum. The individuals interviewed in the 
Yorkshire area were the people from the respective organisations that attended 
the regional HAUC on behalf of their organisation. The findings from the 
interviews are summarised in Table 8.9 below: 
 
Table 8.9 –Yorkshire area – Regional HAUCs 
Authority/Utility Positive Factors Negative Factors Shared Objectives 
 
Kirklees 
(i) High level of knowledge and 
experience amongst members; 
(ii) Working groups as a 
knowledge-bank and common 
procedures. 
(i) Large number of 
attendees; (ii) Different 
authority priorities. 
(i) To improve levels of 
compliance and 
performance; (ii) Sharing 
and promoting good 
practice. 
 
Regional HAUC, Joint 
Chair’s Authority 
(i) Agreements for common 
procedures should help all 
authorities and works promoters; 
(i) Resistance by some 
organisations against 
agreements; 
(i) To minimise disruption 
from works. 
 
North Yorkshire 
Different mind-sets by authorities in the two regional HAUCs attended, so utilities need 
different mind-sets. More emphasis in YHAUC on legislation than in NEHAUC - differences 
relate to the nature of the network. Authorities in urban areas tend to resource their street 
works teams more heavily than rural areas because there are different levels of 
requirements. 
 
Water 
(i) Sense of purpose; (ii) Business 
plan with initiatives; (iii) 
Resolving common issues; (iv) 
Use of working groups to look at 
specific subjects. 
(i) Reluctance for some 
members to participate 
(depends on the topic); 
(ii) Large group. 
(i) Provides a positive 
forum for authorities and 
utilities to work together; 
(ii) Compliance with 
legislation; (iii) Identifying 
and sharing good practice; 
(iv) Developing common 
procedures; (v) Reducing 
disruption and delay at 
works. 
 
Electricity 
(i) Opportunities for discussion; 
(ii) Working groups looking at 
problems and sharing 
information; (iii) Understanding 
each other’s needs. 
(i) Authorities not willing 
to discuss issues in the 
forum but highlight 
problems outside; (ii) 
Authorities not engaging 
in discussions with 
utilities. 
(i) Participation in working 
groups shows that 
authorities and utilities 
have shared objectives; (ii) 
Utility understanding of 
authorities’ view of 
legislation drives utility 
performance. 
 
Gas 
(i) Helps to keep good 
communication; (ii) Allows 
joined-up approach. 
 
(i) To ensure compliance 
with legislation; (ii) To 
minimise disruption from 
works. 
 
Telecommunications 
(i) Open discussions; (ii) 
Pragmatic: (iii) Accepting that 
differences of opinion do occur. 
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8.3.1.2.7 Attitudes to Prosecution 
One of the aims of this research was to study different approaches to „street 
works‟, including an examination of approaches involving prosecutions of utility 
companies for offences under NRASWA. The findings from the interviews 
carried out in Yorkshire are summarised in Table 8.10 below: 
 
Table 8.10 Yorkshire area – Views on Prosecution 
Authority/Util
ity 
Views on Prosecution 
 
Kirklees 
The option to prosecute remains but is seen as a last report. 
It has been used previously where works had resulted in a 
danger to the public. 
 
North 
Yorkshire 
Court action seen as being a failure by council officers in 
delivering the ‘street works’ service - there are other means 
available in getting improvements in utility and contractor 
performance. 
 
Water 
Because of TMA, authorities are now "living the experience" 
of utilities and realising that "this is tough". Situation with 
most authorities is not now as confrontational as it used to 
be. 
 
Electricity 
Some authorities choose to go down the prosecution route - 
so raises issues of consistency. Utility company has to accept 
responsibility even though the works have been done by 
contractors. 
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8.3.1.2.8 Views on the Legislation 
Although not part of the original semi-structured questions, at the end of the 
interviews when asked if there was anything that they would like to add that had 
not already been discussed, a number of the interviewees offered their views as 
to the “fitness for purpose” of the current legislation and what might be the next 
for legislation in terms of „highway works‟. The views from the Yorkshire 
interviews are summarised in Table 8.11 below: 
 
Table 8.11Yorkshire Area – Views on Legislation 
Authority/Utility Views on Legislation Possible Next Steps 
 
Electricity 
(i) Current legislation 
works; (ii) New legislation 
is an opportunity for 
utilities to engage; (iii) 
Need to look for the 
benefits and costs. 
(i) Communication about 
works is a big issue - need to 
explain why works are 
taking place; (ii) Need to 
explain that utility 
companies dig holes for a 
purpose. 
 
Gas 
(i) How codes of practice 
are written makes them 
not easy to follow; (ii) 
Regulations are open to 
different interpretations 
by authorities. 
  
 
Regional HAUC, 
Joint Chair’s 
Authority 
  (i) Need to be better at 
explaining to the public 
about works and when they 
will start/finish. 
 
North Yorkshire 
(i) Current arrangements 
allow authorities to set 
standards locally; (ii) If 
there had been full 
implementation of 
NRASWA from the outset, 
TMA would not have been 
required. 
  
 
8.4 Chapter Summary 
The findings from the Yorkshire area suggest that political involvement and 
direction within local authorities tends more towards „policy-maintenance‟ than 
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„policy-making‟, with interest from members about „highway works‟ being 
specific, i.e. in order to deal with works causing a problem at a location, rather 
than general. This enables officers to have more discretion to develop and 
implement policies. However, the situation within utility companies appears to 
be slightly different, and company directors take more of an interest and this 
provides direction to managers, but managers are still able to use their 
discretion in shaping policy implementation. 
 
The findings have identified that local authorities maintain street works teams to 
administer their responsibilities for managing „highway works‟, and that these 
teams are structured along bureaucratic lines, where staff have defined roles 
and are managed within a hierarchy. The functions of the teams are also 
similar, being based around the maintenance of the local Street Works Register, 
with notices for works being received and co-ordinated, and inspection of works 
carried out in order to ensure compliance with regulations by works promoters. 
 
The findings also suggest that the regulations relating to „highway works‟ is 
open to interpretation but that this is viewed as both a positive, in that it allows 
an authority to adapt the regulations to suit their local circumstances, and a 
negative, in that utility companies in particular have difficulties in developing 
consistent procedures across their whole business as they need to be able to 
adapt to local variations. The findings also raised the issue of the “London-
centric” nature of „highway works‟ regulations and whether the extent and 
nature of the regulations was always appropriate outside the capital. 
 
The findings have highlighted the significance for both authorities and utility 
companies in the need to measure and monitor performance, with organisations 
reporting against a range of metrics. The findings show that performance 
information is used similarly in local authorities and utility companies: in 
authorities it is used to monitor utility and, increasingly, their own workforce‟s 
performance in order to drive improvements, and to report to their own elected 
members and to central Government in order to demonstrate that action is 
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being taken to reduce delay and disruption arising from „highway works‟; in 
utility companies, information is used in order to improve performance, and so 
reduce instances where poor performance could attract financial penalties from 
authorities, to demonstrate to their regulators that their business is operating 
efficiently, and to minimise the need for further regulation within the industry 
sector. 
 
At a regional level, the findings identified a commonality of approach between 
authorities and utility in companies as a consequence of identifying that they are 
serving the same customers. However, the findings also indicated that 
relationships between authorities and utility companies are influenced by local 
issues, which take into account factors such as the traffic flows and patterns 
around an area, which then have an effect on the type of relationship. So, areas 
of larger daily traffic volumes may tend towards a relationship based upon 
stricter compliance with regulations, where in areas with smaller daily traffic 
volumes the relationship is more likely to be based on discussion between the 
authority and utility companies. 
 
The findings relating to authority views on prosecution suggest that legal action 
is seen as a last resort and indication that other remedial measures have failed. 
From a utility perspective, decisions by authorities to prosecute (or not) are 
seen as a further demonstration that there is a lack of consistency between how 
different authorities apply the legislation. 
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Chapter Nine – Devon-area Interview Data Analysis 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter will analyse the data from the interviews carried out in Devon 
County Council (DCC), and with the joint chairs of the regional „highway 
authorities and utilities committee‟ for the South West of England,  within which 
DCC operates, and the finding will then be discussed in chapter 11. 
 
For the Devon area, interviews were carried out with: 
 An officer responsible for the management of‟ highway works‟ in Devon 
County Council; and 
 The joint chairs of SWHAUC (South West HAUC). 
 
In order to have a consistent approach to the interviews carried out in Yorkshire, 
the research had also intended to include an interview with the lead member for 
highways at DCC and representatives of the utility companies. With regard to 
the lead member, numerous approaches were made by the author but the 
councillor involved would not respond. With regard to utility company 
representatives, the author spoke to the secretary of SWHAUC and an item on 
this research was tabled but no representatives agreed to be interviewed. 
 
For the interviews that were carried out, the interview templates described in 
chapter 8 were used to allow for data to be collected about: 
 The roles and responsibilities of the interviewee; 
 The organisation‟s policies relating to „highway works‟; and 
 The nature of the relationship between the interviewee‟s organisation 
and highway authorities and utility companies, depending on whether 
that organisation was a highway authority or utility company. 
 
 322 
9.2.1 Roles and Responsibilities 
9.2.1.1 Street Authority 
9.2.1.1.1 Devon County Council 
The officer interviewed at DCC was the Senior Highways Co-ordination Officer 
(SHCO), whose main role was to manage six co-ordination officers who were 
responsible for co-ordinating all activities – not just „highway works‟ – on the 
highway. This co-ordination function is one of three parts of the overall work of 
the Traffic Management Unit, the other two parts being enforcement, including a 
prosecution officer and nine enforcement officers (inspectors), who also deal 
with builders‟ skips, scaffoldings, A-boards advertising on the highway, and the 
Highway Operation Control Centre, which deals with traffic management, 
including where the highway is affected by road traffic collisions, and adverse 
weather, for example, co-ordinating winter maintenance operations. 
 
The co-ordination function at DCC links to the work of the traffic policy team, 
which deals with civil parking enforcement, special events and road closures, 
and is able to feed into policies relating to those activities, with the Traffic 
Management Team taking a strategic overview across the county. 
 
9.2.1.1.2 Regional HAUC, Highways Chair‟s Authority 
An interview was carried out with the highways-side chair of SWHAUC, who 
was also the Street Works Manager (SWM) within the authority. The 
Streetworks Team comprises the Street Works Manger, a Compliance Officer 
(dealing with Section 74 and defect invoices, and the IT-side of noticing), four 
Road-space Co-ordinators and five Inspectors. The Team sits under a traffic 
manager (who is one step down from the director). In the same Unit are Major 
Projects (any scheme over £500k) and Traffic Signals. 
 
The main role of the Streetworks Team was identified as being “...to protect the 
county council‟s highway asset, which is the biggest asset that the council 
owns.” The duties of the SWM are to deal with all notices that come in from 
utilities and the authority‟s works departments, chair the local co-ordination 
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meetings, and deal with pre-works and pre-site meetings relating to major 
schemes, and managing income from inspections to ensure that it is maximised 
 
9.2.1.1.4 Summary of Street Authority Roles and Responsibilities 
The interviews with street authority representatives from the Devon area are set 
out in Table 9.1 below: 
 
Table 9.1 Devon Authorities –Street Authority Roles & Responsibilities 
Authority 
Streetworks 
Team Functions Officers 
  
  (Y/N)     
Devon 
Y 
Street Works Register 
functions 
Senior Highways Co-
ordination Officer; 
Co-ordination 
officers 
*Prosecution 
Officer; Inspectors 
(working within a 
separate part of the 
Unit) 
  
 
   
Co-ordination of all 
highway activities 
 
  Inspection of works* 
 
 
  Enforcement* 
 
Regional HAUC, Joint 
Chair’s Authority 
Y 
Street Works Register 
functions 
Streetworks 
Manager: 
Compliance Officer; 
Co-ordination 
officers; Inspectors 
  
    
Co-ordination of all 
'highway works'  
 
9.2.1.2 Utility Company 
9.2.1.2.1 Regional HAUC, Utility Chair Company 
An interview was carried out with the Major Projects Manager (MPM) for an 
electricity distribution company operating in the south west of England. The 
MPM was also the utility-side chair of the regional HAUC (SWHAUC). The 
company deals with approximately 12 different highway authorities. 
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The interviewee made reference to their “day job” – indicating that their wider 
„street works‟ role was an additional function in their role as a senior manager – 
as being the major projects manager for the northern part of the South West 
region, which meant looking after higher voltage networks for construction 
projects and maintenance and fault restoration. Managers within the company 
have a “...prime role with a few extra duties tacked on”, one of which for the 
MPM is „street works‟ where the objective is to integrate „street works‟ into 
normal day to day business. The company wants “...everyone working out 
there” doing new connections and repairing faults to understand what they need 
to know about „street works‟ to get the job done efficiently and not contravene 
any rules, to make sure the correct notices are served to comply with 
legislation, and so the company is trying to make „street works‟ an integrated 
part of the business rather than a separate department. The MPM noted that 
the problem with a separate department was that they would know all about 
„street works‟ and no-one else would. 
 
The MPM has both strategic and policy roles. The MPM leads a small team on 
the „street works‟ side that decides on both forward-looking and day-to-day 
bases how the company manages its „street work‟s activities. Key to this is a 
centrally-based street works team, which look after sending all the notices, and 
an IT team looking after IT systems. The MPM looks at what the company 
needs to do in order to comply with legislation, and how to integrate it, and the 
IT team provides the technical support to make sure things happen. The street 
works team take the information in order to send the notices to manage jobs, 
and liaise with contractors doing the excavation and works in the street. There 
are similar arrangements in the southern Wales part of the business. 
 
Nominated operational managers then have a role in attending regional HAUCs 
and liaising with their counterparts in local authorities. The company needs to 
make sure that “...complying with legislation is a natural part of how they do 
things”. 
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The MPM noted that “...it would be handy if all authorities and utilities were 
using the same software...even though there‟s a common specification, systems 
don‟t always talk to each other”. According to the MPM, one of the problems for 
everyone involved in „street works‟ was the constant changing of legislation and 
introduction of new systems – “...something new will be brought in, there might 
be doubts about the regulatory impact assessment, and whether the extra costs 
will have benefits, but before there‟s a chance to evaluate that it‟s on to the next 
change initiative”. Example cited included new codes of practice, changes to the 
noticing regime, fixed penalty notices, permit scheme, increased overrun 
(Section 74) charges, and “lane rental”. 
 
9.2.1.2.2 Summary of Utility Company Roles and Responsibilities 
The interview with the utility company representative in the Devon area is set 
out in Table 9.2 below: 
 
Table 9.2 Devon area – Utility Roles & Responsibilities 
Utility Interviewee's Role Streetworks Responsibilities 
Electricity 
Major Projects Manager; 
Regional HAUC joint chair 
Managing the Streetworks team; 
Ensuring compliance with 
legislation across the business; 
Performance monitoring/reporting 
 
9.2.2 Policies and Influence 
9.2.2.1 Street Authority 
9.2.2.1.1 Devon County Council 
The Senior Highway Co-ordination Officer (SHCO) reported that DCC had 
recently gone through a self-auditing process to review their policies and that 
their policies currently included a number of policies for internal guidance for 
staff. With regard to‟ street works‟ they had an “A-Z guide” for internal staff that 
contained operational and procedural guidance. Although not a written policy, 
the SHCO commented that, for co-ordination purposes, the promoters of the 
authority‟s own „roadworks‟, their term contractor, and utility companies and 
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contractors promoting „street works‟ were treated the same The Service also 
had specific policies on Winter Maintenance, Network Management Duty, and 
Local Transport Plan (LTP). 
 
DCC encourage “information feeding”, where works promoters keep Elected 
Member informed about „highway works‟. Contact between Members and 
officers tend to be at the level of the Traffic Manager and head of highways, 
although local contacts are made at area offices where Members might direct 
any queries. 
 
With regard to „street works‟, DCC use random sample compliance at the three 
set categories of inspection (A – signing, lighting and guarding; B – the 
reinstatement within six months of completion; C – the reinstatement at the end 
of the guarantee period) as a performance measure, and the Traffic Manager‟s 
Unit have developed their own performance measures document, but this does 
not sit at a corporate level. They give feedback to utilities on a quarterly basis, 
looking at the level of noticing compliance, co-ordination compliance, and 
feedback on the results of inspections. They have no set tolerances, unlike 
Cornwall Council, which have set tolerances for performance and failure then 
leads, for example, to the issuing of Fixed Penalty Notices (FPNs). DCC use a 
number of tools – “...not always the stick” – including speaking to the works 
promoter to get an agreed improvement. However, continued poor performance 
does lead to DCC giving FPNs. The last resort is prosecution, where they would 
first apply the “public interest” test. 
 
DCC also uses core-sampling of reinstatements as a performance measure. 
They have had a coring programme in place for about 8 years, with cores taken 
from footway as well as carriageway reinstatements, and compliance levels 
currently have 55-60% passing, with failures due particularly to poor compaction 
and air voids within the reinstated layers. When asked how contractors 
explained this poor level of performance, the SHCO  considered that all utilities 
“...buy-into the need for “best practice” to look at all aspects of „street works‟” 
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but, for DCC, the big one is the need to concentrate on reinstatement where 
“...people think that if it‟s flat, black and shiny it‟s OK”. There is an issue with the 
“Specification for the Reinstatement of Openings in Highway”, in that it is an 
end-performance specification, i.e. “...it doesn‟t tell you how to do it, just what it 
should be like at the end”. Utility companies in the South West are now 
producing a DVD to help their contractors, who “...are more twitchy than utilities 
as they get penalised by their client [for failures]” The SHCO concluded that, 
with regard to the problem of poor reinstatements, it was all about training – 
people can get their accreditation after 5 days training with no prior knowledge 
or experience. 
 
The SHCO also identified staff turnover at the utility companies and contractors 
as a contributor to poor performance, with turnover being high at ground level 
but not so much at office/planner level. This high level of turnover was thought 
to affect performance due to the loss of experience and knowledge. In dealing 
with poor performance, prosecutions by DCC were the norm to address poor 
performance in signing, lighting and guarding, and this was identified as leading 
to improvements.  Core sample failures are now being considered for 
prosecutions as a last resort. 
 
When asked about the extent that as an individual they felt that they could 
influence policy, the SHCO identified that communication links within the council 
had improved and so everyone could input to policies that did not need to go 
through committee. DCC have developed a “stepped approach” to „street 
works‟, based on the experience and involvement of a lot of long-standing 
officers. Historically, DCC had prosecuted rigorously and routinely for breaches 
of street work regulations, which resulted in improvements in some areas but 
not in others. However, this was not a directive from corporate policy – as long 
they get compliance they can use the appropriate tools. DCC do not do so 
many prosecutions now. About 5 years ago they were prosecuting utility 
companies for failures to comply with signing, lighting and guarding 
requirements at „street works‟ sites, and this approach was felt to have led to an 
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improvement in the level of compliance by utility companies and their 
contractors. 
 
When asked about whether prosecuting affected the nature of the relationship 
between the utility companies and their contractors and the council, the SHCO 
felt that “... it must have an effect but not necessarily negative – it‟s about the 
professionalism of the utility company and the council”. By the time companies 
are in court “...it‟s the last resort, so if you‟ve got to that point there‟s a problem”. 
Companies would have previously been informed about poor performance and 
discussions held with the intention of “... let‟s get it right next time”. Utility 
companies were thought to have respect for DCC‟s traffic management team 
because they were direct about how they expected things to operate and the 
tolerances. DCC supports a “best practice” forum and had a training event for 
the new reinstatement specification where 70 people attended, learning 
together to get a consistent approach. 
 
In addition, DCC demonstrate that they are open about what they are doing and 
being reasonable, including having the same approach for their own „roadworks‟ 
term contractor. Where there is a failure to comply by the term contractor, the 
head of highways and head of term maintenance contract sit together in 
“tribunal” as if they were magistrates and give fines. The resulting “virtual 
money” sits in “virtual account” to be used in a number of areas, including other 
highway schemes or for purchasing PPE (personal protection equipment such 
as high-visibility clothing and safety boots. This not only benefits the public and 
provided better tools for Unit‟s inspectors, it has also helped with utility side to 
show that there is complete parity of treatment between promoters of 
„roadworks‟ and „street works‟ and that the rules apply equally to both sides 
 
The issue of dealing with the council‟s own works promoting departments was 
further explored, and the SHCO identified that there had initially been a massive 
culture change over the previous 30-40 years of divisional surveyors saying 
“this is my area and I can do what I want”. When the new team set up in DCC, 
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people perceived that here was a new team, who were not their necessarily 
engineers, “...looking over shoulders and telling them what to do”. Where this 
relationship was initially negative, it is now perceived to be a good relationship. 
Everything that the „roadworks‟ promoter wants to do goes through the Traffic 
Management Team, including early starts and estimates for extending the 
duration of works. “...Some people are OK with it, some not” but the benefits of 
co-ordination have been identified, including avoiding having works dug-up by 
utility companies and getting all works done under one road closure, thereby 
saving money, work, consultation time, and a joint approach to town councils 
and elected members. However, utilities do not always have funding available 
to do schemes before or at the same time as DCC, so the council‟s works might 
have to be deferred, so there needs to be some flexibility and this can have 
implications for the authority‟s finances and budget carry-overs. 
 
9.2.2.1.2 Regional HAUC, Joint Chair‟s Authority 
When asked about the authority‟s policies regarding „highway works‟, the Street 
Works Manger (SWM) commented that “... written down, we probably haven‟t”. 
There is an expectation that the council‟s own „roadworks‟ should be noticed in 
accordance with the requirements of the Traffic Management Act, and this is 
included in the contract with their term contractor, and compliance is included in 
their Key Performance Indicators, so failure to perform noticing-wise means that 
the term contractor loses part of their bonus. 
 
Regarding „street works‟, there are “...different agreements with different people 
over time but then they refer back to legislation”, so, for example, SWHAUC 
have a coring policy, and there are documents which set out principles, but 
there are no local agreements. 
 
When asked about the influence or impact that Elected Members have on how 
the authority deals with „highway works‟, the SWM commented that “they do 
come to us if they are complaining and they are not always as positive as they 
could be. You tend to deal with an elected member when there‟s an issue. 
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Members tend not to be interested until there is something in the local press 
about „highway works‟ that is negative or that people have complained about”. 
 
Elected Members are briefed on large schemes by the authority‟s works 
department on their capital programme. They are informed when there are 
going to be major utility works in their area but still perceive them to be bad, 
asking “... why have you let them do it like that, why are you letting them close 
that road?”. 
 
With regard to any annual reports on „street works‟, the Street Works Team 
report on their coring programme, where core samples are taken from a 
reinstatement in order to assess whether the materials used and compaction of 
the layers of material comply with the national specification, and annual reports 
go to the Cabinet and council which “...might have a few lines in about „street 
works‟”. 
 
The SWM‟s authority does not see themselves as one that would prosecute for 
„street works‟ offences, in contrast to Devon who, according to the SWM, are 
“...very rigorous prosecutors of S65 [signing, lighting and guarding] offences”. 
They try instead to negotiate and “...almost shame them into improving by 
photographic evidence”.  They have rigorously served Fixed Penalty Notices in 
order to improve notice quality, and report that most of the utilities that they deal 
with are up to 98-99% compliance.  
 
The SWM has identified a need for additional staff in order to deal with utility 
companies and their contractors – not co-ordinators but inspectors, to be on site 
to deal with quality issues relating to reinstatements and remedial works. The 
Road-space Co-ordinators deal with enquiries from members of the public and 
requests from works promoters for early starts and revised durations. 
 
When asked about the extent they as an individual could affect policies and 
strategies relating to „highway works‟, the SWM replied that “...it‟s up to me 
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really”. Examples of initiatives introduced by the SWM include starting a coring 
programme, introducing the use of hand-held inspection devices, and approving 
different types of materials for reinstatements. The Director works on the next 
landing and the SWM has access to the Director via meetings and e-mails. 
 
As a member of national working groups, people seek advice from the SWM, 
leading to a conclusion that different areas have different ways of dealing with 
„street works‟. Nationally Scotland, Wales and NI all have their own, devolved 
legislation. English authorities are all working to the same legislation but all 
authorities seem to do things differently. 
 
Looking at the relationship between the departments that promote „roadworks‟ 
on behalf of the council, the SWM admitted that the relationship was “...a bit of a 
roller-coaster”, with people saying that “...your team is costing us money 
because you‟re imposing conditions on us” and complaining about the 
conditions. 
 
The Street Works Team is part of the authority‟s Integrated Transport Unit, and 
so have a duty to the public transport operator, who gets funding from the 
council to pay for providing bus services, to prioritise getting busses through 
„roadworks‟ sites. The SWM reported that the authority‟s work promoting 
department as saying that without TMA-compliance a job would cost £2k but 
with TMA would cost £2.2k.  
 
The authority has defended its use of TMA to keep traffic moving and better 
approach to jobs more professionally than just turning up to do a job. The SWM 
feels that the council‟s performance has been influenced by the need for TMA 
compliance. At the inception, the authority‟s works contractor saw TMA as a 
nuisance but their people who deal with performance saw it as a way of saying 
“we need to do this to comply”. The term contractor started off doing badly but 
has improved recently and things seem to be coming together more 
successfully because they can see the benefits of TMA through better planning. 
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Looking at the benefits and costs of the relationship, the SWM commented that 
financial costs are an issue, where compliance can add considerable costs to a 
scheme. Current noticing arrangements for „highway works‟ was perceived by 
the SWM as being an “...administrative nightmare – if you get the systems right 
it‟s OK but setting the systems up can be difficult, as can getting contractors to 
use the systems”. 
 
9.2.2.1.3 Summary of Street Authority Policies and Procedures 
The policies adopted by the street authorities interviewed in the Devon area in 
relation to their policies on utility „street works‟ and authorities‟ „roadworks‟, and 
targets and measures, and the findings are summarised in Table 9.3 below: 
 
Table 9.3 Devon area – Street Authority Policies & Performance Measures 
Authority Street Works 
Policy 
Policy on 
Authority's own 
Roadworks 
Targets/Performance 
Measures 
Devon 
Operational and 
procedural 
guidance available 
to staff 
Parity of 
treatment with 
'street works' 
(i) Random sample 
inspection results for 
'street works'; (ii) 
Results supplemented 
by a programme of 
coring reinstatements 
 
 
Regional HAUC, 
Joint Chair’s 
Authority 
(i) Legislative 
requirements; (ii) 
Supplemented by 
operating 
agreements with 
utility companies 
Compliance 
with legislation, 
and this is 
written into 
contracts 
(i) Random sample 
inspection results for 
'street works'; (ii) 
Reinstatement coring 
results; (iii) Key 
performance indicators 
for 'roadworks' 
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9.2.2.1.4 Summary of Street Authority Policies and Procedures 
The interviewees were asked about (a) the level of political involvement in their 
regarding „highway works‟ and (b) the extent to which they were able to 
influence their organisation‟s policies relating to „highway works‟. The main 
points are set out in Table 9.4 below:  
 
Table 9.4 Devon Authorities - Policy Influence 
Authority Level of Political Involvement individual Ability to 
Influence Policy 
Devon 
(i) Street authority - members 
want to be kept informed about 
works/road closures that might 
affect their ward 
Council's approach to 
'street works' is based on 
experience of long-serving 
officers; all officers can 
input into the development 
of procedures. 
 
Regional HAUC, 
Joint Chair’s 
Authority 
(i) Highway authority - members 
are briefed about major works; 
(ii) Street authority - reports to 
members on quarterly 
performance and reinstatement 
coring; also responding to specific 
enquiries. 
Officer develops 
procedures for most 
aspects relating to 'highway 
works'. 
 
9.2.2.2 Utility Company 
9.2.2.2.1 Regional HAUC, Utility Chair Company 
The Major Projects Manager (MPM) was asked about policies or strategies 
within the company relating to „street works‟. They have a suite of policy 
documents that detail how various bits of legislation are dealt with, setting out 
who does what, so when there are changes to legislation if anyone wants to 
know what they should be doing they can look at the suite of documents. 
 
The company also have a set of performance monitors to give them feedback 
on how they are doing, including a monthly summary provided by the street 
works team. They also provide information to the National Joint Utilities Group 
(NJUG). The MPM said that had been concern nationally that there were 
assumptions and projections being made about the performance of utility 
companies, and so the utilities had decided to pool their information, “...so if 
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people are saying that too many jobs overrun then utilities can say “here‟s our 
data” showing how many jobs were done, how many overran, how many didn‟t 
and how many were extended”. The hope is that this information will help 
utilities to quantify where things are going well or not well. 
 
Managers get monthly key performance indicators, including the numbers of 
faults and interruptions to customers, because the company is incentivised by 
the regulator to reduce these, and information on noticing performance, 
including potential Fixed Penalty Notice offences to look at “...how we can stop 
that happening”. 
Policies and strategies within the business are normally developed via the 
MPM, as they have the delegated the responsibility for „street works‟. The MPM 
attends SWHAUC and Energy Networks Association (ENA), which has a „street 
works‟ group made up of representatives from other electricity companies. The 
MPM feels that this is a good network to have: it allows formal and informal 
communications and is helpful because there are different interpretations to 
„street works‟ by different authorities. The MPM explained that a team could do 
four jobs in a day, working in four different authority areas, with the authority‟s 
inspectors having different views as to how the job should be done. The ENA is 
an opportunity to share best practice, looking at legislation that is coming 
through and “...how we are going to deal with it”, and what the ENA can do to 
represent the businesses at NJUG in dealing with National HAUC. 
 
The MPM also attends national HAUC meetings, along with the highways-side 
chair, and they both do this on behalf of the South West region. The two have 
agreed to both speak on behalf of the South West, not just a utility or highway 
authority representatives, and are trying to have a combined approach and 
common view across all authorities and utilities in the region when it comes to 
major issues. The MPM did say that the two joint chairs can argue about “...the 
little stuff and day-to-day issues” but wanted to have a common approach to 
things like fixed penalty notices, and cited the example of where NJUG and 
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JAG(UK) had both produced their own separate documents, there was now a 
combined HAUC(UK) document. 
The MPM was asked what the main areas were that drove the company‟s 
„street works‟ policies and strategies. The company wants to be a world-leading 
company proving the best customer service at the best price, which applies to 
everything they do, so if they were not complying with „street works‟ legislation 
then it would impact on the customer. In order to achieve this, people within the 
company need to do what they do well, and do it right first time, which applies to 
„street works‟ noticing as much as it does to carrying out the works. The 
objective is to integrate „street works‟ requirements into jobs to make it easy for 
them. IT systems can deal with a lot of the detail, so the notice can be validated 
in the background by the systems with people checking it before it goes out. 
 
The MPM identified Fixed Penalty Notices (FPNs) as helping to drive 
improvement in noticing performance for the company and other works 
promoters. Discussions about interpretations of potential FPN offences have 
also resulted in improvement. However, “technical” FPN‟s, for example, where a 
notice might have only been sent a few minutes late, were not helpful. The 
MPM was trying to get consistency across highway authorities on interpretation 
of FPN offences, because this has a consequence for the noticing procedure 
and processes. 
 
The company has been in discussion with the regulator about a price review for 
the next five years, and „street works‟ legislation was part of that discussion. 
The company needed to make clear to the regulator that, for example Permit 
schemes would bring unavoidable costs because, unlike with overrun(Section 
74) charges which could be avoided by “...doing things right”, permit fees relate 
to how many jobs were done. So the regulator needs to be aware that the 
permit fee will be added to connection fee, and the company‟s income comes 
solely from the customer. 
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The MPM said that there were inconsistencies between the regulator‟s 
timescales and noticing requirements, noting that there was no “joined-up” 
Government, with one branch of Government producing regulations for roads 
and transportation and another that regulates businesses down to minimum 
cost, and if for better transport there is a cost it should be coming back through 
the regulator. The regulator wants people to be able to get a supply within a 
certain timescale but the timescales do not always match up to „street works‟ 
noticing timescales. 
 
When asked about the extent to which as an individual they felt that they could 
influence the company‟s policies and strategies relating to street works, the 
MPM felt that this was the case “...to a very large extent because the input on 
„street works‟” was focussed through them. It was the MPM‟s job – using their 
experience of the business – to act as that focal point to evaluate all the things 
that were coming through from the „street works‟ area, how it was going to 
impact on the business and how best to shape the business to best deal with 
that and continue to operate efficiently and well on behalf of the customer. This 
has led to the development of good systems for managing work and integrating 
„street works‟, and being set up for the future in terms of things that can be 
foreseen, where systems might need to be modified but still keeping a good 
service for the customer. 
 
If anything looks like coming along that would impact badly on the customer 
then MPM would “...make a fuss” through senior managers, and make 
representations to the regulator and pressure groups such as NJUG, HAUC, to 
try and do something about it. 
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9.2.2.2.2 Summary of Utility Company Policies and Procedures 
The utility interviewee in Devon was asked about their company‟s policy drivers, 
and performance measures, with regard to „street works‟ and these are 
summarised in Table 9.5 below: 
 
Table 9.5 Devon area – Utility Policies and Performance Measures 
Utility Policy Stance Policy Drivers Targets/Performa
nce Measures 
Electricity 
Compliance with legislation; 
company aim to be a world-
leading company proving 
the best customer service 
at the best price 
Regulator 
(Ofwat) 
requirements 
Management 
information and 
KPI 
 
9.2.2.2.3 Policy Influence 
In the interview, the utility company representative was asked about the extent 
to which they felt that they could influence their organisation‟s policies relating 
to „street works‟, and about the extent to which company directors were 
“interested” in „street works‟ issues in order to compare with the level of political 
“interest” in local authorities. The details are summarised in Table 9.6 below: 
 
Table 9.6Devon area – Utility Policy Involvement 
Utility Director 
Involvement 
individual Ability to Influence Policy 
Electricity Yes 
Yes, including within the company and within the 
region HAUC. ‘Street works’ compliance was the 
focus of their role 
 
9.2.3 Inter-organisational Relationships 
9.2.3.1 Street Authority 
9.2.3.1.1 Devon County Council 
With regard to relationships with the council‟s own works promoting 
departments, the Senior Highway Co-ordination Officer (SHCO) did not feel that 
there were any areas where there was a big enough extreme for performance to 
affect relationships with the Traffic Management Unit. 
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With regard to „street works‟, the SHCO felt that there was a fairly good 
relationship, although the difficulty now is that utilities contract-out so much of 
their work. So while relationships with utility companies are good, DCC are now 
looking to get good relationships with contractors, who are the organisations 
that on a day-to-day basis that are achieving, or are failing to achieve, 
performance. The SHCO will have meeting with utilities where there is a 
statutory obligation involved, for example where fines or charges are to be 
discussed, and will never allow utilities to devolve that responsibility, but is 
happy to speak to contractors about day-to-day operations. 
 
When asked about whether the relationship with utility companies and their 
contractors changed depending on performance, the SHCO considered that it 
depended on the utility company. Some companies get information to say that 
their performance has dropped and make certain changes, and want to speak 
to DCC and work with them to resolve the problems. Other companies are given 
information and DCC never hear from them, and “...with a couple of utilities it 
does have a negative effect. It depends on the culture of the organisation”. 
 
Looking at the key factors influencing the regional highway authorities and 
utilities committee, (SWHAUC), the SHCO said that it “...depends on who you 
get round the table, and who wants to buy into the process and improve” and 
that it was “...a culture thing for the company – some want officers to have a big 
involvement, some don‟t”. The SHCO felt that SWHAUC works well and has 
been better over last 12 months with new people attending and better feedback 
and involvement from national JAG (Joint Authorities Group) and HAUC. 
 
SWHAUC were looking to improve performance on „highway works‟ by focusing 
on the quality of reinstatements, trench-sharing agreements, and reducing the 
need for repeat visits. Reinstatement coring is standard agenda item. 
Everyone‟s opinion is listened to and delegates are given the opportunity to 
contribute, but “...stronger voices fair a little bit better”. The regional joint chairs 
attend national HAUC, which can be used as a forum for raising issues, with an 
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improved ability to communicate regional issues, and feedback on national 
issues is better. 
 
9.2.3.1.2 Regional HAUC, Joint Chair‟s Authority 
The Street Works Manager (SWM) characterised the relationship between the 
council as street authority and the utilities as being “...pretty good”. Even where 
there were issues then they could meet to discuss them.  The SWM recognised 
that “...each side can make the other‟s life difficult – that‟s why they need to 
come together to talk”. Utility companies were seen by the SWM as being good 
at “...trying to get people on side, trying new things, explaining about new 
developments”, for example, demonstrating a new barrier system where the 
utility invited an authority‟s inspector to go and have a look, and this was also a 
chance for utility inspectors to meet highway inspectors. 
 
The SWM mentioned that the water utility did more excavations than other utility 
companies but their standards of reinstatement and working practices were very 
good because they had listened to what officers had said. They had been 
prosecuted in past for safety breaches and they were horrified – “...if [the 
authority] are going to prosecute us then everybody is” but they came round 
and there has been a marked improvement. 
 
When asked whether the relationship with individual utilities changed depending 
on their level of performance, the SWM said that it did and cited the introduction 
of Fixed Penalty Notices (FPNs), where“...they didn‟t like that at the start but it 
did cause an improvement in noticing performance”. People working at the 
utilities tend to have been there a while so they know the authority‟s 
expectations. The SWM considered that “...this job is all about relationships. If 
you find you work well with people you‟ll tend to be a bit more forgiving if you 
can see that they are trying” but some people on the utility side were “to the 
letter” – no flexibility. 
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When asked about whether personal relationships had changed as a 
consequence of issuing FPNs or prosecutions, the SWM said “No. They see 
you‟re being serious about an issue. It focuses their minds and shows you‟re 
not going to ignore things”. The electricity utility has a Street Works Relationship 
Manager, demonstrating how seriously they take it and the importance of 
having people as a point of contact. 
 
Looking at the regional HAUC (SWHAUC), and the key factors that influence 
relationships between authorities and utilities, the SWM concluded that the 
forum was not as effective as they could be, with issues being raised that were 
not appropriate, for example, “...in 1993 you didn‟t send a notice for...” or just 
saying to a utility “...you‟re rubbish”. 
 
The SWM identified a number of mutually shared objectives at the regional 
HAUC, including being open and honest in order to come to a resolution about 
an issue, for example, the way in which FPNs are dealt with. Also, in looking for 
improvements penalties from the street authorities were not always the right 
way but “...money is the only way to drive improvements in this industry – it‟s 
the only way to get people to listen, e.g. S74, FPNs, (repeat) defects”.  
 
The SWM identified that the people who attended the regional HAUC had been 
involved for a long time, which could lead to increasing inflexibility (“...more so 
on the highways side”) because the utility representatives tended to move more 
frequently, because for them their job in „street works‟ was more likely to be a 
stepping-stone position and would be moving on. For the highways-side 
representatives there was the technical detail to get involved with, which draws 
people in. 
 
As the chair of a national working group, the SWM also sees things from a 
national perspective. With regard to „street works‟ regulations, the Department 
for Transport (DfT) does not help either side, although is seen to be more 
focussed on helping highway authorities than utilities. The DfT tend not to 
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advise on legislative problems, which leads to letting the courts decide (which is 
“...not helpful”), leading to additional legislation. The way in which civil servants 
move around departments means that at the DfT there is little or no continuity. 
The SWM felt that the DfT writes legislation which is then subject to 
interpretation and second-guessing when disputes or queries arise. At the 
moment, interpretation tended to come from London-centric organisations such 
as Transport for London (TfL), but the issues in London were not the same as 
for authorities and utilities outside London. As a way forward, the SWM said that 
practitioners, through JAG, JUG and HAUC (UK) should be involved in writing 
regulations for the DfT to comment on and then issue. The SWM also felt that 
there was a need to get the legislation that is already in place working rather 
than getting new legislation. 
 
9.2.3.1.3 Summary of Devon-area Authority Inter-organisational 
Relationships 
The street authority representatives were asked about the relationships with the 
works-promoting department, and implications for the authority‟s service 
delivery, and relationship with utility companies, and Table 9.7 below 
summarises the responses: 
 
Table 9.7–Devon – Street Authority Relationships 
Authority Relationship with own 
works promoting teams 
Implications for 
council service 
delivery 
Relationship with 
utilities 
Devon 
"Massive culture change" 
over the years; parity of 
treatment with both own 
works promoters and 
utility companies; no 
issues of concern 
Non-compliance 
results in "virtual 
fines" 
Fairly good with 
utility companies, 
now looking to 
develop with 
utility contractors 
 
Regional HAUC, 
Joint Chair’s 
Authority 
TMA requirements driven 
parity regarding noticing; 
perception that parity 
was costing money 
Financial 
implications for 
authority's term 
contractor for non-
compliance 
Need to be able to 
discuss issues; 
needs to be 
effective 
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9.2.3.1.3.1 Regional HAUC Relationships 
The street authorities‟ representatives in the Devon area were asked about 
relationships generally between authorities and utility companies at their 
respective regional HAUCs. Because street authorities are only one half of a 
regional HAUC, the findings will be summarised more fully below in section 
9.2.3.2.3 after the findings for utility companies have been examined. 
 
9.2.3.2 Utility Companies 
9.2.3.2.1 Regional HAUC, Joint Chair Company 
When asked about the nature of the relationship between their company and 
highway authorities, the Major Projects Manager (MPM) felt that it was “...pretty 
good” but did vary between highway authorities, with some being more keen to 
be co-operative, and some more keen to be directive. The differences, said the 
MPM, were due to the “...character of the people who are in charge at any one 
time. People have personalities and different characters and the world is richer 
for it”. On the whole, there were thought to be very good working relationship 
around the South West – “...but we have our moments and our disagreements, 
but who doesn‟t”? 
 
When asked further about the strict compliance in some authority areas and 
more collaborative and co-operative approach with others, the MPM said that at 
the moment there was a “best practice” group working in the Devon and 
Cornwall area, so it includes Devon and Cornwall, and the utilities and 
contractors working in the area. The group has been focussing on 
reinstatements and reinstatement standards, involving reinstatement 
contractors as well. Highway authorities also attended and brought information 
from their contractors because “…we‟re all working out there on the highway”, 
and, whilst the legislation is aimed at the utilities “…there‟s good practice out 
there that highways are doing so let‟s bring that in, and there‟s good practice 
that utilities are doing so let‟s bring that in, and that might help the highways do 
a bit better as well”. 
 
 343 
Within the South West “…everyone acknowledges that the focus on 
reinstatements has improved performance”. Devon Council had produced some 
coring results. Their approach for years had been very much “…if you step out 
of line we‟ll prosecute [and] ...if you don‟t come up to scratch we‟ll prosecute”. 
For years they had “…been beating [utility companies] over the head until we 
improve and things haven‟t really improved that much”. Their coring results had 
shown a 50-60% success rate, with the last set of coring results showing a 75-
88%% pass rate – “…the best figures we‟ve had”. According to the MPM, the 
conclusion that people were drawing was that working together was better than 
“…beating someone over the head with a big stick” but it was accepted that 
there was a need to get to the root cause of problems. 
 
When asked what it was like working with an organisation that “beats you over 
the head” and prosecutes, the MPM said that it was “…frustrating at times but 
[their company was] not hit often”. Each utility had its own characteristics. For 
example, most of the MPM‟s company apparatus was in the footway, and the 
bulk of its work is either new connections for customers or repairing cable faults. 
Other utilities, such as gas and water, have replacement programmes and their 
work was in the carriageway. The MPM believed that the highway authority 
focus was more on work in the carriageway because that was where most of 
the disruption arose. Devon had prosecuted a lot over the years but was 
possibly now more targeted.  
 
When asked whether it affect relationships with individuals if an authority 
prosecuted, the MPM felt that “…it‟s bound to a little bit but all our people in the 
business are professionals and it‟s not personal, it‟s business. Same from 
highway authority point of view. If it‟s an offence we‟ll agree it‟s an offence”. The 
utility point of view was that working together co-operatively to improve things 
was always going to be the better way than the confrontational approach. The 
MPM noted that everyone in the South West was working together co-
operatively. 
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Looking at the regional HAUC level, the MPM identified a number of key factors 
that influenced the relationship between utilities and authorities. These included 
an appreciation by all attendees – “more so in recent years” – that everyone 
was attending for the same reason: that highway authority and utility attendees 
were both passionate about „street works‟. There was increased realisation that, 
as group they were trying to achieve the same things, and it was about 
attendees influencing others in the utility companies and highway authorities to 
also act in the same way. 
 
There was a particular concentration on reinstatements in a street. Whether it 
was done by highway authorities or utilities, it involved asking for a hole to be 
dug and filled in again, and sometimes the same contractor worked for both 
sides but the focus was different – utilities are subject to fines if they overrun but 
it is essentially the same type of work being done in the same way. Both sides 
want good reinstatement because of the long-term health of the highway, “…so 
anything we can learn from each other is beneficial”. 
 
The MPM said that SWHAUC was working towards a co-operative approach 
through the “good practice group” and initiatives being signed-up to, such as the 
agreement on FPN‟s. The spotlight had been on the financial side of „street 
works‟ involving costs to contractors, with authorities and utilities talking about 
charges and fines rather than focussing on what was going on in the highway. 
 
The MPM had mentioned that the joint chairs speak jointly about South West 
issues. The reasons for this included HAUC(UK) realising that they were 
detached from the regions, in that people would meet and talk about things but 
they would be the same people (‟street works‟ specialists), prompting them to 
ask  what impact was this was having on the ground in the regions and what 
influence the regions were having on the centre. This identified that there were 
issues that were important to the regions. The regional joint chairs now attend 
HAUC(UK) meetings, each feeding back what going in their patch, and DfT 
representatives also attend the meetings. HAUC(UK) is now producing more 
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advice notes – so co-operative as HAUC rather than separate JAG and JUG 
advice notes, which “…gets people singing off the same song sheet”. Utilities 
see the benefit of getting involved on the “ground floor” in order to be able to 
influence (“…hopefully for the better”) „street works‟ issues. 
 
When asked whether, at a national level, utilities felt picked-on by the DfT and 
Government, and whether there was an appreciation of what utilities have to do 
to maintain their networks, the MPM said that it was true, with the situation 
being “… a bit one-sided” - both highway authorities and utilities did work on the 
highway but the focus seemed to be on utilities but the public makes no 
distinction between who is doing the work. The MPM considered that „street 
works‟ legislation was fairly indiscriminate and ended up applying to every 
single „street works‟ job. However, they had “…to get on with it – if we can 
improve, let‟s improve”. 
 
9.2.3.2.2 Summary of Utility Inter-organisational Relationships 
The findings relating to utility company relationships in the Devon area with 
street authorities, and the drivers for them, are set out in Table 9.8 below: 
 
Table 9.8Devon area – Utility Relationships with Street Authorities 
Utility Relationship drivers Implications of 
relationship on utility 
service delivery 
Drivers for "going 
beyond" the legal 
minimum 
Electricity 
Varies between 
authorities - some 
are keen to be co-
operative, some to 
be directive. 
No job-specific issues 
but need to avoid 
getting to 
confrontational 
situation. 
Collaborative 
approach to 
identifying "best 
practice" has helped 
improve 
performance. 
 
 
9.2.3.2.3 Discussion about Regional HAUC relationships 
The inter-organisational relationships between street authorities and utility 
companies were discussed. This was in the context of the direct relationships 
between the two organisations. There is a further level at which relationships 
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between the organisations can be examined, and this is the regional HAUC 
forum. The individuals interviewed in the Devon area were the people from the 
respective organisations that attended the regional HAUC on behalf of their 
organisation. The findings from the interviews are summarised in Table 9.9 
below: 
 
 
 
9.2.3.2.4 Attitudes to Prosecution 
One of the reasons for selecting Devon County Council for research was their 
approach to „street works‟ which involved a considerable number of 
prosecutions of utility companies for offences under NRASWA. This was in 
contrast to the situation in Kirklees where there had been no recent 
Table 9.9Devon area – Regional HAUCs 
Authority/Utility Positive Factors Negative Factors Shared Objectives 
 
  
  
Devon 
(i) Depends on the 
people attending; 
(ii) Newer people 
starting to attend. 
(ii) Some 
organisations want 
their 
representatives to 
have a big 
involvement, some 
don't. 
(i) Improving 
performance, 
including 
reinstatements; (ii) 
Coring 
performance is a 
standard agenda 
item. 
 
Regional HAUC, 
Joint Chair’s 
Authority 
(i) Open and honest 
discussions; (ii) 
Good practice 
group;  
(i) Issued raised not 
always appropriate 
for the forum; (ii) 
Tendency to look 
back at past 
problems rather 
than being forward-
looking; (iii) Finance 
as the only way to 
drive 
improvements. 
(i) Need to resolve 
issues; (ii) Need to 
look for areas of 
improvement. 
 
Electricity 
(i) Shared purpose; 
(ii) Moving towards 
a more co-operative 
approach based on 
shared good 
practice. 
(i) Focus had been 
on the financial side 
- fines and charges - 
rather than on the 
works. 
(i) Everyone is 
trying to achieve 
the same 
outcomes; (ii) 
Getting the 
reinstatements 
done properly. 
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prosecutions. The findings from the interviews carried out in the Devon area are 
summarised in Table 9.10 below: 
 
Table 9.10 Devon area - Views on Prosecutions 
Authority/Utility Views on Prosecution 
Devon 
Not doing as many as were being done a few years ago for 
signing and guarding failures - did lead to improvement. 
 
Regional HAUC, 
Joint Chair’s 
Authority 
Prosecutions have driven improvement, not with 
reinstatements but with safety 
 
Electricity 
People have to go to court and pay the fines but it doesn't 
help to improve performance 
 
 
9.2.3.2.5 Views on the Legislation 
Although not part of the original semi-structured questions, at the end of the 
interviews when asked if there was anything that they would like to add that had 
not already been discussed, a number of the interviewees offered their views as 
to the “fitness for purpose” of the current legislation and what might be the next 
for legislation in terms of „highway works. The views are summarised in Table 
9.11 below: 
 
Table 9.11 Devon area–Views on Legislation 
Authority/Utility Views on Legislation Possible Next Steps 
 
  
Electricity 
(i) Legislation is indiscriminate - 
applies equally to all types of 
works on all roads; (ii) 
Authorities also carry out works 
but the focus is always on utility 
works. 
  
 
Regional 
HAUC, Joint 
Chair’s 
Authority 
(i) Legislation open to 
interpretation; (ii) Lack of clear 
direction from DfT 
(i) The ‘community’ needs to 
make the legislation work that it 
already has rather than getting 
new legislation. 
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9.3 Chapter Summary 
The findings indicated that authorities in the South West of England also 
structure their officers into „street works teams‟, with roles and responsibilities 
based around maintaining the local Street Works Registers, the co-ordination of 
works, and the inspection of works to monitor compliance with regulations by 
works promoters. In addition, DCC make reference to a „prosecution officer‟ 
role. 
 
The findings indicated that within authorities officers have discretion to develop 
policies and procedures, based upon their experience within the sector, and that 
elected members tend to prefer to be kept informed rather than wanting to direct 
policy. Similarly, within the utility company a manager was tasked with „street 
works‟ responsibilities and given the discretion to develop policies and 
procedures to enable their company to comply with „highway works‟ regulations. 
 
The findings show that authorities and the utility company rely on performance 
management information in order to drive performance information and, for the 
utility company, to further ensure compliance with regulations and so avoid 
either legal action or financial penalties as a consequence of failures to comply. 
 
The findings demonstrated, for both authorities and utilities, that legislation and 
regulations were ambiguous and open to interpretation, with implications for 
business processes on both sides. The findings also re-iterated issues with the 
“London-centric” focus of „highway works‟ regulations. 
 
At a regional level, the findings identified that in the past the focus had been on 
financial aspects of „highway works‟, including additional costs to utility 
companies in doing business, but that this was giving way more recently to 
identifying shared performance concerns and developing and sharing good 
practice to drive improvements. 
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Looking at attitudes to prosecutions, the findings demonstrated a difference in 
views as to whether legal action by authorities helped to improve utility 
performance. 
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Chapter Ten – London Interview Data Analysis 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter will analyse the data from the interviews carried out in London, and 
the finding will then be discussed in chapter 11. Interviews were carried out 
with: 
 An officer dealing with transportation policy issues at the Greater London 
Authority; and 
 An officer from Transport for London (TfL) with responsibilities for 
“surface interventions”. 
 
The interviews with authority officers in London were prompted by two main 
factors: (1) interviews already carried out for this study had indicated the 
significance of the management of „highway works‟ in London in shaping 
national legislation, and (2) the high-profile nature of the current Mayor of 
London in having „highway works‟ as a policy priority, as demonstrated by the 
early application for, and commencement of, a permit scheme for „roadworks‟ 
and „street works‟. 
 
The interviews that were carried out were undertaken using the “Street 
Authority” interview template to allow for data to be collected about: 
 The roles and responsibilities of the interviewee; 
 The organisation‟s policies relating to „highway works‟; and 
 The nature of the relationship between the interviewee‟s organisation 
and highway authorities and utility companies. 
 
10.2 Roles and Responsibilities 
10.2.1 Greater London Authority 
The officer interviewed at the Greater London Authority (GLA) is based in the 
Transport Team as a senior policy officer (SPO), whose role is to support the 
deputy mayor for transport on a number of briefs, including congestion and 
smoothing traffic flow, and a sub-component of this is the way the GLA 
 351 
manages road works. The current deputy mayor for transport has been in post 
since May 2011 and one of her four main priorities is “...managing road works 
as best as we can working with a range of stakeholders, so, internally, with TfL 
and also the Boroughs, who also have their own highway authority 
responsibilities, and also, crucially, with the utilities”.  
 
TfL is an agency of the Greater London Authority, and is responsible for the 
Transport for London Road Network (TLRN), which is about 5% of the roads in 
London but carries about 30% of traffic in the city, and also has about 10% of 
the road works. The TLRN roads are “key arteries and so have huge intrinsic 
importance to the way in which goods, services and people are moved across 
the city, and that‟s why we are aware of the impact that road works can have in 
terms of unnecessary disruption and also how road works can contribute to 
“severe” and “serious” disruption”. 
  
10.2.2 Transport for London 
At Transport for London (TfL), the person interviewed was the Head of Planned 
Intervention (HPI), with responsibility for the co-ordination of „roadworks‟ and 
„street works‟ throughout the TfL road network, i.e. the strategic roads, also 
known as the “red routes”. The HPI has responsibility for three teams: one that 
that does works co-ordination and permitting, one that that does inspection and 
enforcement, and then one looking at works compliance, i.e. imposing fines and 
overrun charges. The HPI also has responsibility for an operational analysis 
team, who look back at what has done to ensure that “...we learn the lessons”, 
as well as a forward planning team, who are looking forward in terms of 
schemes generated by TfL and major utility works, how they can be best co-
ordinated, and using techniques such as “heat maps” to identify areas that in 
two or three years are likely to be quite contentious in terms of trying to get 
works done but which would also put additional demand on the network. There 
are about 90 members of staff in all of these teams 
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10.2.3 Street Authority Roles and Responsibilities 
The interviews with street authority representatives in London are summarised 
in Table 10.1 below: 
 
Table 10.1 London – Street Authority Roles & Responsibilities 
Authority 
Streetworks 
Team Functions Officers 
  
  (Y/N)     
Transport for 
London 
Y 
Street Works Register 
functions 
Works co-ordination and 
permitting team 
 
 
 
 
Inspection and 
enforcement team 
Works compliance team 
Operational analysis 
team 
  
    
Co-ordination of all 'highway 
works' 
 
  
    
Inspection of works 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
initiation of charges 
 
Reviewing previous activities 
 
  
    Identification of future works Forward planning team 
 
10.3 Policies and Influence 
10.3.1 Greater London Authority 
When looking at the policies and strategies that apply to the „highway works‟ in 
London, the Senior Policy Officer (SPO) noted that “...things have been 
improving for a number of years, and that started with the introduction of the 
London Permit Scheme and also the “code of conduct”. These were seen as 
being the two elements that enabled the Authority to improve the amount of joint 
working between works promoters and to improve the way they manage the 
works themselves on the road. The SPO went on to say that “... we need to 
evolve [these] tools and take them to the next level, so things like “lane rental” 
gives us much more influence than perhaps under permitting, which, in the 
same way, gave us more influence than under noticing. So, it‟s that continual 
progress, and that‟s what I‟m working on and what [the deputy mayor for 
transport] is leading on”. 
 353 
London‟s “code of conduct” sets out a number of areas where utility companies 
and authorities could demonstrate “best practice” in terms of managing road 
works, and relevant targets such as setting an aspiration for the level of joint 
working between works promoters and the number of days saved through joint 
working, and this is tied into the „cap‟ on works that has also been introduced. 
The „cap‟ was introduced and then tightened by 10% in 2011, and “do we want 
to tighten that again”. 
 
The main drivers on policy for „street works‟ and „roadworks‟ in London were 
identified by the SPO as being “... a political dimension, a press and media 
perspective, a business perspective, and ordinary people, and these are all 
different forms of stakeholder”. „Highway works‟ is a top issue for high-profile 
shopping areas where presentation is very important, where there is already 
constrained road space and people have to detour around sites to get into 
shops. This does not give a good impression, and has a reputational impact that 
costs businesses in their “bottom line”, and so businesses make it clear that 
road works have an actual impact on the way in which they conduct their 
business. More generally, businesses and the lobby groups are aware of the 
impact of congestion and journey-time reliability, which is a key thing for 
deliveries of goods and services. 
 
There is then the way in which these are “...reflected through the prism of the 
media”. Going back to some of the decision-making about introducing the „cap‟, 
internal discussions reflected external dialogue in the press, where, in a 
particular month, there was a peak in the number of works as utility companies 
were trying to complete works before their financial year end. People noticed 
the increase and there was a sense of “enough‟s enough”.  
 
The SPO noted that, when looking into the specific reports, the road works are 
uncoordinated and that “the utilities at the moment do set the agenda, and we 
can do much more to make it a more efficient process to reduce disruption, 
which has real economic costs, to make Londoners‟ lives better”. When asked 
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in what way he thought that utilities set the agenda, the SPO highlighted that 
the utilities are in “an incredibly powerful position at the moment in terms of the 
changes to the legislation that there have been”, including the number of utilities 
that are allowed to dig up the road, the circumstances in which they can, and 
the very limited circumstances in which highway authorities can refuse to allow 
„street works‟. The SPO considered that “the playing field is skewed towards an 
assumption that road works have to happen. Yes, they do but can we do more 
to plan?” One way proposed by the SPO for doing this was for utility companies 
to have forward plans for three or four years‟ time, and then “solidify them and 
get them out” so that highway authorities can co-ordinate works and get joint 
working. The SPO recognised that there were problems associated with getting 
this level of advance information, and that the process can get complicated, but 
that the problems should be outweighed by the benefits – benefits to road users 
in terms of having the road dug up only once and benefits to utility companies in 
terms of cost saving. 
 
However, the SPO did say that the policy agenda for „highway works‟ in London 
was also driven by politicians “in terms of changes to the status quo” because “if 
the mayor and deputy mayor were not pushing the issue there would be no 
changes”. When the current Mayor was first elected in 2008, it was on a clear 
manifesto of “smoothing traffic flow, and as a policy area there has been a lot of 
thought and focus to make that something concrete, tangible and real”. 
According to the SPO, London‟s permit scheme “code of conduct” and the „cap‟ 
to limit the number of works, show that the political impetus has resulted in 
change which has begun the process of improving the status quo, and that the 
mayor has demonstrated his personal commitment to the issue of „highway 
works‟. 
 
The SPO also noted the “political with a small „p‟ dialogue” between Londoners 
and their elected representatives, to then take policies and shape the way that 
organisations like TfL approach their management function, and utilise their 
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relationships with utilities, and that this “has brought a beneficial impact with 
regard to managing „street works‟”. 
 
The issues for London with regard to „street works‟, and links to other policy 
areas, highlighted by the SPO include the Olympics, which will be held in 
London in 2012. TfL will be operating the Olympic Route Network, to make sure 
that specific routes are kept clear. This will involve managing the number of 
works including banning planned works and doing intensive management of 
emergency works. There is also an agenda for smoothing traffic flow and what 
can be done to manage the 25% of congestion relating to „highway works‟ to 
works to manage the situation. With regard to smoothing traffic flows and 
effective capacity, the SPO noted that London operates on “an historic, often 
medieval, road layout. Compared to large cities in other counties, it has 
relatively narrow streets, doesn‟t have a grid pattern so there is less in-built 
redundancy in the network, so if there‟s disruption at a particular point it can 
have severe ramifications”. That awareness and sensitivity of the network 
shapes the importance and political priority given to road works. The SPO 
posed the question as to whether it was “the most appropriate use of the road 
space to hand it over to road works? No. So, what do we do? We know the 
works have to happen but can we make them happen in a smaller envelope, 
can we make them happen much quicker and less frequently by promoting co-
ordination and joint working”. 
 
The SPO noted that there were some stakeholders “who are a bit more 
resistant and taking longer to bring along” because “every organisation has 
limited resources and has different priorities, and you rarely get a perfect 
alignment of priorities and resource. It‟s about going out and explaining to 
people why it‟s important – to you and them – and what the benefits in their own 
terms might be. Part of the argument for joint working isn‟t just that it causes 
less disruption for road users; it‟s also in the long-term it will be a saving for 
utilities”. 
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The “code of conduct” mentioned earlier was a voluntary code agreed by the 
GLA, the London Boroughs and by the six main utilities. It was negotiated 
initially with “London Councils”, which is an umbrella organisation for the 32 
London Boroughs, the City of London and the GLA/TfL. Currently, 20 of the 
Boroughs are signed up to the code of conduct plus the six main utilities. 
 
When asked how did they had managed to get the utilities to sign up to the 
code, the SPO noted that “TfL, because of its size, its resources, and its strong 
political links through the Mayor‟s Office at quite a high level, has much more 
influence over the utilities”. They have regular meetings and have built up 
relationships at high levels, including chief executive, and so have been able to 
influence the thinking in the utility companies and persuade them that this was 
“a good thing to come on board with”. The SPO acknowledged that “the 
London-wide organisations have in-built advantages”. Feedback from the 
Boroughs to TfL has included that the utilities are perceived to do what TfL 
wants, give them the best gangs, and have the communication links, for 
example, telephone contacts with organisation‟s chief executives, but this was 
not the same for the Boroughs. The Mayor is currently looking at how the 
influence he has can be used for the broader benefit for all of the different 
authorities in London, and for the relationships between the Boroughs and 
utilities. 
 
The SPO was asked about feedback from utility companies about how the 
different requirements for working, for example, increased requirements for 
evening working in order to comply with the “code of conduct” and the permit 
scheme, fit in with the need for them as private companies to maximise profits. 
The SPO acknowledged that this was a key debate with “lane rental”, where the 
big concern was that all that would happen would be that the charges would just 
be passed on to the consumer. So, in addition to working with utilities, “we‟ve 
now started a separate track of work to work very closely with the regulators, to 
explain what we‟re doing, what we expect from the utilities, and why there are 
different charges in place, including the cost of permits, penalty charges for 
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non-compliance or working without a permit, and, in future, lane rental charges. 
We‟ve explained why we‟re introducing them and that lane rental is a targeted, 
flexible scheme that applies at certain times at certain key parts of the network, 
and trying to make the case to the regulators to not allow these costs to be 
passed on because utilities are being inefficient and having a huge impact on 
the road network, and the only way for us to influence over them and have 
leverage is if they have to absorb these costs into their “bottom line”. If they can 
just pass them on, they have no incentive to change their behaviour”. 
 
The SPO was asked how much scope or influence they had on policies and 
strategies, and replied “a lot, I would say” and that this reflected how the deputy 
mayor for transport empowered people: “she wants you to go out there and find 
out what‟s going on, to come with ideas, to go and talk to people at TfL and 
influence things. Then, of course, you have to bring them back to her as the 
decision-maker and, with other decision-makers, there needs to be a 
discussion. Having a “seat at the table”, attending key meetings along with 
senior TfL officers, the deputy mayor and others, you have an influence and an 
equal voice and you stand on the merits of your ideas, your arguments or the 
evidence that you bring to the table”. 
  
The SPO was asked whether the additional measures described earlier, i.e. the 
„cap‟ and the “code of conduct”, suggest that the national legislation did not suit 
London‟s situation. The SPO commented that the „cap‟ was made under the 
Mayor‟s network management duty but that there are other powers that the 
utility regulators held which allowed utilities to undertake certain types of work 
and they have the right of access to their assets, meaning they have the right to 
dig up the roads. So there was a potential conflict between the two types of 
legislation which might limit the extent to which improved work practices, joint 
working, good practice and innovation could be promoted, and getting away 
from the assumption that works had to be done according to the utilities‟ 
schedule and so take into account the needs of other road users and to 
minimise disruption. 
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The SPO noted that there was willingness in the utility companies, especially 
amongst their senior management, to do better because “it‟s good for them in 
terms of PR and customer management engagement. They don‟t want their 
reputations damaged by being seen as the people who continually dig up the 
roads, so we‟re pushing on an open door”. The complexity comes in where 
utility companies have existing processes and, like any organisation, there is 
inertia regarding change and “you need the right people in the organisation to 
be told and then follow through to behaviours. So just because you convince the 
chief executive doesn‟t mean that it‟s going to improve overnight but that‟s a 
very important part of the picture but it‟s about changing the approach 
throughout the company and embedding it in their DNA, and then it goes right to 
the bottom to the site manager and the person digging the hole ...It‟s about 
main-streaming the approach but the consistency isn‟t there yet, and that‟s the 
next part”. 
 
When asked about any consequences if road works targets are not met, the 
SPO said that there were consequences in terms of the overall network 
management duty because “if we don‟t properly manage road works then we 
lose one of the tools for managing congestion on the road network, and the 
road network is such a delicate ecosystem, which is under increasing pressure 
that we can‟t “drop the ball” like that. If we did then, in addition to the real-world, 
economic impact for London, and the impact on the different kinds of road 
users, there would be a political impact for the occupant of City Hall. An 
effective Mayor is one who has a good handle over all the different policy levers 
available to him to being about the best management of the road network. The 
reality is that it‟s incredibly complicated and everyone makes it sound easy and 
it‟s not. It‟s all about a lot of difficult choices”. 
 
10.3.2 Transport for London 
When asked about the policies and strategies that TfL had with regard to „street 
works‟ and „roadworks‟, the Head of Planned Interventions (HPI) identified their 
overriding policy as being to mitigate the disruption caused by those works on 
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their network. The current Mayor has a policy of smoothing traffic flow and this 
feeds down to TfL in terms of a “road works pledge”, which was launched on 21 
September 2011, which contains “basic tenets that we follow”, such as: keeping 
sites safe and tidy; have the works take-up a little space as possible; make sure 
that there is always activity on site and if there is not activity then explain why, 
for example, concrete curing; ensure that works are done as efficiently as 
possible, so 24-hour working where possible and, if there are residents in the 
vicinity of the works, liaising with the environmental health department. 
 
TfL measure congestion on the Transport for London Road Network (TLRN) by 
reference to “serious” and “severe”: “serious” is essentially three minutes of 
queuing without any movement, and “severe” is five minutes of queuing without 
movement.  This is over and above the norm for that street, and some parts of 
the network, for example, the Blackwall Tunnel usually already has three 
minutes queuing. 
 
In 2009, the London Mayor launched a voluntary “code of conduct for road 
works”, which includes both „streets works‟ and „roadworks‟, and this code was 
signed up to by five of the six major utilities and TfL in April 2009. There was an 
updated version in February 2010 and the sixth major utility joined in at that 
time. This means that approximately 95% of works on the TLRN are covered by 
the code. 
 
When it was first launched, the “code of conduct” described working towards a 
permit scheme, and the London Permit Scheme is now in effect, but the code 
also addressed other issues such as sharing good practice, sharing coring 
results, promoting first-time reinstatements, increasing the number of 
collaborative works, and having more works carried out outside peak hours. 
 
The HPI identified the “code of conduct” and the permit scheme as being “key 
tools in our armoury to drive down disruption caused by road works”. A potential 
future tool is “lane rental”, where TfL in November 2011 had just finished a 
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consultation, working closely with the DfT, and are “very keen to be a pioneer 
for an avoidable and targeted “lane rental” scheme”. There was a “lane rental” 
scheme operated in 2004 – in two authority areas, Camden and in 
Middlesbrough – “but [the scheme] was neither targeted – it included every 
single road – and it wasn‟t avoidable – it applied 24 hours a day”. The TfL “lane 
rental” proposal would cover approximately 57% of the TLRN and then only at 
certain times of the day. The proposed TfL “lane rental” scheme is data-driven, 
in that they have analysed their network and identified those stretches of road 
and pinch-points that are most susceptible to disruption by road works.  
 
The HPI was asked about how political oversight worked between TfL and the 
London Mayor, and said that TfL was an agency of the Mayor‟s office. The 
Mayor has a team around him for different areas, including a transport advisor, 
who is also a deputy mayor. TfL came into existence in 2000, and brought 
together a number of predecessor organisations, including London 
Underground, London buses, transport control systems, parts of the Highways 
Agency and a number of disparate organisations. The current TfL commissioner 
is driving for there to be “one TfL”, and it wants to connect with their customers, 
who are anyone that lives in London or visits London”. 
 
Political oversight in TfL is on a daily basis through conversations with the 
Mayor‟s office and regular, weekly meetings where „highway works‟ issues are 
discussed. There are also network tours on a regular basis, which involves 
officers and politicians going out in a mini-bus, with the chief operating officer. 
There are 23 “corridors” on the TLRN and a different one is done each month. 
The HPI commented that “It is challenging but at the same time you know that 
you‟ve got their support. If there‟s a problem, they can just pick up the phone to 
the utility company‟s chief executive”. 
 
The HPI was asked about how TfL‟s policies fitted in with the national 
legislation, e.g. NRASWA and TMA, and whether he saw a need to go beyond 
what‟s in the legislation. It was felt that although the legislation a good platform 
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to work from, the London Mayor felt that he needed something extra, which was 
the start of the work on the “code of conduct”. Then, in 2010, the London Permit 
Scheme was brought in. In March 2010, London experienced an increase in the 
number of works being carried out within a 4-week reporting period. This was 
picked up by the press and the Mayor said that he wanted a „cap‟ on the 
number of road works, i.e. to reduce the number of works by 20% in any 4-week 
period. The high-point figure in London in March 2010 was 5,212 works and this 
was reduced by 20% in April 2010 by informing all works promoters, including 
TfL‟s own, of the „cap‟. The utility companies had some issues with the 
introduction of the „cap‟ and cited their own legislative and regulatory 
requirements, but were informed that, in London, there would be no more than 
4,170 works in any 4-week period on the network. The „cap‟ was developed 
under the network management duty placed on authorities under the TMA to 
ensure that traffic moves “expeditiously” and has not been challenged by utility 
companies. Since its introduction, TfL have never had to refuse a permit to a 
utility on the basis of the „cap‟. In October/November 2010, TfL‟s own promoters 
were asked to put back to the next period a very few number of their non-
essential works. 
 
According to the HPI, what was absolutely key in dealing with managing works 
under the „cap‟ was “having a strong [Street Works] Register and a strong 
analysis team, who produce statistics at about 2.30/3.00 pm every day, which 
goes out to all the co-ordination officers and all internal work promoters, broken 
down by area and by TfL and utility works, and the „cap‟ is also broken down by 
week and by area”. The information goes to the TfL internal works promoters 
and so has helped to change their behaviour. Utilities do not get to see this 
internal information but they would be informed if they were anywhere near their 
individual level under the „cap‟. In September 2011, to coincide with the Mayor‟s 
road works plan, the „cap‟ was reduced by a further 10%, and so is now 3,753 
works in a 4-week period.  
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The MPI noted that the „cap‟ had enabled TfL to manage the “hockey stick” 
profile of works on the highway where utility works fall off at Christmas and then 
pick up again in the new year. TfL said to their own works promoters not to plan 
works in January, February and March but to bring them forward, and they have 
done. TfL have also tried to get more work done in the summer holidays, when 
traffic reduces by about 10%, and are also trying to challenge the strongly-held 
belief that organisation cannot do any works over Christmas period, taking into 
account moratoria in shopping and residential areas, where this might be easier 
on the TLRN because TfL have fewer residents per kilometre than other local 
authorities. The HPI reported that the actual number of works had not reduced 
by a huge amount but the arrangements put in place in London allow them to be 
spread out over the year, so the number in any 4-week period has reduced by 
the „cap‟ level of 20%. 
 
TfL meet with the utilities every month at director-level, chaired by the TfL chief 
operating officer, with meetings occasionally attended by the Mayor‟s transport 
advisor and representatives of the London Boroughs. The HPI noted that there 
had been a change of attitude from works promoters. Works durations and 
working methods had been challenged, the number of works was subject to the 
„cap‟, and promoters make sure that the Planned Interventions team “are happy 
with what they are doing”. As an example of this change of attitude, the HPI 
stated that all surfacing works were now done at night “except the „noisy‟ parts”, 
which are done during the day. There is a cost to doing this but it means that 
Londoners don‟t suffer the social cost of the congestion that would be 
engendered if the works were done during the day. Most utilities and authorities 
think “what‟s the easiest way for me to do this work” not “what‟s the best way for 
me to do it and keep the road open”. This is about pedestrians as well as 
vehicles. “It‟s a different mind-set”. 
 
This change of mind-set was considered by the HPI to be a combination of the 
introduction of the “code of conduct” and the permit scheme. The “code of 
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conduct” was voluntary, so “it wasn‟t in the forefront as it might have been, but 
the permit scheme really did focus minds and it made them think”.  
 
According to the HPI, the “code of conduct” set a platform which the permit 
scheme built on, and “lane rental” is proposed to build on that even more. Lane 
rental will be another change in the way in which they treat the works and 
approach the works. 
 
10.3.4 Summary of Street Authority Policies and Procedures 
The policies and procedures identified in the London interviews in relation to 
utility „street works‟ and authorities‟ „roadworks‟, and the targets and 
performance measures adopted, are summarised in Table 10.2 below: 
 
Table 10.2 London - Street Authority Policies and  Performance Measures 
Authority Street Works 
Policy 
Policy on 
Authority's own 
Roadworks 
Targets/Performance 
Measures 
Transport for 
London 
(i) London Permit 
Scheme; (ii) Code 
of Conduct; (iii) 
Road works Pledge 
(i) London Permit 
Scheme; (ii) Code 
of Conduct; (iii) 
Road works Pledge 
(i) Random sample 
inspection results for 
'street works'; (ii) 
Congestion 
measures; (iii) Road 
works ‘cap’ 
 
10.3.5 Policy Influence 
The interviewees were asked about (a) the level of political involvement in their 
regarding „highway works‟ and (b) the extent to which they were able to 
influence their organisation‟s policies relating to „highway works‟. The main 
points are set out in Table 10.3 below:  
 
Table 10.3 London - Street Authorities - Policy Influence 
Authority Level of Political Involvement individual Ability to 
Influence Policy 
Transport for 
London 
Involvement of the London 
Mayor and the deputy mayor for 
transport. 
Both officers interviewed 
described their influence. 
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10.4 Inter-organisational Relationships 
10.4.1 Greater London Authority 
The Senior Policy Officer was asked about how the relationship with the 
Department for Transport (DfT) worked and replied that everyone had their 
relationships at different levels and everyone had to play their part. So, for 
example, with the recent “lane rental” consultation, the mayor and deputy mayor 
could liaise with the DfT‟s special advisors and the minister because they had 
that relationship and, by doing this, it made it easier at other levels. The DfT 
recognise that “London and TfL in particular often has a bit more resource, a 
bigger problem, and often because of the size of the problem you need a bigger 
solution which you can then adapt and trial in other part of the UK. So, we‟re a 
natural laboratory and it‟s a positive relationship with a lot of back and forth”. 
 
When asked whether works promoters and authorities in London have shared 
values about „highway works‟, the SPO felt that “increasingly, they are 
converging”. There are issues with the culture of the gangs doing the works in 
terms of working practices, for example, ensuring that some of the teams on 
site keep working during permitted hours, rather than all going for breaks at the 
same time. Similarly, with regard to the traditional Christmas “shut-down”, 
where works stop for two or three weeks. Over Christmas, the motorway 
network might be busy as people travel to visit family but other parts of the 
London road network are less disrupted, giving opportunities to do works and 
have less disruption on people. These are examples of works being structured 
and phased around the people carrying them out. Another of the SPO‟s areas of 
responsibility is the London Underground, where all the engineers and the 
people doing maintenance work there work at night, with shift patterns for 
weekend working, and they are rewarded for that in their terms and conditions, 
and this reflects the “working reality of the Tube where you can‟t be doing 
maintenance between 8.00 am and 4.00 pm”. This was highlighted by the SPO 
as an area where there is still a misalignment between what a highway authority 
might want and what works promoters and their contractors, and specifically the 
crews and gangs, want. 
 365 
Other than the utilities and authorities own works, the other key stakeholders 
with regard to „highway works‟ identified by the SPO included underground 
asset managers, i.e. those organisations that owned underground assets, 
“which is about 40 organisations, so it‟s a broader community than just the 
utilities”; those who use the road space; and those who are “disadvantaged by 
road space constraints, so retailers, cyclists and pedestrians; the Boroughs; 
contractors who do the works. It‟s a broad stakeholder community. We have a 
very passionate and increasingly influential cycling and pedestrian community in 
London”.  
 
The SPO was asked whether the developments in legislation showed that the 
previous legislation had not worked, and concluded that “it‟s not that it hasn‟t 
worked, it‟s a continual evolution. The need for the “lane rental” regulations was 
a recognition that under the previous legislation there had been the shift 
towards the default assumption that it was always for those owning 
underground assets should always be able to dig them up whenever they 
needed to”. When asked about future policy areas after “lane rental”, the SPO 
commented that the current “lane rental” proposals were “relatively small scale, 
and there will be an evolution with more schemes done by the Boroughs which, 
over time, would squeeze utilities on when works can take place, and this would 
mirror an evolution in working practices. There are also things like “keyhole 
cutting” and quicker drying concrete”. The” big solution” identified by the SPO 
was about technology and  the need to think more about “utility corridors” 
underground, which means that workmen can access it from the pavement, and 
with major new developments that should be as standard so that over a period 
of time you have an improving network with less disruption.  
 
The SPO identified other, potential legislative tools, such as requirements for 
new developments to phase their connection works so that they are all done in 
one go rather than doing it on a schedule that reflects the needs of the 
developer or the utility. Also noted by the SPO was the need for a better 
understanding of who actually owns underground assets, and one way of 
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reducing disruption in the future may be by having better underground mapping, 
which would reduce confusion as to who owns an asset and where it is located. 
 
10.4.2 Transport for London 
When asked about how in London the utilities had come to a position where 
they would sign up to the “code of conduct”, the Head of Planned Interventions 
(HPI) identified that there had been lot of liaison with them at a strategic level, at 
director level, and with the National Joint Utilities Group (NJUG). There had 
been a realisation that there was a groundswell of feeling from the public about 
road works and their impact. In London, some 98-99% of the utilities tend to be 
under the roads, sometimes under the pavement, so any works are disruptive. 
A key part of bringing the utilities along was identified by the HPI as saying that 
arrangements would also apply to authorities‟ works, evidenced by the fact that 
the only works moved under the „cap‟ were TfL‟s own works, utility works were 
not touched. The HPI identified that there had been a “...real level of trust build 
up between TfL, the utilities and NJUG”.  
 
At the end of November 2011, the London Mayor was due to meet with the 
utility company chief executives to talk about the “road works pledge” and to talk 
about more things he wants from them, including a commitment to doing things 
more efficiently. As an example, the HPI noted that some works that could be 
done in one day take four days: utilities have a gang that comes along and 
excavates and puts barriers around, the next day their specialist comes and 
does the connection or repair, and then on the fourth day the reinstatement 
team comes along and reinstates. These activities could all be done in a day 
but it is not the most efficient, economical way for the utility to do it, and the 
utility companies “...are beholden to their shareholders not to the users of the 
London network. So that‟s where there‟s a disconnect – it‟s getting into the 
minds of the chief executives that they can get good publicity and good news 
stories, and there already have been some”. 
 
 367 
TfL works promoter colleagues complained initially about the parity requirement 
but if found working without a permit then they are fined in the same way as 
with utility works. The chief operating officer for TfL had a meeting with the 
managing directors of all the contractors, told them what was happening, and 
they all agreed that they would pay fines. TfL works promoters are currently 
writing a contract the takes account of lane rental charges. 
 
The HPI noted that while the message had filtered down to lower levels, e.g. to 
the local co-ordination meetings, it had not fully filtered down to utility sub-
contractors.  
 
When asked about whether, despite all the good work and good relationships, 
there were still situations where TfL had to prosecute a utility, the HPI confirmed 
that this did very occasionally happen (“...a handful of occasions”) when utility 
works had cause specific disruption and where utilities fail to pay FPNs or 
overrun charges.  
 
Looking at wider relationships, the HPI said that TfL meet with the DfT every 
month but, now that the lane rental consultation has closed, they will be meeting 
with them every week until they submit their proposal. The HPI noted that it was 
“...probably easier for [TfL] to get those links in and forge those relationships 
than it would be for other authorities, but we try to share with the London 
Boroughs any messages we get back from the DfT, and if there‟s anything the 
Boroughs want we try to feed that back to the DfT, although they do have their 
own channels. But by the nature of the strategic authority that we are we 
probably are treated differently.” 
 
10.4.3 Summary of Inter-organisational Relationships in London 
The street authority representatives were asked about the relationships with the 
works-promoting department, and implications for the authority‟s service 
delivery, and relationship with utility companies. It should be noted that this is 
an area of difference in questioning between the Yorkshire and Devon area 
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representatives and the interviews in London. The reason for this is that the 
interviewees in Yorkshire and Devon were selected on the basis that they 
attended the regional HAUCs on behalf of their organisations, and this would 
enable comparisons to be made. The interviewees from London did not attend 
their regional HAUC and so the questions in these interviews were intended to 
mainly explore the strategic implications of „highway works‟ arrangements in 
London. Table 10.4 below summarises the London responses: 
 
Table 10.4 London - Street Authority Relationships 
Authority Relationship with own 
works promoting teams 
Implications for 
council service 
delivery 
Relationship with 
utilities 
Transport for 
London 
TMA requirements, 
London Permit Scheme, 
code of conduct have all 
driven greater 
compliance 
Under the road works 
'cap', the only works 
affected have been 
authorities’ works by 
re-scheduling 
Effective 
communication 
from director-level 
down; significant 
trust-building 
 
10.5 Views on the Legislation 
Although not part of the original semi-structured questions, at the end of the 
interviews when asked if there was anything that they would like to add that had 
not already been discussed, a number of the interviewees offered their views as 
to the “fitness for purpose” of the current legislation and what might be the next 
for legislation in terms of „highway works. Views from the London interviews are 
summarised in Table 10.5 below: 
 
Table 10.5 London – Views on Legislation 
Authority Views on Legislation Possible Next Steps 
Transport for 
London/GLA 
(i) Additions to legislation 
show the process as evolving; 
(ii) Recent developments, e.g. 
"lane rental", shifting the 
balance of the relationship 
away from utility presumption. 
(i) Current Coalition Government 
has a "one in, one out" approach to 
new legislation; (ii) Use of 
technology to "map" the location of 
underground assets and to develop 
less-intrusive methods of working. 
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10.6 Chapter Summary 
The findings in this chapter identified similar arrangements for the highway 
authority with regard to having a „street works team‟, still based around 
maintaining the local Street Works Register, undertaking co-ordination and 
inspection of works. The findings also identified a higher-level management 
view than was obtainable in chapters 8 and 9 regarding how the team was 
integrated into a wider management structure, demonstrating a significantly 
greater availability of resources. 
 
The findings supported earlier finding relating to the use of management 
information to report on performance and drive performance, but also gave an 
insight into the wider collection and use of information through mechanisms not 
reported in the Yorkshire and Devon areas. Additional tools were reported in 
London, including road works „caps‟ and “codes of conduct”. 
 
The findings also highlighted a difference in political involvement, where the 
current London Mayor takes a direct interest, including day-to-day through a 
deputy mayor and commissioner, in „highway works‟, resulting in a greater level 
of direction than was reported in the other two geographical areas. This 
involvement was also translated to higher-level discussions between the 
London Mayor and the directors of the utility companies, in order to agree and 
secure performance improvements. 
 
In developing the additional tools available in London, the findings highlighted 
the importance of developing trust between the authority and utility companies, 
based upon evidence that the same standards and expectations were being 
applied to the authority‟s own works as with utility works. 
 
When looking at the existing regulation, the findings demonstrated the extent to 
which TfL, with its availability of resources, was able to carry out additional 
research into „highway works‟ and, working with the DfT, help to set the agenda 
for the development of future legislation. 
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Chapter Eleven – Discussion of Findings 
This chapter will discuss the findings from the in-depth interviews carried out in 
chapters 8, 9 and 10, and from the document analysis in chapter 7. There were 
12 interviews carried out across three geographical areas in England – 
Yorkshire, Devon, and London – and they were semi-structured to enable 
qualitative data to be collected to explore the role and contribution of individual 
“actors”. This thesis reviewed the literature on local government in England, the 
legislation relating to the management of „highway works‟, and inter-
organisational relationships, and the implications of the findings from this study 
will be examined against the existing literature. 
 
Three distinct but related interview templates were developed to collect data 
from elected members, local authority officers, and utility company 
representatives. The interviews allowed for data to be collected in the following 
areas: 
1. The roles and responsibilities of the interviewee. 
2. The organisation‟s policies relating to „highway works‟, and the extent to 
which the interviewee could influence them. 
3. The nature of the relationship between the interviewee‟s organisation 
and highway authorities and utility companies, depending on whether 
that organisation is a highway authority or utility company. 
 
The interview findings will be discussed below against each of these areas, and 
will then be discussed with reference to the existing literature. In addition, an 
analysis of documents was undertaken in order to triangulate the interview 
findings, and the findings will be included in the discussion. 
 
11.1 Roles and Responsibilities 
11.1.1 Discussion about Elected Member Roles and Responsibilities 
It was not possible to carry out interviews with elected members in the other 
geographical areas included in this study in order to make comparisons. The 
interview with the Kirklees councillor confirmed that there was political oversight 
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of the „highway works‟ function within the authority and that decision-making 
can be devolved to officers. 
 
The councillor at this part of the interview identified their role in terms of how 
they engaged with the public (and the extent to which the public wanted to be 
engaged) and how performance information was used within the authority to 
help determine spending priorities. The interview highlighted the importance to 
the councillor of proving information to people about the council‟s performance, 
and about how this performance information was particularly important when, as 
now, the council was going through a period of budget cuts, with the 
consequential dilemma for elected members about how budgets should best be 
allocated, with options including either equal amounts across all wards or 
targeting areas of most need. 
 
11.1.2 Discussion about Street Authority Roles and Responsibilities 
The interviews with street authority representatives highlighted a number of 
similarities and differences in the ways in which authorities approach their 
duties. These are set out in Table 11.1 below. 
 
The finding show that authorities have „street work‟ teams‟, comprising council 
officers operating within a bureaucratic structure, i.e. with managers and staff 
including co-ordination officers and inspectors, whose responsibilities include 
maintaining the individual authority‟s Street Works Register, in which details of 
all „highway works‟ are registered, and undertaking activities to co-ordinate 
„highway works‟. In addition, „street works teams‟ deal with the inspection 
regime which enables individual authorities to monitor the level of compliance 
by utility companies with the relevant national codes of practice. This monitoring 
of compliance links to an authority‟s enforcement role in having legal powers to 
prosecute for offences under the New Roads and Street Works Act and Traffic 
Management Act. DCC specifically mentioned having a „prosecution officer‟ as 
part of their enforcement activities. 
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Table 11.1 - Street Authority Roles & Responsibilities 
Area Authority 
Streetworks 
Team Functions Officers 
    (Y/N)     
 
Kirklees 
Y 
Street Works Register functions Streetworks Manager; Co-
ordination officers; 
Inspectors; Business 
Support officers 
     
Co-ordination of all 'highway 
works' 
Yo
rk
sh
ir
e 
 
  Inspection of works 
  
 
  initiation of charges 
  
Regional HAUC, 
Joint Chair’s 
Authority Y 
Street Works Register functions 
Establishment not specified 
     
Co-ordination of all 'highway 
works' 
 
  
North Yorkshire 
Y 
Street Works Register functions Streetworks Manager; Co-
ordination officer; 
Inspectors 
     Inspection of works 
     initiation of charges 
 Devon Y 
Street Works Register functions Senior Highways Co-
ordination Officer; Co-
ordination officers 
     
Co-ordination of all highway 
activities 
D
ev
o
n
 
 
  
Inspection of works* 
*Prosecution Officer; 
Inspectors (working within 
a separate part of the Unit) 
  
 
  Enforcement*   
  
Regional HAUC, 
Joint Chair’s 
Authority Y 
Street Works Register functions Streetworks Manager: 
Compliance Officer; Co-
ordination officers; 
Inspectors 
     
Co-ordination of all 'highway 
works' 
     Inspection of works 
     initiation of charges 
 
Transport for 
London Y 
Street Works Register functions Works co-ordination and 
permitting team 
      
Co-ordination of all 'highway 
works'   
     Inspection of works 
Inspection and 
enforcement team 
Lo
n
d
o
n
 
    initiation of charges Works compliance team 
      Reviewing previous activities Operational analysis team 
      Identification of future works Forward planning team 
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These findings demonstrate that local authorities are still structured along 
“traditional” bureaucratic lines, with officers having defined roles and 
responsibilities within „street works teams‟ and reporting to managers. The 
functions of the „street works teams‟ are fairly consistent, dealing with the 
statutory requirement to maintain the authority‟s Street Works Register, co-
ordinate works, and undertake inspections to monitor compliance by works 
promoters with regulations.  
 
11.1.3 Discussion on Utility Company Roles and Responsibilities 
The interviews with the utility company representatives highlighted that there 
was a greater degree of commonality of approach than was evident with street 
authorities. Details are set out in Table 11.2 below: 
 
Table 11.2 Utility Roles & Responsibilities 
Area Utility Interviewee's Role Streetworks Responsibilities 
Yo
rk
sh
ir
e 
Water 
Contracts Manager; Regional 
HAUC joint chair 
Writing legislative 
requirements onto contracts; 
Leading the Streetworks team; 
Performance 
monitoring/reporting; 
Stakeholder engagement; 
Driving innovation 
  
Electricity Street Works Manager 
Responsible for Compliance 
Team; Legislative awareness; 
Performance 
monitoring/reporting 
  
Gas NRSWA Delivery Manager 
Dealing with all noticing and 
compliance issues; 
Performance 
monitoring/reporting 
  
Telecommunications 
NRSWA Compliance 
Manager 
Ensuring that the organisation 
is compliant with legislation 
(covering the North of England) 
D
ev
o
n
 
Electricity 
Major Projects Manager; 
Regional HAUC joint chair 
Managing the Streetworks 
team; Ensuring compliance with 
legislation across the business; 
Performance 
monitoring/reporting 
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A feature of the utility interviews was that the interviewees tended to have a 
strategic role within their organisation, with the „street works‟ responsibilities 
forming part of their overall portfolio of duties. 
 
A key element of the interviewees‟ role with regard to „street works‟ was the 
need to ensure compliance with the various regulations and codes of practice 
set out under legislation, and a significant part of this element involved the 
interviewees in ensuring that the software and hardware required to operate the 
electronic noticing system were in place and were compliant, and that there 
were procedures in place for users to operate the systems correctly. 
 
As well as ensuring compliance from a „top-down‟ perspective, interviewees 
were also dealing „bottom-up‟ with non-compliances identified by individual local 
authorities where there was a potential for a financial cost or prosecution 
against the utility. These non-compliance issues were either with regard to 
works overrunning the agreed duration, known as “Section 74” overruns, or 
fixed penalty notices (FPNs) in the event of non-compliance with the noticing 
requirements set out in NRASWA. 
 
The bureaucracy surround the operation of „highway works‟ legislation was also 
common to the interviewees regarding (a) the need to keep abreast of 
developments and changes to regulations, the potential impact of new 
legislation; and (b) that there was no consistent approach by authorities in 
applying or interpreting the legislation, and so there was a requirement for utility 
companies to have different procedures in place for dealing with the authorities 
in their area of operation. 
 
11.2 Policies and Influence 
11.2.1 Discussion of Elected Member view of policies and influence 
The interview with the councillor reinforced findings in the literature that the 
changes to the structure of councils, including moving away from the old 
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committee system to cabinet and leader models, have had implications for the 
level of knowledge of members and on the nature of relationships between 
councillors and officers. The findings also identified that, in the case of London, 
a directly-elected mayor can have a significant interest in a council function and 
provide a higher degree of political direction. 
 
The councillor‟s view of „highway works‟ was as an overview – an awareness 
that utility „street works‟ had to be carried out in order to provide the utility 
services that people needed, and was informed about the plans for the 
authority‟s own „roadworks‟ – and that elected members wanted to be kept 
informed about any works that might cause delay in their wards.  
 
There was, however, no identified linkage between what works were being 
carried out and the council‟s wider objectives, and there appeared to be no 
evidence of widespread interest from the public to councillors about „highway 
works‟ in general, other than specific works that might cause delay or disruption. 
This can be contrasted with the situation in London, discussed below, where the 
current Mayor has „highway works‟ as one of his three top priorities and the 
consequences of this for the way in which street authorities and utilities operate. 
 
11.2.2 Discussion about Street Authority Policies and Procedures 
The policies adopted by the street authorities interviewed in relation to utility 
„street works‟ and authorities‟ „roadworks‟, and the targets and performance 
measures adopted, are set out in Table 11.3 below: 
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Table 11.3 Street Authority Policies & Performance Measures 
Area Authority Street Works Policy Policy on Authority's 
own Roadworks 
Targets/Performance 
Measures 
Yo
rk
sh
ir
e 
Kirklees 
(i) Ensuring 
compliance with 
legislation; (ii) 
Maintain the 
highway asset 
Written "Highway 
Maintenance Plan"; 
roads identified for 
treatment based on 
surveys and member 
input 
(i) Random sample 
inspection results for 
'street works'; (ii) 
National performance 
indicators for 
'roadworks' 
  
Regional 
HAUC, Joint 
Chair’s 
Authority 
(i) Ensure that all 
works are co-
ordinated; (ii) Works 
are well-managed on 
site, including the 
provision of 
information 
Links to the council's 
policies for 
attracting new 
businesses and 
developments into 
the borough 
(i) Random sample 
inspection results for 
'street works'; (ii) For 
both 'street works' 
and  'roadworks', 
keep job durations 
and delay to a 
minimum 
  
North 
Yorkshire 
The legislation is the 
policy, i.e. NRASWA 
and TMA 
Statutory and non-
statutory 
requirements 
(i) Random sample 
inspection results for 
'street works'; (ii) 
Parity measures for 
'roadworks'; (iii) 
'Roadworks' 
performance affects 
contract payments 
D
ev
o
n
 
Devon 
Operational and 
procedural guidance 
available to staff 
Parity of treatment 
with 'street works' 
(i) Random sample 
inspection results for 
'street works'; (ii) 
Results supplemented 
by a programme of 
coring reinstatements 
  
Regional 
HAUC, Joint 
Chair’s 
Authority 
(i) Legislative 
requirements; (ii) 
Supplemented by 
operating 
agreements with 
utility companies 
Compliance with 
legislation, and this 
is written into 
contracts 
(i) Random sample 
inspection results for 
'street works'; (ii) 
Reinstatement coring 
results; (iii) Key 
performance 
indicators for 
'roadworks' 
Lo
n
d
o
n
 
Transport for 
London 
(i) London Permit 
Scheme; (ii) Code of 
Conduct; (iii) Road 
works Pledge 
(i) London Permit 
Scheme; (ii) Code of 
Conduct; (iii) Road 
works Pledge 
(i) Random sample 
inspection results for 
'street works'; (ii) 
Congestion measures; 
(iii) Road works ‘cap’ 
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11.2.2.1 Policies 
With regard to „street works‟, the findings show a general consensus amongst 
authorities that organisational policy is the application of the national legislation, 
and specifically ensuring that the utility companies comply. This is supported by 
the use of the random sample inspection results in order to monitor and report 
on levels of compliance. 
 
The interviews, particularly with NYCC, highlighted the distinction made by 
authorities between „policies‟ and „procedures‟, with „policies‟ being approved by 
a council and „procedures‟ being officer-led ways for dealing with the day-to-day 
working. This links to the earlier discussion in the literature review about local 
government being “policy maintainers” rather than “policy makers” where 
individual local authorities adopt the national legislation as their policy, and this 
policy is then implemented at a local level by the officers involved. This is 
further supported by the findings that describe the ways by which authorities 
have local discussions with the utility companies about how works might impact 
on the highway network, taking into account factors such as the geography of 
the authority‟s area and the type of traffic using the highway network, and also 
how these factors might have an impact on the ways in which the utility 
company‟s works are undertaken. 
 
The situation in London appears to demonstrate, with the development of their 
“code of practice” and introduction of a „cap‟ on the number of works at any one 
time, a move beyond adoption and implementation of national legislation. Many 
of the elements in London are common with the other organisations 
interviewed, such as the operation of a street works register and use of random 
sample inspection information to monitor performance, but the findings indicate 
that the differences are a result of the political direction from the London Mayor.  
 
With regard to policies for authorities‟ own „roadworks‟, the findings indicate an 
overlap between an authority‟s dual functions of street authority, i.e. being 
responsible for co-ordinating all „highway works‟, and highway authority, i.e. as 
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a promoter of works for road purposes. On the highway authority side there are 
likely to be either written policies identifying the criteria for assessing roads and 
identifying which roads will get what type of treatment, ranging from patching to 
full reconstruction, or links that set out how the council‟s policies for maintaining 
their highways connect with wider council policies. In addition, highway authority 
policies are also driven by national performance indicators as to road condition. 
On the street authority side, there was a general expectation of „parity of 
treatment‟ in that the authority‟s own works promoting departments were 
expected to comply with legislation in the same way as the utility companies. 
The findings also indicated that this „parity‟ requirement was also being 
formalised by writing it into contracts being agreed with contractors working on 
behalf of authorities. 
 
London was an “early adopter” of the option to operate a permit scheme, and 
the findings show that demonstrating to the utility companies that an authority‟s 
own works were to be treated in the same way, with the same expectations 
surrounding giving notice of works and performance, was a key element in 
building up trust and getting agreement to sign-up to the “code of practice” and 
„cap‟. This „relationship-building‟ approach was also evident in NYCC. 
 
11.2.2.2 Policy Influence 
The interviewees were asked about (a) the level of political involvement in their 
regarding „highway works‟ and (b) the extent to which they were able to 
influence their organisation‟s policies relating to „highway works‟. The main 
points are set out in Table 11.4 below:  
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Table 11.4Street Authorities - Policy Influence 
Area Authority Level of Political 
Involvement 
individual Ability to Influence 
Policy 
Yo
rk
sh
ir
e 
Kirklees 
(i) Highway authority - 
members set budgets which 
affects the volume of work; 
(ii)  Street authority – ‘ad 
hoc’ reports and specific 
information 
requests/provision 
Can suggest and implement 
changes to procedures for 
dealing with 'highway works' 
  
Regional 
HAUC, Joint 
Chair’s 
Authority 
(i) Highway authority - ward 
panels identify priorities, 
including highway works; 
(ii) Street authority - 
quarterly utility 
performance reports 
As regional HAUC joint chair, 
awareness of developments in 
legislation.  
  
North 
Yorkshire 
(i) Street authority - 
members want to be kept 
informed about works/road 
closures that might affect 
their ward 
Procedures were developed 
by officers interviewed. 
D
ev
o
n
 
Devon 
(i) Street authority - 
members want to be kept 
informed about works/road 
closures that might affect 
their ward 
Council's approach to 'street 
works' is based on experience 
of long-serving officers; all 
officers can input into the 
development of procedures. 
  
Regional 
HAUC, Joint 
Chair’s 
Authority 
(i) Highway authority - 
members are briefed about 
major works; (ii) Street 
authority - reports to 
members on quarterly 
performance and 
reinstatement coring; also 
responding to specific 
enquiries. 
Officer develops procedures 
for most aspects relating to 
'highway works'. 
Lo
n
d
o
n
 
Transport for 
London 
Involvement of the London 
Mayor and the deputy 
mayor for transport. 
Both officers interviewed 
described their influence. 
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With regard to political involvement, the findings in both the Yorkshire and 
Devon areas indicated that members tended to have more of an interest from 
the highway authority perspective in identifying, funding and choosing schemes 
to be undertaken by the authority. From the street authority perspective, 
members might receive quarterly reports about „street works‟, they were more 
likely to be interested in knowing about specific works that might have an impact 
in their ward, for example if the works were likely to cause delay or disruption, 
so that they were aware of the works before they started and could deal with 
enquiries from their constituents. These findings supported the interview finding 
with the Kirklees councillor, who discussed his role in making choices about 
which council „roadworks‟ scheme to approve (or not), how to explain these 
choices to the public, and how the public tended to have an interest in „highway 
works‟ when they were directly affected by them. 
 
Again, a clear distinction can be made between the general experiences in the 
Yorkshire and Devon areas and London. The finding highlighted the higher 
political interest in „highway works‟ in London, with „highway works‟ being one of 
the London Mayor‟s top three priorities. The findings also identified a difference 
in the level at which discussions about „street works‟ are carried out, where in 
London these involve the London Mayor, senior managers within the 
authorities, and the directors of the utility companies. This level of discussion 
was not evident in the Yorkshire and Devon areas. These findings support 
findings from interviews in the Yorkshire and Devon areas that London is, in 
some ways, a special case regarding „highway works‟. The local politicians in 
London have a mandate and powers to drive a more proactive approach, 
meaning that resources are made available to a greater extent in order to co-
ordinate and  analyse „highway works‟, and so drive developments in 
regulations. 
 
Looking at the extent to which the officers interviewed felt that they could 
influence their organisation‟s policies and procedures relating to „highway 
works‟, the finding indicated more of a consensus in the Yorkshire and Devon 
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areas that the officers involved felt that they were able to influence the 
procedures by which „highway works‟ were dealt with. However, this is probably 
best viewed through the discussion about “policy maintenance” versus “policy 
making”; where the authorities in Yorkshire and Devon are “maintaining policy” 
by looking at how to implement national legislation in the context of their own 
authority area, taking into account the geography of the area and the nature of 
the highway network. Whereas in London, officers are looking to both “make” 
and “maintain” policy, so they are taking national legislation and adding to it for 
London, based upon political direction from the London Mayor. 
 
11.2.3 Discussion about Utility Company Policies and Procedures 
The utility interviewees were asked about their company‟s policy drivers, and 
performance measures, with regard to „street works‟ and these are summarised 
in Table 11.5 below: 
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Table 11.5 Utility Policies and Performance Measures 
Area Utility Policy Stance Policy Drivers Targets/Performance 
Measures 
Yo
rk
sh
ir
e
 
Water 
Compliance with 
legislation; company 
aim "to be the best". 
Regulator (Ofwat) 
requirements, 
including financial 
penalties; Drinking 
Water Inspectorate; 
Environment 
Agency; Health & 
Safety Executive 
(i) Highway authority 
random sample 
inspection results; (ii) 
Balanced scorecards; 
(iii) Contractual 
arrangements 
Electricity 
Compliance with 
legislation; looking 
to make "self-
regulation" work. 
Regulator (Ofgem) 
requirements, 
including financial 
penalties; Street 
Care Charter 
(i) Highway authority 
random sample 
inspection results; (ii) 
Internal inspection 
results; (iii) Reputational 
impacts; (iv) Contractual 
arrangements 
Gas 
Compliance with 
legislation; company 
aim to be a top 
utility, achieve good 
performance and 
reduce costs 
Regulator (Ofgem) 
requirements, 
highway authority 
requirements 
Management 
information and KPI, 
including feedback from 
highway authorities 
Telecommunications 
Maximise 
compliance and 
minimise 
expenditure 
Regulator (Oftel) 
requirements; 
finance; 
"scoreboard" 
(i) "Scoreboard"; (ii) 
Contractual 
arrangements 
D
ev
o
n
 
Electricity 
Compliance with 
legislation; company 
aim to be a world-
leading company 
proving the best 
customer service at 
the best price 
Regulator (Ofwat) 
requirements 
Management 
information and KPI 
 
 
11.2.3.1 Policy Stance 
The findings demonstrate a commonality amongst all the utilities interviewed 
that their policies relating to „street works‟ were based on a requirement to 
ensure that their companies are compliant with legislation.  
 
„Compliance‟ for utility companies was identified by interviewees from two 
perspectives: (1) the need to comply generally with „street works‟ regulations 
with regard to having systems in place for giving notice to street authorities 
about their works, so that the authorities could discharge their duty to co-
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ordinate the works, and ensuring that the works comply with requirements 
relating to signing, lighting and guarding whilst the works are on-going, and 
comply with specifications regarding materials to be used, and standards of 
workmanship to be observed, in reinstating the trenches that had been 
excavated; and (2) dealing with specific works where authorities identify a non-
compliance that may result in a financial penalty, i.e. in the case of works that 
overrun the agreed duration (known as “Section 74” overruns, and named for 
the specific section of NRASWA) or fixed penalty notices (FPNs) where an 
authority has identified a non-compliance regard to notices served, or even 
prosecution. With regard to this second area, utility companies need to validate 
and pay the charge, if appropriate, and, where required, recover the charge 
from their contractor, and deal with the consequences that might arise from a 
prosecution. 
 
Both of these „compliance‟ areas were further explored by interviewees. They 
highlighted that the NRASWA/TMA requirements are incredibly “bureaucratic” in 
that they are complex, detailed and extensive (in addition to the NRASWA itself, 
there are statutory instruments relating to charges by authorities for inspections, 
overrun charges, and fixed penalty notices, a code of practice for signing, 
lighting and guarding and a code of practice on the specification to be used in 
reinstating excavations, a detailed technical specification covering IT system 
requirements for the electronic exchange of notices between utilities and 
authorities, and a separate code of practice setting out how noticing is to be 
carried out. In addition, where a permit scheme is in operation, there is a 
separate permit scheme document, set out in a statutory instrument, detailing 
the operation of the scheme. 
 
A further finding from the interviews was the view that there was a lack of 
consistency in how individual authorities interpreted the legislation and 
associated regulations, meaning that utility companies operating across 
authority boundaries need to understand the particular requirements of an 
authority, and then have procedures in place for dealing with that aspect of 
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„street works‟ regulation in that authority, which might require them to have 
several procedures covering the same function. 
 
The findings also indicated that, being private-sector businesses, the utility 
companies have organisational goals (“being the best”) and reputational issues 
that need taking into account. 
 
11.2.3.2 Policy Drivers 
The interviews identified the significance for the individual utilities of the 
involvement of their respective regulator, who (i) sets their pricing strategies for 
customers; (ii) sets performance standards; (iii) agrees the extent of investment 
in replacement and new assets; and (iv) can impose penalties, including 
financial penalties. 
 
In addition to the utility-sector specific regulator, the findings also identified that 
there are a number of other regulatory bodies whose oversight has implications 
for „street works‟ policy, for example, the Drinking Water Inspectorate sets 
quality standards that affect water utilities‟ response times and mains 
replacement strategy, and Health & Safety Executive (HSE) requirements have 
implications for safety at all „highway works‟ sites and, in addition, can directly 
affect the mains replacement strategy of the gas utility where there is a need to 
replace cast-iron mains near properties. The involvement and oversight of these 
other bodies, together with the “bureaucratic” perception of „street works‟ 
regulations, illustrates that, for utility companies, the „street works‟ function is 
both a discrete function that is separate to the company‟s main business, i.e. 
providing a utility service, it has to be integrated within the company‟s 
operations in order for it to be able to carry out that main function.  
 
Regarding performance measurement, all of the utilities identified the use of 
performance information reporting and that these incorporated the information 
provided to them by quarterly by authorities reporting their performance in the 
random sample inspections undertaken on signing, lighting and guarding 
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(known as “Category A” inspections) and on reinstatements (known as 
“Category B” and “Category C” inspections), these inspections usually being 
supplemented by the companies own internal inspections in the same 
categories. This performance reporting is then used at different levels, and for 
different levels of management, within the companies. There was also evidence 
from the findings that performance information was being used within utility 
companies as part of their staff appraisal/reward processes. 
 
The findings also identified the significance of the relationship between utility 
companies and the people, often external contractors, who carry out works on 
their behalf. The potential consequences to utility companies of non-compliance 
were discussed above, and the findings from the interviews showed that the 
utilities needed to integrate contractor performance with their own requirements 
and expectations, and this was usually done by specifying the requirements 
(and potential penalties) in contracts. This further reinforces the findings about 
utility companies‟ reputational concerns, where compliance is seen as a way of 
avoiding any negative consequences, for example adverse publicity or 
prosecutions that might arise from badly-managed works, particularly from the 
point of view of the ultimate owners of the companies. 
 
11.2.3.3 Policy Influence 
In the interviews, the utility company representatives were asked about the 
extent to which they felt that they could influence their organisation‟s policies 
relating to „street works‟, and about the extent to which company directors were 
“interested” in „street works‟ issues in order to compare with the level of political 
“interest” in local authorities. The details are summarised in Table 11.6 below: 
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Table 11.6 Utility Policy Involvement 
Area Utility Director 
Involvement 
individual Ability to Influence Policy 
Yo
rk
sh
ir
e 
Water 
Yes Very influential, including within the 
company, within the region HAUC, and 
nationally. 
Electricity 
Yes Yes, supported by the director and CEO 
as required; also attends national forums 
Gas Yes Quite a lot 
Telecommunications 
Yes Depends on the situation and 
circumstances 
D
ev
o
n
 
Electricity 
Yes Yes, including within the company and 
within the region HAUC. ‘Street works’ 
compliance was the focus of their role 
 
While the findings reveal a degree of commonality, with all of the interviewees 
indicating that they are able to influence their organisation‟s policies, there 
appears to be a difference as to the extent to which they could exercise that 
influence. This is due to the level of the people interviewed, ranging from senior 
managers to team leaders, and the extent of their remit with regard to „street 
works‟, with some of the interviewees having additional responsibilities at 
regional or national forums. This is an interesting point in itself, as all of the 
interviewees were identified on the basis that they represented their 
organisation at their regional HAUC, and this will be explored further below 
when looking at the findings on inter-organisational relationships. 
 
The findings indicated that there were directors within the companies that took 
either a general or specific interest in „street works‟, including receiving 
performance information reports and being briefed on developments in 
legislation and how they might affect the business.  The directors were likely to 
become more interested with regard to issues affecting costs, including overrun 
charges and fixed penalty notices, which arise as a consequence of poor 
performance and so are not allowed by the regulator to be passed onto 
customers, and permit schemes where the utility companies will have to pay 
permit fees; and “reputational” issues, where performance or non-compliance 
might result in adverse publicity or prosecution. 
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11.3 Inter-organisational Relationships 
11.3.1 Discussion of Inter-organisational Relationships 
11.3.1.1 Street Authority Relationships 
The street authority representatives were asked about the relationships with the 
works-promoting department, and implications for the authority‟s service 
delivery, and relationship with utility companies. It should be noted that this is 
an area of difference in questioning between the Yorkshire and Devon area 
representatives and the interviews in London. The reason for this is that the 
interviewees in Yorkshire and Devon were selected on the basis that they 
attended the regional HAUCs on behalf of their organisations, and this would 
enable comparisons to be made. The interviewees from London did not attend 
their regional HAUC and so the questions in these interviews were intended to 
mainly explore the strategic implications of „highway works‟ arrangements in 
London. Table 11.7 below summarises the responses: 
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Table 11.7 Street Authority Relationships 
Area Authority Relationship with 
own works 
promoting teams 
Implications for 
council service 
delivery 
Relationship with 
utilities 
Yo
rk
sh
ir
e 
Kirklees 
Changed since the 
introduction of 
TMA 
requirements; 
issues in being able 
to co-ordinate 
works 
Balancing duty to 
co-ordinate works 
with need to keep 
work 
flows/scheme 
delivery 
Feedback from 
utilities is good; 
authority seen as 
being reasonable 
  
Regional 
HAUC, Joint 
Chair’s 
Authority 
Needs partnership 
and team-work 
Making sure 
service delivery 
plan is met 
Needs to be 
positive in order to 
be effective 
  
North 
Yorkshire 
Confrontational in 
order to compare 
and drive 
performance 
Using the same 
performance 
measures for own 
works as for 'street 
works' 
Seen as being fair; 
acceptance that 
'street works' have 
to be carried out 
D
ev
o
n
 
Devon 
"Massive culture 
change" over the 
years; parity of 
treatment with 
both own works 
promoters and 
utility companies; 
no issues of 
concern 
Non-compliance 
results in "virtual 
fines" 
Fairly good with 
utility companies, 
now looking to 
develop with utility 
contractors 
  
Regional 
HAUC, Joint 
Chair’s 
Authority 
TMA requirements 
driven parity 
regarding noticing; 
perception that 
parity was costing 
money 
Financial 
implications for 
authority's term 
contractor for non-
compliance 
Need to be able to 
discuss issues; 
needs to be 
effective 
Lo
n
d
o
n
 
Transport for 
London 
TMA 
requirements, 
London Permit 
Scheme, code of 
conduct have all 
driven greater 
compliance 
Under the road 
works 'cap', the 
only works 
affected have been 
authorities’ works 
by re-scheduling 
Effective 
communication 
from director-level 
down; significant 
trust-building 
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The findings indicated a general agreement amongst street authorities that the 
requirement in the Traffic Management Act (TMA) that highway authorities 
should register their own works in the same way as utilities did, i.e. by giving a 
notice to the relevant street authority, had an impact on the way in which 
authorities carried out their work. Prior to this, highway authorities had tended to 
plan works based on their direct labour or contractor requirement or scheme 
delivery deadlines.  
 
Looking at relationships between street authorities and utility companies, the 
basis of the relationship is driven by legislative requirements, where the utility 
companies have a statutory duty to install their apparatus in the highway, and to 
be able to excavate in the highway to maintain that apparatus, with street 
authorities then having a duty to co-ordinate those works. At the moment, the 
utility companies exercise their rights to work in the highway by giving notice 
and street authorities use that notice to then co-ordinate. This is the situation 
currently in effect in the Yorkshire and Devon areas. In London, however, 
authorities have introduced a permit scheme whereby all works promoters, 
including highway authorities and utility companies, have to apply to the street 
authority for a permit to work, and this permit can be granted by the street 
authority with conditions attached.  
 
The findings from London, where a number of “legislative plus” initiatives have 
been agreed, including the “code of practice” and „cap‟, suggested a shift in the 
presumption that „street works‟ are initiated based on utility company and their 
contractors‟ identified requirements. London authorities have challenged this by 
asking the question that “the work might have to be done but does it have to be 
done now?” This challenging approach seeks to address wider concerns 
expressed by the Government about the disruptive effect of „highway works. 
The London authorities appear able to do this through a combination of 
additional powers under their permit scheme, which helps to fund additional 
staff to deal with the co-ordination elements, “legislative plus” initiatives, driven 
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by central and London governments and signed-up to by utility companies, and 
the strategic nature of the London road network and the unique pressures on it. 
 
The findings indicate the benefits to street authorities where there is a positive 
relationship with utility companies, and that key aspects of securing a positive 
relationship include: effective communication, trust, and a demonstration of 
parity of treatment by the street authority in dealing with the authority‟s own 
works and those of the utility companies. This was clearly identified in the 
London interviews, where these key aspects were present in the high-level 
discussions involving the London Mayor and utility company directors. There 
was no indication from the interviews in Yorkshire and Devon that discussions 
were held at such a high level but that such discussion did take place at senior 
manager level. 
 
In addition, the findings highlighted the importance of engagement with utility 
contractors in order to develop positive relationships. 
 
11.3.1.2 Regional HAUC Relationships 
The street authorities‟ representatives in the Yorkshire and Devon areas were 
asked about relationships generally between authorities and utility companies at 
their respective regional HAUCs. As mentioned above, the interviewees in 
London were not HAUC representatives. There were three regional HAUCs 
included: in the Yorkshire area there are YHAUC and NEHAUC, and SWHAUC 
in the Devon area. 
 
In discussing the role of the regional HAUCs, the interviewees identified a 
number of common elements, including: members being open and honest, 
members being knowledgeable about the legislation, and providing a forum for 
discussing interpretations of the legislation and regulations. The findings also 
identified that different region HAUCs prioritise different aspects of „highway 
works, and that this may be related to the type of authority area, i.e. the extent 
 391 
to which they are urbanised or rural, and the consequential implications for the 
demands on the road networks. 
 
Because street authorities are only one half of a regional HAUC, the findings 
will be discussed more fully below when the findings for utility companies are 
discussed. 
 
11.3.2 Discussion about Inter-organisational Relationships 
11.3.2.1 Utility Relationships 
The findings relating to utility company relationships in the Yorkshire and Devon 
areas with street authorities, and the drivers for them, are set out in Table 11.8 
below: 
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Table 11.8 Utility Relationships with Street Authorities 
Area Utility Relationship drivers Implications of 
relationship on 
utility service 
delivery 
Drivers for "going 
beyond" the legal 
minimum 
Yo
rk
sh
ir
e 
Water 
Utility aim: to be 
reasonable, friendly 
to deal with, and 
influential. Positive 
and proactive 
relationships with 
authorities. 
Business driven by 
meeting customer 
needs. Good 
communication 
with authorities is 
essential. 
Where 
economically 
beneficial to do so 
- cost is an 
influence. 
Electricity 
Developing a 
customer service 
plan for each 
authority. Generally 
good relationships 
but problems 
communicating with 
some authorities. 
No massive impact 
- there are still 
statutory 
obligations that 
allow works to be 
done. 
Providing better 
customer service 
and reducing (all) 
customer 
complaints. 
Gas 
Different 
relationships with 
different authorities 
- due to differing 
authority priorities. 
Poor performance 
can strain 
relationships. 
Positive 
relationships allow 
company to 
provide better 
customer service; 
poor relationships 
take up resources 
in addressing them. 
Better customer 
service; meeting 
targets. 
Telecommunications 
Use of highway 
authority 
perception survey; 
authority-specific 
issues can then be 
identified. 
Positive 
relationship makes 
service delivery 
easier; negative 
relationship can 
result in greater 
scrutiny by 
authorities and 
increased charges 
for non-
compliance. 
Meeting service 
delivery targets. 
D
ev
o
n
 
Electricity 
Varies between 
authorities - some 
are keen to be co-
operative, some to 
be directive. 
No job-specific 
issues but need to 
avoid getting to 
confrontational 
situation. 
Collaborative 
approach to 
identifying "best 
practice" has 
helped improve 
performance. 
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The findings with regard to utility company relationships with street authorities 
suggest that: (1) utility companies generally seek to have a positive relationship 
with street authorities; and (2) that utility companies are looking to understand 
the particular priorities and approach to co-ordination of the street authorities 
with which they deal. 
 
Positive relationships tend to be expressed by utility companies in terms of 
effective communication, both generally with regard to maintaining 
relationships, and also with regard to specific jobs where site meetings might be 
required in order to discuss traffic management at the site of proposed works, or 
where a temporary road closure might be necessary. The reasons that utility 
companies want a positive relationship are that it brings benefits to the 
company in enabling them to meet their customer service timescales which 
might differ from the noticing timescales in NRASWA. 
 
The findings also highlight a potential area of tension between utility companies 
and street authorities, in that, whatever the nature of the relationship, the works 
can still go ahead under the utility companies‟ statutory powers to install and 
maintain apparatus in the highway. The NRASWA/TMA legislation deals only 
with the co-ordination and regulation of how the works are carried out.  
 
Although no utility company representatives were interviewed in London, the 
findings from the authority interviews identified the “legislation plus” initiatives 
that had been put in place, and described how all works promoters had got to a 
position where they were able to sign-up to these. The interviews in Yorkshire 
and Devon areas explored the factors that might result in a utility going beyond 
the current, basic legislative requirements, and the findings identified that 
improved customer service as a main factor, with customer service being 
looked at both from the point-of-view of the utilities‟ customer and the highway 
authorities‟ customers, i.e. the road users. These findings link to those 
discussed previously about the “reputational” concern that utilities have about 
the implications of poor performance or negative publicity. 
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11.3.3 Discussion about Regional HAUC relationships 
The inter-organisational relationships between street authorities and utility 
companies were discussed above in the context of the direct relationships 
between the two organisations. There is a further level at which relationships 
between the organisations can be examined, and this is the regional HAUC 
forum. The individuals interviewed in the Yorkshire and Devon areas were the 
people from the respective organisations that attended the regional HAUC on 
behalf of their organisation. The findings from the interviews are summarised in 
Table 11.9 below: 
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Table 11.9 Regional HAUCs 
Area Authority/Utility Positive Factors Negative Factors Shared Objectives 
Yo
rk
sh
ir
e 
Kirklees 
(i) High level of knowledge 
and experience amongst 
members; (ii) Working 
groups as a knowledge-
bank and common 
procedures. 
(i) Large number of 
attendees; (ii) Different 
authority priorities. 
(i) To improve levels of 
compliance and 
performance; (ii) Sharing 
and promoting good 
practice. 
Regional HAUC, Joint 
Chair’s Authority 
(i) Agreements for 
common procedures 
should help all authorities 
and works promoters;  
(i) Resistance by some 
organisations against 
agreements;  
(i) To minimise disruption 
from works. 
North Yorkshire 
Different mind-sets by authorities in the two regional HAUCs attended, so utilities 
need different mind-sets. More emphasis in YHAUC on legislation than in NEHAUC - 
differences relate to the nature of the network. Authorities in urban areas tend to 
resource their street works teams more heavily than rural areas because there are 
different levels of requirements. 
Water 
(i) Sense of purpose; (ii) 
Business plan with 
initiatives; (iii) Resolving 
common issues; (iv) Use of 
working groups to look at 
specific subjects. 
(i) Reluctance for some 
members to participate 
(depends on the topic); (ii) 
Large group. 
(i) Provides a positive 
forum for authorities and 
utilities to work together; 
(ii) Compliance with 
legislation; (iii) Identifying 
and sharing good 
practice; (iv) Developing 
common procedures; (v) 
Reducing disruption and 
delay at works. 
Electricity 
(i) Opportunities for 
discussion; (ii) Working 
groups looking at 
problems and sharing 
information; (iii) 
Understanding each 
other’s needs. 
(i) Authorities not willing 
to discuss issues in the 
forum but highlight 
problems outside; (ii) 
Authorities not engaging 
in discussions with 
utilities. 
(i) Participation in 
working groups shows 
that authorities and 
utilities have shared 
objectives; (ii) Utility 
understanding of 
authorities’ view of 
legislation drives utility 
performance. 
Gas 
(i) Helps to keep good 
communication; (ii) Allows 
joined-up approach. 
  (i) To ensure compliance 
with legislation; (ii) To 
minimise disruption from 
works. 
Telecommunications 
(i) Open discussions; (ii) 
Pragmatic: (iii) Accepting 
that differences of opinion 
do occur. 
    
D
ev
o
n
 
Devon 
(i) Depends on the people 
attending; (ii) Newer 
people starting to attend. 
(ii) Some organisations 
want their representatives 
to have a big involvement, 
some don't. 
(i) Improving 
performance, including 
reinstatements; (ii) Coring 
performance is a standard 
agenda item. 
  
  
Regional HAUC, Joint 
Chair’s Authority 
(i) Open and honest 
discussions; (ii) Good 
practice group;  
(i) Issued raised not 
always appropriate for the 
forum; (ii) Tendency to 
look back at past 
problems rather than 
being forward-looking; (iii) 
Finance as the only way to 
drive improvements. 
(i) Need to resolve issues; 
(ii) Need to look for areas 
of improvement. 
Electricity 
(i) Shared purpose; (ii) 
Moving towards a more 
co-operative approach 
based on shared good 
practice. 
(i) Focus had been on the 
financial side - fines and 
charges - rather than on 
the works. 
(i) Everyone is trying to 
achieve the same 
outcomes; (ii) Getting the 
reinstatements done 
properly. 
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11.3.3.1 Regional HAUC Relationships, Yorkshire area 
The interviews in the Yorkshire area were carried out mainly with people 
attending the Yorkshire HAUC (YHAUC), although NYCC are also members of 
the North of England HAUC (NEHAUC). The findings showed that both 
authorities and utilities saw the positive factors of YHAUC in terms of it 
providing a forum for discussing interpretations about the legislation and coming 
to common agreements and procedures, where possible, in order to make 
dealing with the legislation more effective and efficient for both authorities and 
utility companies. Negative factors included the difficulty of getting engagement 
from all members, partly down to the size of the group and partly due to the 
differing priorities and interests of the individual members and their 
organisations. 
 
There was considerable agreement regarding shared outcomes, highlighted by 
the participation of authority and utility members in joint working groups looking 
at developing common approaches, with a general recognition that there was a 
need to reduce delay and disruption arising from „highway works‟. 
 
The findings from the NYCC interview, where the authority is a member of two 
regional HAUCs, highlighted two issues: (1) the significance of the 
characteristics of the road network and demands on it with regard to an 
authority‟s likely approach to „highway works‟; and (2) that this approach could 
then have an effect on the focus of attention, with the focus of attention in 
YHAUC being identified as on the legislation. This is reinforced by the findings 
from individual interviews where legislative compliance was considered to be a 
key factor. 
 
11.3.3.2 Regional HAUC Relationships, Devon area 
The findings indicate recent changes in this regional HAUC, moving away from 
a model where the focus was on past problems and difficulties, and where 
compliance was driven through the use of financial penalties and charges, to a 
situation where good practice is shared between members. It appears that the 
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main focus is on the end product of the „highway works‟ process, i.e. the 
completed reinstatement and the extent to which compliance and performance 
can be demonstrated through a systematic programme of taking core samples. 
 
11.4 Attitudes to Prosecution 
The approach taken by Devon County Council to „street works‟ involved a 
considerable number of prosecutions of utility companies for offences under 
NRASWA. This was in contrast to the situation in Kirklees where there had 
been no recent prosecutions. The findings from the interviews carried out are 
summarised in Table 11.10 below: 
 
Table 11.10 Views on Prosecutions 
Area Authority/Utility Views on Prosecution 
  
Kirklees 
The option to prosecute remains but is seen as a last 
report. It has been used previously where works had 
resulted in a danger to the public. 
Yo
rk
sh
ir
e 
North Yorkshire 
Court action seen as being a failure by council officers in 
delivering the ‘street works’ service - there are other 
means available in getting improvements in utility and 
contractor performance. 
Water 
Because of TMA, authorities are now "living the 
experience" of utilities and realising that "this is tough". 
Situation with most authorities is not now as 
confrontational as it used to be. 
Electricity 
Some authorities choose to go down the prosecution 
route - so raises issues of consistency. Utility company has 
to accept responsibility even though the works have been 
done by contractors. 
D
ev
o
n
 
Devon 
Not doing as many as were being done a few years ago for 
signing and guarding failures - did lead to improvement. 
Regional HAUC, 
Joint Chair’s 
Authority 
Prosecutions have driven improvement, not with 
reinstatements but with safety 
Electricity 
People have to go to court and pay the fines but it doesn't 
help to improve performance 
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The findings indicate two main reasons why authorities would prosecute for 
offences under NRASWA: (1) where utility works or method of working had 
resulted in a danger to the public, and (2) as a tool for driving performance. In 
the Devon area, the findings highlight a difference of opinion about the 
effectiveness of legal action, where the utility view is that prosecution does not 
help drive performance improvements and the authority view is that 
prosecutions have done exactly that, although possibly not in the ways 
intended. Devon County Council acknowledged that they were no longer doing 
as many prosecutions as they used to, and findings elsewhere have noted that 
in the Devon area their “Good Practice Working Group” has been effective in 
focussing attention on performance issues. 
 
Similarly, in the Yorkshire area, performance data for the random sample 
inspections, looking at performance in signing, lighting and guarding and 
reinstatement, is collated for all of the member utility companies, and is reported 
at the YHAUC meetings. YHAUC also has working groups looking at 
performance issues and good practice in both signing, lighting and guarding 
and reinstatements. 
 
The findings from London were not included in Table 11.10 but they indicated 
that their approach to prosecution was that it was used as a last resort or where 
a utility company works had caused a specific problem. 
 
11.4 Views on the Legislation 
Although not part of the original semi-structured questions, at the end of the 
interviews when asked if there was anything that they would like to add that had 
not already been discussed, a number of the interviewees offered their views as 
to the “fitness for purpose” of the current legislation and what might be the next 
for legislation in terms of „highway works‟. The views are summarised in Table 
11.11 below: 
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Table 11.11 – Legislation 
Area Authority/Utility Views on Legislation Possible Next Steps 
Yo
rk
sh
ir
e 
Electricity 
(i) Current legislation works; 
(ii) New legislation is an 
opportunity for utilities to 
engage; (iii) Need to look for 
the benefits and costs. 
(i) Communication about 
works is a big issue - need to 
explain why works are taking 
place; (ii) Need to explain that 
utility companies dig holes for 
a purpose. 
Gas 
(i) How codes of practice are 
written makes them not easy 
to follow; (ii) Regulations are 
open to different 
interpretations by authorities. 
  
Regional HAUC, 
Joint Chair’s 
Authority 
  (i) Need to be better at 
explaining to the public about 
works and when they will 
start/finish. 
North Yorkshire 
(i) Current arrangements 
allow authorities to set 
standards locally; (ii) If there 
had been full implementation 
of NRASWA from the outset, 
TMA would not have been 
required. 
  
D
ev
o
n
 
Electricity 
(i) Legislation is indiscriminate 
- applies equally to all types of 
works on all roads; (ii) 
Authorities also carry out 
works but the focus is always 
on utility works. 
  
  
Regional HAUC, 
Joint Chair’s 
Authority 
(i) Legislation open to 
interpretation; (ii) Lack of 
clear direction from DfT 
(i) The community needs to 
the legislation working that it 
already has rather than getting 
new legislation. 
Lo
n
d
o
n
 
Transport for 
London/GLA 
(i) Additions to legislation 
show the process as evolving; 
(ii) Recent developments, e.g. 
"lane rental", shifting the 
balance of the relationship 
away from utility 
presumption. 
(i) Current Coalition 
Government has a "one in, 
one out" approach to new 
legislation; (ii) Use of 
technology to "map" the 
location of underground assets 
and to develop less-intrusive 
methods of working. 
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The views expressed about the legislation and regulations currently in place 
identify contrasting perspectives about it being “open to interpretation”. The 
street authority view on this is that, by being so, it enables authorities to decide 
which parts of the regulations to focus or concentrate on, and by doing so is 
able to build this in to its „street works‟ service provision to make it appropriate 
and relevant to the circumstances prevailing in their area, i.e. there is no 
requirement for a “one size fits all”. However, the utility company view is that 
this “openness to interpretation” means that individual authorities choose to 
interpret and apply the legislation differently, meaning that they (the utility 
companies) are not able to have standard processes that can be used across 
the entirety of their business. This means that they need to develop local 
processes with variations for each local authority area, with the consequence 
that they risk not complying with an authority‟s requirements and so, potentially, 
leaving it open to a financial penalty such as an overrun charge or fixed penalty 
notice.  
 
One of the findings suggested that part of the reason for the „highway works‟ 
sector being continually subjected to modified and new regulation was that 
authorities and utility companies had both failed to engage with and fully-deploy 
NRASWA when it was introduced initially in 1993. 
 
Looking at views on future legislation relating to „highway works‟, a number of 
the interviewees mentioned the need to better communicate with the public 
about the reason for works, including likely duration of jobs. This aligns with one 
of the outcomes from the Government‟s “Street Works Summit” in 2009, which 
identified the need to produce good practice for utility and highway authorities 
on improving communication with road users and communities. 
 
11.5 Discussion of Findings and Existing Literature 
This thesis has revised the existing literature on local government in England; 
the legislation relating to the management of „highway works‟; and inter-
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organisational relationships. The findings from this study will now be discussed 
with regard to those areas of literature.  
 
11.5.1 Local Government in England 
11.5.1.1 Functions 
From its earliest days, one of the functions of local government has been to 
provide a service to maintain roads and bridges. This function is described as 
being an amenity service (Wilson and Game, 2006) as road are a facility used 
at some time by most, if not all, people in some way. Within local authorities, 
provision of this function is carried out, either directly or by contractors on behalf 
of the council as a highway authority and has powers to carry out works on the 
highway for maintenance purposes. The literature tends to discuss an 
authority‟s roads function with regard to its highway authority role. This thesis 
has identified another function carried out by local authorities in co-ordinating 
the activities of an authority‟s own highway authority works along with the „street 
works‟ carried out by utility companies. Within local councils this role is dealt 
with by the street authority. 
 
11.5.1.2 Service Provision 
The literature discussed the notion of a “post code lottery”, whereby local 
authorities exercised discretion in the type and extent of services provided, 
which was at odds with the view that certain uniform standards should be 
expected in the quality of and provision of local authority services. The findings 
from interviews with street authority representatives indicated that although 
legislation relating to „highway works‟ is national, there are differences in the 
ways in which local authorities decide to implement and apply the legislation. 
 
An element common to all street authority service provision is compliance with 
the legislation and associated regulations. Differences are characterised by the 
specific focus of a street authority. The interview findings identified that a 
number of internal and external factors help to direct this focus. 
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Internal factors include an authority‟s plans and priorities, particularly where the 
highway asset has a contribution to make in delivering them. These plans 
include economic contributions, in the efficient movement of goods and services 
around an area to help support the local economy and regeneration; residential 
and business developments, where new roads or links might be required and 
the additional traffic flows need to be managed; social, where the highway 
network is a resource to enable people to move around the area; and relating to 
transport policies to support the use of public transport and use of non-car 
methods of travel. 
 
The findings indicate that where local political interest in an authority‟s street 
authority role was low then officers develop procedures for applying the national 
legislation. This was the case in the Yorkshire area. Where local political 
interest is high then officers are directed by politicians to develop and apply the 
legislation in specific ways. 
 
External factors include the geography of the area which sets constraints on the 
highway network. This can be characterised along an urban-rural continuum, 
where the more urban and developed an area then the more demand is placed 
on the highway network in terms of people and goods and services wanting to 
access the network; the more rural an area then less demand is placed on the 
highway network. The findings suggest that authorities in urban areas are more 
likely to take an approach to the management of „highway works‟ based on 
legislative compliance (through performance monitoring) and enforcement 
(through overrun charges, fixed penalty notices or prosecution); whereas 
authorities in rural areas are more likely to take an approach based on 
communication with works promoters. 
 
11.5.1.3 Customer Service 
Chapter 2 examined the literature on Government initiatives to identify citizens 
as being customers who should be able to expect certain standards of service, 
and who would play a part in services provided by authorities. One of the 
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means by which this was achieved was through the use of charters, where 
organisations set down in writing the nature of the non-contractual relationships 
between them. 
 
The findings from interviews and the documents analysed indicate that 
performance is measured by both authorities and utility companies, in order to 
demonstrate that current levels of performance comply with minimum standards 
and also to identify areas for performance improvements. Performance 
information is used similarly by authorities and utility companies: authorities 
share the information individually and regionally with utility companies and also 
report to the DfT, whereas utility companies use the information to agree levels 
of performance with individual local highway authorities and also as part of their 
discussions with their regulator in order to demonstrate efficiency of service 
delivery, which can have an impact on the prices that they can charge to 
customers. 
 
There is some evidence that “dashboard” reporting regionally and nationally is 
mirroring some of the elements of charters, in that arrangements are non-
contractual and are intended to provide “customers” with information about 
effectiveness and efficiency in providing services or functions. 
 
11.5.1.4 Policy Making/Policy Maintenance 
The findings demonstrate the distinction in the literature between local 
authorities as policy „maintainers‟ and policy „makers‟. In the Yorkshire and 
Devon area, the street authorities policies relating to „highway works‟ were 
effectively the adoption of the national legislation. This is policy maintenance In 
London, the local politicians had identified a need to go beyond the basic 
national legislation and introduce an additional code of practice and road works 
„cap‟. This is an example of policy making. 
 
The findings suggest that policy making with regard to „highway works‟ arises as 
a consequence of (i) identified needs, e.g. in London, the size of the city and 
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resulting high number of works, the volume of traffic flows and the need to have 
journey-time reliability, the need to be able to manage the highway network to 
ensure that national events can take place (for example, the 2012 Olympics), 
and (ii) ability to be able to drive the “legislation plus”, where local politicians 
have responded to the concerns of stakeholders affected by the impact of works 
and identified tackling the problem as a policy goal, and then making resources 
available to deliver the new policies. 
 
11.5.1.5 The Role of Officers 
Where „highway works‟ are dealt with within an authority as policy maintenance 
then the findings indicate that council officers dealing with the management of 
„highway works‟ have scope to influence the way in which the national 
legislation is applied. The findings showed that in the Yorkshire and Devon 
areas officers reported considerable scope for developing policies and 
procedures that enabled their authorities to implement national legislation, 
ensuring that the portfolio-holder or committee was kept informed, usually via 
some form of annual report. In London, where there was more „top-down‟ 
political direction and oversight, officers still had scope for making contributions 
to policy and procedures. 
 
The findings indicated that engagement between officers and elected members 
tends to be at senior officer/director level and the councillor portfolio holder, 
other than specific enquiries regarding particular works.  
 
11.5.1.6 Political Structures 
With regard to the type of structures adopted by local authorities, the findings 
from the interviews identified experiences from both councillors and officers that 
the move to council leaders and cabinets, replacing the previous committee 
systems, has had implications on the level of knowledge and level of interest of 
elected members about the management of „highway works‟, with ward 
members no longer having the opportunity to sit on “highway committees”. The 
research findings in this thesis have also demonstrated the shift over time from 
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authorities having a committee identified specifically to having a committee 
dealing with the highway to a situation where the „highways‟ function is 
contained within the wider remit of an overview or scrutiny committee. This also 
supports the findings that an authority‟s view of its highways function has shifted 
from one of maintenance to one of viewing its highway network as an asset 
which can play a part in the authority‟s wider policies. 
 
11.5.2 Legislation Relating to Highways and „Highway Works‟ 
The findings in chapters 7 to 10 have recorded the current situation regarding 
the management of „highway works‟ and the development of relevant 
legislation. 
 
The Government‟s roads policy reflects that the use of the highway network is 
increasing year-on-year, and that providing additional capacity, i.e. building new 
roads, is neither a possibility nor a long-term solution, and so the focus is on 
improving the management of the network. The Government has further 
concluded that disruption arising from „highway works‟ is at an unacceptable 
level and associated cost to the national economy. This is against the 
background of a previous Government‟s privatisation programme which 
extended the right to dig in the highway to an increased number of utility 
companies. 
 
The findings in this thesis indicate that the current regulations are complex and 
ambiguous, and are open to differing interpretations by street authorities. This 
interpretation by authorities has already been discussed above in relation to 
authorities‟ discretion regarding service provision but, from a utility company 
perspective, this is identified in the findings as resulting in: potential 
uncertainties about being able to get their jobs on site in order to meet their 
service delivery targets, and also has the potential consequence for incurring 
penalties for non-compliance. 
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The literature review revealed that utility companies and authorities had 
originally begun negotiations in the early twentieth century about how to 
regulate „street works‟ activities. The findings indicate that such discussions are 
still a feature of current arrangements, although the preference to avoid further 
regulation and participating in “self-regulation” is helping to drive behaviours.  
 
11.5.3 Public Policy Implementation 
The literature on „public policy‟ and policy implementation has suggested a 
number of different perspectives and models for analysis. The findings have 
shown the way in which the legislation relating to the management of „highway 
work‟ can be viewed from two perspectives: (1) „top-down‟, where the 
Government has established regulations that apply nationally, and has „handed 
them down‟ to local authorities for implementation; and (2) „bottom-up‟, where 
implementation depends on the involvement of individuals within organisations. 
 
The interviews in chapters 8, 9 and 10 have shown how individuals within street 
authorities can influence how the national policy is applied. Similarly, the 
findings have shown how individuals within utility companies respond to the 
requirements and interpretations of street authorities whilst still trying to 
maintain a level of consistency in order to have efficient business processes 
and for the purposes of compliance. 
 
Taking a “synthesiser‟s” view of policy implementation, i.e. looking for gaps 
between intended and actual outcomes, the findings suggest that a number of 
internal and external factors were discussed about that help to explain the 
differences in focus adopted by individual street authorities. The findings from 
Yorkshire highlighted the relevance of traffic flow volumes in establishing a 
„mind-set‟ which authorities might adopt, suggesting that higher volumes of 
traffic led to authorities needing to be more prescriptive in how the regulations 
were applied because the consequences of failure would be unacceptable 
disruption and delay. This was partly supported by the findings from London, 
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where authorities had put significant resources into the co-ordination and 
monitoring of works. 
 
11.5.4 Inter-organisational Collaborations 
The findings in chapters 7 to 10 have helped to explain: (1) the inter-
organisational domain in which managing „highway works‟ sits, and (2) the 
factors that contribute to collaborations between street authorities and utility 
companies, and these will now be examined in more detail. 
 
11.5.4.1 The Inter-organisational Domain 
The organisations within this particular domain are linked by the problems of: 
o Utility companies needing to work in the highway in order to maintain 
their apparatus and provide a utility service; 
o Local authorities needing to carry out highway maintenance work – 
their highway authority role; 
o Local authorities needing to comply with their duties to co-ordinate 
works and minimise delay and disruption arising from works – their 
street authority role. 
 
A key feature of the domain is that the utility companies tend to be private-
sector organisations with a need to maximise profits, and so the least-cost 
option would be their preferred option. However, works that are planned so as 
to minimise delay and disruption are likely to cost more as a consequence of 
having additional resources on site, to complete the works quicker, or working 
at night or weekends, to minimise disruption during the day, or having enhanced 
traffic management arrangements in order to minimise delay for people passing 
through the works. 
 
Through the recent introduction of TMA Performance Indicators (TPI), the 
Government has set out a requirement for authorities to provide better 
information to the public about works and performance by utility companies and 
their own works. 
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Thus, utilities companies are, to an extent, dependant on street authorities in 
obtaining road-space at the time they need it in order to guarantee their service 
delivery; and street authorities are dependent on utility companies and highway 
authorities to plan their works, so that they can give notice that will enable the 
works to be co-ordinated, and execute the works to the minimum time possible. 
There is also a mutual dependency in order to avoid further regulation within the 
industry sector, which would likely follow if current levels of public dissatisfaction 
about how „highway works‟ are managed and executed do not improve. 
 
At a micro level, the findings have established that there are direct relationships 
between authorities and utility companies, and a macro level of relationships 
that involve regional HAUCs and national representative bodies. 
 
11.5.4.2 Inter-organisational Collaboration 
Huxham (2003) identified a number of features present in collaborations, and 
these can be used to analyse the findings. 
 
11.5.4.2.1 Power Relationships 
At the micro level, the findings show that street authorities have powers granted 
to them through NRASWA and TMA to co-ordinate works and require the co-
operation of works promoters in order to do so. These powers are strengthened 
further where permit schemes are in operation since the works promoters need 
to obtain a permit to work rather than relying on the own powers to work in the 
highway, subject to giving the appropriate notice. The findings from London 
further demonstrate the significance of power relationships where authorities 
have been able to introduce “legislation plus”. 
 
Utility companies do have powers to work in the highway but the finding indicate 
that they prefer a co-operative approach in their dealings with authorities in 
order to be able to guarantee the availability of road-space when they need it. 
Adopting a confrontational approach involves both parties in additional resource 
expenditure in managing relationships and dealing with compliance issues. 
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At the macro level, the findings indicate that power relationships are more equal 
because the national representative bodies have a role in advising DfT in 
developing policy, and authority and utility representative are mindful of the 
need to work together in order to make the current legislation work. Similarly, at 
regional HAUCs, representatives are motivated by the need for consistency and 
performance standards. 
 
11.5.4.2.2 Aims 
The findings have highlighted a number of aims. These include the aims of the 
individual authorities and utility companies, but also the aims of the domain‟s 
wider environment which includes stakeholders such as the Government, 
industry regulators and the public. 
 
At the micro level, these aims tend to be addressed through performance 
meetings between authorities and individual companies, where performance is 
measured and reported against random sample inspections and other 
measures such as the average duration of works. 
 
The findings from London show that, at the macro level, there can be a 
convergence of aims between authorities and works promoters. 
 
11.5.4.2.3 Trust 
The findings highlighted the importance of trust between authorities and utility 
companies in developing an effective approach to managing „highway works‟. 
This was particularly evident in London where, at the macro level, developing 
that trust was a key element in enabling the “legislation plus” code of practice 
and road works „cap‟ to be agreed and implemented. The approach in London 
was facilitated by relationships between very senior managers, politicians and 
utility company directors.  
 
This level of exchange was not replicated in the Yorkshire or Devon areas. In 
discussing the role of the regional HAUCs, the interviewees identified a number 
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of common elements, including: members being open and honest, members 
being knowledgeable about the legislation, and providing a forum for discussing 
interpretations of the legislation and regulations. These attributes support those 
set out in the literature as being present in inter-organisational collaborations. 
 
11.6 Chapter Summary 
The aim of this study was to examine the way in which local authorities in 
England deal with the implementation of Government policy regarding the 
management of „highway works‟. This was to be done by looking at internal 
authority arrangements, stakeholder involvement (particularly utility companies), 
and would take into account published documents relating to „highway works‟. 
 
The findings discussed above have reported on the situation within three 
geographical areas across England, looking at how the authorities are 
structured, how they implement „highway works‟ regulations, the level of political 
oversight and direction, and the nature of the relationship between authorities 
and utility companies. Interview findings were triangulated by reference to 
authorities‟ published plans.  
 
The literature review undertaken in chapters 2 to 5 helped to establish a 
framework for the research by setting out the development of local government 
in England up to and including those introduced by the Coalition Government of 
2010; the development of „highway works‟ legislation; „public policy‟ and policy 
implementation; and inter-organisational collaborations. 
 
The findings above have been discussed against this research framework. 
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Chapter Twelve – Conclusions 
12.1 Contribution to Knowledge 
This thesis has made a number of contributions to knowledge regarding public 
policy implementation, local government services in England, and inter-
organisational relationships. The research question for this thesis was to 
examine the extent to which a partnership approach to managing „highway 
works‟ an advantage in implementing public policy, and this was to be done by: 
1. Examining alternative approaches to the implementation of public policy 
by local authorities; 
2. Analysing and considering the use of charters in a way not previously 
described in the literature; 
3. Provide empirical research results for a sector of public management not 
widely covered in the literature; 
4. Address gaps in research on public policy implementation, specifically 
with regard to implementing central Government policy and inter-
organisational relationships; and 
5. Relate current practice to current policy formulation, particularly with 
regard to the development and implementation of schemes for 
“permitting” „highway works. 
 
12.1.1 Examination of Alternative Approaches 
The findings in chapters 7 to 10 examined the approaches taken by a number of 
local authorities, covering the Yorkshire, Devon and London areas, in 
implementing the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 (NRASWA) and 
Traffic Management Act 2004. The author has identified from the findings a 
number of common elements and differences in how authorities apply the 
legislation, and cross-referenced these against national policy documents and 
how policy-implementation impacts on the operation of utility companies. The 
thesis suggests that political interest in „highway works‟ is generally low but 
where it is high it can be useful in establishing “legislation plus” approaches to 
the management of works. 
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12.1.2 Analysis and Consideration of the Use of Charters 
Regarding the use of charters, the findings were not as conclusive as had been 
anticipated. The charters mentioned in chapter 1 between Kirklees Metropolitan 
Council and two utilities were found to be no longer in use. However, the 
findings have demonstrated that agreed performance measures are present in 
direct dealings between individual highway authorities and utility companies; 
that these figures are aggregated at regional HAUC level in order to identify 
wider performance issues; and that recent Government proposals identified in 
chapter 3 that require street authorities to provide performance information 
across a range of measures, for an authority‟s own works and utility works, in 
order to demonstrate improvement in performance. 
 
12.1.3 Empirical Research Results 
This thesis has provided empirical research findings for a sector of public 
management, i.e. the management by local authorities of „highway works‟. A 
search conducted on 20 February 2012 of an electronic journals database, 
looking for journal articles in scholarly publications containing the phrase “New 
Roads and Street Works Act” returned 28 results, including duplicates; the 
phrase “Traffic Management Act” returned 10 results, including duplicates; and 
for both phrases together returned just two results. 
 
12.1.4 Address Research Gaps in Public Policy Implementation 
In chapter 11, the findings synthesised the literature on public policy 
implementation and inter-organisational relationships through the identification 
in both sets of literature of the role and contribution of “actors” and “street-level 
bureaucrats”. The findings indicated that organisation‟s policies relating to 
„highway works‟ were a combination of „top-down‟ – with regard to ensuring 
compliance – and „bottom-up‟ – with regard to people developing relationships 
with their counter-parts in order to tailor national policy to the specific 
requirements of an authorities‟ area or, in the case of utility companies, to the 
requirements of the authorities in whose area the utility operated. 
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12.1.5 Relate Practice to Current Policy Formulation 
Chapter 7 has related current practice across a number of street authorities in 
preparing permit schemes, identifying similarities and differences, and 
suggested that there is no “one size fits all” option. This helps to compare the 
content of the legislation as being consistent nationally but applied and 
interpreted individually. 
 
12.2 Limitations 
The author of this thesis was mindful from the outset of a number of limitations 
to the study and findings. 
 
12.2.1 Scope 
The research for the thesis would need to be carried out on a part-time basis in 
order to fit-in with the author‟s full-time employment commitments. In order to 
maximise the amount of time that could be devoted to the research, the 
research area was developed around the author‟s job and area of work, i.e. 
„highway works‟. The research area was already an area of interest to the 
author who, having recently completed an MBA, was keen to develop the 
research skills learned in completing that programme. The author‟s skills were 
supplemented by attending qualitative and quantitative seminars provided by 
the University of Huddersfield, as well as undertaking an “Interview Skills” 
taught module in order to further develop and understand the skills and 
techniques that would be required. 
 
Having established the research area for the study, the author was aware of the 
need to be realistic about scope of the study. There are some 250 highway 
authorities in England, and so the research could have been developed to 
survey as many authorities as possible or to focus on a smaller sample and to 
examine these in more detail. With the resources in terms of time and money 
available to the author, a decision was taken to conduct an in-depth study to 
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compare two authority areas; one being the author‟s employing authority and 
the other being Devon County Council. 
 
12.2.2 Access 
Prior to beginning the research project, the author met with the head of Highway 
Service for Kirklees and agreed that the authority could be used as a case 
study, and that the author could speak to elected members about the research. 
Arrangements were also made via the regional HAUC (YHAUC) to speak to 
highway authority and utility representatives about the research.   
 
Enquiries were also made at Devon, via a personal contact by the author‟s line 
manager at the time, to an officer at Devon, who was contacted and agreed to 
facilitate access to the authority. Unfortunately, before the research started the 
contact officer died. It proved difficult subsequently to identify another contact at 
Devon. An interview with a highway authority officer was eventually arranged 
and carried out. However, despite repeated telephone calls and e-mails, it has 
not to date been possible to arrange an interview with a relevant elected 
member at Devon. An approach was made to the regional HAUC (SWHAUC), 
and was included as an agenda item at one of their meetings, to see if utility 
representatives would agree to be interviewed but all of them, other than the 
utility-side joint chair, declined. 
 
In order to address the lack of response from the South West region, the 
research plan was modified to incorporate work that was being done on permit 
schemes, which had been introduced by legislation since the original proposal 
for this thesis was approved. This, together with finding emerging from the 
research that had been carried out, led to interviews being carried out with 
authorities in London. 
 
In addition, arrangements were made to interview officers in North Yorkshire 
County Council, which is a large, unitary authority in the same regional HAUC 
as Kirklees, and deals with the same utility companies, but which has not yet 
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decided to make an application to operate a permit scheme. This offered a 
further opportunity to compare policy implementation across authorities. 
 
Research findings were also pointing to highlighting the role and contribution of 
utility contractors in the „street works‟ community. In order to explore this, 
agreements were made with a utility contactor operating in Yorkshire to conduct 
interviews in their organisations. However, prior to the interviews being 
arranged, the contractor lost the contract and both the contractor and their 
client, the utility company, asked for the interviews to not go ahead. The utility 
company offered initially to re-facilitate an interview with their new contractor but 
this interview was not arranged before the completion of this thesis. 
 
The extent of the difficulties in accessing people for interview had not been fully 
anticipated by the author.  
 
12.2.3 Generalisations 
With the research being carried out in only a small number of authority areas, in 
one area of an authority‟s responsibility, the research findings cannot be said to 
be representative of all authorities or areas of responsibility. More research 
would be required in order to identify commonalities and disparities across 
authorities in England and the wider United Kingdom. 
 
12.3.4 Future Research 
As this study covered only a relatively small number of authorities, future 
research could be carried out in a wider number of authority areas in order to 
test these findings against a larger sample. 
 
The findings in this thesis indicated the significance to the process of 
contractors, particularly those working for utility companies. These contractors 
are directly responsible for carrying out the „street works‟ and the findings in this 
study indicated that they were also contractually liable for some of the financial 
penalties applied by street authorities in the form of overrun charges and fixed 
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penalty notice. In addition, it is the contractors who are being driven to reduce 
works duration in order to minimise delay and disruption from works. The 
implications of the contractual relationships, and pressures to reduce works 
durations, are an area for future research. 
 
The findings also indicate that although the legislation applies equally across 
England, utility companies, authorities, and software developers have different 
interpretations of the regulations. The situation with regard to „highway works‟ in 
Scotland is that there is one software provider which authorities and utility 
companies use in order to provide an exchange of notifications, and a 
Commissioner who oversees the performance of utility companies and 
authorities. The situation in Scotland could be examined as an area of future 
research. 
 
The legislation relating to the managing of „highway works‟ is continuing to 
develop. Following the introduction of regulations allowing permit schemes to be 
introduced there is a small number or authorities already operating schemes, 
with a greater number of authorities having applied to, or considering making an 
application to, the Secretary of State for Transport for approval to operate a 
scheme. The effect of these schemes is an area for future research. 
 
If starting the research again, the author would be mindful of the time involved 
in utilising the chosen research strategy of in-depth semi-structured interviews 
to support the case studies. The interviews were time-consuming in terms of 
negotiating access and then travelling to and from the interview locations, as 
well as incurring additional travel and accommodation costs where interviews 
involved travelling distances. In addition, the interviews were recorded, which 
then required further time spending on transcribing and analysing the 
interviews. 
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The author would also follow-up earlier on the initial contact with Devon County 
Council, with subsequent events this time making it difficult to get access to be 
able conduct comparable interviews with those in Yorkshire.  
 
12.3.5 Conclusions 
The research question for this thesis was: 
“To what extent is a partnership approach to managing „highway 
works‟ an advantage in implementing public policy?” 
 
It is the conclusion of this thesis that a partnership approach is an advantage 
because: 
The complex, and at times ambiguous, nature of the legal framework 
surrounding the management of „highway works‟ means that utility 
companies need to work with authorities.  
 
The legal framework relating to the management of „highway works‟ comprises 
primary legislation, regulations (in the form of statutory instruments) and both 
statutory and non-statutory codes of practice. Utility companies need to work in 
the highway in order to install or maintain their distribution networks, and to 
enable them to provide supplies to customers. Although utility companies have 
separate powers that allow them to keep their apparatus in the highway, they 
are required by „highway works‟ legislation to notify the local street authority of 
their intention to carry out works. 
 
Although the legal framework applies nationally across England, the 
responsibility for application is between the utility company wanting to carry out 
the works and the individual local authority for the area in which the works are 
to be carried out. The interpretation that an authority puts on the legislative 
requirements can have implications for (a) the notice period that utility 
companies need to give before starting works, and (b) the way in which the 
authority monitors the works whilst on-going in order to check compliance 
against specifications for signing, lighting and guarding and reinstatement. 
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Utility companies want start-date certainty for their works in order to meet their 
service delivery targets, which are driven partly by regulatory requirements (for 
example, providing customer connections within a required timescale or 
ensuring service quality standards), as well as the commercial need to provide 
a workload for either their own workforce or their contractors, and this would be 
easier to achieve where there was a nationally-consistent approach by 
authorities in interpretation and application of the legislation. In the absence of a 
nationally-consistent approach, utility companies need to engage with individual 
authorities on order to ensure certainty of start-date. 
 
The interpretation, and also extent of application, by individual authorities also 
has potential implications for utility companies through financial penalties for 
administrative errors in noticing, on-site non-compliance with codes of practice, 
and overrunning works. As a consequence, where authorities choose to apply 
charges utility companies need to investigate and deal with the charges, and 
also adapt their processes to eliminate or reduce future instances. Again, in the 
absence of a nationally-consistent approach by authorities, utility companies 
need to engage with individual authorities in order to reduce their exposure to 
financial penalties. 
 
In addition to financial penalties, individual authorities have the power to 
prosecute utility companies for offences under the legislation. Utility companies 
are motivated to minimise their reputational exposure to negative publicity or 
poor performance. 
 
Authorities need to work with utility companies in order to discharge their 
legal network management duty. 
 
The legal framework surrounding the management of „highway works‟ has 
placed a legal network management duty on local street authorities, meaning 
that they have to ensure that traffic can move expeditiously around its road 
network. With regard to utility company „street works‟, this means that 
authorities have to ensure that the works, for which the utility companies have a 
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statutory right to carry out following serving of the required notices, are properly 
co-ordinated to minimise delay and disruption. 
 
This means that the utility companies are a significant stakeholder an authority 
being able to be successful in discharging its duty. Conclusion 1 identified 
concerns about consistency in application of the legislation by authorities. 
Similarly, from the point of view of authorities, utility companies operate 
differently due to the nature of the operations required to support their 
apparatus, thus working practices for a water utility will be different to those for 
a gas utility. Differences are also associated with the extent of a utility 
company‟s coverage, with some organisations (such as telecommunications) 
having national coverage and some (such as water companies) having regional 
franchises. 
 
As mentioned in the above Conclusion, „highway works‟ regulations are open to 
interpretation, and this includes the regulations relating to noticing. In addition to 
the interpretation taken by the individual utility companies and authorities, the 
exchange of notices relies on computer software and so the software 
developers and their interpretation also play a part. Authorities need to engage 
with utility companies in order understand how the utility methods of working 
and individual works to be carried out will impact on the authority‟s road 
network. The electronic exchange of notices for works can only partly support 
this, with communication between authority officers and utility company 
representatives providing a vital link in the successful co-ordination of works in 
order to minimise delay and disruption. 
 
In addition to discharging their network management duty, authorities are 
increasingly looking to maintain their highway asset in order to allow it be an 
efficient and effective network in order to integrate it with other council priorities 
and plans, contributing to the local and regional economy (in terms of the 
transportation of goods and services) and social (in terms of people being able 
to access jobs and education.)  
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A further factor for authorities has been the requirement for their own works 
promoting departments to notify their works in line with the requirements applied 
to utility companies. This is relatively new and serves two functions: (i) it 
demonstrates to utility companies‟ parity of treatment in driving improvements in 
co-ordination and reducing works durations, both of which come at a cost to the 
promoter, and (ii) provides the authority with an insight into the issues faced by 
the utility companies in complying with legislative requirements. 
 
Utility companies and authorities need to work jointly in order to avoid the 
need for further legislation in an industry sector, already regarded as 
being heavily regulated, to address Government concerns about the 
disruptive effects of all „highway works‟. 
 
As an industry sector, the management of „highway works‟ has, in recent years, 
been subject to central Government scrutiny and additional regulation. The 
scrutiny has surround the perceived disruption caused to road users by utility 
„street works‟ and authorities‟ own „roadworks‟. The additional regulation has 
been in the form of additional powers being granted to authorities to better 
control the activities of all promoters of „highway works‟. These additional 
powers include fixed penalty notice charges for noticing errors (designed to 
improve noticing quality), increased charges for overrun „street work‟ (designed 
to reduce work durations), and the introduction of permit schemes (designed to 
give authorities the ability to place condition on the timing and carrying out of 
works.) 
 
The conclusions drawn by the industry sector are that it needs to be better 
jointly at communicating with the public about why „highway works‟ are carried 
out – either for „street works‟ to provide the utility services that everyone 
expects to be able to access immediately, or for authority „roadworks‟ carried 
out to maintain the highway network – and to explain the need for individual 
works to be on site for the duration required. The sector has identified that utility 
companies and authorities are both serving the same customers as either 
consumers of utility services or users of the road network, and that a joined-up 
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approach between the two elements of the sector will better enable 
communication with the public to be improved. This would avoid the need for 
Government to further regulate the sector, a move which could lead to 
additional regulation adding additional complexity for both elements of the 
sector. 
 
In order to drive “self-regulation”, the national representative organisations, 
including HAUC(UK), JAG(UK) and NJUG, are working more collaboratively to 
produce advice notes on, and examples of, good practice that can be shared 
with authorities and utilities. This also helps to support consistency of 
interpretation. 
 
The findings from this study have shown that „reputational‟ considerations are a 
factor in a collaborative approach between authorities and utility companies. 
Utility companies in particular have identified the need to ensure that their 
company‟s „street works‟ are carried out efficiently in order to avoid negative 
publicity being attached to the company and to minimise the potential for 
authorities to apply additional financial changes, or initiate prosecutions, for 
non-compliant works. 
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Appendix A – Interview Schedule – Utility 
 
Preamble: 
 Introduction 
 Outline objectives of research area 
 Permission to record the interview 
 Permission to use the contents in the Thesis 
 
Section 1 – Introduction 
 What is your position within the organisation 
 What are your main responsibilities with regard to „street works‟ 
 
Section 2 – Organisational setting 
 What are your organisation‟s policies and strategies relating to „street 
works‟ 
o How are these policies and strategies developed (prompt: top-
down or bottom-up) 
 Other than the industry regulator, what are the main areas that drive your 
organisation‟s policies and strategies relating to „street works‟ 
 How are your organisation‟s activities influenced/affected by the 
industry‟s regulator 
 What are your organisation‟s targets/performance measures for „street 
works‟ 
o How is performance measured against them 
o What are the consequences for failing to achieve targets 
 To what extent do you as an individual feel that you can influence your 
organisation‟s polices and strategies 
 
Section 3 – Inter-organisational relationships 
Utility – Street Authority relationships 
 How would you characterise the nature of the relationship between your 
organisation and the Street Authority (SA) 
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o How does your organisation approach it‟s duty to comply with the 
SA (prompt: strict compliance only or partnership approach) 
 How is your organisation‟s service delivery influenced (either positively or 
negatively) by this relationship 
o What benefits does your organisation get from the relationship 
o What are the „costs‟ 
 Does the relationship with the SA change depending on the level of 
performance of your organisation 
o If relevant, what are the effects on the relationship following a 
prosecution by the SA 
 
Regional HAUC relationships 
 Within the regional HAUC, what would you say are the key factors that 
influence (either positively or negatively) the relationship between utility 
and SA representatives 
 Do utilities and SA within the regional HAUC have shared or mutually 
beneficial objectives 
o What are they  
o How are they identified and shared 
o How are they measured 
o To what extent do you as an individual feel that you are able to 
influence and direct these objectives 
 
Finally 
 Is there anything that you‟d like to add? 
 Thanks for your time 
 Will send a copy of the interview transcript for information/comment 
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Appendix B – Interview Schedule – Street Authority 
 
Preamble: 
 Introduction 
 Outline objectives of research area 
 Permission to record the interview 
 Permission to use the contents in the Thesis 
 
Section 1 – Introduction 
 What is your position within the organisation 
 What are your main responsibilities with regard to „street works‟ 
 
Section 2 – Organisational setting 
 What are your organisation‟s policies and strategies relating to „highway 
works‟ 
o How are these policies and strategies developed (prompt: top-
down or bottom-up) 
o To what extent are policies and strategies relating to „works for 
road purposes‟ different to those for „street works‟ 
 what are the main areas that drive your organisation‟s policies and 
strategies relating to „highway works‟ 
 How are your organisation‟s activities influenced/affected by the elected 
members individually or as the council 
 What are your organisation‟s targets/performance measures for „highway 
works‟ 
o How is performance measured against them 
o What are the consequences for failing to achieve targets 
 To what extent do you as an individual feel that you can influence your 
organisation‟s polices and strategies 
 
Section 3 – Inter-organisational relationships 
Street Authority – Works Promoter relationships 
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 How would you characterise the nature of the relationship between you 
as the Street Authority (SA) and units within the Service that promote 
„works for road purposes‟ 
o How does the council approach it‟s duty to co-ordinate the 
activities of these units (prompt: expect strict compliance only or 
partnership approach) 
 How is the council‟s service performance influenced (either positively or 
negatively) by this relationship 
o What benefits does the council get from the relationship 
o What are the „costs‟ 
 Does the relationship with individual utilities change depending on the 
level of their performance 
 
Street Authority – Utility relationships 
 How would you characterise the nature of the relationship between you 
as the Street Authority (SA) and the utilities 
o How does the council approach it‟s duty to co-ordinate the 
activities of utilities (prompt: expect strict compliance only or 
partnership approach) 
 How is the council‟s service performance influenced (either positively or 
negatively) by this relationship 
o What benefits does the council get from the relationship 
o What are the „costs‟ 
 Does the relationship with individual utilities change depending on the 
level of their performance 
o If relevant, what are the effects on the relationship following a 
prosecution by the SA 
 
Regional HAUC relationships 
 Within the regional HAUC, what would you say are the key factors that 
influence (either positively or negatively) the relationship between SA 
and utility representatives 
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 Do SA and utilities within the regional HAUC have shared or mutually 
beneficial objectives 
o What are they  
o How are they identified and shared 
o How are they measured 
o To what extent do you as an individual feel that you are able to 
influence and direct these objectives 
 
Finally 
 Is there anything that you‟d like to add? 
 Thanks for your time 
 Will send a copy of the interview transcript for information/comment 
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Appendix C – Interview Schedule – Elected Members 
 
Preamble: 
 Introduction 
 Outline objectives of research area 
 Permission to record the interview 
 Permission to use the contents in the Thesis 
 
Section 1 
 What are your main responsibilities or areas of interest with regard to 
„highway works‟ 
 What are the council‟s policies and strategies relating to „highway works‟ 
o How are these policies and strategies developed (prompt: top-
down or bottom-up) 
 What are the main areas that drive the council‟s policies and strategies 
relating to „highway works‟ 
 To what extent do you as an individual councillor feel that you can 
influence the council‟s polices and strategies 
 
Section 2 – Inter-organisational relationships 
Elected Member – Street Authority – Utility relationships 
 How would you characterise the nature of the relationship between you 
and the Street Authority (SA) 
 How is the council‟s service performance influenced (either positively or 
negatively) by this relationship 
o Does the relationship change depending on the level of 
performance by the SA or utility companies 
 
Finally 
 Is there anything that you‟d like to add? 
 Thanks for your time 
 Will send a copy of the interview transcript for information/comment 
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Appendix D – Schedule of Interviews 
 
No. Interviewee(s) 
Interview 
Schedule 
Interview 
Date 
    1 SWHAUC Authority Joint Chair street authority 03/02/2010 
    2 SWHAUC Utility Joint Chair utility company 09/02/2010 
    3 Councillor (Kirklees) elected member 26/07/2010 
    4 Devon County Council street authority 29/09/2010 
    5 YHAUC Utility Joint Chair utility company 01/02/2011 
    6 Electricity Utility (Kirklees area) utility company 15/04/2011 
    7 & 8 North Yorkshire County Council street authority 27/10/2011 
    9 Transport for London street authority 16/11/2011 
    10 Greater London Authority street authority 16/11/2011 
    11 Telecoms Utility (Kirklees area) utility company 28/11/2011 
    12 Gas Utility (Kirklees area) utility company 03/12/2011 
 
